DONALD NOLAN v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
AUGUST 11, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO.
2005-CA-001040-MR
DONALD NOLAN
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM GREENUP CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LEWIS D. NICHOLLS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CR-00089
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
ABRAMSON AND BARBER, JUDGES; EMBERTON,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
EMBERTON, SENIOR JUDGE:
Donald Nolan appeals from an order of
the Greenup Circuit Court revoking his conditional discharge.
He alleges that he was denied due process because the
conditional discharge was revoked based on his inability to
complete a sex offender treatment program as required by the
order of conditional discharge and KRS 532.045.2
We agree with
the trial court that Nolan’s failure to complete the program is
1
Senior Judge Thomas D. Emberton sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
good and sufficient cause to revoke the period of conditional
discharge.
We therefore affirm.
Nolan pled guilty to one count of sex abuse, first
degree and, in November 2004, was sentenced to one year probated
and three years conditional discharge.
His sentence was
conditioned, in part, on finding a residence in which there were
no children and after the payment for, and completion of, a sex
offender treatment program.
Following a hearing, on February
22, 2005, the court found that Nolan had not found the required
housing, and, therefore, ordered that he remain incarcerated in
the Greenup County Detention Center.
Another hearing was held
March 3, 2005, and he was again reminded to comply with the
conditions of his discharge.
Nolan remained in the detention
center until April 3, 2005, when, with time served, he completed
his one year sentence and was released; the same day, however,
he was returned to the detention center because he failed to
maintain a registered address.
He was later transported to Ashland, Kentucky to the
Transitions Halfway House where he was required to comply with
the house rules, including attending a sex offender treatment
program.
Although provided clothing, Nolan was not provided
transportation to seek employment or attend the sex offender
treatment program in Morehead, Kentucky.
He was terminated from
the halfway house on April 11, 2005, because of his failure to
-2-
attend sex offender treatment and was returned to the detention
center.
Following a revocation hearing, Nolan’s conditional
discharge was revoked.
Nolan’s only justification for not attending the
required treatment program is that he had no transportation
either to Morehead or to seek employment, whereby he could
purchase transportation.
He asserts that his failure to meet
the conditions of his discharge was the “inevitable consequence”
of the halfway house’s rule, not due to any “affirmative
misconduct”.
He further asserts that he had no knowledge when
entering the halfway house that transportation was not provided.
Our review of the trial court’s decision to revoke
Nolan’s conditional discharge is limited to whether the court
abused its discretion.3
Conditional discharge is a privilege and
subject to revocation if the court finds that the defendant
violated the conditions of his discharge.4
Although the
revocation process requires that minimum due process
requirements be met, KRS 533.050(2) provides that the court may
revoke a conditional discharge after written notice of the
grounds for the revocation has been given and following a
hearing where the defendant is represented by counsel.
3
Tiryung v. Commonwealth, 717 S.W.2d 503, 504 (Ky.App. 1986).
4
Id.
-3-
Nolan was given notice of the hearing and was
represented by counsel.
He had the opportunity to, and did,
present evidence on his own behalf.
His complaint that due
process requires he be provided the means to comply with the
conditions of his discharge is unpersuasive.
Although
admittedly difficult for many on conditional discharge status,
there was nothing done by the Commonwealth or the halfway house
that prevented Nolan from successfully completing the conditions
of his discharge.
His physical inability to obtain
transportation or suitable housing was a product of the
circumstances he created by the commission of his crime.
The record is clear that at his sentencing and at
subsequent hearings, Nolan was informed that he must comply with
the conditions of his probation.
There is no merit to his
contention that he was unaware he must pay for, and complete, a
sex offender treatment program.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Julia K. Pearson
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
George G. Seelig
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
-4-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.