KERMIT EUGENE HAYES v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 8, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO.
2005-CA-000432-MR
KERMIT EUGENE HAYES
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BOYD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE C. DAVID HAGERMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CR-00173
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JUDGE.
SCHRODER, JUDGE; KNOPF,1 SENIOR JUDGE; MILLER,2 SPECIAL
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
Kermit Eugene Hayes appeals from a judgment of
the Boyd Circuit Court convicting him of first-degree
trafficking in a controlled substance.
Having reviewed the
record and the applicable law, we affirm.
In June, 2004, Sergeant Rod Williamson, of the Boyd
County Sheriff’s Department, began a drug investigation
1
Senior Judge William L. Knopf sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
KRS 21.580.
2
Retired Judge John D. Miller, sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution.
involving appellant and his girlfriend, Geneva Gard.
Pursuant
to the investigation, Sergeant Williamson utilized a
confidential informant, Robert McCormick.
McCormick had a
pending charge in Boyd County, and had come to the police
wanting to do some work to try to get leniency for himself.
On
June 5, 2004, McCormick told Sergeant Williamson that he had a
drug sale set up at the residence of appellant and Geneva Gard.
After being searched, given money which had been photocopied,
and wired by Sergeant Williamson, McCormick went to the trailer
where appellant and Gard lived.
McCormick returned to
Williamson with a folded post-it note in which there were three
pills containing oxycodone.
As a result of the transaction, on
July 29, 2004, appellant was indicted on one count of
trafficking in a controlled substance.
A jury trial commenced in January, 2005.
At trial,
McCormick testified that when he went to the trailer, Geneva
Gard answered the door and did almost all the talking, but that
when it came time to hand over the pills, it was appellant who
got them from the bedroom and handed them to him.
McCormick
testified that because Gard and appellant couldn’t find any
cellophane or baggies, they put the pills in a post-it note.
McCormick admitted that the reason he offered to assist the
police was to try to get leniency for himself, because he had a
pending charge did not want to go back to prison.
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McCormick
further admitted that because of his assistance, he received
probation in his case.
Sergeant Williamson testified that when he met up with
McCormick after the transaction, McCormick told him that
appellant had handed him the drugs.
Williamson acknowledged
that he did not see the transaction, and was relying on
McCormick’s version of what occurred.
Williamson acknowledged
that on the tape recording of the transaction, which was played
for the jury, Geneva Gard could be heard complaining that “we’re
out of baggies, Kermit give me a cellophane.”
Sergeant
Williamson testified that McCormick made two other buys at the
trailer for the investigation, on June 2 and June 16, both of
which were made from Geneva Gard.
Assistant Police Chief Dean Akers, of the Catlettsburg
Police Department, testified that he took a statement from
appellant on August 3, 2004.
Akers read the statement to the
jury, which had been written by appellant.
Therein, appellant
stated that he and his girlfriend had sold drugs for a couple of
months, which he (appellant) thought were April and May, to make
some extra money to go on vacation.
Appellant stated that they
stopped at about the end of May, except that a couple of times
he went to get some marijuana for a friend.
Geneva Gard testified on appellant’s behalf.
Gard
testified that it was mainly she, not appellant, who dealt with
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McCormick on June 5, 2004, and that appellant did not take the
money nor hand McCormick the drugs.
The jury found appellant guilty of first-degree
trafficking in a controlled substance.
to five years’ imprisonment.
Appellant was sentenced
This appeal followed.
Appellant first argues that the trial court erred in
denying his request for a facilitation instruction in light of
the evidence presented at trial.
In support of his argument,
appellant points to the following evidence.
On cross-
examination, Sergeant Williamson acknowledged that the June 2
and June 16 buys were made from Geneva Gard, and that appellant
was not even in the house during the June 2 buy.
On the tape,
Gard could be heard asking appellant for cellophane, and Gard
testified that it was “mainly” she who dealt with McCormick
during the June 5 transaction.
In light of the aforementioned
evidence, appellant contends that a reasonable juror could have
found him culpable as some type of accomplice, rather than the
principal.
KRS 506.080(1) provides:
A person is guilty of criminal facilitation
when, acting with knowledge that another
person is committing or intends to commit a
crime, he engages in conduct which knowingly
provides such person with means or
opportunity for the commission of the crime
and which in fact aids such person to commit
the crime.
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Additionally, “[f]acilitation reflects the mental state of one
who is ‘wholly indifferent’ to the actual completion of the
crime.”
Perdue v. Commonwealth, 916 S.W.2d 148, 160 (Ky. 1995).
The trial court found that the evidence did not
support the giving of a facilitation instruction.
We agree that
appellant was not entitled to a facilitation instruction, but on
other grounds as well.
In Houston v. Commonwealth, 975 S.W.2d
925 (Ky. 1998), the Kentucky Supreme Court held that
facilitation is not a lesser-included offense of trafficking.
The Court stated:
The offenses of trafficking in or possession
of a controlled substance require proof that
the defendant, himself, knowingly and
unlawfully committed the charged offense.
The offense of criminal facilitation
requires proof that someone other than the
defendant committed the object offense and
the defendant, knowing that such person was
committing or intended to commit that
offense, provided that person with the means
or opportunity to do so. Thus, criminal
facilitation requires proof not of the same
or less than all the facts required to prove
the charged offenses of trafficking in or
possession of a controlled substance, but
proof of additional and completely different
facts. A fortiori, it is not a lesser
included offense when the defendant is
charged with committing either of the object
offenses.
Id. at 930 (citations omitted).
trafficking.
Appellant was charged with
Per Houston, as facilitation is not a lesser
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included offense of trafficking, the trial court did not err in
denying the request for a facilitation instruction.
Appellant’s second argument is that the trial court
erred when it failed to allow defense counsel to sufficiently
cross-examine Robert McCormick concerning the nature of the
consideration he received from the Commonwealth in exchange for
his testimony.
On direct, McCormick testified that he is a
convicted felon, was facing legal problems, and therefore agreed
to work with the Boyd County Sheriff’s Department as an
informant.
McCormick testified that he was not promised
anything for his help, but believed that there was a good chance
that he could get a leaner sentence.
McCormick testified that
he entered a plea and received five years’ probation.
On cross-
examination, McCormick admitted that he uses drugs, had been
convicted of a felony, and that he sought to get a lenient
sentence by helping out the police.
McCormick admitted that he
seriously doubted that he would have received a lenient sentence
if he didn’t help the police by making buys.
McCormick admitted
that he had been to prison before, that it was “not a fun
place”, and that he was worried about having to go back.
McCormick explained that there was no set number of buys he had
to make, but agreed that the more people he bought from the more
leniency he believed he might receive.
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On re-cross, McCormick admitted that because of his
assistance, he received probation.
The defense then attempted
to question McCormick about the number of felonies he had been
convicted of.
When asked if he had been convicted of three
felonies, the Commonwealth objected.
In the subsequent bench
conference, defense counsel informed the court that he wished to
point out to the jury that McCormick was a three-time convicted
felon, and question McCormick as to whether, in exchange for his
assistance, he would not be prosecuted under the PFO statute.
The prosecutor informed the court that he had made no such
offer.
The trial court ruled that while the defense was not
permitted to inquire as to the number of felonies, the defense
could ask McCormick if he was promised that no additional
charges would be brought against him in his case.
Subsequently,
defense counsel reconfirmed with McCormick that as a result of
his assistance, he received probation and served no jail time in
his case.
Appellant contends that McCormick, as a three-time
convicted felon, was facing prosecution and a severe penalty as
a persistent felony offender, which therefore gave him motive to
be a productive confidential informant.
Appellant contends that
a juror could have formed reasonable doubt as to the veracity of
McCormick’s testimony if defense counsel had been allowed to
fully cross-examine him as to the nature of his understanding of
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the consideration he was afforded for cooperating with the
Commonwealth against appellant, in particular, whether the
Commonwealth had agreed not to bring PFO charges against him.
Appellant contends, therefore, that the cross-examination he was
afforded was not “adequate to develop the issue of bias properly
to the jury.”
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318, 94 S. Ct.
1105, 1111, 39 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1974).
As the trial court correctly noted, the general rule
is that a witness may be impeached by being asked if he has been
previously convicted of a felony, and if his answer is yes, the
questioning must stop.
515 (Ky. 1984).
Commonwealth v. Richardson, 674 S.W.2d
However, appellant is correct that a defendant
must be afforded adequate opportunity to develop the issue of
bias, prejudice, or motivation, in order for the jury to “make
an informed judgment as to the weight to place on [the
witness’s] testimony.”
Davis, 415 U.S. at 317.
See also
Williams v. Commonwealth, 569 S.W.2d 139, 145 (Ky. 1978).
“[O]nce the essential facts constituting bias have been
admitted, a trial court may . . . impose reasonable limits on
defense counsel’s inquiry into the potential bias of a
prosecution witness . . . .”
Weaver v. Commonwealth, 955 S.W.2d
722, 726 (Ky. 1997)(citations and quotation marks omitted).
In the present case, we believe appellant was afforded
sufficient cross-examination to develop the issue of bias on the
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part of McCormick.
Davis, 415 U.S. 308; Weaver, 955 S.W.2d 722.
McCormick admitted that he was helping the police to get
leniency for himself, and that he believed he would get more
favorable treatment by making more buys.
McCormick admitted
that he was a convicted felon, that he had been to prison, and
that he did not want to go back to prison.
Most importantly,
McCormick was unequivocal in his testimony that he was helping
the police in order to help himself, and that because of his
assistance, he did, in fact, receive probation.
Accordingly,
the jury was well apprised of McCormick’s self-serving
motivation.
Further, the prosecutor informed the court that he
did not offer to not bring a PFO charge.
Similarly, McCormick,
although admitting he hoped for leniency, testified that he had
no set deal with the Commonwealth.
Error, if any, was harmless.
Appellant finally argues that the trial court erred in
denying his motion to suppress the statement given to Assistant
Police Chief Akers.
At trial, appellant moved to suppress the
statement as irrelevant, on grounds that it specified conduct in
April and May, and did not apply to the June, 2004, indictment,
and that its introduction would only serve to substantially
prejudice the jury.
The trial court overruled the motion.
Appellant contends that because the trial court
overruled the motion without holding an evidentiary hearing or
making findings of fact, it is impossible to determine whether
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the statement was voluntary.
This argument was not made before
the trial court, where appellant argued irrelevance and undue
prejudice.
It is well settled that an appellant “will not be
permitted to feed one can of worms to the trial judge and
another to the appellate court.”
S.W.2d 219, 222 (Ky. 1976).
Kennedy v. Commonwealth, 544
Accordingly, appellant’s argument
is not properly before this court.
For the aforementioned reasons, the judgment of the
Boyd Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Donald H. Morehead
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Todd D. Ferguson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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