ALPHONZO R. MORTON v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: July 7, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-000087-MR
AND
NO. 2005-CA-001115-MR
AND
NO. 2005-CA-001146-MR
ALPHONZO R. MORTON
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES D. ISHMAEL JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CR-00936
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING APPEAL NO. 2005-CA-000087-MR;
REVERSING AND REMANDING APPEAL NO. 2005-CA-001115-MR;
AND AFFIRMING APPEAL NO. 2005-CA-001146-MR
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
TAYLOR AND VANMETER, JUDGES; EMBERTON, SENIOR JUDGE.1
TAYLOR, JUDGE:
Alphonzo R. Morton, pro se, appeals from three
orders of the Fayette Circuit Court.
Appeal No. 2005-CA-000087-
MR is taken from a December 9, 2004, order denying his motion
for jail-time credit; Appeal No. 2005-CA-001115-MR is taken from
1
Senior Judge Thomas D. Emberton sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 21.580.
a May 3, 2005, order denying his motion to compel the
Commonwealth to produce a transcript of grand jury proceedings;
and Appeal No. 2005-CA-001146-MR is taken from a May 12, 2005,
order denying his motion to correct sentence.
We affirm Appeal
No. 2005-CA-000087-MR, reverse and remand Appeal No. 2005-CA001115-MR, and affirm Appeal No. 2005-CA-001146-MR.
On September 13, 1999, appellant was indicted by a
Fayette County Grand Jury upon twenty-seven counts of sexualrelated offenses involving a minor.
The indicted offenses
ranged from rape to sexual abuse and spanned some three months.
The record indicates that upon being released from prison,
appellant moved in with the victim’s mother and proceeded to
prey upon the twelve-year old child.
Following a jury trial,
appellant was convicted of twenty counts of use of a minor in a
sexual performance (Class B felony), two counts of second-degree
sodomy (Class C felony), and four counts of second-degree sexual
abuse (misdemeanor).
The trial court sentenced appellant to
twelve months in jail and a $500.00 fine upon each of the four
counts of sexual abuse, five years on each of the two counts of
sodomy, and fifteen years on each of the twenty counts of using
a minor in a sexual performance.
The court ordered four of the
fifteen-year sentences to be served consecutively for a total of
sixty years’ imprisonment.
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On direct appeal, appellant’s conviction was affirmed
by the Kentucky Supreme Court in Appeal No. 2000-SC-0507-MR, and
the subsequent denial by the circuit court of a Ky. R. Crim. P.
(RCr) 11.42 motion was affirmed by this Court in Appeal No.
2003-CA-000914-MR.
Appellant then filed a motion for jail-time credit.
By order entered December 9, 2004, the circuit court denied
appellant’s motion.
Appellant also filed a motion pursuant to
RCr 5.16(3) seeking a transcript of the grand jury testimony.
By order entered May 3, 2005, the circuit court denied the
motion.
Appellant finally filed a motion to correct sentence
that was denied by order entered May 12, 2005.
These appeals
follow.
Appeal No. 2005-CA-000087
Appellant contends the circuit court committed error
by denying his motion for jail-time credit.
Specifically,
appellant contends he is entitled to two hundred and thirty days
credit toward his final sentence for time he spent in home
incarceration as part of his pretrial release.
In Buford v. Commonwealth, 58 S.W.3d 490, 491 (Ky.App.
2001), this Court addressed the precise issue presented by
appellant:
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[W]hile some defendants may serve all or a
portion of a county jail sentence in home
incarceration and be credited with that time
against the service of the jail term, jailtime credit is not allowed for time spent in
home incarceration where it is ordered as a
form of pretrial release.
In accordance with Buford, we hold that appellant is not
entitled to jail-time credit for time he spent in home
incarceration as part of his pretrial release.
See id.
As
such, we believe the circuit court properly denied appellant’s
motion for jail-time credit.
Appeal No. 2005-CA-001115-MR
Appellant argues the circuit court erred by denying
his motion seeking a transcript of the grand jury proceedings.
Specifically, appellant asserts he is entitled to a copy of the
transcript pursuant to RCr 5.16(3).
RCr 5.16(3) states, in relevant part, as follows:
[A]ny person indicted by the grand jury
shall have a right to procure a transcript
of any stenographic report or a duplicate of
any mechanical recording relating to his or
her indictment or any part thereof upon
payment of its reasonable cost.
It is well-established that pursuant to RCr 5.16(3), a
transcript of the grand jury testimony shall be made available
to an indicted defendant.
RCr 5.16(3); 8 Leslie W. Abramson,
Kentucky Practice, § 10:29 (4th ed. 2003).
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Following the clear
mandate of RCr 5.16(3), we are of the opinion the circuit court
erred by denying appellant’s motion pursuant to RCr 5.16 for a
transcript of the grand jury testimony.
Thus, we are compelled
to reverse and remand this matter for the circuit to enter an
order directing the Commonwealth to make a transcript of the
grand jury testimony available to appellant.
Appellant shall
pay the reasonable cost of such transcript.
Appeal No. 2005-CA-001146-MR
Appellant maintains the circuit court committed error
by denying his motion for correction of sentence.2
Appellant
specifically contends the circuit court erred by ordering four
of the fifteen-year sentences to run consecutively for a total
sentence of sixty years’ imprisonment.
Appellant raises myriad
arguments attacking the validity of his sentence.
Appellant
claims that his sentence violates double jeopardy and that the
circuit court had no authority to sentence him in contravention
of the jury’s recommendation.
without merit.
These two arguments plainly are
See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299
(1932).
2
We treat Alphonzo R. Morton’s motion for correction of sentence as having
been made pursuant to Ky. R. Civ. P. (CR) 60.02. See Jackson v.
Commonwealth, 344 S.W.2d 381 (Ky. 1961). We further observe that “imposition
of an unauthorized sentence is an error correctable by appeal, by writ, or by
motion pursuant to RCr [Ky. R. Crim. P.] 11.42 or CR 60.02.” Myers v.
Commonwealth, 42 S.W.3d 594, 596 (Ky. 2001).
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Appellant also argues that his sixty-year sentence is
in excess of the maximum sentence allowed by KRS 532.110(1)(c).
We disagree.
It is well-established that “an offense must be . . .
punished according to the provisions of law existing at the time
of the commission of such offense . . . .”
Kotas v.
Commonwealth, 565 S.W.2d 445, 448 (Ky. 1978).
In the case sub
judice, the indictment charged appellant with committing various
offenses in January, February, and March of 1998.
In January
through March of 1998, the version of KRS 532.110(1)(c) in
effect read:3
The aggregate of consecutive indeterminate
terms shall not exceed in maximum length the
longest extended term which would be
authorized by KRS 532.080 for the highest
class of crime for which any of the
sentences is imposed.
The relevant version of KRS 532.080(6)(a), in effect during this
time, read:4
If the offense for which he presently stands
convicted is a Class A or Class B felony, a
persistent felony offender in the first
degree shall be sentenced to an
indeterminate term of imprisonment, the
maximum of which shall not be less than
twenty (20) years nor more than life
imprisonment[.]
3
This version was enacted effective July 14, 1992.
4
This version was enacted effective April 4, 1996.
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In construing these versions of KRS 532.110(1)(c) and
KRS 532.080(6)(a), we are guided by the Supreme Court’s decision
in Hampton v. Commonwealth, 666 S.W.2d 737 (Ky. 1984).
Therein,
Hampton was convicted of two counts of first-degree sodomy,
seven counts of first-degree sexual abuse, and one count of
second-degree sexual abuse.
years’ imprisonment.
He was sentenced to a total of 105
Hampton maintained that the sentence of
105 years violated KRS 532.110(1)(c).
Specifically, he argued
that “a sentence of one hundred five (105) years exceeds in
maximum length a term of life imprisonment.”
Id. at 740.
In
rejecting Hampton’s argument, the Supreme Court concluded:
No term of years, regardless of length,
conflicts technically with the terms of a
sentencing statute which expresses no
limitation on the number of years.
Obviously, as a practical matter, one
hundred five (105) years exceeds appellant's
life expectancy so that the state cannot
exact such a penalty should it be so
inclined. But the sentence must conform to
the limitations of the statute, regardless
of inherent practical limitations. The
statute does not address the practical
limitations and neither should we.
Id. at 740-741.
Stated differently, the Supreme Court held that KRS
532.110(1)(c) and KRS 532.080(6)(a) did not place an upper limit
upon a “term of years” sentence.
In so doing, the Court
particularly rejected Hampton’s contention that life
imprisonment operated as an upper limit upon a term of years
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sentence and specifically stated the statute “expresses no
limitation on the number of years.”
Id. at 740.5
As appellant was sentenced to a “term of years” (60
years), we hold that KRS 532.110(1)(c) was not violated.6
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Fayette
Circuit Court in Appeal No. 2005-CA-000087-MR is affirmed, the
order in Appeal No. 2005-CA-001115-MR is reversed and remanded
for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion, and Appeal
NO. 2005-CA-001146-MR is affirmed.
EMBERTON, SENIOR JUDGE, CONCURS.
VANMETER, JUDGE, CONCURS IN PART, DISSENTS IN PART,
AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
I concur in part and dissent in part.
I concur with
the majority’s opinion with respect to 2005-CA-0087-MR and
appellant’s motion for jail-time credit.
5
KRS 532.080(6)(a) was amended effective July 15, 1998. This amended version
specifically placed an upper limit of fifty (50) years upon a term of years
sentence:
If the offense for which he presently stands
convicted is a Class A or Class B felony, a
persistent felony offender in the first degree shall
be sentenced to an indeterminate term of
imprisonment, the maximum of which shall not be less
than twenty (20) years nor more than fifty (50)
years, or life imprisonment[.]
6
We observe there was no allegation by appellant that he elected to be
sentenced under the mitigating versions of KRS 532.110(1)(c) and KRS
532.080(1)(b) in effect at his sentencing as permitted by KRS 446.110. We
also express no opinion as to whether appellant’s “term of years” (60 years)
sentence would violate the versions of KRS 532.110(1)(c) and KRS
532.080(1)(b), which were in effect at the time of appellant’s sentence and
which are also the relevant current versions. As before stated, the current
versions of these statutes would place an upper limit of fifty years upon a
term of years sentence for Class A or Class B felonies.
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As to 2005-CA-1115-MR, I respectfully dissent.
RCr
5.16(3) grants any person who has been indicted the right to
receive a copy of the grand jury testimony.
The appellant
acknowledges that his trial attorney had a copy of a videotape
of the grand jury proceeding prior to and in preparation for
trial.7
Furthermore, appellant went to trial, exhausted his
remedies of direct appeal and post-conviction relief, and has no
other post-conviction proceedings pending.
I would hold, at
this late stage of the proceedings, the Commonwealth has no
further obligation under RCr 5.16(3).
As to 2005-CA-001146-MR, I concur in result, but write
separately to express my view that the motion to correct
sentence is untimely.
Presumably the motion is brought under CR
60.02, since appellant had exhausted both his direct appeal and
RCr 11.42 relief.
However, as has been often stated by our
courts, “CR 60.02 is not intended merely as an additional
opportunity to raise Boykin defenses. It is for relief that is
not available by direct appeal and not available under RCr
11.42.”8
If appellant had received an incorrect sentence,
certainly that fact was readily discoverable by his counsel and
7
See Chinn v. Commonwealth, 310 S.W.2d 65, 67 (Ky. 1957) (court noting the
importance of the grand jury testimony in preparing for trial, and for
impeaching any witnesses at trial who appeared before the grand jury).
8
Gross v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 853, 856 (Ky. 1983).
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him at the time of sentencing, and should have been a matter for
direct appeal.
I would affirm the Fayette Circuit Court in all
respects.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEFS FOR APPELLEE:
Alphonzo R. Morton, Pro Se
West Liberty, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Rickie L. Pearson
Assistant Attorney General of
Kentucky
Courtney J. Hightower
Assistant Attorney General of
Kentucky
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