SCOTT BAILEY v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 22, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-002653-MR
SCOTT BAILEY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM PIKE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEVEN D. COMBS, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 04-CR-00056
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
HENRY AND VANMETER, JUDGES; BUCKINGHAM,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
HENRY, JUDGE:
Scott Bailey appeals from a jury verdict and
judgment of the Pike Circuit Court convicting him of seconddegree burglary and theft by unlawful taking.
Upon review, we
affirm.
The facts of the case, as provided at trial, are as
follows: On the evening of December 18, 2003, Charles and Kristi
Edmonds left their residence on Brushy Road in Pike County to go
to the funeral home.
1
When they returned home, they found that
Senior Judge David C. Buckingham, sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
the door to their bathroom was locked and they could see broken
glass under the door.
Mrs. Edmonds went outside and discovered
that someone had broken into their house through the bathroom
window.
Once they gained access to the bathroom, the Edmonds
found that a red bucket in which Mr. Edmonds had been keeping
hundreds of dollars in new state quarters was gone.
They also
found that Mrs. Edmonds’ jewelry box, which contained about 50
pieces of jewelry – including her engagement ring – was missing.
Approximately six weeks prior to this incident, Mr.
Edmonds had Bailey and his brother Duane come to his residence
to give him an estimate for remodeling that same bathroom.
The
Baileys had previously done similar work for Edmonds’ brother.
While looking at the bathroom, the Baileys commented about the
bucket of quarters.
They also drew a floor plan of the house in
a work sketch book that was alleged to have later been stolen
from Duane’s van.
On December 20, 2003, two days after the subject
incident, Bailey gave his girlfriend Gail McPeek a pair of gold
hoop earrings.
According to her, he later also gave her over
$100.00 in quarters during the course of the following week;
Scott, however, denied this, and testified that he had instead
given her a $50.00 bill.
McPeek’s cousin, Linda Justice, was
also given several items of jewelry by Duane Bailey, including a
necklace with a heart pendant, two pairs of earrings, a
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bracelet, and a ring.
quarters to McPeek.
She also verified that Bailey gave
By all accounts, the jewelry items were
among the same ones that were taken from the Edmonds’ home.
Mr.
Edmonds recovered these items from McPeek and Justice on January
1, 2004.
On January 2, 2004, after receiving evidence of the
stolen jewelry that had been received by McPeek and Justice,
local police arrived at Bailey’s home to arrest him and Duane;
however, Bailey was not on the premises.
Duane subsequently
called Mary Borders, Bailey’s former mother-in-law, to pick up
Bailey’s children.
When Borders arrived, she found Edmonds, his
wife, and Bailey’s landlord rummaging through the apartment.
Borders ultimately found some more of the stolen jewelry and
returned it to Edmonds, along with a receipt for jewelry cleaner
purchased a day after the burglary; she signed a statement
confirming that this occurred.
Edmonds admitted to conducting
his own search of Bailey’s apartment with the landlord’s
permission, but testified that he never personally removed
anything from it.
Bailey later turned himself in to the police.
On January 3, 2004, Edmonds recovered additional
jewelry from Billy Shannon Robinson, Bailey’s neighbor.
Robinson indicated that he purchased two gold rope chains from
Bailey approximately one week before Christmas.
He also noted
that he had observed Bailey keeping other jewelry in a sandwich
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bag that was hidden in a pillow case in his bedroom.
On January
7, 2004, Edmonds recovered more jewelry from Melida Scee,
Bailey’s mother, including his wife’s engagement ring and a pair
of gold hoop earrings.
At trial, both Baileys denied having anything to do
with the burglary in question.
Scott Bailey maintained that he
had purchased the jewelry in question from Arthur Canaday, Gail
McPeek’s former foster child, and denied ever giving any
quarters to McPeek.
Duane Bailey also testified that he had
been told by Canaday that Donovan Fink, McPeek’s brother, had
thrown the remainder of the jewelry in a ditch by the side of
the road.
This jewelry was eventually located and returned to
the Edmonds by Marvin Montgomery, a criminal investigator for
the Pike County public defenders’ office, after the Baileys told
him where it could be found.
Billy Shannon Robinson testified
that the baggie in which the missing jewelry was found was the
same baggie that he had seen in the Baileys’ apartment, as it
had an identifiable tear.
On February 18, 2004, the Pike County Grand Jury
indicted Bailey and his brother on charges of second-degree
burglary and theft by unlawful taking over $300.00.
On February
27, 2004, Bailey appeared before the trial court and entered a
plea of “not guilty.”
He was tried on the foregoing charges
along with his brother in October 2004.
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The jury found Bailey
guilty on both counts of the indictment and recommended a total
sentence of five years’ imprisonment.
On December 23, 2004, the
trial court entered a “Final Judgment and Order of Imprisonment”
consistent with the jury’s verdict and sentencing
recommendation.
This appeal followed.
On appeal, Bailey argues that he is entitled to relief
on the following grounds: (1) the trial court erred in failing
to give a jury instruction on receiving stolen property; (2) the
trial court erred in allowing Charles Edmonds to give lay
opinion testimony in violation of KRE2 701; (3) that he suffered
substantial prejudice due to prosecutorial misconduct during the
Commonwealth’s closing argument; and (4) that he suffered
substantial prejudice due to the Commonwealth being allowed to
introduce evidence obtained during a purportedly illegal search
of his home.
We address each of these contentions in turn.
I. “RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY” JURY INSTRUCTION
Bailey first contends that the trial erred to his
substantial prejudice in failing to give a jury instruction on
“receiving stolen property.”
He argues that such an instruction
was merited because of the testimony from the Bailey brothers
indicating that Scott purchased the allegedly stolen jewelry
from Arthur Canaday, Gail McPeek’s former foster child.
disagree.
2
Kentucky Rules of Evidence.
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We
“It is well settled that a defendant is entitled to
have his theory of the case submitted to the jury.”
Commonwealth, 158 S.W.3d 203, 207 (Ky. 2005).
Mondie v.
“In a criminal
case, it is the duty of the trial judge to prepare and give
instructions on the whole law of the case, and this rule
requires instructions applicable to every state of the case
deducible or supported to any extent by the testimony.”
v. Commonwealth, 995 S.W.2d 355, 360 (Ky. 1999).
Taylor
“A defendant
has a right to have every issue of fact raised by the evidence
and material to his defense submitted to the jury on proper
instructions.”
Id.
We also note that our Supreme Court has specifically
held that “[a] defendant is entitled to an instruction on any
lawful defense which he has.
Although a lesser included offense
is not a defense within the technical meaning of those terms as
used in the penal code, it is, in fact and principle, a defense
against the higher charge.”
845, 856 (Ky. 1997).
Slaven v. Commonwealth, 962 S.W.2d
Therefore, an instruction on a lesser-
included offense is required if the evidence would permit the
jury to find the defendant not guilty of the primary offense,
but guilty of the lesser offense.
S.W.3d 534, 539 (Ky. 1999).
Commonwealth v. Wolford, 4
However, with this said, the
Supreme Court has recently held that a defendant is not entitled
to an instruction on a separate, “lesser” uncharged offense -
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even when the evidence would support a guilty verdict - when
said offense does not constitute a “lesser-included offense” as
that term is understood.
Hudson v. Commonwealth, 202 S.W.3d 17,
21 (Ky. 2006); see also Kotila v. Commonwealth, 114 S.W.3d 226,
242 n. 3 (Ky. 2003), overruled on other grounds by Matheney v.
Commonwealth, 191 S.W.3d 599 (Ky. 2006).
In reaching this decision, the Court explicitly
rejected the defendant’s reliance on Taylor v. Commonwealth,
supra, Sanborn v. Commonwealth, supra, and Mishler v.
Commonwealth, 556 S.W.2d 676 (Ky. 1977), for the proposition
that a requested instruction is required for each theory of the
case supported by the testimony to any extent; such rejection is
notable in that all are cases heavily relied upon by Bailey
here.
The Court found that Taylor and Mishler were inapplicable
to the question of whether a jury should be instructed on a
“lesser” offense because “both involve the erroneous refusal to
instruct the jury on a defendant’s statutory defenses to the
charged crimes, no matter how improbable under the facts.”
Hudson, 202 S.W.3d at 21.3
Moreover, although the Court
acknowledged that Sanborn v. Commonwealth “does contain language
suggesting an instruction on a separate, uncharged, but ‘lesser’
offense is required whenever the evidence could conceivably
support the charge,” Id., it rejected that decision as “a
3
Specifically, Taylor and Mishler involved the statutory defenses of duress
(KRS 501.090) and intoxication (KRS 501.080).
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plurality opinion of limited precedential value.”
Id.
In doing
so, the Court noted: “[A] minority opinion has no binding
precedential value ... [and] if a majority of the court agreed
on a decision in the case, but less than a majority could agree
on the reasoning for that decision, the decision has no stare
decisis effect.”
Id. at 21-22.
The offense of receiving stolen property is not a
lesser-included offense of theft or burglary.
See Roark v.
Commonwealth, 90 S.W.3d 24, 38 (Ky. 2002); Macklin v.
Commonwealth, 687 S.W.2d 540, 542 (Ky.App. 1984).
Accordingly,
per Hudson, we conclude that the trial court did not err in
failing to give Bailey a “receiving stolen property”
instruction.
II. LAY OPINION TESTIMONY
Bailey next argues that the trial court erred in
allowing Charles Edmonds to give opinion and inference testimony
in violation of KRE 701.
That provision, entitled “Opinion
testimony by lay witnesses,” provides as follows:
If the witness is not testifying as an
expert, the witness’ testimony in the form
of opinions or inferences is limited to
those opinions or inferences which are:
(a)
Rationally based on the perception of the
witness; and
(b)
Helpful to a clear understanding of the
witness’ testimony or the determination of a
fact in issue.
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Bailey specifically contends that Edmonds was erroneously
allowed to offer his opinion that a “Saws-all,” or reciprocating
saw, appeared to have been used to cut the aluminum window frame
leading into his bathroom.
There was testimony at trial that
Bailey owned such a saw, and Charles Edmonds testified that he
saw it in Bailey’s vehicle.
The Commonwealth offers in rebuttal
that the issue is not properly reserved for review and that
Edmonds’ testimony satisfies the requirements of KRE 701.
We first address the Commonwealth’s position that this
issue is unpreserved for review.
As noted by the Commonwealth,
during Edmonds’ testimony on the first day of trial, Bailey’s
defense counsel asked for permission to approach the bench.
At
the ensuing bench conference, defense counsel complained that
the Commonwealth was attempting to elicit testimony from Edmonds
that the bathroom’s window frame was cut with a “Saws-all.”
Defense counsel specifically stated that he did not think that
there had been any forensic determination that the frame was cut
by such equipment, so he objected to any testimony on that issue
unless the Commonwealth produced a report stating that a “Sawsall” was used to make the cut.
He further contended that the
anticipated testimony in question would be speculative.
The
trial court decided not to make any specific ruling regarding
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the objection, instead choosing to wait and see what Edmonds’
testimony would actually be.
The trial court’s failure to make an immediate ruling
as to the aforementioned objections is of particular importance,
as no further objections or requests for a ruling were made even
after Edmonds gave testimony that it appeared to him as if
someone had used a “Saws-all” to cut into the bathroom window’s
aluminum frame; moreover, the trial court ultimately never
issued a ruling as to its admissibility.
Our case law is well-
established that a failure to insist on a ruling or admonition
from a trial court when an objection is made as to a particular
matter operates as a waiver of that issue for purposes of
appellate review.
Hayes v. Commonwealth, 175 S.W.3d 574, 596
(Ky. 2005); Commonwealth v. Pace, 82 S.W.3d 894, 895 (Ky. 2002);
Bell v. Commonwealth, 473 S.W.2d 820, 821 (Ky. 1971).
Accordingly, as the trial court failed to rule on the testimony
in question here, the issue is waived.
Nevertheless, Bailey asks us to review the issue under
RCr 10.26, the “palpable error” rule.4
As the issue pertains to
a purported evidentiary error, however, KRE 103(a) is more
directly applicable.
This rule provides that
4
RCr 10.26 provides: “A palpable error which affects the substantial rights
of a party may be considered by the court on motion for a new trial or by an
appellate court on appeal, even though insufficiently raised or preserved for
review, and appropriate relief may be granted upon a determination that
manifest injustice has resulted from the error.”
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[a] palpable error in applying the Kentucky
Rules of Evidence which affects the
substantial rights of a party may be
considered by a trial court on motion for a
new trial or by an appellate court on
appeal, even though insufficiently raised or
preserved for review, and appropriate relief
may be granted upon a determination that
manifest injustice has resulted from the
error.
Under KRE 103(e), “[a] finding of palpable error must involve
prejudice more egregious than that occurring in reversible error
... and the error must have resulted in ‘manifest injustice.’”
Ernst v. Commonwealth, 160 S.W.3d 744, 758 (Ky. 2005).
“Authorities discussing palpable error consider it to be
composed of two elements: obviousness and seriousness, the
latter of which is present when a failure to notice and correct
such an error would seriously affect the fairness, integrity,
and public reputation of the judicial proceeding.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
“A court reviewing for
palpable error must do so in light of the entire record; the
inquiry is heavily dependent upon the facts of each case.”
Id.
Our Supreme Court has held that “[a] nonexpert witness
may express an opinion which is rationally based on the
perception of the witness and helpful to a determination of a
fact in issue.”
Clifford v. Commonwealth, 7 S.W.3d 371, 374
(Ky. 1999).
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Edmonds testified that he had familiarity with
carpentry tools and home construction.
Assuming for the sake of
argument that allowing this testimony to come into evidence was
erroneous, we cannot conclude as a matter of law that any such
error was so “obvious” and “serious” that manifest injustice
occurred and a finding of palpable error is required.
Ernst, 160 S.W.3d at 758.
See
Consequently, Bailey’s arguments in
this context must be rejected.
III. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
Bailey next argues that he suffered substantial
prejudice due to a number of inappropriate and inflammatory
comments made in the Commonwealth’s closing argument.
“When
prosecutorial misconduct is claimed, the relevant inquiry on
appeal should always center around the overall fairness of the
trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.”
Commonwealth, 129 S.W.3d 343, 345 (Ky. 2004).
Young v.
Reversal is only
merited when the alleged misconduct is so serious that it
renders the trial fundamentally unfair.
918 S.W.2d 219, 224 (Ky. 1996).
Partin v. Commonwealth,
Moreover, in considering a
claim of prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument, we
must be mindful that “prosecutors are allowed wide latitude
during closing arguments and may comment upon the evidence
presented.”
Maxie v. Commonwealth, 82 S.W.3d 860, 866 (Ky.
2002).
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Bailey first complains that the Commonwealth Attorney
improperly made repeated references to “the Edmonds’ good
qualities” in his closing argument.
He specifically points to
statements by the Commonwealth Attorney that he “was glad [the
Edmonds] did the work they did,” and that they “work hard for
their money” and did not deserve to be robbed.
According to
Bailey, by these statements, “the Commonwealth went beyond
portraying the victims as more than mere statistics into
glorifying the Edmonds in order to evoke passion and prejudice.”
However, as the Commonwealth points out, Bailey failed to make a
contemporaneous objection to either of these statements.
Accordingly, the issue is not preserved for our review.
Weaver
v. Commonwealth, 955 S.W.2d 722, 728 (Ky. 1997); see also RCr
9.22.
Moreover, we do not believe that Bailey is entitled to
relief under RCr 10.26, as the Commonwealth introduced
substantial evidence of his guilt for the crimes charged.
See
Grundy v. Commonwealth, 25 S.W.3d 76, 81-82 (Ky. 2000).
For the same reasons, we must reject Bailey’s
complaints about the following additional statements made by the
Commonwealth in closing: (1) that the prosecutor felt sorry for
the Baileys’ mother because “she raised two fellas that are
burglars” and (2) that if the Baileys “would give stolen jewelry
to their dying mother, then they would lie.”
“As there were no
objections made, the trial court was not given the opportunity
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to pass upon the merits of these allegations which are not
properly preserved for review.
consider this challenge.”
We must therefore decline to
Gray v. Commonwealth, 979 S.W.2d 454,
457 (Ky. 1998), overruled on other grounds by Morrow v.
Commonwealth, 77 S.W.3d 558 (Ky. 2002); see also Charash v.
Johnson, 43 S.W.3d 274, 278 (Ky.App. 2000).
Bailey also complains that he was unfairly prejudiced
when the Commonwealth Attorney – referring to the Baileys - told
the jury that the natural instinct for thieves is to lie.
However, upon reviewing the record, we find that, upon Bailey’s
objection to this statement, the Commonwealth Attorney agreed to
rephrase its point, and Bailey raised no further objection to
what was then stated.
“Merely voicing an objection, without a
request for a mistrial or at least for an admonition, is not
sufficient to establish error once the objection is sustained.”
Hayes v. Commonwealth, 698 S.W.2d 827, 829 (Ky. 1985).
As
Bailey requested no additional relief from the trial court here,
this issue is unpreserved for our review.
Taylor v.
Commonwealth, 449 S.W.2d 208, 209 (Ky. 1969).
For similar reasons, we also reject Bailey’s
complaints about the Commonwealth Attorney’s statement that
there were no other “thieves” looking at the inside of the
Edmonds’ home.
Bailey’s objection to this statement was
sustained by the trial court, and the jury was subsequently
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admonished.
“[I]t has long been the law in Kentucky that an
admonition to the jury to disregard an improper argument cures
the error unless it appears the argument was so prejudicial,
under the circumstances of the case, that an admonition could
not cure it.”
2001).
Price v. Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 878, 881 (Ky.
In “consider[ing] the Commonwealth’s conduct in context
and in light of the trial as a whole ... we see nothing in the
statement at issue which would warrant reversal” and believe
that the trial court’s admonition was sufficient to cure any
possible error that might have occurred here.
Brown v.
Commonwealth, 934 S.W.2d 242, 248 (Ky. 1996) (Internal quotation
marks omitted).
Bailey next complains about the Commonwealth
Attorney’s characterization of him as a “burglar” during closing
argument.
Our Supreme Court has deemed it permissible to refer
to a defendant as a “bit of evil,” Slaughter v. Commonwealth,
744 S.W.2d 407, 412 (Ky. 1987), a “beast,” Ferguson v.
Commonwealth, 401 S.W.2d 225, 228 (Ky. 1965), and as a
“desperado,” Holbrook v. Commonwealth, 249 Ky. 795, 61 S.W.2d
644, 645 (1933).
Given these prior holdings, along with the
fact that Bailey was actually being tried for burglary and that
there was substantial evidence linking him to the crime, we
cannot say that any error occurred here.
See Russell v.
Commonwealth, 403 S.W.2d 694, 697 (Ky. 1966).
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Bailey also argues that the Commonwealth Attorney
improperly vouched for the credibility of witnesses Gail McPeek
and Linda Justice during its closing argument, stating that he
“did not see a reason why those girls would lie.”
However, upon
reviewing the record, we find that Bailey did not object to this
statement, but instead objected to the Commonwealth Attorney’s
comment that Bailey “didn’t show any reason why [the witnesses]
were lying.”
While it is true that it is improper for counsel
to bolster a witness’ credibility during closing argument with
his own personal opinion, Armstrong v. Commonwealth, 517 S.W.2d
233, 236 (Ky. 1974), we do not believe that such inappropriate
bolstering occurred here.
Our case law holds that a prosecutor
may offer his interpretation of the evidence to a jury.
Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 401 S.W.2d 80, 88 (Ky. 1966).
A
prosecutor may also draw reasonable inferences from the evidence
and may make reasonable comments upon the evidence.
Commonwealth, 466 S.W.2d 957, 959 (Ky. 1971).
Hunt v.
We believe that
the comment in question fits within these bounds, and –
accordingly – no error occurred here.
Bailey finally complains that the Commonwealth
introduced evidence in its closing argument that was not
presented at trial.
He specifically refers to the Commonwealth
Attorney’s statement to the jury that Duane Bailey asked Charles
Edmonds about an alarm system when confronted about the
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burglary.
From the record, it appears as if this fact was never
put into evidence.
Although Bailey contends that he objected to
the statement when it was made, we do not agree.
Instead, the
record reflects that Bailey raised the issue and moved for a
mistrial only after the case had been submitted to the jury and
the jury had retired to deliberate.
At that point, any
objection was too late and the error was waived.
Bowers v.
Commonwealth, 555 S.W.2d 241, 243 (Ky. 1977).
IV. ILLEGAL SEARCH
Bailey finally argues that he was denied his right to
a fair trial and due process when the Commonwealth was allowed
to introduce evidence purportedly obtained through an illegal
search of his home.
Specifically, he complains that Charles
Edmonds was acting as an agent of the police when he entered his
home following his arrest and conducted his own search of the
premises.
It is a well-established principle that the
exclusionary rule barring the introduction of evidence obtained
by an illegal search extends only to “state action” by public
officers and does not apply to searches conducted by private
individuals acting on their own initiative.
See Stone v.
Commonwealth, 418 S.W.2d 646, 650 (Ky. 1967).
After reviewing
the record, we can find no indication that Edmonds was somehow
acting on behalf of the police when he conducted his own search
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of Bailey’s home.
His testimony indicates that he was at the
home of Bailey’s neighbor, Billy Shannon Robinson, recovering
some of the stolen jewelry at the same time that Mary Borders
was at Bailey’s residence removing his belongings following
Bailey’s arrest the day before.
Edmonds asked Bailey’s landlord
if he could search the apartment, and he agreed.
Whether he had
the authority to allow such a search is ultimately irrelevant,
as Edmonds was not accompanied by any law enforcement officers,
and – as noted – there is no indication that he was acting on
behalf of the police.
Accordingly, even if we were to assume
that the search was unlawful, any evidence resulting from said
search was admissible at trial, as it did not result from “state
action.”
Therefore, Bailey’s argument must be rejected.
The judgment of the Pike Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Astrida L. Lemkins
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Clint E. Watson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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