MIRIAM E. AKIN (FORMERLY HART) v. CURTIS W. HART
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RENDERED:
APRIL 14, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-002632-MR
MIRIAM E. AKIN (FORMERLY HART)
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE JO ANN WISE, JUDGE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 02-CI-04191
v.
CURTIS W. HART
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
MINTON AND VANMETER, JUDGES; MILLER, SENIOR JUDGE.1
MINTON, JUDGE:
Miriam E. Akin (formerly Hart) appeals from an
order denying her motion to set aside the property settlement
agreement in the dissolution of her marriage to Curtis W. Hart.
We affirm.
About three months into their marriage dissolution
proceedings, but before any discovery had taken place, Miriam
and Curtis, each represented by counsel, signed a property
1
Senior Judge John D. Miller sitting as Special Judge by assignment
of the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky
Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 21.580.
settlement agreement on January 18, 2003.
Under the agreement,
Curtis became obligated to pay Miriam two up-front cash
payments:
$100,000 not later than January 25, 2003, and
$400,000 not later than February 18, 2003.
Three more $125,000
annual installments were due no later than February 18,
beginning in 2004.
The settlement agreement stated that “[e]ach
party represents and warrants that he or she has disclosed to
the other during the course of this proceeding all assets in
which either of the parties may have an interest.
Any asset
which has not been disclosed shall be divided equally between
the parties.”
(Emphasis added.)
As contemplated by the
parties, the settlement agreement was approved and incorporated
by reference in the Decree of Dissolution of Marriage entered in
February 2003.
Three days after he signed the settlement agreement,
Curtis received a $510,000 bonus from his employer, Central
Rock, Inc.
This prompted in a motion from Miriam to set aside
the settlement agreement under Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure
(CR) 60.02, or, in the alternative, to distribute equally
Curtis’s bonus check, which Miriam contended was an undisclosed
asset.
In addition, Miriam argued that she was entitled to a
portion of Curtis’s shares of stock in Central Rock because
Curtis had failed to disclose that a portion of those shares had
been bought with marital funds.
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The family court held an evidentiary hearing on
Miriam’s motion.
The family court eventually issued an amended
opinion and order, finding that Curtis’s bonus was not an
undisclosed asset because Miriam knew that he received an annual
bonus.
As for the Central Rock stock, the family court found
that Curtis knowingly failed to list a portion of it as a
marital asset on his preliminary verified disclosure statement,
but that his dishonesty was not actionable fraud because Miriam
actually knew of the marital aspect of this stock.
family court denied Miriam’s motion.
So the
Miriam then filed this
appeal.
Miriam raises two issues on appeal.
First, she
contends that the trial court erred by denying her motion to
divide Curtis’s bonus equally, either by setting aside the
separation agreement or by declaring the bonus an undisclosed
asset which, under the express terms of the agreement, must be
divided equally.
Second, Miriam contends that the trial court
erred by not finding that the marital aspect of the Central Rock
stock was an undisclosed asset.
A property settlement agreement is an enforceable
contract,2 which a court may not disturb unless the contract is
2
Pursley v. Pursley, 144 S.W.3d 820, 826 (Ky. 2004).
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unconscionable.3
A court may not find an agreement to be
unconscionable “absent some showing of fraud, undue influence,
overreaching or manifest unfairness.”4
Because a trial court is
in the “best position to judge the circumstances surrounding the
agreement,” we defer to the trial court’s findings regarding
whether a separation agreement is unconscionable unless those
findings are clearly erroneous.5
Similarly, we may not disturb a
trial court’s decision to deny a motion under CR 60.02 unless
that decision is an abuse of discretion.6
The family court found that Curtis’s bonus was not an
undisclosed asset because Miriam “did know prior to the
execution of the property settlement agreement that [Curtis] was
eligible to receive a yearly bonus from Central Rock in the
first quarter of each year, that he almost always received a
bonus[,] and that the amount of the bonus fluctuated greatly.
The only information about the bonus not known by [Miriam] was
exactly when it would be received and the exact amount of the
bonus.”
Although the family court’s findings are not the only
possible inferences permitted by the evidence, the family
3
See KRS 403.180(2).
4
Pursley, 144 S.W.2d at 826.
5
Peterson v. Peterson, 583 S.W.2d 707, 712 (Ky.App. 1979).
6
Dull v. George, 982 S.W.2d 227, 229 (Ky.App. 1998).
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court’s findings are supported by the record.
Curtis testified
that he had received a bonus annually for the past ten to
fifteen years, usually in March, and that the bonus had
fluctuated from $22,000 to $477,000.
And Curtis testified that
he always told Miriam the amount of his bonus.
Similarly, Miriam testified that she was aware that
Curtis had received a bonus in previous years.
Actually,
Miriam’s testimony on this point was inconsistent.
She
testified once that she was unaware of Curtis’s having received
a bonus for the previous two years but later testified that she
was aware that Curtis had received annual bonuses in the past.
The family court, as the finder of fact, has the discretion to
choose which evidence to believe and which to disbelieve, even
if that conflicting evidence comes from the same witness.7
In
addition, Curtis testified that he knew that he would likely
receive a bonus in 2003; but at the time he entered into the
settlement agreement, he did not know either the amount or date
he would receive the bonus.
According to Curtis, he knew he would need about
$500,000 to give to Miriam to make the initial payments under
the agreement, so, on the Monday following the Saturday on which
he signed the settlement agreement, he asked J. Cooper Hartley,
the president of Central Rock, if he could borrow money from the
7
See, e.g., Magic Coal Co. v. Fox, 19 S.W.3d 88, 96 (Ky. 2000).
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company.
Curtis testified that Hartley then sought and received
permission from Central Rock’s majority shareholder to pay
Curtis his bonus a few weeks early so he would not have to
borrow the money.
Hartley’s affidavit corroborates Curtis’s
testimony.
Furthermore, both Miriam and James Green, one of her
attorneys, testified that they had examined Curtis’s tax returns
and were aware that Curtis’s income fluctuated from year to
year.
Green testified that the wide fluctuations in Curtis’s
income would have “probably” caused him to ask questions as to
why that fluctuation existed and, furthermore, that he was aware
that Curtis had received bonuses in the past.
In addition,
Thomas Clay, another of Miriam’s attorneys testified that a
potential bonus for Curtis was “an item of concern,” though Clay
testified that he did not have any knowledge that Curtis could
receive a bonus of over $500,000.
Finally, Miriam testified
that she thought her lawyers were “smart enough” to discern the
existence of bonuses when they reviewed Curtis’s W-2 forms
before she agreed to settle her case.
In summary, the record contains evidence that:
Curtis
had historically received bonuses; Miriam was aware of those
bonuses; Miriam’s attorneys were aware of Curtis’s tax returns
and history of receiving bonuses; and Curtis did not know the
precise amount of his 2003 bonus, nor when he would receive it,
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at the time he signed the settlement agreement.
So the trial
court’s decision that the bonus was not an undisclosed asset is
supported by the record.
This means that we may not find it to
be clearly erroneous.
Furthermore, since Miriam had knowledge of the
probability of Curtis receiving a bonus when she entered into
the agreement, and since his 2003 bonus was not vastly greater
than the $477,000 bonus he received in 2000, the fact that
Curtis received an slightly larger bonus earlier than usual does
not make the settlement agreement so grossly unfair as to
entitle Miriam to relief under CR 60.02.
In short, we find that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied
Miriam relief under CR 60.02.
Curtis owned stock representing a twenty-five percent
ownership interest in Central Rock.
Curtis bought his Central
Rock stock before he married Miriam.
But he borrowed $150,000
from Central Rock to finance a portion of his Central Rock stock
before his marriage to Miriam; and he repaid that $150,000
during the marriage using marital funds.
So both Curtis and
Miriam now agree that the stock he financed with marital funds
is marital property.
However, on his preliminary verified
disclosure statement, which he filed with the court before
entering into the settlement agreement, Curtis listed all the
Central Rock stock as being his nonmarital property.
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For that
reason, Miriam later sought to set aside the settlement
agreement based on Curtis’s misrepresentation.
The family court’s findings on this issue are as
follows:
Petitioner [Curtis] did make a material
misrepresentation to Respondent [Miriam] in
these proceedings which was not true. He
failed to disclose to Respondent in his
Preliminary Verified Disclosure Statement
that there was a marital component of
Central Rock. Petitioner knew that part of
his purchase of Central Rock stock was
during the marriage and the purchase was
accomplished with marital funds. Despite
this knowledge, Petitioner verified, under
oath, in his Preliminary Verified Disclosure
Statement, that Central Rock was an asset
that was entirely nonmarital and did not
list any part of his ownership of Central
Rock as marital in nature. Petitioner, an
established business person, never denied
that he knew, when filling out and signing
the Preliminary Verified Disclosure
Statement, that these were the facts. The
Court finds that he knew this representation
to be false at the time. The Court further
finds that Petitioner deliberately
misrepresented these facts in the
Preliminary Verified Disclosure Statement to
induce Respondent to believe there was no
marital component of Central Rock or to
induce her not to inquire further as to
Petitioner’s interest in Central Rock.
However, despite these findings, this
Court cannot reopen the property settlement
in this case because the testimony of
Respondent’s counsel at trial established
that the false representation on the
Preliminary Verified Disclosure Statement
did not affect these proceedings because
Respondent did not rely on these
representations to her detriment. The
Respondent not only knew of the marital
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stock purchase, but she and her counsel
discussed this issue before the property
settlement was executed. James M. Green,
attorney for the Respondent, testified that
Respondent told him of repayment of a loan
during the marriage that was used to
purchase stock in Central Rock. Armed with
this knowledge and the assistance of very
able counsel, Respondent voluntarily elected
to execute the property settlement
agreement. Therefore, these acts of
Petitioner do not constitute fraud as
defined by Kentucky law in United Parcel
Service Co. v. Rickert, [996 S.W.2d 464 (Ky.
1999)].
As a prefatory note, the trial court seemed to believe
that Curtis did not really commit fraud because Miriam did not
rely on his misrepresentations.
Indeed, reliance is an element
of fraud under United Parcel Service Co. v. Rickert.8
But the
trial court erred to the extent it believed that actual fraud
was necessary to set aside a settlement agreement.
The Kentucky
Supreme Court has held that “fraud, deceit, mental instability
or the like, are not required to obtain invalidation of a
separation agreement.”9
Rather, all that is required is “a
showing of fundamental unfairness as determined ‘after
considering the economic circumstances of the parties and any
other relevant evidence . . . .’
KRS 403.180(2).”10
8
996 S.W.2d at 468.
9
Shraberg v. Shraberg, 939 S.W.2d 330, 333 (Ky. 1997).
10
Id.
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Thus,
whether Curtis’s actions fit within the strict definition of
fraud is largely irrelevant.
The record does contain some evidence to support
Miriam’s contention that she had no knowledge that a portion of
the Central Rock stock was marital property.
Miriam predictably
testified that she did not know about the Central Rock stock’s
marital component when she agreed to the terms of the settlement
agreement.
Rather, Miriam testified that she was aware that
Curtis had taken out a loan from Central Rock; but she thought
the loan was used to finance property repairs and improvements.
Similarly, Attorney Clay also testified that he had no knowledge
of the marital aspect of a portion of Curtis’s Central Rock
stock.
But Attorney Green testified to the contrary.
In his
testimony, Green testified that he “recall[ed] conversations
with Genie [Miriam] regarding repayment of a loan with marital
funds and that money was used to buy an interest [in Central
Rock].”
The family court might well have come to a different
conclusion, but Green’s testimony is substantial evidence
supporting the finding that Miriam had knowledge of the marital
aspect of the Central Rock stock.
Having found that Miriam had
this knowledge, the family court’s later finding was logical
that Miriam did not rely on Curtis’s false representation on his
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disclosure statement.
Thus, the marital component of the
Central Rock stock was not an undisclosed asset because Miriam
knew about it⎯it had already been disclosed to her at the time
of the settlement.
Clearly, Curtis erred and acted dishonorably when he
failed to disclose a marital aspect of the Central Rock stock.
We do not condone such behavior.
But since Miriam, arguably,
knew of Curtis’s misrepresentation and did not, consequently,
rely to her detriment upon that misrepresentation, we cannot say
that the trial court clearly erred by finding that the
settlement agreement was not unconscionable, especially in light
of the fact that the settlement agreement provided for Marilyn
to receive $875,000 in cash within four years.
In this case, we may well have come to different
conclusions than did the family court.
But the family court’s
decisions are supported by substantial evidence.
Thus, the
opinion and order of the Fayette Family Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Richard A. Getty
Jason L. Hargadon
Trevor W. Wells
Lexington, Kentucky
Natalie S. Wilson
Lori B. Shelburne
Lexington, Kentucky
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