LEWIS BIZZACK; GARY BIZZACK APPELLANTS/ JOHN BIZZACK; TERESA A. BARTON, COUNTY JUDGE EXECUTIVE; HOWARD R. DAWSON, MAGISTRATE; IRA W. FANNIN, MAGISTRATE; PHILLIP W. KRING, MAGISTRATE; LAMBERT MOORE, MAGISTRATE; JILL E. ROBINSON, MAGISTRATE; HUSTON WELLS, MAGISTRATE; FRANKLIN COUNTY FISCAL COURT APPEAL AND v. ALICE SOUTH HUME; APPELLEES/ PIN OAK STUD, LLC
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RENDERED:
APRIL 7, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-002592-MR
AND
NO. 2004-CA-002676-MR
LEWIS BIZZACK; GARY BIZZACK
JOHN BIZZACK; TERESA A.
BARTON, COUNTY JUDGE
EXECUTIVE; HOWARD R. DAWSON,
MAGISTRATE; IRA W. FANNIN,
MAGISTRATE; PHILLIP W. KRING,
MAGISTRATE; LAMBERT MOORE,
MAGISTRATE; JILL E. ROBINSON,
MAGISTRATE; HUSTON WELLS,
MAGISTRATE; FRANKLIN COUNTY
FISCAL COURT
v.
APPELLANTS/CROSS-APPELLEES
APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM L. GRAHAM, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CI-00355
ALICE SOUTH HUME;
PIN OAK STUD, LLC
APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING WITH DIRECTIONS
** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: KNOPF AND MINTON, JUDGES; MILLER, SENIOR JUDGE.1
MILLER, SENIOR JUDGE:
Lewis Bizzack, Gary Bizzack, and John W.
Bizzack appeal from an order of the Franklin Circuit Court
1
Senior Judge John D. Miller sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
Kentucky Revised Statute 21.580.
overturning a zone change approved by the Franklin County Fiscal
Court of property located in Franklin County, Kentucky.
For the
reasons stated below, we reverse and remand with directions.2
In order to provide context to this matter, we find it
appropriate to review prior litigation surrounding the rezoning
issue.
Alice Hume and Pin Oak Stud are neighboring landowners
of property owned by the Bizzacks.
The Bizzacks’ tract consists
of 10.31 acres bordered by U.S. 60 (Versailles Road) and
Millville-Duncan Road.
A 1981 plat of record in the Franklin
County Clerk’s office identifies the 10.31 acre-property as Lot
15 of the Englewood Office Park.
In the spring of 1997, the Bizzacks proposed a change
in the zoning of their property from Professional Office to
Highway Commercial.
The Frankfort-Franklin County Planning
Commission voted approval.
After two readings the Fiscal Court
approved the zone amendment adopting in full the findings of the
Planning Commission.
On appeal, Franklin Circuit Court found
that although there had been a good faith attempt by the
Planning Commission to analyze changes which had taken place in
the area, both it and the Fiscal Court failed to analyze those
facts in light of defined standards set out in Kentucky Revised
2
Alice South Hume and Pin Oak Stud, LLC, cross-appeal the circuit court’s
order. Because of our disposition of the appeal, we deem matters raised in
the cross-appeal as moot and do not address same.
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Statutes (KRS) 100.213.3
It remanded the case to the Fiscal
Court for reconsideration.
However, the Fiscal Court failed to appropriately
reconsider the zone change as mandated by the circuit court.
Instead, it conducted an ex parte meeting with the Bizzacks’
counsel in order to prepare findings which would satisfy the
circuit court upon review.
The Fiscal Court held two meetings
in March 1998 at which it gave first and second readings to the
proposed zone map amendment without allowing debate or
considering other findings.
The Fiscal Court considered only
the set of findings specifically intended to result in approval
of the zone map amendment.
This second adoption of the zone map amendment was
appealed to Franklin Circuit Court, which vacated the decision
on the basis of the fundamental unfairness of the procedures
before the Fiscal Court.
3
It found that although ex parte
KRS 100.213(1) provides as follows:
Before any map amendment is granted, the planning commission or the
legislative body or fiscal court must find that the map amendment is in
agreement with the adopted comprehensive plan, or, in the absence of such a
finding, that one (1) or more of the following apply and such finding shall
be recorded in the minutes and records of the planning commission or the
legislative body or fiscal court:
(a) That the existing zoning classification given to the property is
inappropriate and that the proposed zoning classification is appropriate;
(b) That there have been major changes of an economic, physical, or social
nature within the area involved which were not anticipated in the adopted
comprehensive plan and which have substantially altered the basic character
of such area.
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contact does not invalidate a decision per se, the result here
was so egregious that it resulted in an impermissible denial of
due process to affected landowners challenging the proposed
change.
In response to a motion to alter, amend or vacate its
judgment, the circuit court expressly declined to again remand
the matter to the fiscal court.
In so doing, it stated that the
aura of such an arbitrary action could not be erased by a second
remand.
The Bizzacks appealed to this Court in John Bizzack
and Lewis Bizzack v. Alice South Hume and Crit Blackburn
Luallen, Case No. 1999-CA-001356-MR.
This Court dismissed the
appeal without reaching the merits because of the Bizzacks'
failure to name the Franklin County Fiscal Court as a party to
the appeal.
On January 19, 2001, the Bizzacks again applied to the
Planning Commission for a change in the zoning of the subject
property from Professional Office to Highway Commercial.
Included in the application was a development plan which
included a large restaurant, a fast food restaurant, a bank, a
dry cleaning establishment and a hardware store intended to be
placed on the property.
Following a hearing, the Planning
Commission voted 5-4 to approve the request.
On July 19, 2001, the Franklin County Fiscal Court
voted not to hold a new hearing but to place an ordinance on its
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agenda.
The Fiscal Court added a finding of its own to those of
the Planning Commission, which was that "the Franklin County
Fiscal Court finds that the subject map amendment is in
agreement with the adopted Comprehensive Plan, as amended[.]"
On August 9, 2001, the Fiscal Court gave a second reading and
voted to grant the requested zone change.
Following the decision by the Fiscal Court, Hume and
Pin Oak Stud appealed to Franklin Circuit Court arguing that the
Fiscal Court acted arbitrarily in granting the zoning amendment.
Their arguments were that the Fiscal Court did not make
appropriate findings when it rendered its decision, that what
findings it did make were not supported by substantial evidence,
and that the entire procedure denied them procedural due
process.
The circuit court upheld the Fiscal Court on multiple
grounds.
Hume and Pin Oak Stud then appealed to this Court.
On
May 9, 2003, this Court rendered an opinion reversing the zone
change on the basis that the Fiscal Court and Planning
Commission acted arbitrarily in approving the proposed zone map
amendment.
Specifically, this Court held that the Fiscal Court
had failed to make its findings based upon sufficient
adjudicative facts contained in the record in that the Fiscal
Court neither conducted its own evidentiary hearing nor reviewed
the transcript of the Planning Commission’s hearing, and that
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the adjudicative facts found based upon evidence contained in
the record were insufficient to support its decision.
The
Bizzacks subsequently petitioned the Supreme Court for
discretionary review.
The petition was not denied by the
Supreme Court until June 9, 2004.
Meanwhile, on June 24, 2003, approximately two years
and five months subsequent to the prior application; six weeks
following this Court’s reversal of the prior zone change; and
over a year prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling on the petition
for discretionary review, the Bizzacks filed a new zone change
request with the Planning Commission.
Again, the subject
property was Lot 15 in Englewood Office Park and the application
again called for Highway Commercial zoning.
The development
plan described banking, fast food, restaurant, hardware, and
dry-cleaning establishments.
Hume and Pin Oak Stud filed a motion in Franklin
Circuit Court to stay Planning Commission action on the
application.
The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to
entertain the motion, and declined to rule.
On September 18, 2003, the Planning Commission held a
public hearing on the application.
On November 20, 2003, the
Planning Commission met to consider the zone change.
was deadlocked five to five.
The vote
The application was forwarded to
the Fiscal Court without a recommendation.
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On February 6, 2004,
the Fiscal Court considered the Bizzacks application for a zone
change and granted the proposed rezoning of Lot 15.
On the
whole, the project was substantially identical to the project
associated with the prior filing.
Hume and Pin Oak Stud again appealed the Fiscal
Court’s rezoning decision to the Franklin Circuit Court.
On
November 23, 2004, the circuit court entered an order reversing
the rezoning on the basis that it was improper for the
application for rezoning to have been filed while the prior
rezoning decision was pending upon appeal.
This appeal
followed.
The Bizzacks contend that the Franklin Circuit Court
erred in determining that it was improper for the Bizzacks to
have filed a new rezoning application for Lot 15 while the prior
rezoning application was pending upon appeal.
In its order
reversing the Fiscal Court, the circuit court expressed its
opinion that res judicata barred the filing of the present
rezoning application, but, ultimately, based its decision upon
the “time-honored doctrine that the same case cannot be pending
in two different tribunals at the same time.”
We disagree with the circuit court’s reliance upon the
latter premise; however, we agree with the circuit court that
central to our present review is the issue of res judicata in
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the area of zoning.
We thus begin our review with a discussion
of the rules of res judicata in the area of zoning.
We first note that a petition for discretionary review
was pending before the Supreme Court on the prior application at
the time the present application was filed, and in that respect
this Court’s May 9, 2003, opinion denying the prior zone change
was nonfinal.
However, this does not mean that res judicata
principles do not apply.
We are of the opinion that a pending
appeal of a judgment in a prior action does not deprive that
judgment of res judicata effect.
See Sidney Coal Co., Inc. v.
Massanari, 221 F.Supp.2d 755, 772 (E.D. Ky. 2002) (citing
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 13, comment f (1982)).4
“The matter of res judicata in zoning matters is a
serious and vexing problem.
The textbook writers indicate that
there is a division of authority in the application of res
judicata to rezoning requests.
Certainly, the people affected
by repeated and harassing rezoning applications are entitled to
protection.
large.
There should be some safety for the public at
Certainly, the doctrine of res judicata is a valuable
tool in litigation arising from zoning changes.
4
It clearly has
We realize that there is a split of authority on this issue. Our
Commonwealth, however, has never succinctly addressed the matter. We believe
the majority rule follows the Restatement, and perforce adopt same in the
context of zoning with which we are concerned. In this regard it is
unfortunate that these proceedings were not abated pending the Supreme
Court’s ruling on the motion for discretionary review as requested by Hume
and Pin Oak Stud.
- 8 -
a place in the law of zoning.”
Fiscal Court of Jefferson County
v. Ogden, 556 S.W.2d 899, 902 (Ky.App. 1977).
It seems to us,
too, there is no valid reason for denying zoning litigants the
settling effect of the doctrine of res judicata.
“Res judicata applies to administrative zoning
decisions in order to promote finality of decisions unless it is
shown that there has been a substantial change of circumstances
since the earlier ruling.”
83 Am Jur 2d Zoning and Planning §
741 (August 2005 Update) (footnotes omitted) (Emphasis added).
See also Judgment Denying Permit for use of Premises under
Zoning Regulations as Bar to Subsequent Application, 71 A.L.R.2d
1362 (the doctrine of res judicata in the area of zoning does
not ordinarily apply where there are changed conditions and new
facts which did not exist at the time of the prior judgment) and
Johnson v. Lagrew, 447 S.W.2d 98 (Ky. 1969) (Recognizing
legitimacy of successive zone change application when there have
been changes since the prior application).
Moreover, KRS 100.213(2)
provides that “[t]he planning commission, legislative body, or
fiscal court may adopt provisions which prohibit for a period of
two (2) years, the reconsideration of a denied map amendment or
the consideration of a map amendment identical to a denied map
amendment.”
Hence, the statutory scheme for a zoning change
specifically contemplates that an unsuccessful application may
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at some point file an application identical to a previously
denied application.
From the foregoing authorities, we infer the following
rule with respect to res judicata in the area of zoning:
The
doctrine does apply, but is limited to the period in which there
are no changes in facts since the denial of a prior application.
Upon the occurrence of a change in facts such that the basis for
the prior denial is no longer applicable, an application for a
zoning change previously denied may be in order.
The Fiscal Court’s final action on the prior
application was on August 9, 2001.
The present application was
filed on June 24, 2003, less than two years following the Fiscal
Court’s action in the prior application.
Franklin County Fiscal
Court has not adopted the optional rule provided for in KRS
100.213(2) which provides for up to a two-year limitations
period between the filing of a new application following action
on a prior application; hence, the Bizzacks were not barred by
this limitations period in filing a new application.
However, in order for the Bizzacks’ new application to
comply with res judicata in the area of zoning, it is necessary
that there have been changes since the Fiscal Court’s action in
the prior case, which was ultimately denied, and the filing of
its new application.
In their brief, the Bizzacks argue that
there have been changes since the prior application, primarily
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in that substantial additional office space has become available
in Franklin County.
This, if true, may be sufficient to bring
the present application into compliance with the res judicata
rules governing zone changes.
However, the Fiscal Court did not
make a finding to this effect in its ordinance approving the
zone change.
There likewise may be other changes which would
bring the Bizzacks’ application within the requirement that
there have been a change since the prior application.
An examination of the Fiscal Court’s January 15, 2004,
ordinance approving the zone change sought by the Bizzacks
discloses that it does not make any findings regarding whether
there have been changes since its action on the prior
application.
Upon the whole we are of the opinion this matter
should be remanded to the Franklin Fiscal Court for a
determination of whether there have been changes since its
action on the prior application in justification of a zone
change.
The Fiscal Court should specifically identify any such
changes, and make appropriate findings of fact in support of its
determination.
Because of our disposition herein, we need not
consider other issues raised by the Bizzacks or issues raised by
Hume and Pin Oak Stud in their cross-appeal.
- 11 -
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Franklin
Circuit Court is reversed and this cause is remanded with
directions to remand to the Frankfort Fiscal Court for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS/CROSSAPPELLEES LEWIS BIZZAK, GARY
BIZZACK, AND JOHN W. BIZZACK:
William M. Lear, Jr.
Rena G. Wiseman
Paul C. Harnice
Lexington, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES/CROSSAPPELLANTS:
Richard V. Murphy
Lexington, Kentucky
H. Henry Graddy, IV
Midway, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS/CROSSAPPELLEES FRANKLIN CIRCUIT
COURT AND ITS MEMBERS:
Richard M. Sullivan
Scott A. Johnson
Louisville, Kentucky
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