TRUSERV CORPORATION v. FLEGLES, INC.
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RENDERED: JUNE 2, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO.
No.
2004-CA-002487-MR
AND
2005-CA-000162-MR
TRUSERV CORPORATION
v.
APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE
APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL FROM CARLISLE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM LEWIS SHADOAN, JUDGE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 03-CI-00005
FLEGLES, INC.
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
OPINION
REVERSING ON DIRECT APPEAL
AND AFFIRMING ON CROSS-APPEAL
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
KNOPF AND TACKETT,1 JUDGES; HUDDLESTON, SENIOR JUDGE.2
HUDDLESTON, SENIOR JUDGE:
In 1924, the Flegle family opened a
lumberyard and hardware store in the small rural town of
Bardwell, Kentucky.
The lumberyard and hardware store is still
1
Judge Julia K. Tackett concurred in this opinion prior to her retirement
effective June 1, 2006.
2
Senior Judge Joseph R. Huddleston sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
owned by the Flegle family through a family-owned and operated
corporation known as Flegles, Inc.
(The corporation, the family
and the hardware store will be referred to hereinafter as
“Flegles”.)
In 1976, Flegles joined a hardware cooperative,
Cotter & Company.
In 1997, Cotter & Company merged with another
hardware cooperative to form the cooperative now known as
TruServ Corporation (Cotter & Company as well as TruServ will be
referred to hereinafter as “TruServ”.)
TruServ is a Delaware
corporation with its principal place of business in Chicago,
Illinois.
In 1997, Flegles became a member of TruServ.
In the early 1990s, Flegles began to consider
expanding its business, and, in 1994, it purchased property on
which it built a new store in 1999.
In 1996, TruServ offered to
prepare, free of charge, a customized market and operational
analysis of Flegles’ hardware business.
Then, using this
analysis, TruServ would recommend how Flegles could enhance its
future profitability.
Flegles accepted TruServ’s offer and
provided the corporation the information necessary for TruServ
to prepare the analysis.
TruServ produced a 500 page written projection
containing recommendations for Flegles, referred to hereinafter
as the “1996 projections.”
In the 1996 projections, TruServ
recommended that Flegles would benefit if it expanded to a new
location with a new store containing 28,800 square feet of
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space.
TruServ also recommended that Flegles add a rental
program at the new location.
TruServ allegedly told Flegles
that the rental program could generate annual revenues between
$127,000.00 and $202,000.00.
According to Flegles, TruServ told
Flegles that the expansion would not be successful without the
addition of the rental program.
Later, Flegles would allege
that TruServ knew that the rental program would only generate
average annual revenues of $68,000.00 and would allege that
TruServ’s projections were not customized to Flegles’ particular
needs but were mere “boilerplate”.
In early 1999, Flegles asked TruServ to perform yet
another analysis to make sure that the proposed expansion was
still feasible.
According to TruServ, it prepared three
different projections, one was favorable, one was less favorable
and the other was unfavorable.
According to Flegles, TruServ
only revealed the most favorable projections to Flegles.
Flegles maintains that it did not learn about the other
projections until years later.
Despite the fact that all of TruServ’s projections
contained disclaimers that they were for general guidance only
and that they did not represent a guarantee of future
performance, Flegles claimed that it specifically relied on the
favorable 1999 projections when it decided to build a new store
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at a new location and to add the rental program.
In doing so,
Flegles incurred nearly $3 million in debt.
In the 1999 projections, TruServ made estimates
regarding Flegles’ future sales for the years 2000, 2001 and
2002.
In 2000, Flegles’ sales fell short of TruServ’s
estimation.
In 2001, Flegles’ sales were close to TruServ’s
estimation.
However, in 2002, Flegles’ sales fell far short of
TruServ’s estimation.
In 2000, Carlisle County experienced a
recession in its construction industry; in addition, Flegles
spent more money on advertising and salaries than assumed by
TruServ when it prepared the 1999 projections.
In 2001, western
Kentucky experienced an economic downturn, along with the rest
of the nation, after the terrorist attacks on September 11,
2001.
In early 2002, the beginning of construction season in
Carlisle County was delayed due to poor weather, and a large box
hardware franchise store opened in nearby Paducah that competed
with Flegles.
By the summer of 2002, Flegles decided to seek a loan
from the United States Department of Agriculture.
In its loan
application, Flegles referenced the 1999 projections.
During
that same year, Flegles claimed that it learned for the first
time that TruServ did not have the lowest prices, as it had
advertised for many years.
In fact, according to Flegles, the
ACE hardware cooperative had lower prices.
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To further complicate matters, by the fall of 2002,
Flegles owed an outstanding debt to TruServ.
When TruServ tried
to collect the debt, Flegles became less than cordial and
threatened to sue TruServ over TruServ’s loss of $131 million
due to an inventory accounting error made by the co-op a few
years earlier.
According to Flegles, in early 2000, it learned
that TruServ had lost the $131 million during 1997, 1998 and
1999, and Flegles claimed that TruServ concealed the loss from
its members.
Later, Flegles would claim that had it known about
the $131 million loss, it would not have expanded to the new
location.
Nevertheless, Flegles remained a member of TruServ
until late 2002.
On February 12, 2003, Flegles filed suit against
TruServ in Carlisle Circuit Court.3
In its complaint, Flegles
claimed that TruServ breached the membership agreement between
Flegles and TruServ; committed fraud when it concealed the loss
of $131 million in profits; made negligent misrepresentations
regarding the 1996, 1997 and 1999 projections; breached
fiduciary duties owed to Flegles and fraudulently induced
3
Another hardware store, Elias Family Center, Inc., was named as an
additional plaintiff in the complaint filed in February 2003. Elias is an
Illinois corporation with its principal place of business in Cairo, Illinois.
On July 30, 2004, Carlisle Circuit Court ordered Elias’s claims tried
separately.
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Flegles to enter into a membership agreement with TruServ in
2000.4
The jury trial in the present case began on July 26,
2004, and ended on July 30, 2004.
After the close of the
evidence, the trial court instructed the jury regarding fraud
and fraud in the inducement.
The jury found TruServ liable on
both claims and awarded Flegles $1.3 million in damages.
TruServ immediately moved for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict (JNOV) or, in the alternative, for a new trial.
But the
trial court denied TruServ’s motion and entered judgment against
the co-op.
This appeal, and a subsequent cross-appeal from
Flegles, followed.
TRUSERV’S ARGUMENTS FOR REVERSAL AS A MATTER OF LAW
On appeal, TruServ argues that the trial court erred
when it failed to grant judgment in TruServ’s favor as a matter
of law.
According to TruServ, Flegles’ fraud claim was based on
three allegations:
(1) TruServ made fraudulent
misrepresentations in the 1996 and 1999 projections; (2) TruServ
fraudulently concealed from Flegles that the co-op had lost $131
million in profit between 1997 and 1999; and (3) TruServ
fraudulently advertised that it had the best prices when, in
fact, it did not.
4
TruServ insists that none of these
Flegles raised this claim in an amended complaint.
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allegations justify the jury’s verdict in light of the current
state of the law in this Commonwealth.
TruServ relies on McHargue v. Fayette Coal & Feed Co.5
for the proposition that for a misrepresentation to be used as
the basis for fraud, it must relate to a past or present
material fact, as opposed to a prediction of the future.
TruServ also cites Papa John’s Int’l, Inc. v. Dynamic Pizza,
Inc.6 and Moseley v. Owensboro Municipal Housing Com’n7 and
argues that, in a fraud case, it is unreasonable for a person to
rely upon estimates of future profits.
Finally, TruServ points
out that the projections contained disclaimers that they were
not guarantees of future profitability.
According to TruServ,
Mark Flegle, the president of Flegles, testified that Flegles
was aware of the disclaimers found in the projections.
Thus,
TruServ concludes that Flegles could not have relied upon the
projections as guarantees of future performance.
When this Court reviews a trial court’s decision to
deny a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, we apply
the same standard of review that we use when reviewing a lower
court’s decision to deny a motion for a directed verdict.8
5
283 S.W.2d 170, 172 (Ky. 1955).
6
317 F. Supp. 2d 740, 749 (W.D. Ky. 2004).
7
252 S.W.2d 880, 881 (Ky. 1952).
8
Prichard v. Bank Josephine, 723 S.W.2d 883, 885 (Ky. App. 1987).
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When
a trial court considers a JNOV motion, it must view the evidence
in a light that is most favorable to the opposing party and give
the opposing party every fair and reasonable inference that can
be drawn from the evidence.9
Furthermore, the trial court may
only grant judgment notwithstanding the verdict where “there is
a complete absence of proof on a material issue in the action,
or if no disputed issue or fact exists upon which reasonable men
could differ.”10
It has long been the law in the Commonwealth that to
prevail on a claim of fraud, a plaintiff must establish, by
clear and convincing evidence, six elements:
(1) that the
declarant made a material misrepresentation to the plaintiff,
(2) that this misrepresentation was false, (3) that the
declarant knew it was false or made it recklessly, (4) that the
declarant induced the plaintiff to act upon the
misrepresentation, (5) that the plaintiff relied upon the
misrepresentation, and (6) that the misrepresentation caused
injury to the plaintiff.11
However, as TruServ points out, for a
declarant’s misrepresentation to be used as the basis for fraud,
it must relate to an existing or past fact.12
9
If the alleged
Taylor v. Kennedy, 700 S.W.2d 415, 416 (Ky. App. 1985).
10
Id.
11
United Parcel Service Co. v. Rickert, 996 S.W.2d 464, 468 (Ky. 1999).
12
Edward Brockhaus & Co. v. Gilson, 92 S.W.2d 830, 834 (Ky. 1936).
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misrepresentation relates to a future promise or an opinion of a
future event, then it is not actionable.13
Flegles observes that Kentucky’s highest court has
adopted Section 542 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts which
provides that
[t]he recipient in a business transaction of
a fraudulent misrepresentation of the
maker’s opinion upon facts known to the
recipient is not justified in relying
thereon in a transaction with the maker
unless the opinion is material and the maker
(a) holds himself out as having special
knowledge of the matter which the recipient
does not have, or
(b) stands in a fiduciary or other similar
relation of trust and confidence to the
recipient, or
(c) has successfully endeavored to secure
the confidence of the recipient, or
(d) knows that the recipient will rely on
his opinion.14
While Flegles claims that all four exceptions apply, it insists,
in particular, that TruServ had special knowledge regarding the
projections that Flegles did not have and that TruServ had a
fiduciary relationship with it.
Thus, it concludes, it could
use the projections, which were opinions regarding future
events, as the basis for a fraud claim.
13
Id. See also, McHargue v. Fayette Coal & Feed Co., supra, note 4; Church
v. Eastham, 331 S.W.2d 718 (Ky. 1960); and Rivermont Inn, Inc. v. Bass Hotels
Resorts, Inc., 113 S.W.3d 636 (Ky. App. 2003).
14
Johnson v. Lowery, 270 S.W.2d 943, 945, quoting Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 542 (Ky. 1954).
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Flegles reliance on Johnson v. Lowery is misplaced.
Johnson, a real estate broker who had worked for many years for
Ms. Lowery, agreed to sell Lowery a home he owned.15
Johnson
told Lowery that the value of the property was $26,000.00.
Lowery bought the property, but when she subsequently sold it
she learned it was worth only $17,000.00.16
Lowery sued Johnson
for fraudulent misrepresentation and recovered $9,000.00.17
Johnson claimed that his opinion about the price of the property
was “sales talk” or “puffing.”18
In adopting Section 542 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, the Johnson court held that
Lowery was justified in relying on Johnson’s statement regarding
the purchase price the property.19
In Johnson, the real estate
broker’s statement regarding the purchase price related to an
existing material fact.
In this case, TruServ’s alleged
misrepresentations were opinions regarding future events.
Thus,
Johnson and its exceptions do not apply.
We conclude, therefore, as a matter of law that
Flegles could not base a claim of fraud on the projections
prepared by TruServ since they did not relate to either a past
or an existing fact.
15
Id. at 944.
16
Id. at 945.
17
Id. at 944.
18
Id. at 945.
19
Id.
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At trial, Mark Flegle testified that had Flegles known
about the $131 million loss due to TruServ’s inventory
accounting error, Flegles would not have expanded to the new
location.
According to Mark Flegle, his company needed a strong
hardware co-op with which to expand.
TruServ, on the other
hand, contends that TruServ’s losses during 1997, 1998 and 1999
had no connection with Flegles’ subsequent losses.
Thus,
TruServ argues, to establish fraud Flegles had to prove that
TruServ’s $131 million loss prior to the expansion was the
proximate cause of the losses experienced by Flegles after the
expansion.
And, to establish proximate cause, TruServ contends,
Flegles had to prove more than “but for” causation.20
TruServ
points out that Mark Flegle testified that TruServ’s losses did
not cause Flegles to lose profits after the expansion.
According to TruServ, Flegles failed to prove that TruServ’s
1997, 1998 and 1999 losses proximately caused Flegles’
subsequent losses.
“Proximate cause” is defined as: “1. A cause that is
legally sufficient to result in liability.
2. A cause that
directly produces an event and without which the event would not
have occurred.”21
Flegles claims that TruServ’s loss of $131
million prior to the expansion caused Flegles to lose profits
20
Bruck v. Thompson, 131 S.W.3d 764, 767-768 (Ky. App. 2004).
21
Bryan A. Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary 213 (7th ed. 1999).
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after the expansion.
To support this proposition, Flegles
relies on Mark Flegle’s testimony, noted above, that had Flegles
known about the $131 million loss it would not have expanded
because it required a strong co-op with which to expand.
Flegles does not explain how this testimony establishes
proximate cause, that is, how TruServ’s $131 million loss
directly produced Flegles’ subsequent loss of profits.
So, at
trial, Flegles failed to establish one of the essential elements
of fraud:
causation.
Since it failed to establish causation,
the trial court should have directed a verdict in TruServ’s
favor.
Also at trial, Flegles claimed that TruServ
fraudulently claimed to have the best prices.
Citing McHargue
v. Fayette Coal & Feed Co.,22 TruServ argues that such a claim is
merely “sales talk,” which is also known as “puffing”; and
TruServ insists that “sales talk” can not serve as the basis for
fraud.23
According to TruServ, Flegles has been in the hardware
business since the 1970’s and it has performed comparisons
between TruServ’s prices and the prices of TruServ’s
competitors.
Since Flegles had access to TruServ’s prices and
the prices of TruServ’s competitors, Flegles could not use
TruServ’s sales talk regarding its prices as a basis for fraud.
22
Supra, note 4, at 171.
23
Id. at 172.
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As the McHargue court pointed out, sales talk is a
universal and expected practice.
Accordingly, the court held
that such representations were not actionable as fraud where the
parties have dealt with one another at arm’s length and each
have equal access to the information.24
exceptions to this rule where:
There are four
(1) the declarant holds himself
out as having special knowledge which the recipient does not
have, or (2) the declarant has a fiduciary duty to the
recipient, or (3) the declarant has successfully gained the
confidence of the recipient, or (4) the declarant knows that the
recipient will rely of his opinion.25
However, the exceptions
set forth in Johnson do not apply to this case.
According to
Mark Flegle’s testimony, representatives from various other
hardware co-ops had visited Flegles for many years attempting to
lure the hardware store away from TruServ.
Thus, Flegles would
have had access to pricing information from TruServ’s
competitors.
And, as TruServ points out, Flegles eventually did
its own price comparison between TruServ and its competitors,
although at trial Mark Flegle claimed this document had been
lost during discovery and so was never disclosed to TruServ.
The first exception in Johnson does not apply.
24
Id.
25
Johnson v. Lowery, supra, note 13, at 945.
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The existence of a fiduciary relationship is a
question of fact left for the jury.26
The jury in this case was
not given an opportunity to and did not make a finding of fact
that a fiduciary relationship existed between TruServ and
Flegles.
Thus, the second exception does not apply.
As for the
last two exceptions, there is no evidence that TruServ sought to
gain Flegles’ confidence nor is there evidence that TruServ
expected Flegles to rely on TruServ’s sales talk.
Thus, Flegles
could not use TruServ’s sales talk as the basis for a claim of
fraud.
TRUSERV’S ARGUMENT FOR REVERSAL BASED ON ERRORS DURING VOIR DIRE
TruServ argues that, during the voir dire examination
of potential jurors, several of them openly admitted to being
biased in favor of Flegles.
While there is merit to Truserv’s
argument, we find it unnecessary to address it given our
disposition of this appeal.
FLEGLES’ ARGUMENTS ON CROSS-APPEAL
In Flegles’ complaint, it claimed that TruServ
breached its fiduciary duty and that TruServ made negligent
misrepresentations to Flegles.
Flegles insists that it proved
both of these claims at trial.
Thus, Flegles argues, the trial
court erred when it failed to instruct the jury regarding both
of these claims.
26
See Trieseler v. Helmbacher, 168 S.W.2d 1030, 1036 (Mo. 1943), cited in.
36A Corpus Juris Secundum, Fiduciary (1961).
-14-
Alleged errors regarding jury instructions are
questions of law that this Court reviews de novo.
27
“Instructions must be based upon the evidence and they must
properly and intelligibly state the law.”28
While Flegles’
claims it has proved that TruServ breached its fiduciary duty
and proved TruServ made negligent misrepresentations, it cites
to nothing in the record to support its argument.
Thus, we
assume that the evidence did not support an instruction for
either breach of fiduciary duty or negligent misrepresentation.
CONCLUSION
The judgment is reversed on direct appeal and is
affirmed on cross-appeal.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT:
Jean W. Bird
WYATT, TARRANT & COMBS, LLP
Louisville, Kentucky
Jim L. Flegle
LOEWINSOHN & FLEGLE, L.L.P.
Dallas, Texas
ON BRIEF:
ON BRIEF:
Virginia Hamilton Snell
Louisville, Kentucky
Michael W. Hogancamp
Bardwell, Kentucky
27
Howard v. Commonwealth, 618 S.W.2d 177, 178 (Ky. 1981).
28
Id.
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