D.F., A MINOR v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
MARCH 17, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
ORDERED NOT PUBLISHED BY THE KENTUCKY SUPREME COURT:
OCTOBER 12, 2006
(2006-SC-000283-D)
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-001868-DG
D.F., A MINOR
v.
APPELLANT
ON DISCRETIONARY REVIEW FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE F. KENNETH CONLIFFE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-XX-000023
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; DYCHE AND JOHNSON, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
D.F., a minor, was granted discretionary review
of an opinion and order entered by the Jefferson Circuit Court
on August 12, 2004, which affirmed an amended order of the
Jefferson District Court entered on April 6, 2004, which
modified a dispositional order by changing the amount of
restitution D.F. owed from $14.43 to $214.43.
Having concluded
that the Jefferson District Court retained continuing
jurisdiction over D.F.’s case when it entered the amended
restitution order, we affirm.
Pursuant to KRS1 610.010(1), the juvenile session of
the Jefferson District Court had exclusive jurisdiction over
D.F. in this case because D.F. resided in Jefferson County and
was under eighteen years of age at the time of the burglary.
The Jefferson District Court thereby had jurisdiction to
adjudicate and to dispose of the charge as provided in KRS
610.080.
The District Court adjudicated the truth of the
allegations in the petition on the basis of D.F.’s admitting to
the charge of burglary in the second degree.2
Disposition of the
matter occurred during the same hearing as the adjudication
pursuant to D.F.’s waiver of the bifurcated procedure as
permitted by KRS 610.080.
Under KRS 635.060(1), the District Court had the power
to, and did, order D.F. to make restitution to the burglary
victim “in the sum and upon the conditions as the court
determine[d].”
The dispositional order entered by the District
Court on December 10, 2003, following the adjudication of the
petition against D.F. ordered, inter alia, that restitution for
the damage to a door in the amount of $14.43 be paid within 45
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
2
KRS 511.030.
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days after the entry of the dispositional order.
The District
Court set a hearing for a 90-day review for March 10, 2004.
D.F. tendered the restitution through the court, as
required, within the 45-day period.
However, at the scheduled
review hearing, the Commonwealth informed the District Court, as
well as D.F. and his counsel, that the restitution amount of
$14.43 was incorrect, and the correct amount was $214.43.
Over
D.F.’s objection, the District Court scheduled a hearing
regarding the restitution dispute for April 6, 2004.
At the hearing, the burglary victim testified that she
told the Commonwealth’s Attorney on December 10, 2003, that her
damages as a result of the burglary were $214.43, but that the
prosecutor had misunderstood and had written down the amount
incorrectly as $14.43.
The victim further testified that she
notified the Commonwealth’s Attorney of the mistake when she
received the restitution check in the amount of $14.43.
The
Commonwealth moved to amend the restitution order to include the
additional $200.00 claimed as damages as a result of the
burglary.
After receiving the testimony at the April 6, 2004,
hearing, the District Court ruled that restitution in the amount
of $214.43 had been proved and ordered D.F. to pay an additional
$200.00 for restitution at $25.00 per month.
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The District Court
also ruled that the requirement under Workman v. Commonwealth,3
that the Commonwealth honor a plea bargain agreement was not
applicable to the matter because the prosecutor had a
misunderstanding regarding the amount of damages incurred by the
burglary victim.
D.F. appealed the amended dispositional order
to the Jefferson Circuit Court which affirmed the District Court
in an opinion and order entered on August 12, 2004.
This Court
granted discretionary review.
D.F. argues that the juvenile court did not have
jurisdiction to amend the dispositional order entered on
December 10, 2003, after the expiration of ten days following
its entry.4
D.F. claims the original dispositional order was a
final order for the purposes of CR 59.05 because it adjudicated
“all the rights of all the parties in an action or
proceeding[.]”5
Additionally, D.F. asserts that the original
dispositional order was a final order pursuant to KRS 610.130,
which permits the taking of an appeal from such an order to the
circuit court as a matter of right.
D.F. argues that the
original dispositional order was a final order and the
Commonwealth’s motion to amend was untimely.
3
He also argues
580 S.W.2d 206 (Ky. 1979).
4
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 59.05; Crane v. Commonwealth, 833
S.W.2d 813, 818 (Ky. 1992).
5
CR 54.01.
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that the Commonwealth improperly breached its plea agreement
with him when it moved to amend the dispositional order to
increase the amount of restitution.6
The Commonwealth asserts that the juvenile court acted
within its jurisdiction in amending the dispositional order to
increase the amount of restitution because the Unified Juvenile
Code gives the juvenile court “continuing jurisdiction” over a
child when a dispositional order is entered.7
The Commonwealth
relies on KRS 610.010(13), which provides as follows:
The court shall have continuing
jurisdiction over a child pursuant to
subsection (1) of this section, to review
dispositional orders, and to conduct
permanency hearings under 42 U.S.C. sec.
675(5)(c) until the child is placed for
adoption, returned home to his or her
parents with all the court imposed
conditions terminated, or reaches the age of
eighteen (18) years [emphases added].
Based upon this “continuing jurisdiction,” the
Commonwealth argues that the District Court acted within its
jurisdiction in amending the dispositional order to increase the
amount of restitution.
The Commonwealth contends that the
amended dispositional order was in accordance with the intent of
the Unified Juvenile Code to advance “principles of personal
6
Workman, 580 S.W.2d at 206.
7
KRS 610.010(13).
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responsibility” and “accountability”8 and that the District
Court’s action was authorized.
The Commonwealth argues that a
distinction should be made between juvenile court cases and
criminal court cases because the dispositional alternatives are
more lenient for juveniles than adults.
Further, the
Commonwealth asserts that it has not breached a plea agreement
with D.F. because juvenile proceedings are not undertaken to
obtain a criminal conviction.
We agree with the Commonwealth that in light of the
continuing jurisdiction granted to the District Court by KRS
610.010(13), CR 59.05 does not apply to the entry of the
dispositional order.
KRS 610.010(13) grants the juvenile
session of the District Court “continuing jurisdiction” to
“review” a previously entered dispositional order.
“All
statutes of this state shall be liberally construed with a view
to promote their objects and carry out the intent of the
legislature[.]”9
“The primary purpose of judicial construction
is to carry out the intent of the legislature” [citations
omitted].10
It is clear in the case before us that the Jefferson
District Court intended to exercise this jurisdiction when it
8
KRS 600.010(2)(e).
9
KRS 446.080(1).
10
Commonwealth v. Kash, 967 S.W.2d 37, 43 (Ky.App. 1997).
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scheduled a review hearing for 90 days following the entry of
the original dispositional order against D.F.
Such review is
proper so the juvenile court can ensure that a previously
entered order is being complied with by the child and any other
persons covered by the order.
If there is noncompliance, the
court can use its contempt powers against a child to enforce a
prior order issued by the court.11
We conclude from the overall
purpose of the Unified Juvenile Code that it was the intent of
the legislature that the grant of “continuing jurisdiction” set
out in KRS 610.010(13) include the continuing power to amend or
to modify a previously entered dispositional order.
As to D.F.’s claim that under Workman the Commonwealth
should not be allowed “to disregard promises and fail to perform
bargains,”12 we note that D.F. has not asked the District Court
to allow him to withdraw his plea.
However, in view of the
equities in this case (i.e., D.F. is only being ordered to pay
the victim the restitution she is rightly due) we do not see how
the District Court’s refusal to allow D.F. to withdraw his plea
would be an abuse of discretion.13
Based on the foregoing, the opinion and order of the
Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed.
11
KRS 610.010(10).
12
Workman, 580 S.W.2d at 207.
13
See Bronk v. Commonwealth, 58 S.W.3d 482, 487 (Ky. 2001).
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Frank W. Heft, Jr.
Linda J. Noll
Louisville, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANT:
Linda J. Noll
Louisville, Kentucky
David A. Sexton
Special Assistant Attorney
General
Louisville, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE:
David A. Sexton
Special Assistant Attorney
General
Louisville, Kentucky
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