R.F. v. R.P.H.
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RENDERED: MAY 26, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
MODIFIED: JULY 21, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-001411-MR
R.F.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE KEVIN L. GARVEY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 87-FP-004739
v.
R.P.H.
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
TACKETT AND TAYLOR, JUDGES; EMBERTON,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
TACKETT, JUDGE:
R.F. appeals from an order of the Jefferson
Family Court dismissing her motion to set aside a 1990 judgment
in her paternity action against R.P.H.
R.F., who represents
herself, presents no legal arguments in her support of her
motion, rather she relies on a lengthy recitation of facts in an
attempt to persuade this Court that the trial court ruled
1
Senior Judge Thomas D. Emberton sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
incorrectly.
We disagree and affirm the decision of the family
court.
R.F. filed a paternity action in Jefferson District
Court in 1987 seeking to have R.P.H. adjudged the father of her
unborn child.
The child was born June 17, 1988.
R.F. and
R.P.H. signed an agreed order, dated September 13, 1990,
dismissing the paternity action with prejudice.
The parties
were both represented by attorneys at the time.
R.F. contends
that there was an agreement between the parties regarding child
support; however, such an agreement has never been made a part
of any court record.
In fact, R.F. states in her brief that she
considered signing the agreement and decided not to.
In February 2004, R.F. filed a motion, through
counsel, asking the Family Court to set aside the 1990 order
which had dismissed her paternity action against R.P.H.
According to a note on the March 5, 2004, court calendar, the
case was passed until May 7th after counsel advised the court
that the parties planned to arrange for DNA tests.
After citing
her failure to cooperate with him, R.F.’s counsel was permitted
to withdraw from her case at the end of May.
She subsequently
filed a pro se motion requesting, among other things, that
R.P.H. be held in contempt of court for failure to comply with a
non-existent court order to undergo DNA testing.
R.P.H. filed a
motion with a supporting memorandum requesting that the action
-2-
be dismissed.
On July 16, 2004, the Family Court entered an
order stating that the “case was dismissed with prejudice on 913-90.
[Plaintiff] has no standing to bring any of these
motions.”
This appeal followed.
As previously stated, R.F. cites no legal precedents
in support of her argument that the trial court erroneously
dismissed her motion.
Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (CR)
60.02 allows the court to set aside its previous judgment
against a party on the following grounds:
(a)
mistake, inadvertence, surprise or
excusable neglect;
(b) newly discovered evidence which by due
diligence could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new
trial under Rule 59.02;
(c) perjury or falsified evidence;
(d) fraud affecting the proceedings, other
than perjury or falsified evidence;
(e) the judgment is void, or has been
satisfied, released, or discharged, or
a prior judgment upon which it is based
has been reversed or otherwise vacated,
or it is no longer equitable that the
judgment should have prospective
application; or
(f) any other reason of an extraordinary
nature justifying relief.
The motion shall be made within a
reasonable time, and on grounds (a), (b),
and (c) not more than one year after the
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered
or taken. A motion under this rule does not
affect the finality of a judgment or suspend
its operation.
R.F. does not cite to CR 60.02, nor does she argue any of the
grounds contained in the rule in support of her motion to set
-3-
aside the 1990 judgment.
Further, CR 60.02 requires that
motions to set aside final judgment be filed within a reasonable
time, or on grounds (a), (b) and (c), within one year of the
entry of judgment.
R.F. fails to present any legal grounds
which would entitle her to have the 1990 agreed order set aside.
Consequently, the judgment of the Jefferson Family
Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
R.F., Pro se
Steven J. Kriegshaber
Louisville, Kentucky
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