ASHLEY JUDSON PARKER v. NATHAN SETH PARKER and NATHAN SETH PARKER v. ASHLEY J. PARKER (NOW NESBIT)
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RENDERED: May 24, 2002; 10:00 a.m.
ORDERED NOT PUBLISHED BY THE KENTUCKY SUPREME COURT:
MARCH 12, 2003
(2002-SC-0683-D)
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court Of Appeals
NO.
2001-CA-000453-MR
ASHLEY JUDSON PARKER
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HOPKINS CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CHARLES W. BOTELER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-00447
NATHAN SETH PARKER
AND:
APPELLEE
NO. 2001-CA-000481-MR
NATHAN SETH PARKER
v.
CROSS-APPELLANT
CROSS-APPEAL FROM HOPKINS CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CHARLES W. BOTELER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-00447
ASHLEY J. PARKER (NOW NESBIT)
CROSS-APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING ON DIRECT APPEAL NO. 2001-CA-000453-MR;
VACATING AND REMANDING ON CROSS-APPEAL NO. 2001-CA-000481-MR
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, MILLER, AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
MILLER, JUDGE:
Ashley Judson Parker brings Appeal No. 2001-CA-
000453-MR and Nathan Seth Parker brings Cross-Appeal No. 2001CA-000481-MR from a February 1, 2001 order of the Hopkins
Circuit Court.
We reverse on Appeal No. 2001-CA-000453-MR; we
vacate and remand on Cross-Appeal No. 2001-CA-000481-MR.
Nathan and Ashley were married June 24, 1995.
One
child, Mary Alexandria, was born of the marriage on December 19,
1996.
Neither party was employed during the marriage.
was the beneficiary of two substantial trusts.
Nathan
The
distributions from the trusts provided the parties' income and
allowed for a high standard of living.
On April 1, 1997, Nathan was notified by the Superior
Court of New Jersey that an order for child support would be
entered against him April 15, 1997 in a paternity action.
This
action involved a child born in New Jersey in 1994 as a result
of an earlier relationship.
The order required Nathan to
disclose his assets for the three years prior to the order.
On
the same day, April 1, 1997, Nathan transferred $186,760.90 into
a credit union account in Fort Campbell, Kentucky, which Ashley
held jointly with her mother, Mary J. Poole.
About two months
later, he transferred $94,242.75 into a separate “investment
account” in Ashley's name only with Harris Bank.
Nathan
ultimately settled the paternity action before filing any asset
disclosure with the New Jersey court.
Nathan and Ashley separated in March of 1998.
filed the instant action for dissolution July 6, 1998.
Ashley
The
matter was referred to a Domestic Relations Commissioner (DRC),
who filed a report and recommendation.
both parties.
Exceptions were taken by
The circuit court adopted the DRC's
recommendations in part, but granted some exceptions.
The
circuit court found, inter alia, that the parties should have
joint custody of the infant child with Ashley having “final
decision-making power”; that Nathan's income for the purposes of
computing child support was $275,000.00 a year, with a
$25,000.00 deduction for child support paid to his child in New
Jersey.
The circuit court further ordered that the funds
transferred to the Fort Campbell credit union account and the
Harris investment account be returned to Nathan as his nonmarital property.
This appeal and cross-appeal follow.
ASHLEY'S APPEAL NO. 2001-CA-000453-MR
Ashley contends the circuit court erred in restoring
to Nathan the funds which he placed in her hands to avoid the
impact of the New Jersey court.
The circuit court restored the
funds to Nathan as non-marital property.
We believe this was
error.
The funds were, of course, non-marital, but this begs
the question of whether the equitable powers of the court may be
invoked to cause their return to Nathan.
Ashley desires to invoke the ancient equitable maxim
that one who seeks equity must come with clean hands.
Sherman v. Sherman, 290 Ky. 237, 160 S.W.2d 637 (1942).
See
The
circuit court, in fact, found that the money was transferred in
an attempt to circumvent the New Jersey court:
It is the [circuit court's] finding that the
transfers were made to avoid disclosure to
the New Jersey court.
This finding is the predicate of Ashley's claim that Nathan
should not recover the funds.
She insists that Nathan's placing
of the funds in her hands to evade action of the New Jersey
court was sufficient evidence of wrongdoing to violate the
clean-hands doctrine.
This being so, she claims Nathan may not
invoke the power of equity to cause their restoration.
It is well established that equity will not lend its
aid to a party who attempts to defraud his creditors by
transferring title of property to another.
See Asher v. Asher,
278 Ky. 802, 129 S.W.2d 552 (1939); Ballance v. Ballance, 213
Ky. 73, 280 S.W. 473 (1926).
In Eline Realty Company v. Foeman, Ky., 252 S.W.2d 15
(1952), Eline transferred real property to Foeman for tax
evasion purposes.
Foeman, who was in a lower tax bracket, sold
the property to a third party and incurred reduced tax
liability.
Eline reimbursed Foeman for the taxes.
In
subsequent litigation between the parties, Eline sought credit
for the reimbursement made to Foeman.
The Court refused and
reasoned as follows:
In all cases involving moral delinquency or
turpitude, all parties participating are
deemed to be in pari delicto. (Citations
omitted). Equity will not relieve one party
against another where both are in pari
delicto. (Citation omitted).
Id. at 19.
In such a case, equity will leave the parties where
it finds them.
Id.; see also Ballance, 280 S.W. 473.
In the present case, Ashley and Nathan together
attempted to hide assets from the New Jersey court by
transferring the funds in question from Nathan to Ashley.
This
constituted an in pari delicto attempt to defraud the court.
We are aware the clean-hands doctrine is not
inflexible and may be applied in consideration of the relative
culpability of the parties.
Cf. USACO Coal Company v. Carbomin
Energy, Inc., 689 F.2d 94 (6th Cir. 1982).
It is hard, however,
to find greater culpability than that of attempting to defraud a
court.
It was Nathan and not Ashley who sought to lessen his
child support obligation in New Jersey by transferring funds to
the latter.
Certainly, such an act is more egregious than the
transfer of real estate for the purpose of evading a levy of
execution.
See Asher, 129 S.W.2d 552.
Finally, we note that Nathan tries to escape the
clean-hands doctrine by pointing out that he had settled his New
Jersey litigation before he was required to make financial
disclosure.
Perforce, he argues there was no fraud upon the New
Jersey court.
We cannot offer him succor in this contention.
The dispute here is not with the New Jersey court.
Rather, it
is a dispute with Ashley, with whom he stands in pari delicto.
Had there been a dispute with the New Jersey court, perhaps his
failure to consummate the fraud would have been material.
Here,
where the dispute is between two individuals of unclean hands,
we think the failure to consummate the fraud upon the New Jersey
court is of no consequence.
In sum, we are of the opinion that the circuit court
erred in ordering restoration of the funds to Nathan.
We think
the funds should remain with Ashley; this being the situation in
which the court found the parties.
NATHAN'S CROSS-APPEAL NO. 2001-CA-000481-MR
Nathan maintains that the circuit court erred by
making Ashley “final decision-maker” in an award of joint
custody.
We agree.1
“[J]oint custody envisions shared decision-making and
extensive parental involvement in the child's upbringing, and in
general serves the child's best interest.”
Squires v. Squires,
Ky., 854 S.W.2d 765, 769 (1993); see also Chalupa v. Chalupa,
Ky. App., 830 S.W.2d 391 (1992); Burchell v. Burchell, Ky. App.,
684 S.W.2d 296 (1984).
“The inherent nature of joint custody
negates the possibility of vesting one parent with the primary
authority to make decisions concerning the upbringing of the
child.”
Aton v. Aton, Ky. App., 911 S.W.2d 612, 614 (1995).
Upon the above authority, we are of the opinion the circuit
court, in purporting to grant joint custody while using the
limiting language of sole custody, failed to render a valid
award of custody.
incongruous.
Such custody arrangement is legally
As we understand the law, it does not permit the
granting of joint custody on one hand, and, on the other hand,
vesting primary decision-making power in one party.
In sum, we vacate the judgment of the circuit court
and remand this cause for reconsideration as to custody of the
infant child, at which time appropriate child support shall be
considered.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Hopkins
Circuit Court is reversed on Appeal No. 2001-CA-000453-MR, and
1In her direct appeal, Ashley also maintained that the
circuit court erred in fixing child support. As we view the
circuit court's award of custody improper, we deem this
assignment of error moot.
vacated and remanded on Cross-Appeal No. 2001-CA-000481-MR.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT/CROSSAPPELLEE:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE/CROSSAPPELLANT:
William A. Nisbet III
Madisonville, Kentucky
Michael Davidson
Lexington, Kentucky
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