DUANE COPASS AND RUTH COPASS, HIS WIFE v. MONROE COUNTY MEDICAL FOUNDATION, INC.; NATIONAL EMERGENCY SERVICES, INC.; AND STEVE L. JENSEN, M.D.
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RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 21, 2001; 2:00 p.m.
MODIFIED: NOVEMBER 21, 2001; 10:00 a.m.
ORDERED NOT PUBLISHED BY THE KENTUCKY SUPREME COURT:
AUGUST 14, 2002 (2001-SC-1062-D)
C o m m o n w e a l t h O f K e n t uc k y
C o urt O f A ppe a l s
NO.
2000-CA-001132-MR
DUANE COPASS AND
RUTH COPASS, HIS WIFE
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM MONROE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAUL BARRY JONES, JUDGE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 95-CI-00152
v.
MONROE COUNTY MEDICAL FOUNDATION, INC.;
NATIONAL EMERGENCY SERVICES, INC.; AND
STEVE L. JENSEN, M.D.
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, GUIDUGLI, AND HUDDLESTON, JUDGES.
BARBER, JUDGE:
The Appellants are Duane Copass ACopass@) and
(
Ruth Copass, his wife.
Duane Copass became paralyzed as the
result of an epidural bleed and hematoma which occurred during
his convalescence from back surgery.
The Copasses raise three
issues on appeal claiming (1) the trial court abused its
discretion by refusing to allow Copass’s expert, Dr. Ravenscraft,
to testify about the standard of care; (2) the trial court erred
in concluding that if the jury had found the emergency room
physician to be negligent, such negligence would have been too
remote in time to constitute a causative factor; and (3) the
trial court erred in directing a verdict against plaintiffs for
failing to meet their burden of proof on standard of care.
On September 17, 1992, Copass underwent a lumbar fusion
performed by Dr. Glassman in Louisville, Kentucky.
Following
his discharge from the hospital, Copass returned home to
Tompkinsville.
On the afternoon of Saturday, September 26, 1992,
Copass experienced sudden, severe low back pain uncontrolled by
medication.
He was unable to urinate.
Copass was taken by
ambulance to Monroe County Medical Center in the early morning of
Sunday, September 27, 1992.
Copass was seen in the emergency room by Dr. Steven
Jensen, a urology resident, who had been licensed to practice
medicine for three months.
At the time, Dr. Jensen was
moonlighting through National Emergency Services, Inc., which had
contracted with the Medical Center to provide physicians to work
in the E.R.
Dr. Jensen drained Copass’s bladder using a catheter
and consulted with Dr. Kenneth Crabtree, Copass’s family
physician, by phone.
Center.
Dr. Crabtree admitted Copass to the Medical
Approximately 26 hours after Copass’s admission, his
lower extremities became permanently paralyzed.
Dr. Jensen testified that he completed four years of
medical school at the University of Utah and a one-year general
surgery internship at the University of Kentucky (July 1991 to
July 1992) before entering the urology (residency) program.
Interns work under the supervision of an attending physician and
-2-
are not licensed to practice medicine.
During his internship,
Jensen had rotated through different fields of surgery.
Jensen
told the jury that complications can occur with any type of
surgery.
As an intern, he would inform surgery patients of
possible surgical complications using a standard form devised by
the University.
Jensen named several categories of surgical
complications: death, respiratory complications, bleeding,
infection, bowel difficulties, urinary retention/incontinence,
pain and clots.
The Copasses contend that Dr. Jensen failed to
recognize the signs and symptoms of a surgical complication -- an
epidural hematoma -- when he saw Copass in the E.R.
They further
contend that had Dr. Jensen done so he could have transferred
Copass to a surgeon in time to evacuate the hematoma, which would
have prevented paralysis.
According to Dr. Jensen, the Medical
Center did not have MRI or myelogram capabilities, nor did it
have a neurologist or neurosurgeon on call in September 1992.
At trial, the Copasses called Dr. Howard Ravenscraft as
their expert witness to testify about the standard of care that
Dr. Jensen should have exercised.
Dr. Ravenscraft’s discovery
deposition had previously been taken.
Dr. Ravenscraft testified
at trial about his education, training and experience.
A
graduate of the University of Louisville School of Medicine, Dr.
Ravenscraft, began practicing in 1956 and practiced continuously
until his retirement in May 1998.
He testified that he has more
than 42 years of Ahand-on experience treating patients.
@
-3-
Dr.
Ravenscraft has acted as a consultant since the mid-1970’s.
He
is licensed to practice in Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio, and he is
board-certified in family practice.
His current certification is
effective until the year 2003.
Dr. Ravenscraft served as an adjunct clinical professor
at U.K. taking senior medical students into his practice for
hands-on training.
Prior to the recognition of emergency room
medicine as a Aboard-certifiable specialty, Dr. Ravenscraft
@
served on three different emergency room committees at St.
Elizabeth Hospital Medical Center and at St. Luke Hospitals, East
and West, which involved hiring, discussing contracts and setting
up schedules.
Dr. Ravenscraft has specialized training in
anesthesiology, and he completed what he called a
Aminiresidency@ at Indiana University.
Dr. Ravenscraft explained that
in the years before there were any board-certified
anesthesiologists in Northern Kentucky, where he practiced, he
was approached by some other physicians to take additional
training in anesthesiology.
Doctors in the emergency room would
contact Dr. Ravenscraft when they wanted to put their patients on
respirators.
During this time, Dr. Ravencroft was called to the
E.R. once or twice a week to intubate patients.
Although never a Asalaried employee of a hospital
@
E.R., Dr. Ravenscraft has treated patients in the E.R.
He
explained that he saw his own patients if they presented to the
E.R. while he was in the hospital making rounds.
-4-
The physician
in the E.R. would stabilize the patient, then Dr. Ravenscraft
would come to the E.R. to examine the patient and make the
decision whether or not to admit the patient to the hospital.
Additionally, Dr. Ravenscraft provided emergency medical care to
patients in his own office.
Dr. Ravenscraft testified that he
had a very large family practice, Acradle to grave equipped with
@
an emergency room with a separate entrance.
The clinic was
located about ten miles from the hospital on a major interchange
near the airport.
Dr. Ravenscraft explained that he took care of
a lot of trauma from the interstate, provided emergency care and
kept a lot of people from having to go to the hospital E.R.
At trial, the court granted a motion to exclude Dr.
Ravenscraft’s testimony about the standard of care of an
emergency room physician on the ground that he was not qualified.
At the conclusion of their case in chief, the trial court entered
a directed verdict against the CopassesC
At the conclusion of Plaintiffs’ case in
chief, Defendant, Monroe County Medical
Foundation, Inc. moved for a Directed Verdict
on various grounds, including that the
Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of
proof, as they were unable to present
evidence of a prima facie case of medical
malpractice through the testimony of a duly
qualified expert witness.
AThe burden of proof in a malpractice case
is, of course, on the party charging
negligence or wrong. Johnson v. Vaughn
@
,
Ky., 370 S.W.2d 591, 596 (1963). The
Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden
of proof as they have been unable to put on
evidence of a prima facie case of medical
malpractice. The Plaintiffs are required to
present evidence that Dr. Jensen breached his
-5-
duty owed to his patient, Mr. Copass, and
that Mr. Copass’s injury was the result of
that breach.
Because this is a case of medical
malpractice, the Plaintiffs must present
expert testimony on both the issues of
causation and liability. AThe rule of
malpractice cases is that negligence must be
established by medical or expert testimony
unless the negligence and injurious results
are so apparent that laymen with a general
knowledge would have no difficulty in
recognizing it. Harmon v. Rust Ky., 420
@
,
S.W.2d 563, 564 (1967) (citing Johnson v.
Vaughn, Ky., 370 S.W.2d 591 (1963)[)].
In this action, the only standard of care
expert identified by the Plaintiffs was
Howard Ravenscraft, M.D. However Dr.
,
Ravenscraft does not possess the education,
training or experience necessary to qualify
him as an expert in emergency medicine, and
thus he was prohibited from expressing any
opinions concerning the standard of care
expected of emergency room physicians and
whether Dr. Jensen met that standard of care
when he examined Mr. Copass. Without expert
testimony concerning that Dr. Jensen breached
the standard of care, the Plaintiffs fail to
meet their burden of proof, and thus the
Defendant, Monroe County Medical Foundation,
Inc., is entitled to a directed verdict. The
Court, therefore, directed a verdict in favor
of the Defendant, Monroe County Medical
Foundation, Inc., and dismissed the Complaint
of Plaintiffs, Duane and Ruth Copass, against
said Defendant, with the objection of the
Plaintiffs duly noted.
In addition, the Defendant, Monroe County
Medical Center, and the Third-Party
Defendant, Dr. Steven Jensen, move the Court
for a directed verdict on the basis that the
evidence . . . demonstrated that Dr. Jensen
saw the Plaintiff for a 30-minute period at
5:00 a.m. on Sunday, September 27, 1992, in
the . . . Emergency Room and, therefore, Mr.
Copass was admitted to the Monroe County
Hospital under the exclusive care of his
family physician Dr. Kenneth Crabtree. The
-6-
undisputed evidence demonstrated that Dr.
Jensen, from the time that Duane Copass was
admitted . . . under the care of Dr. Kenneth
Crabtree, had no further authority or
responsibility for the care or treatment of
Duane Copass.
Although the evidence in this case was
somewhat inconclusive as to the exact time
that Duane Copass’s condition causing his
lower extremity paralysis became
irreversible, it is clear from the undisputed
evidence that Mr. Copass continued to be able
to move his legs up until late evening on
Sunday, September 20, 1992, and therefore,
had he had proper surgical intervention
before [sic] experienced total paralysis,
his condition would not have resulted in
Duane Copass’s loss of the use of his lower
extremities.
. . . .
The Defendant, Monroe County Medical Hospital
[sic], and the Third-Party Defendant, Dr.
Steven Jensen, as an additional part of their
Motion for Directed Verdict, maintain that
even if a jury should have concluded Dr.
Jensen somehow was negligent, then his
evaluation of care of the Plaintiff (such
showing in fact was not made by the
Plaintiffs for the reasons stated above)
would be too remote in time so as to
constitute a causative factor of the
Plaintiffs’ damages. Given the lapse of time
from when Dr. Steven Jensen had any
responsibility or control over the care and
management of Duane Copass that such care had
become the direct responsibility of his
family physician who had admitted Duane
Copass to the Monroe County Medical Center,
the Court further finds that the aforesaid
motion of the Defendant and Co-Defendant are
meritorious and serve as an independent
additional basis for a directed verdict.
(Emphasis added.)
The Copasses filed a motion for a new trial which was
denied by order entered April 5, 2000.
-7-
The court stated:
[T]he Plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial
. . . is overruled. The present sitting
Judge did not preside over the trial or enter
the Judgment in this action . . . .
While the present sitting Judge may have
ruled differently and may not agree with the
former Judge, extreme caution should be
exercised in undertaking to review a Judgment
of his predecessor. This Judge has the
authority to set the Judgment aside and grant
a new trial. However, respect for the
Judicial process will be best served for the
Judgment to be reviewed by an Appellate
Court.
The Copasses filed their notice of appeal on May 2,
2000.
Their first argument on appeal is that the trial court
abused its discretion by refusing to allow their expert, Dr.
Ravenscraft, to testify about standard of care. A[A]buse of
discretion is the proper standard of review of a trial court's
evidentiary rulings." Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Thompson
,
Ky., 11 S.W.3d 575, 577 (2000)
.
The Medical Center contends that the Copasses failed to
preserve the issue because they did not offer Dr. Ravenscraft’s
testimony concerning standard of care by avowal.
Kentucky Rules
of Civil Procedure (CR) 43.10.
The Copasses reply that Dr. Ravenscraft’s opinion is of
record contained in supplemental answers to interrogatories filed
December 1, 1997 and in his deposition filed March 19, 1998.
The Copasses provide references to Dr. Ravenscraft’s deposition
testimony regarding his opinion that Dr. Jensen deviated from the
standard of care.
Although the Copasses designated the entire
original record, it does not include depositions not read at
-8-
trial.
CR 75.01(1) provides, in part, that:AThe designation
shall . . . list any depositions or portions thereof as have been
filed with the clerk but were not read into evidence and are thus
required by Rule 75.07(1) to be excluded from the record on
appeal.@
Richman v. First Sec. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. Ky. App.,
,
652 S.W.2d 671 (1983).
Nevertheless, neither Appellee has moved
to strike portions of the reply brief referring to Dr.
Ravenscraft’s deposition testimony, nor have they raised
noncompliance with CR 75.01 as an issue; thus, we consider any
objection waived.
AThe purpose of an avowal is to permit a reviewing
court to have the information needed to consider the ruling of
the trial court.
@
461 (1988).
Underhill v. Stephenson Ky., 756 S.W.2d 459,
,
We have sufficient information to properly consider
whether the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that Dr.
Ravenscraft did not possess the education, training or experience
necessary to qualify him to express an expert opinion in this
case.
KRE 702 provides: AIf scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified
as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise.@
Appellees devote pages of their well-researched
briefs to a discussion of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), and
-9-
its progeny; however, we do not believe that analysis applies
here.
Rather, we believe this case is more akin toCollins v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 951 S.W.2d 569 (1997).
In Collins, the
appellant challenged the testimony of a physician who had
testified as both the treating physician of a sexual abuse victim
and as an expert in the physical aspects of child sexual abuse
cases, although there is no recognized specialty in child sexual
abuse in Kentucky:
Appellant also challenges the substance of
Dr. Bates's testimony on the grounds that it
did not satisfy the test set forth inDaubert
. . . . Daubert provides that when faced
with a proffer of expert scientific
testimony, the trial court must determine at
a preliminary hearing "whether the expert is
proposing to testify to (1) scientific
knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of
fact to understand or determine a fact in
issue." Id. at 592, 113 S.Ct. at 2796. The
Daubert decision was based upon the Supreme
Court's interpretation of Federal Rule of
Evidence 702 . . . . Kentucky Rule of
Evidence 702 contains the same language as
its federal counterpart . . . .
. . . .
This Court adopted the Daubert analysis in
Mitchell v. Commonwealth 908 S.W.2d 100
,
(1995). The Mitchell opinion discusses the
factors a lower court should consider in
determining the admissibility of expert
scientific testimony, including whether the
theory or technique can be tested; whether it
has been subjected to peer review; whether it
has been generally accepted; and the known or
potential rate of error. Id. at 102.
Having articulated that Kentucky follows the
Daubert analysis for the admissibility of
scientific evidence, we conclude that such
analysis is not, in fact, triggered in this
case. Daubert and Mitchell use the catch
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phrases "expert scientific testimony,
@
"theory," "technology," and "methodology."
Dr. Bates's testimony, on the other hand,
concerned basic female anatomical findings.
Her examinations did not involve any novel
scientific techniques or theories. . . . We
discern nothing of a scientific nature to
trigger the necessity of applying theDaubert
analysis.
In accordance with KRE 702, Dr. Bates was
qualified as an expert based upon her
knowledge, experience and training. Her
testimony clearly assisted the trier of fact
to understand a fact in issue . . . .
Id. at 574-575.
In the case sub judice, Dr. Ravenscraft’s opinion is
not based upon some untested theory; rather his opinion concerns
facts in issue, such as recognition of the signs and symptoms of
a hematoma following recent back surgery and the standard of
medical care.
The Medical Center asserts that the trial court
ruled Dr. Ravenscraft was not qualified to testify due to his
Alack of any experience in actually practicing emergency medicine
. . . .@
The Medical Center states that A[w]ithout the
specialized training and experience required to practice
emergency medicine, Dr. Ravenscraft’s offered testimony lacked
. . . [a] reliable basis . . . .
@
We consider the Medical
Center’s attack upon Dr. Ravenscraft’s qualifications close to an
admission that it had an unqualified physician covering its own
E.R. on September 27, 1992.
emergency medicine.
Dr. Jensen did not specialize in
He was a urology resident who had just
completed a one-year general surgery internship.
-11-
Dr. Jensen
lacked experience practicing in any field of medicine because he
had only been licensed to practice for three months.
In Owensboro Mercy Health System v. Payne Ky. App., 24
,
S.W.3d 675 (1999), this Court declined to promulgate a blanket
rule regarding the qualification of a physician to express an
opinion on medical matters outside his area of expertise.
In
that case, the hospital argued that a pulmonary specialist was
incompetent to testify about standard of care and breach of that
standard by the hospital and its staff in treating post-op
patients being transferred to the ICU.
This Court held that the
pulmonary specialist, although Anot experienced in post-operative
care, he was competent to testify regarding the effects of
anesthetic on the pulmonary system and the measures required to
prevent medical tragedy.
@
Id. at 678.
Any lack of specialized
training goes only to the weight not the competency of the expert
testimony.
Id. at 677.
Dr. Ravenscraft is competent to testify as an expert in
this case based upon the entirety of his education and training,
his 40-plus years of experience in aAcradle to grave family
@
practice, his knowledge of the E.R. setting, as well as his
actual experience treating his own patients in the E.R. and
providing emergency medical care in his own clinic.
The trial
court abused its discretion in excluding Dr. Ravenscraft’s
testimony.
In light of our determination, we do not reach the
issue of whether the trial court erred in directing a verdict on
-12-
the ground that the Copasses failed to meet their burden of proof
on standard of care.
The remaining issue is whether the trial court erred in
determining that had the jury found Dr. Jensen to be negligent,
his negligence would have been Atoo remote in time to be a
@
causative factor.
In their motion for directed verdict,
Appellees had argued the remoteness in time between Dr. Jensen’s
care and Copass’s paralysis severed any causal connection.
The
court found this argument Ameritorious@ and an Aindependent
additional basis for the directed verdict.
@
Appellants rely upon NKC Hospitals, Inc. v. Anthony
,
Ky. App., 849 S.W.2d 564 (1993).
There, plaintiff’s decedent,
Margaret Anthony, was 30 weeks along in an uneventful pregnancy.
She was taken to the E.R. on the evening of September 5, 1989
with nausea, vomiting and abdominal pain.
Despite her continued
pain, the treating obstetrician discharged Mrs. Anthony from the
hospital the next morning.
At the time of her discharge, Mrs.
Anthony had not been clinically seen or examined by a physician.
Mrs. Anthony returned to the hospital later the same morning, and
she was readmitted.
The next day, September 7, it was determined
that she had a serious respiratory problem.
was transferred to ICU.
by Cesarian section.
On September 8, she
On September 9, the baby was delivered
At that time, it was determined that Mrs.
Anthony had a perforation of the appendix at the large bowel,
which was undetected at the time of the first admission.
Mrs.
Anthony died three weeks later, still in the hospital, of acute
-13-
adult respiratory distress syndrome, a complication of the delay
in diagnosis.
The jury attributed causation 65% to the obstetrician
and 35% to the hospital.
As did Dr. Crabtree, in the case
sub
judice, the treating obstetrician had settled prior to trial.
On
appeal, the hospital argued the trial court erred in failing to
direct a verdict.
The hospital contended that no negligence was
committed by the hospital after Mrs. Anthony’s readmission on
September 6, reasoning that the obstetrician’s conduct became the
superseding cause of Mrs. Anthony’s death,Abreaking the chain of
causation and cutting short the negligence and liability of the
hospital.@
NKC Hospitals, Inc. v. Anthony 849 S.W.2d at 567.
,
That is essentially the Appellees’ argumentB that after Mr.
Copass was admitted to the Medical Center as Dr. Crabtree’s
patient, Dr. Jensen was no longer responsible, and Dr. Crabtree’s
conduct became the superseding cause of Copass’s paralysis.
The Court of Appeals explained thatA[n]egligence may
rest on an omission as comfortably as positive acts; the
consequence is the same.
@
Id.
The hospital’s defense of
superseding cause Apresupposes, ipso facto, negligence on its on
behalf.@
Where the resultant injury is Areasonably foreseeable
from the view of the original actor, then the other factors
causing to bring about the injury are not a superseding cause.
@
Id. at 568.
The Court concluded that the foreseeability by the
original or antecedent actor B the hospital B negated an
-14-
otherwise superseding cause B the obstetrician B Awhich means the
hospital is left on the liability hook. Id.
@
In Michels v. Sklavos Ky., 869 S.W.2d 728, 732 (1994),
,
a legal malpractice case, our Supreme Court held:
However, if [the first attorneys] can prove
[that the second attorney] was also negligent
. . . the negligence of a second attorney
would not relieve the first attorneys who
were also negligent from the consequences of
their wrongdoing. It does not qualify as an
intervening cause because it is simply one of
the "collective . . . causes for which it
['the law'] lays responsibility." House v.
Kellerman, Ky., 519 S.W.2d 380, 382 (1975).
It would not be an intervening or superseding
cause because it is not . . . a new cause of
an Aextraordinary or unforeseeable nature
@
"overriding and eliminating the legal
significance of . . . antecedent causation."
Id. at 383.
Appellants state that Dr. Natelson, a neurosurgeon,
testified that the signs and symptoms of the epidural hematoma
were present when Dr. Jensen saw Copass in the E.R.
Dr. Natelson
testified that had Copass been transferred out of the E.R. for
treatment he would not be paralyzed today.
We certainly cannot
say that, as a matter of law, any negligence on Dr. Jensen’s part
was Atoo remote@ in time to be a causative factor in Copass’s
paralysis.
It was improper for the trial court to direct a
verdict on the issue.
The judgment of Monroe Circuit Court is reversed, and
this matter is remanded with direction to grant Appellants a new
trial.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
BRIEFS FOR APPELLEES:
Charles E. Theiler, II
Sitlinger, McGlincy, Steiner,
Theiler & Karem
Louisville, Kentucky
John R. Grise
Shawn Rosso Alcott
Kerrick, Grise, Stivers &
Coyle
Bowling Green, Kentucky
Counsel for Monroe County
Medical Foundation
Robert S. Walker III
Brown, Todd & Heyburn
Lexington, Kentucky
Counsel for Steven L. Jensen,
M.D.
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEES:
Robert S. Walker III
Counsel for Steven L. Jensen,
M.D.
Lexington, Kentucky
Shawn Alcott
Counsel for Monroe County
Medical Foundation
Bowling Green, Kentucky
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