DAVID L. LANE v. AND PAULA O. LANE
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RENDERED:
SEPTEMBER 30, 2005; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-001450-MR
AND
NO. 2004-CA-002298-MR
DAVID L. LANE
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM McCRACKEN FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE CYNTHIA E. SANDERSON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-00189
AND
APPEAL FROM McCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CRAIG Z. CLYMER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-00189
PAULA O. LANE
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART, VACATING
IN PART, AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: DYCHE AND SCHRODER, JUDGES; ROSENBLUM, SENIOR JUDGE. 1
ROSENBLUM, SENIOR JUDGE:
Davie Lane appeals from orders of the
McCracken Family Court and McCracken Circuit Court 2 increasing
1
Senior Judge Paul W. Rosenblum sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
Kentucky Revised Statute 21.580.
2
The McCracken Family Court entered the orders resulting in appeal 2004-CA001450-MR. Following the entry of those orders, Family Court Judge Cynthia
E. Sanderson recused herself from the case. McCracken Circuit Court Judge
his child support obligation to Paula Lane; denying his motion
to hold Paula in contempt for failing to keep him informed
regarding the children; denying his motion to supersede the
increased child support obligation pending the outcome of his
appeal of the increase; and denying his motion for credits.
For
the reasons stated below, we affirm in part and vacate and
remand in part.
BACKGROUND
David and Paula were married on November 24, 1990.
Two children were born during the marriage, David L. Lane, II
(born September 16, 1992) and Grant A. Lane (born March 29,
1995).
The marriage was dissolved by a decree entered on April
24, 2000.
In the original divorce proceedings, among other
things, David was ordered to pay Paula $12,000.00 per month in
maintenance for a period of 36 months and $3,000.00 per month in
child support.
This case was previously before this Court on appeal
and cross-appeal from the original divorce proceedings. On
January 30, 2004, this Court rendered an unpublished opinion
which, among other things, upheld an antenuptial agreement under
which Paula waived her right to maintenance (see Case Nos. 2002CA-000647-MR and 2002-CA-000754-MR).
The effect of this Court’s
Craig Z. Clymer entered the orders leading to appeal 2004-CA-002298-MR in
orders captioned “McCracken Circuit Court.” For convenience we refer to both
McCracken Family Court and McCracken Circuit Court as the “trial court.”
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decision was to nullify the maintenance award to Paula of
$12,000.00 per month for 36 months. 3
The decision is currently
pending before the Supreme Court upon Paula’s motion for
discretionary review (See Case No. 2004-SC-000151).
The current phase of litigation began on January 7,
2004, when Paula filed a motion to modify child support.
In
support of her motion to modify child support, Paula stated that
there had been a change in conditions in that, among other
things, her 36-month maintenance award had elapsed, thereby
lowering her monthly income by $12,000.00.
On February 25,
2004, David filed a motion to hold Paula in contempt for failing
to keep him properly informed regarding various matters
concerning the children.
On March 15, 2004, a hearing was held on Paula’s
motion to modify child support and David’s motion to hold Paula
in contempt.
On March 22, 2004, the trial court entered an
order increasing David’s child support obligation from $3,000.00
per month to $5,000.00 per month; the order also denied David’s
motion to hold Paula in contempt.
On March 31, 2004, David
filed a motion for additional findings pursuant to CR 4 52 and/or
to alter, amend or vacate pursuant to CR 59.
3
On July 8, 2004,
In the original divorce proceedings, the family court had held that the
antenuptial agreement under which Paula had waived her right to maintenance
was unconscionable.
4
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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the trial court entered an order denying David’s CR 59 motion,
but granting his CR 52 motion and entering additional findings
of fact.
On July 16, 2004, David filed his notice of appeal
from the foregoing rulings (Case No. 2004-CA-001450-MR).
David subsequently attempted to supersede the
increased child support obligation by filing a supersedeas bond
for the estimated child support obligation which would accrue
during the appeals process.
On July 21, 2004, David filed a
motion for various credits against any amounts owed, or to be
owed, to Paula, including credits for maintenance paid to Paula.
On October 7, 2004, the trial court entered an order
denying David’s motion for credits.
On October 13, 2004, the
trial court entered an order permitting David to supersede that
portion of his child support obligation relating to the period
from the time Paula filed her motion until the circuit court’s
order granting the modification.
The order denied David’s
motion with respect to amounts due following entry of the
modification order.
On November 3, 2004, David filed his notice
of appeal from the foregoing orders (Case No. 2004-CA-002298MR).
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APPEAL NO. 2004-CA-001450-MR
CHILD SUPPORT
David contends that the circuit court erred by
increasing his child support obligation from $3,000.00 per month
to $5,000.00 per month.
KRS 5 403.213 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(1) The provisions of any decree
respecting child support may be modified
only as to installments accruing
subsequent to the filing of the motion
for modification and only upon a showing
of a material change in circumstances
that is substantial and continuing.
(2) Application of the Kentucky child
support guidelines to the circumstances
of the parties at the time of the
filing of a motion or petition for
modification of the child support order
which results in equal to or greater
than a fifteen percent (15%) change in
the amount of support due per month
shall be rebuttably presumed to be a
material change in circumstances.
Application which results in less than
a fifteen percent (15%) change in the
amount of support due per month shall
be rebuttably presumed not to be a
material change in circumstances. . . .
In its order of March 22, 2004, the trial court
addressed Paula’s motion to modify child support as follows:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DIRECTED
AS FOLLOWS:
5
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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. . . .
2. The Court finds there has been a
substantial change of circumstances
justifying a modification of child support.
Specifically, the Court notes that at the
time the original child support award was
entered, Paula was living in Paducah without
a house payment, as David was making the
house payment on the marital residence where
Paula was living. In addition, Paula was to
receive $12,000.00 a month in maintenance.
Since the order in 2001, the maintenance
award has expired, Paula has moved to
Florida, and she has purchased a new home
for herself and the children. The Court
finds that if Paula could receive a job
making $20,000 a year, that would be an
excellent job for her, considering her lack
of education and lack of work experience.
Indeed, Paula will probably struggle to
receive a job making near that much. David,
on the other hand, makes a substantial
income. He reports that for 2003 his
monthly gross income was $86,625.
Reviewing the child support chart, the top
child support would be $1,844 per month for
a man making $15,000 a month. That would be
approximately 12.3% of that person’s income.
If the Court were to award similar child
support based on David’s income, the award
would be $10,600 per month. The Court does
not believe such an award would be
appropriate, and indeed finds it would be an
abuse of discretion to award that much child
support.
The Court finds that an appropriate amount
of child support is $5,000 per month. The
Court finds this amount to be sufficient
child support to support the children, and
is based upon the manner in which the
children were previously supported by both
parties, both prior to the divorce and
subsequent to the divorce. With this amount
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of money, Paula will not be able to
duplicate the exact same lifestyle for the
children. She probably will not be able to
remain in her current house or live in a
gated community. The Court notes that Paula
made a decision not to finish her education
after testifying at the original hearing
that she was going to get a degree in
interior design. The Court also finds that
Paula has, according to her own testimony,
spent all the property award she received.
The Court finds the order it is entering is
going to require David to pay approximately
5% of his gross income toward child support.
The Court finds the children have
substantial expenses, although the Court was
not persuaded that the expenses listed on
Paula’s Financial Declaration were accurate
or realistic.
In its July 8, 2004, order which, in part, granted
David’s motion for additional findings, the trial court made, in
relevant part, the following additional findings of fact
relating to Paula’s motion to modify child support:
1. The Court finds that on March 13, 2001,
the Court entered Supplemental Findings and
Decree, which the Court found David Lane to
have gross income from his employment of
$95,728.33 per month. The Court had ordered
David Lane to pay Paula Lane the amount of
$12,000 per month in maintenance.
Therefore, David’s adjusted gross income was
$83,481.33 per month. Paula was unemployed
at that time, but had the maintenance award,
so her income was calculated at $12,000 per
month. The Court awarded $3,000 per month
in child support based upon those respective
incomes. The case is back before the Court
for a modification of child support based
upon a change of circumstances. . . . The
Court finds specifically there has been a
material change of circumstances that is
substantial and continuing. That material
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change of circumstances which is substantial
and continuing is David Lane has not, since
January of this year, been under any
obligation to pay $12,000 per month
maintenance to Paula Lane. Therefore, David
Lane’s actual income has been increased by
$12,000 per month, and Paula Lane’s actual
income has decreased by $12,000 per month.
2. The Court finds at the hearing of this
matter, David Lane reported his monthly
gross income to now be $86,625. After the
hearing, in his motion to alter, amend or
vacate, David asked for an opportunity to
present additional proof that he had
misstated his income, and his accountant,
Richard Walker would testify that David’s
actual gross monthly income is $80,474.16.
. . . Richard Walker has now confirmed that
David Lane’s gross monthly income was
$80,474.16, or $965,689.92 per year. That
income figure is based upon David’s earnings
for the year 2003. The Court finds that
consistently for the past several years,
David’s income has been around $1,000,000
per year. In some years, he has earned
slightly more, and in some years he has
earned slightly less.
3. At the hearing, Paula Lane testified
regarding the needs of the children. In the
Court’s previous finding, the Court noted it
did not accept all of Paula’s monthly
expenses. Paula allocated $9,257.75 as
expenses for the children. On oral
argument, David’s attorney argued, as an
example, that Paula has claimed a much too
high expense for food, being $900 per month.
Yet, as the Court pointed out to David’s
attorney, the financial declaration which
David filed, showed the three people in his
household, including him, his wife and his
step-daughter, spend $1,867 per month in
food. Accordingly, the Court cannot find
that Paula and the parties’ two children
spending $900 per month on food is
unreasonable.
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4. The Court specifically finds it is
legitimate for Paula to assess a portion of
her household expenses for the children.
But for her children, she would not need as
large a house, she would not incur as much
in utilities, and her living costs would be
much less. The Court specifically finds
that the children were residing in a house
valued in excess of $1,000,000 at the time
of dissolution. It would not be reasonable
to expect that because Paula makes little
money, the children should now reside in
rent subsidized housing. The Court notes
also in comparing Financial Declarations
that David, his wife and step-daughter spend
$726 per month at a country club. Paula has
requested as entertainment for the children
$360.83 for travel, and $126 for pool
service, which in and of itself is less than
David’s country club bill. In fact, David
and Paula have a similar expense for travel
with the children. Paula claims $360.83,
and David claims $380 per month.
5. The two expenses which the Court does
not accept as legitimate expenses for Paula
assessing to the children are the $666 for
landscaping and home repairs, and the Court
does not find credible that clothing and
athletic expenses for the parties’ children
should run Paula $2,215.11 per month,
although the court has previously found that
some of the children’s clothes have been
destroyed when they have had prior visits
with their father. Reducing the children’s
clothing and athletic expenses to $500 per
month, deducting the landscaping and home
repairs of $666 per month, leaves Paula’s
expenses for the children at $6,876.64. The
Court believes it could have legitimately
assessed child support as high as $6,500 a
month, considering David’s income in
comparison with imputed income for Paula.
At the time of the hearing, Paula was not
working, and she testified she had not been
able to complete her education. If Paula
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could make $10 an hour, which the evidence
does not support she will necessarily earn,
she would have approximately 2% of the total
parental income ($10 x 40 hours x 52 weeks ÷
12 = $1,733 per month). Contrast $1,733 per
month in income Paula has to help support
her children with David’s income of $80,474
per month.
6. The Court finds that when it made the
original child support award in this case,
it was cognizant it was awarding $12,000 in
maintenance. The Court took into
consideration at that time that income tax
consequences made higher maintenance more
preferable to David than higher child
support. David is no longer paying
maintenance. David certainly has the
ability to pay $5,000 per month in child
support, and the Court specifically finds
that the children’s needs are in excess of
$6,000 per month. Therefore, child support
of $5,000 per month is reasonable. As the
Court noted in its earlier ruling, the Court
has awarded the equivalent of $86 per day,
per child for Paula to feed, clothe, house,
transport, entertain, provide gifts for the
children, and otherwise support the
children.
Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless they
are clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the court to judge the credibility of witnesses.
CR 52.01.
David does not specifically challenge any of the
trial court’s factual findings, and its findings are supported
by substantial evidence in the record.
We find no basis in the
record to disturb the trial court's findings of fact and,
accordingly, our review of child support issues in this case
will presuppose that the findings made by the trial court in its
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orders of March 22, 2004, and July 8, 2004, are our proper
guide.
The child support guidelines set out in KRS 403.212
serve as a rebuttable presumption for the establishment or
modification of the amount of child support.
Courts may deviate
from the guidelines only upon making a specific finding that
application of the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate.
KRS 403.211(2).
However, KRS 403.211(3)(e) specifically
designates that "combined monthly adjusted parental gross income
in excess of the Kentucky child support guidelines" is a valid
basis for deviating from the child support table.
Furthermore,
the trial court may use its judicial discretion to determine
child support in circumstances where combined adjusted parental
gross income exceeds the uppermost level of the guidelines
table.
KRS 403.212(5).
The child support table ends at the
$15,000.00 per month level, so deviation from the guidelines is
clearly appropriate in this case.
See
Downing v. Downing, 45
S.W.3d 449 (Ky.App. 2001)
Kentucky trial courts have been given broad discretion
in considering the relevant circumstances and setting
correspondingly appropriate child support.
823 S.W.2d 463 (Ky.App 1992).
Redmon v. Redmon,
A reviewing court should defer to
the lower court's discretion in child support matters whenever
possible.
See Pegler v. Pegler, 895 S.W.2d 580 (Ky.App. 1995).
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As long as the trial court's discretion comports with the
guidelines, or any deviation is adequately justified in writing,
this Court will not disturb the trial court's ruling in this
regard.
Commonwealth v. Marshall, 15 S.W.3d 396, 400-01
(Ky.App. 2000).
unlimited.
However, a trial court's discretion is not
The test for abuse of discretion is whether the
trial judge's decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or
unsupported by sound legal principles.
Goodyear Tire and Rubber
Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575, 581 (Ky. 2000); Commonwealth v.
English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999).
At a minimum, any decision to set child support above
the guidelines must be based primarily on the child's needs, as
set out in specific supporting findings.
Stringer v. Brandt,
128 Or.App. 502, 506-07, 877 P.2d 100, 102 (1994).
In determining the reasonable needs of the children,
the trial court should also take into consideration the standard
of living which the children enjoyed during and after the
marriage.
Consequently, the concept of "reasonable needs" is
flexible and may vary depending upon the standard of living to
which they have become accustomed.
Harris v. Harris, 168 Vt.
13, 714 A.2d 626, 633 (1998); White v. Marciano, 190 Cal.App.3d
1026, 1032, 235 Cal.Rptr. 779, 782 (Cal.App. 2 Distr., 1987).
Any assessment of the child's reasonable needs should
also be based upon the parents' financial ability to meet those
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needs.
Factors which should be considered when setting child
support include the financial circumstances of the parties,
their station in life, their age and physical condition, and
expenses in educating the children.
Voishan v. Palma, 327 Md.
318, 329, 609 A.2d 319, 324-325 (1992).
The focus of this
inquiry does not concern the lifestyle which the parents could
afford to provide the child, but rather it is the standard of
living which satisfies the child's reasonable and realistic
needs under the circumstances.
Thus, while a trial court may
take a parent's additional resources into account, a large
income does not require a noncustodial parent to support a
lifestyle for his children of which he does not approve.
Downing v. Downing, supra.
In the present case, the combined adjusted parental
gross income exceeds the uppermost levels of the guideline
tables, and, accordingly, it was within the trial court’s
discretion to determine an appropriate level of child support.
KRS 403.211(3)(e); KRS 403.212(5).
The trial court made
findings concerning the reasonable needs of the children,
David’s financial ability to meet those needs, the children’s
station in life, and set David’s support obligation at a
corresponding level.
After payment of his $5,000.00 child
support obligation David will still have gross income in excess
of $75,000.00 per month.
A $5,000.00 child support obligation,
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or $2,500.00 per child, is not excessive for David’s income
level.
The children will not enjoy an extravagant lifestyle at
that level of support.
In summary, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in modifying David’s child support
obligation from $3,000.00 per month to $5,000.00 per month.
In opposition to the trial court’s decision to modify
child support, David raises five arguments.
First, David argues
that the trial court failed to make adequate findings of fact in
support of its modification order and failed to base the
modification on the reasonable and realistic needs under the
circumstances.
We disagree.
As noted in our general discussion
above, deviation from the guidelines is authorized when the
combined income of the parents exceed the uppermost level of the
support tables; the trial court’s modification order is based
upon findings of fact which considered the relevant factors in
setting child support when income exceeds the guidelines; the
trial court considered the children’s reasonable needs and
David’s ability to meet those needs in setting child support;
and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in establishing
David’s child support obligation at $5,000.00 per month.
David also argues that the trial court erred in its
modification order on the basis that the increase in child
support accrues primarily for the benefit of Paula.
Under
present circumstances, however, Paula’s sole source of income is
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child support.
While the trial court did impute income of
$1,733.00 per month to Paula, absent the increase, the actual
household income of the home where the children would reside
would be only $36,000 per year ($3,000.00 x 12), whereas David
earns an income approaching $1,000,000.00 per year.
In light of
David’s income of $80,474.16 per month, the children’s
reasonable needs, and David’s financial wherewithal, the
modification of David’s child support obligation to $60,000.00
per year ($5,000.00 x 12) was not an abuse of the trial court’s
discretion.
David also argues that the trial court failed to
consider that the children spend 30% of their time with David.
However, under a typical visitation schedule the noncustodial
parent will normally receive visitation days (counting weekend,
summer, and holiday visitation) of approximately 25% to 30%
annually.
If David’s visitation is slightly above average, in
light of the other factors discussed herein, nevertheless, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion by establishing child
support at $5,000.00 per month.
Next, David contends that the trial court erred in
setting child support because it increased child support by
66.67% when the income of both David and Paula decreased and
Paula’s projected living expenses decreased.
In support of this
argument David notes that his income decreased from $95,728.33
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per month at the time of the original award to $80,474.16 per
month at the time of the modification, a 16% decrease.
However,
upon the expiration of her maintenance award, Paula’s income
decreased from $15,000.00 per month to $3,000.00, an 80%
decrease.
In light of this, David’s argument is unpersuasive.
Next, David contends that the trial court failed to
impute income to Paula pursuant to KRS 403.212(2)(d).
However,
we construe paragraph 5 of the trial court’s order of July 8,
2004, as an imputation of income to Paula which was considered
by the trial court in setting David’s child support obligation.
We agree with David, however, that the trial court
erred by failing to consider Paula’s imputed income in its
allocation of uninsured medical expenses.
The trial court
ordered David to pay 100% of uninsured medical expenses on the
basis that, considering the animosity between the parties and
Paula’s relatively small share of the expense, it would not be
worth the bookkeeping to allocate a portion to Paula.
However,
KRS 403.211(8) provides that “[t]he cost of extraordinary
medical expenses shall be allocated between the parties in
proportion to their combined monthly adjusted parental gross
incomes.”
(Emphasis added).
The term “shall” is mandatory.
Bowen v. Commonwealth, ex rel. Stidham, 887 S.W.2d 350, 352 (Ky.
1994).
While we sympathize with the trial court’s motive for
deviating from the statute, nevertheless, as the allocation
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provisions of KRS 403.211(8) are mandatory, we vacate the trial
court’s March 22, 2004, order insofar as it requires David to
bear 100% of the uninsured medical expenses, and remand for
entry of an order requiring Paula to bear her proportionate
share of such expenses based upon her imputed income.
MOTION FOR CONTEMPT
Next, David contends that the circuit court erred by
failing to hold Paula in contempt for violating its orders
concerning Paula’s obligation to keep David informed regarding
the children.
In its March 23, 2004, order, the trial court made the
following findings concerning David’s motion to hold Paula in
contempt for failing to keep him informed regarding the
children:
The next issue before the Court was David’s
motion to hold Paula in contempt of court
for his perception that she has failed to
comply with the Court’s Orders in keeping
David informed of the children and their
activities, doctor’s appointments, sports
schedules, teachers, etc. The Court finds
that Paula is in substantial compliance with
the Court’s previous orders. The Court
finds that David’s expectations are too
high. David has a right to know what is
going on in his children’s life as a joint
custodian, but the Court finds that Paula is
doing a reasonably good job of keeping him
informed. The Court finds that Paula’s
behavior does not rise to a level of
contempt. On a relative scale, David seems
to know a lot more about his children and
what is going on with his children than most
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non-residential custodial parents. In some
areas, David’s complaints about Paula almost
arise to the level of harassment. The Court
perceives that David may be trying to set
Paula up so she would fail, and then he can
find fault with her failure. Finding Paula
in contempt on this issue would be giving
David too much control of a situation in
which these parties have never been
cooperative with each other. Accordingly,
the Court does not find Paula Lane to be in
contempt of court for any failures to abide
by the Court’s prior Orders on this issue.
Power to punish for contempt is inherent in every
court.
Arnett v. Meade, 462 S.W.2d 940, 947 (KY. 1971);
Underhill v. Murphy, 117 Ky. 640, 78 S.W. 482, 484 (1904).
Any
court or judge may punish any person guilty of contempt for
disobeying a judicial order entered under the authority of the
Court.
KRS 432.280.
In Commonwealth v. Bailey, 970 S.W.2d 818
(Ky.App. 1998), the Supreme Court defined contempt as "the
willful disobedience of -- or open disrespect for -- the rules
or orders of a court." Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Burge, 947
S.W.2d 805 (Ky. 1996)).
A trial court’s decisions concerning whether to hold a
party in contempt is reviewed under an abuse of discretion
standard.
See Smith v. City of Loyall 702 S.W.2d 838, 839
(Ky.App. 1986).
The courts' discretionary power necessarily
includes the power to refrain from imposing sanctions and fines
in the face of compliance.
Id.
The trial court’s findings
concerning contempt issues are supported by substantial evidence
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and are not clearly erroneous.
In light of those findings, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that
Paula should not be held in contempt.
APPEAL NO. 2004-CA-002298-MR
MOTION FOR SUPERSEDEAS BOND
David contends that the trial court erred by denying
his motion to supersede his increased child support obligation
pending the conclusion of the appeals process.
The trial court
permitted David to supersede that portion of his child support
obligation related to the time between when Paula filed her
motion to modify child support and the time of the modification
order; however, the trial court denied the superseding of child
support during the pendency of the appeals process.
Generally, judgments respecting the custody and
maintenance of infants may not be superseded.
Franklin v.
Franklin, 299 Ky. 426, 185 S.W.2d 696, 697 (1945); Clay v. Clay,
707 S.W.2d 352 (Ky.App. 1986).
However, an exception exists for
a judgment for lump-sum child support where the judgment
consists of arrearages accumulated by the retroactivity of the
Circuit Court's ruling based upon that court's increase of child
support.
Getty v. Getty, 792 S.W.2d 136 (Ky.App. 1990).
Hence,
the trial court properly permitted David to supersede that
portion of his child support obligation relating to the period
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from when Paula filed her motion to modify and the trial court
entered its modification order.
The ongoing increase, however,
may not be superseded and the trial court did not err in denying
David’s motion to supersede that portion of his obligation.
Franklin, supra; Clay, supra.
MOTION FOR CREDITS
Next, David contends that the trial court erred in
denying his motion for various credits against his payment
obligations to Paula.
Specifically, David contends that he is
entitled to a $62,000.00 credit related to attorney fees he paid
on behalf of Paula.
David also contends that he is entitled to
credits for maintenance paid to Paula as a result of this
Court’s decision in the previous appeal that the antenuptial
agreement waiving Paula’s right to maintenance is enforceable,
thereby nullifying David’s maintenance obligation and entitling
him to reimbursement of any maintenance paid to Paula.
David does not explain why he is entitled to a credit
relating to attorney fees paid on behalf of Paula, and we
accordingly are unable to undertake a meaningful review of the
issue.
Further, as previously noted, this Court’s decision
upholding the antenuptial agreement is currently pending before
the Supreme Court upon discretionary review, and any review of
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credits concerning maintenance would be premature.
We
accordingly will not review David’s request for credits relating
to maintenance payments on the merits.
For the foregoing reason we affirm in part, vacate and
remand in part, and remand for additional proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
SCHRODER, JUDGE, CONCURS.
DYCHE, JUDGE, CONCURS IN PART, DISSENTS IN PART AND
FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
DYCHE, JUDGE, CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN
PART: I would affirm in toto.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
James B. Brien, Jr.
Mayfield, Kentucky
John T. Reed
Paducah, Kentucky
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