RICHARD T. MORROW v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
AUGUST 19, 2005; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-000856-MR
RICHARD T. MORROW
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM PULASKI CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JEFFREY T. BURDETTE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CR-00306
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
TACKETT AND TAYLOR, JUDGES; HUDDLESTON, SENIOR JUDGE.1
TAYLOR, JUDGE:
Richard T. Morrow appeals from an April 21,
2004, final judgment of the Pulaski Circuit Court entered upon a
jury verdict finding him guilty of robbery in the first degree
and sentencing him to thirteen years’ imprisonment.
We affirm.
On December 10, 2002, appellant was indicted by the
Pulaski County Grand Jury upon one count of robbery in the first
degree.
1
The indictment was returned following an armed robbery
Senior Judge Joseph R. Huddleston sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and Kentucky Revised Statutes 21.580.
on the morning of December 4, 2002, at the Science Hill Drug
Store in Science Hill, Kentucky.
of cash were taken.
Oxycontin and a small amount
On March 8, 2004, a jury trial was held
whereupon the appellant was found guilty of robbery in the first
degree.
By judgment entered April 21, 2004, appellant was
sentenced to thirteen years’ imprisonment.
This appeal follows.
Appellant asserts four errors occurred at trial.
will address each error separately.
We
Appellant contends the
trial court erred by denying his motions to strike two
prospective jurors, Benjamin Van Hook and Evelyn Oblisk, for
cause.
Because of the relationship of Van Hook and Oblisk to
the Science Hill Drug Store, appellant argues the two were
unable to render an impartial verdict.
Ky. R. Crim. P. (RCr) 9.36 requires that a prospective
juror be excused if there is a reasonable belief he cannot
render a fair and impartial verdict based upon the evidence.
RCr 9.36 vests the trial court with discretion to determine
“bias from particular circumstances or relationships between the
juror and the accused or the case.”
942 S.W.2d 293, 299 (Ky. 1997).
Bowling v. Commonwealth,
Bias of a prospective juror
will not be presumed; rather, it must be proved by the alleging
party.
Hicks v. Commonwealth, 805 S.W.2d 144 (Ky.App. 1990).
Absent an abuse of discretion, the trial court’s determination
will not be disturbed on appeal.
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In this case, Van Hook stated he was a regular
customer of the Science Hill Drug Store but did not know the
names of any of the drug store’s clerks.
Van Hook also
acknowledged that he attended college with a pharmacist employed
there but did not know if the pharmacist was working when the
robbery occurred.
Juror Oblisk stated she was employed by a
pharmacy in Somerset, Kentucky, from December 2002 through
August 2003.
Oblisk maintained that her interaction with the
Science Hill Drug Store was limited to an occasional phone
conversation for the purpose of transferring a prescription.
Oblisk claimed that her previous employment would not prevent
her from being impartial in this case.
Appellant did not demonstrate that Van Hook or Oblisk
were biased.
Although both jurors acknowledged a minimal
relationship with the Science Hill Drug Store, there was no
evidence demonstrating that appellant’s right to a fair and
impartial trial was violated.
As no prejudice was demonstrated
by appellant, we do not believe the trial court abused its
discretion by denying appellant’s motions to strike Van Hook and
Oblisk for cause.
Appellant next contends the trial court erred in the
administration of the jury selection process. Specifically,
appellant contends the trial court failed to comply with the
mandates of Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 29A.100 and KRS
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29A.080.
Appellant complains that only 38 or 39 of the 69
prospective jurors were present when voir dire began and that
the trial court did not follow the mandates of KRS 29A.080 and
KRS 29A.100 when it excused jurors from service.
KRS 29A.100 states, in relevant part, as follows:
(2) The Chief Circuit Judge may . . . excuse
a juror from service . . . . The reasons
for excuse or postponement shall be entered
in the space provided on the juror
qualification form.
(3) In his or her discretion the judge may
excuse a juror from service entirely, . . .
When excusing a juror, the judge shall
record the juror's name, as provided in KRS
29A.080, and the reasons for granting the
excuse.
KRS 29A.080 states, in relevant part, as follows:
(1) The Chief Circuit Judge . . . shall
determine . . . whether the prospective
juror is disqualified for jury service
. . . . This determination shall be entered
in the space provided on the juror
qualification form.
KRS 29A.100 and KRA 29A.080 clearly require the trial judge to
record the name of any excused juror and to enter the reason for
the excuse on the juror qualification form.
Substantial
compliance with jury selection procedures is essential to
providing a defendant with an impartial jury.
Sanborn v.
Commonwealth, 754 S.W.2d 534 (Ky. 1988).
The record in this case includes a list of all the
persons on the jury panel for appellant’s trial.
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The record
does not include juror qualification forms for any of the
prospective jurors.
It is well-established that the burden is upon an
appellant to ensure that this Court is supplied with the record
necessary to decide the appeal.
S.W.2d 255 (Ky. 1968).
Fanelli v. Commonwealth, 423
An appellate court is to presume that
any portion of the record not supplied would support the
decision of the trial court.
Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co.
v. Weartz, 636 S.W.2d 891 (Ky.App. 1982).
As appellant has not
caused the juror forms to be included as part of the record, we
must presume such forms would comply with the statutory mandates
and would support the trial court’s decision.
Appellant next alleges that the trial court erred by
overruling his objection to the Commonwealth’s use of a
peremptory challenge to strike Bobby Napier, the only AfricanAmerican on the jury panel.
Appellant argues that the
Commonwealth’s use of this peremptory challenge was in violation
of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed.
2d 69 (1986).
In Batson, a three-part test was established for
determining whether the prosecution wrongfully removed a
prospective juror solely based upon race.
Id.
In Commonwealth
v. Snodgrass, 831 S.W.2d 176 (Ky. 1992), the Kentucky Supreme
Court summarized the three-part test as follows:
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First, the defendant must make a prima facie
showing that the prosecutor has exercised
peremptory challenges on the basis of race.
Second, if the requisite showing has been
made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to
articulate a race-neutral explanation for
striking the jurors in question. Finally,
the trial court must determine whether the
defendant has carried his burden of proving
purposeful discrimination.
Id. at 178 (citations omitted).
Appellant concedes that the first and second steps of
Batson were satisfied but contends the third step was not.
Appellant specifically asserts the trial judge did not properly
evaluate the Commonwealth’s explanation for striking Napier to
determine whether it was merely a pretext for discrimination.
In Harris v. Commonwealth, 134 S.W.3d 603 (Ky. 2004),
the Court discussed the third step of Batson as follows:
During this step, the trial judge must
evaluate the reasons offered by the
prosecutor to determine if they are valid
and neutral and not simply a pretext for
discrimination. The trial judge's decision
is accorded great deference on this issue
because the judge is in the best position to
evaluate the credibility and demeanor of the
prosecutor. This decision will not be
overturned unless it is clearly erroneous.
Id. at 611-612 (citations omitted).
In the case sub judice, the Commonwealth gave the
following reason for striking Napier:
Yes, sir, I struck Mr. Napier, the reason
being that he was on the original Catron
panel. During the entire eight hours that
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we were there swearing the jury,
interviewing the jury, he was unattentive
[sic], chewing on a straw and about fell
asleep, and that’s noted by three people at
my office, so that would be my non-racial
reason for striking Mr. Napier, my own
personal observations of him in a prior voir
dire. Id.
Appellant’s Brief at 17.
Appellant argues that inattentiveness is not a
sufficient race-neutral explanation for exercise of a peremptory
challenge and relies heavily upon the case of Washington v.
Commonwealth, 34 S.W.3d 376 (Ky. 2000).
We believe Washington
is clearly distinguishable and are not persuaded by appellant’s
argument.
In Washington, the Court stated:
The most disturbing aspect of this case is
the prosecutor's insistence that he did not
strike Mr. Newberry. Notably, when he was
shown the strike sheet, his immediate
response was "Oh my God." Given the
prosecutor's initial denial, followed by his
obvious surprise at the fact he had struck
Mr. Newberry, subsequent explanations for
the strike were disingenuous.
Id. at 379.
The court in Washington obviously focused upon the
prosecutor’s insistence that he had not stricken the juror, the
prosecutor’s surprise upon being informed that he had, and his
subsequent disingenuous explanations.
The circumstances in the present case are clearly
distinguishable.
Napier.
Here, the Commonwealth did not deny striking
Rather, the Commonwealth immediately responded to the
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Batson challenge with a sufficiently race-neutral reason.
As
such, the circuit court did not err by overruling appellant’s
challenge to the Commonwealth’s exercise of a peremptory
challenge to strike Napier.
Appellant’s final contention is that his right to a
speedy trial pursuant to KRS 500.110, the United States
Constitution and the Kentucky Constitution was violated.
We will first address appellant’s contention that KRS
500.110 was violated because his trial was conducted outside the
180-day time limit.
KRS 500.110 provides as follows:
Whenever a person has entered upon a term of
imprisonment in a penal or correctional
institution of this state, and whenever
during the continuance of the term of
imprisonment there is pending in any
jurisdiction of this state any untried
indictment, information or complaint on the
basis of which a detainer has been lodged
against the prisoner, he shall be brought to
trial within one hundred and eighty (180)
days after he shall have caused to be
delivered to the prosecuting officer and the
appropriate court of the prosecuting
officer's jurisdiction written notice of the
place of his imprisonment and his request
for a final disposition to be made of the
indictment, information or complaint;
provided that for good cause shown in open
court, the prisoner or his counsel being
present, the court having jurisdiction of
the matter may grant any necessary or
reasonable continuance.
Appellant asserts the following facts: on June 16,
2003, while incarcerated upon other charges, he filed a pro se
-8-
motion pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statues (KRS) 500.110
requesting final disposition of the untried robbery indictment;
his attorney filed a motion for a speedy trial on August 15,
2003; and the detainer acknowledgement was filed on August 21,
2003.
The triggering mechanism that brings KRS 500.110 “into
play is the lodging of a detainer against a prisoner.”
Huddleston v. Jennings, 723 S.W.2d 381, 383 (Ky.App. 1986).
By
appellant’s own admission, the detainer had not yet been lodged
at the time of appellant’s pro se motion or his counsel’s motion
for a speedy trial was filed.
As such, appellant’s request for
relief pursuant to KRS 500.110 was premature.
We will now address appellant’s contention that his
right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution
was violated.
The constitutional right to a speedy trial is
analyzed by applying the four-factor test established in Barker
v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972).
See also Dunaway v. Commonwealth, 60 S.W.3d 563 (Ky. 2001).
The first Barker factor to be considered is the length
of the delay.
The proper analysis involves determining whether
the delay was presumptively prejudicial to appellant, which
involves consideration of two elements:
the charges against
appellant and the length of the delay involved.
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Dunaway, 60
S.W.3d 563.
In this case, appellant was charged with first-
degree robbery.
The length of time between the indictment and
the trial was some fifteen months.
Courts differ in the length
of time required to find presumptive prejudice but we believe
under the facts of this case 15 months was presumptively
prejudicial.
See id.
Having found presumptive prejudice in the
15 month delay, we must now examine the remaining Barker
factors.
Preston v. Commonwealth, 898 S.W.2d 504 (Ky.App.
1995).
The second Barker factor to be considered is the
reason for the delay.
Barker, 407 U.S. 514.
The Court in
Barker, identified three general areas of delay: (1) a
deliberate attempt to delay trial to hamper the defense; (2) a
neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts; and (3)
a valid reason, such as a missing witness.
In this case, it is unclear why during the May 2003
pretrial conference the trial was set for March 8, 2004.
At the
August 2003 hearing on appellant’s motion for a speedy trial,
the court declined to advance the trial date because the
Commonwealth needed to conduct DNA testing.
The testing was
necessary to determine whether hair from inside a ski mask found
at the robbery scene belonged to appellant.
The testing could
not be performed in Kentucky and would have to be conducted outof-state.
Under the circumstances, we do not believe the
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Commonwealth’s request for DNA testing rises to the level of a
deliberate attempt on the part of the Commonwealth to hamper the
defense, and thus find the reason for the delay to be valid.
The third Barker factor to be considered is the demand
for a speedy trial.
Here, the motion simply referred to a
constitutional right but no basis for appellant’s argument was
articulated.
At the hearing on the motion, appellant’s argument
was based entirely upon KRS 500.110 and there was no mention of
a constitutional basis for the claim.
Appellant’s less than
vigorous assertion of his constitutional claim does not weigh in
his favor.
The fourth and final factor in the Barker analysis is
the prejudice caused by the delay.
The Court in Barker
identified three interests that have bearing on this issue:
“(1) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) to
minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3) to limit
the possibility that the defense will be impaired.”
Dunaway, 60
S.W.3d at 563 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 532).
Appellant’s argument focuses upon his defense being
impaired by the delay.
Specifically, appellant complains that
the delay hindered the memory of his alibi witness, Larry
Burdie.
Burdie’s testimony revealed that Burdie did not wake up
until after the robbery had occurred on the morning of December
4, 2002, and, thus, Burdie could not confirm whether appellant
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was at his house at the time of the robbery.
Burdie further
testified that his memory of the events of the morning of the
robbery was hampered because he had been up drinking all night
before.
Burdie’s testimony does not reveal that a delay in the
trial caused any prejudice to appellant’s defense.
After balancing all of the factors identified in
Barker, we conclude appellant’s constitutional right to a speedy
trial was not violated.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Pulaski
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Julie Namkin
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Ken W. Riggs
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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