CARL TIMOTHY FULKERSON v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
SEPTEMBER 23, 2005; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-000228-MR
CARL TIMOTHY FULKERSON
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MCLEAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DAVID H. JERNIGAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CR-00028
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
HENRY, McANULTY, AND MINTON, JUDGES.
McANULTY, JUDGE:
Carl Timothy Fulkerson was tried by a McLean
County jury and found guilty of first degree possession of a
controlled substance (methamphetamine) while in possession of a
firearm.
In this direct appeal of that judgment, Fulkerson
alleges that errors occurred in the evidence introduced at trial
which require that his judgment of conviction be set aside.
We
affirm the judgment below.
Fulkerson was involved in a single vehicle accident on
April 23, 2003, in the early morning hours.
His truck was
observed by the staff of the McLean County Ambulance Service
wedged in a ditch so that the doors could not be opened.
Fulkerson was seated in the driver’s seat.
was uninjured.
He asserted that he
While paramedics waited for the police to
arrive, they observed Fulkerson crawl out of the truck through
the window, and walk to the passenger side of the truck.
He
appeared to rummage through items in the vehicle, and leave the
vehicle holding something.
He walked to a wooded area nearby,
and returned empty handed.
The paramedics observed this
behavior continuing until the police arrived.
When Deputy Palmer arrived, he observed Fulkerson in
the wooded area.
The paramedics shared their observations with
the deputy, who then asked Fulkerson to come back from the
woods.
Deputy Palmer went to the wooded area and found a blue
container by a tree where Fulkerson had been.
Inside the
container, there was a clear plastic bag containing a white
powdered substance.
Fulkerson was arrested, and a search of the
vehicle incident to arrest revealed a loaded Smith & Wesson 9 mm
pistol and loaded Ruger .44 caliber revolver.
The Kentucky
State Police crime laboratory performed tests which identified
the substance as being methamphetamine.
Fulkerson’s first claim of error is that the
Commonwealth did not establish that the weapons in his vehicle
were “firearms” as defined by the Kentucky Penal Code.
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Pursuant
to KRS 218A.992, Fulkerson’s conviction for possession of a
controlled substance was enhanced due to his possession of a
firearm at the time of commission of the offense.
KRS 237.060
defines “firearm” for purposes of the use of KRS 218A.992 as,
“any weapon which will expel a projectile by the action of an
explosive.”
Fulkerson argues that the Commonwealth did not
establish that the pistols in his vehicle were firearms because
they were not shown to be operable.
He asserts that since the
deputy testified the Commonwealth never tested the weapons for
operability, it did not show that they were capable of firing
any projectiles.
We do not agree that testing the weapon was the only
way to show that the firearms met the statutory definition.
The
circumstances proved by the Commonwealth in this case included
the deputy’s testimony that he had experience and training in
the use of firearms, and that the weapons upon his examination
appeared to be in working order.
Appellant testified that the
weapons were capable of firing before the wreck of his vehicle.
On motion for directed verdict, the trial court must
draw all fair and reasonable inferences from the evidence in
favor of the Commonwealth.
186 (Ky. 1991).
Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d
It is well-settled in Kentucky that a
conviction may be obtained by circumstantial evidence.
v. Commonwealth, 490 S.W.2d 486, 488 (Ky. 1972).
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Pruitt
Circumstantial
evidence must be of such a nature that it would not be clearly
unreasonable for the jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Ford v. Commonwealth, 665 S.W.2d 304 (Ky. 1983).
We
concur that this standard was met as to the firearm element of
the offense.
The facts adduced were consistent with a belief
that the weapons were operable, and therefore “firearms” under
the statutory definition.
The trial court correctly denied
Fulkerson’s motion for directed verdict on this issue.
Fulkerson next claims that it was error for the
Kentucky State Police chemist to testify that she identified the
substance as methamphetamine without the trial court’s first
conducting a hearing, pursuant to Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed.
2d 469 (1993), to determine the scientific reliability of the
tests conducted.
The chemist testified that she performed two
tests on the sample supplied: 1) an identifying test, using mass
spectroscopy, which she testified is to concretely identify the
item as a certain substance, and 2) a confirming test, using gas
chromatography, which she stated identifies a substance by
comparing it to a standard that is run at the same time.
She
testified that the methods of mass spectroscopy and gas
chromatography are well accepted for analysis of organic
substances, which is what controlled substances are generally.
Following Fulkerson’s objection to the admission of the test
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results, the trial court held that a hearing was not required
under Daubert because the tests were such that, “They’re very
reliable, they’re not new, they’re timeworn.”
We review the court’s finding that the reasoning or
methodology is scientifically reliable for clear error.
v. Eldridge, 146 S.W.3d 909, 917 (Ky. 2004).
Miller
The trial court is
not required under Daubert to hold a formal hearing in every
case.
Hyatt v. Commonwealth, 72 S.W.3d 566, 575 (Ky. 2002).
A
trial court has “wide latitude in deciding how to test an
expert’s reliability and in deciding whether or when special
briefing or other proceedings, i.e., at a Daubert hearing, is
needed to investigate reliability.”
Dixon v. Commonwealth, 149
S.W.3d 426, 430 (Ky. 2004).
The trial court was correct that there are scientific
methods, techniques and theories so well established that they
can be accepted without the necessity of a formal hearing.
See
Johnson v. Commonwealth, 12 S.W.3d 258 (Ky. 1999); Florence v.
Commonwealth, 120 S.W.3d 699 (Ky. 2003).
The better method is
to take judicial notice pursuant to KRE 201(b)(2) of the
evidence’s reliability and validity.
Johnson, 12 S.W.3d at 261.
We conclude that the tests used in this case to identify the
substance as methamphetamine are widely accepted in the
scientific community and are considered quite reliable and
valid.
State v. Lucero, 207 Ariz. 301, 85 P.3d 1059 (Ariz.App.
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2004); State v. Sercey, 825 So.2d 959 (Fla.App. 2002).
Moreover, Fulkerson did not provide proof to refute the
reliability of the identifying and confirming tests used in this
case.
Florence, 120 S.W.3d at 703.
Thus, we affirm the trial
court’s admission of this evidence.
Fulkerson’s third allegation of error is that one of
the sheriff’s deputies erroneously testified to a field test
result without his having been qualified as an expert in such
tests.
Although Fulkerson objected to this line of inquiry, the
deputy testified that his field test result “was positive”
before the trial court could sustain the objection.
Fulkerson
requested a mistrial, and stated that if the trial court was not
inclined to grant a mistrial, an admonition should be given.
The Commonwealth argued that there was no necessity for a
mistrial since the chemist was expected to testify that the
substance was tested and found to be methamphetamine.
The trial
court held that the mistrial would be granted if the chemist did
not so testify, and granted the motion for an admonition.
The
trial court admonished the jury to disregard the testimony
regarding a field test as such tests were not admissible
testimony.
Indeed, as previously discussed, the Kentucky State
Police lab chemist testified that the substance tested positive
for methamphetamine.
We conclude that Fulkerson has received an
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adequate remedy, particularly as he requested the admonition,
Stanford v. Commonwealth, 734 S.W.2d 781 (Ky. 1987), and can
show no harm for which a mistrial would be necessary since the
substance was scientifically identified as methamphetamine.
A
mistrial is appropriate only where the record reveals “a
manifest necessity for such an action or an urgent or real
necessity.”
Skaggs v. Commonwealth, 694 S.W.2d 672, 678 (Ky.
1985), citing Wiley v. Commonwealth, 575 S.W.2d 166 (Ky.App.
1979).
The trial court’s ruling was correct.
Finally, Fulkerson argues that no proper chain of
custody of the evidence was established and so the integrity of
the substance was not maintained.
Deputy Palmer testified that
he secured the evidence from the scene in the McLean County
evidence room.
His answer to the Commonwealth’s Attorney’s
question, “You personally took it and took it there?” is
inaudible.
When asked what was done with the container with the
powdery substance, Deputy Palmer testified that Deputy Wright
transported it to the Kentucky State Police laboratory.
When
asked how Deputy Wright came into possession of the substance,
Deputy Palmer testified that he gave it to him from the evidence
room.
Deputy Palmer was unable to recall the date that
occurred.
Deputy Wright testified that the evidence was in the
sheriff’s office, and either the sheriff or Chief Deputy Orton
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asked him to transport the substance to the Madisonville
laboratory.
Deputy Wright was unable to answer the question
from whom he had received the evidence.
He testified that the
evidence was kept in the office filing cabinet and he did not
know whether the cabinet was locked, but said that the evidence
was not accessible to anyone but a deputy.
He testified that he
took the evidence to the Kentucky State Police laboratory at
Madisonville on June 5, 2003.
Fulkerson objected to the admission of the evidence on
the basis of the chain of custody as Officer Wright could not
testify as to how he had received the evidence.
The
Commonwealth argued that Deputy Palmer identified himself as the
source of providing the evidence to Deputy Wright.
The trial
court found that there was sufficient proof as to the
evidentiary admissibility and the defense’s arguments were ones
that went to the weight of the evidence.
The trial court’s ruling was correct.
It is
unnecessary to establish a perfect chain of custody or to
eliminate all possibility of tampering or misidentification so
long as there is persuasive evidence that the reasonable
probability is that the evidence has not been altered in any
material respect.
1998).
Love v. Commonwealth, 55 S.W.3d 816, 821 (Ky.
Gaps in the chain normally go to the weight of the
evidence and not to its admissibility.
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Id.
The evidence offered by the deputies provided a
reasonable probability that the substance delivered to the
Kentucky State Police laboratory was the same as that collected
from the scene.
Additionally, there was a sufficient basis for
believing that the substance was not accessible to others and so
had not been altered in any material respect prior to its being
transported from the McLean County Sheriff’s office to the
laboratory.
Any questions as to the transfer of the evidence
from the evidence area to Deputy Wright, as a possible gap in
the chain, go to the weight of the evidence rather than to its
admissibility.
Therefore, the court’s ruling was correct and
the evidence as to the testing of the substance was properly
admitted.
For all the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment
of the Mclean Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
John W. Tullis
Owensboro, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Susan Roncarti Lenz
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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