HELEN LIBANAN GUFFEY v. JERRY DALE GUFFEY
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RENDERED: APRIL 22, 2005; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-002307-ME
HELEN LIBANAN GUFFEY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE W. MITCHELL NANCE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-00448
JERRY DALE GUFFEY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER AND SCHRODER, JUDGES; HUDDLESTON, SENIOR JUDGE.1
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
This is an appeal from an order changing
primary residential custodian of the minor child from appellant
to appellee, and terminating appellee’s maintenance obligation.
Upon review of the record and hearing in this case, we reverse
both as to the modification of custody and as to the termination
1
Senior Judge Joseph R. Huddleston sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110 (5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
of maintenance.
The matter is remanded for any necessary
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The parties, Helen Guffey and Jerry Guffey, were
married in 1996 in Hong Kong and divorced by decree of
dissolution entered on February 27, 2001.
One child was born of
the marriage, James Guffey, born October 14, 1996.
Another
child, Nicole Guffey, who was born before the parties’ marriage
and who was not James’ biological child, lived with the parties
during the marriage.
The separation agreement, which was
incorporated by reference into the decree, provided that the
parties would have joint custody of James and that Helen would
be the primary residential custodian of the child.
continue to be the sole custodian of Nicole.
Helen was to
Jerry was given
reasonable visitation with James and Nicole.
At the time of the divorce, Jerry was 35 years of age
and Helen was 28.
Jerry is employed as an airline pilot,
earning approximately $48,000 a year in 2003.
Helen, who is
from the Philippines and not an American citizen, apparently did
not work outside the home during the marriage.
Per the
separation agreement, Jerry was to pay Helen $1,000 a month, of
which $580 was designated as child support for James, and $420
was designated as maintenance.
After the divorce, Jerry moved to Clarksburg, West
Virginia to be near his base, Pittsburgh.
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He would normally
exercise his visitation with the children at his parents’ home
in Glasgow, Kentucky every other week.
During that time, Helen
and the children were living in the marital residence in
Glasgow.
In October 2002, Helen moved with the two children to
Lebanon, Tennessee without telling Jerry.
The evidence
established that Lebanon was about an hour’s drive from Glasgow.
At the hearing in this case, Jerry testified that he had to find
out where they had moved on his own and did not learn that they
had moved to Lebanon, Tennessee until two weeks later.
After
the move, Helen did, however, continue to bring the children to
Glasgow for visitation every other week per the informal
visitation schedule the parties had established.
On March 3, 2003, Jerry filed a motion requesting that
his maintenance obligation be suspended.
Jerry thereafter
amended the motion, requesting modification of custody as to
James and Nicole.
Specifically, Jerry sought to be named the
primary residential custodian of both children.
The court held
a full evidentiary hearing on the maintenance and custody issues
on September 18, 2003.
On September 23, 2003, the court entered
its findings of fact, conclusions of law and order in which it
terminated maintenance to Helen and named Jerry primary
residential custodian of James and Nicole.
The basis for the
custody award as to Nicole was a finding that Jerry was a de
facto custodian of Nicole pursuant to KRS 402.270(1).
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Upon
Helen’s motion to amend, alter or vacate, the court entered an
amended order on October 24, 2003, retaining Helen as the sole
custodian of Nicole.
The court found that Jerry did not sustain
his burden of proof that he was the primary caregiver of Nicole
under KRS 403.270(1)(a).
The court’s rulings as to termination
of maintenance and primary residential custody of James were
unchanged.
Helen now appeals those rulings.
Modification of Custody Hearing
Helen first argues that the trial court erred in
setting a modification of custody hearing pursuant to KRS
403.350.
Helen maintains that Jerry did not present sufficient
facts to warrant a custody modification hearing in this case.
KRS 403.350 provides that “a party seeking a . . . modification
of a custody decree shall submit together with his moving papers
an affidavit setting forth facts supporting the requested order
or modification.”
Under KRS 403.340(3), a prior custody decree
cannot be modified unless the court finds “that a change has
occurred in the circumstances of the child or his custodian, and
that the modification is necessary to serve the best interests
of the child.”
In determining if a change has occurred
necessitating modification for the best interests of the child,
the court is to consider the following:
(a) Whether the custodian agrees to the
modification;
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(b) Whether the child has been integrated
into the family of the petitioner with
consent of the custodian;
(c) The factors set forth in KRS 403.270(2)
to determine the best interests of the
child;
(d) Whether the child's present environment
endangers seriously his physical, mental,
moral, or emotional health;
(e) Whether the harm likely to be caused by
a change of environment is outweighed by its
advantages to him; and
(f) Whether the custodian has placed the
child with a de facto custodian.
KRS 403.340(3).
Pursuant to KRS 403.340(4), “In determining whether a
child’s present environment may endanger seriously his physical,
mental, moral, or emotional health, the court shall consider all
relevant factors, including, but not limited to:”
(a) The interaction and interrelationship of
the child with his parent or parents, his de
facto custodian, his siblings, and any other
person who may significantly affect the
child's best interests;
(b) The mental and physical health of all
individuals involved;
(c) Repeated or substantial failure, without
good cause as specified in KRS 403.240, of
either parent to observe visitation, child
support, or other provisions of the decree
which affect the child, except that
modification of custody orders shall not be
made solely on the basis of failure to
comply with visitation or child support
provisions, or on the basis of which parent
is more likely to allow visitation or pay
child support;
(d) If domestic violence and abuse, as
defined in KRS 403.720,is found by the court
to exist, the extent to which the domestic
violence and abuse has affected the child
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and the child’s relationship to both
parents.
The affidavit submitted by Jerry in support of his
motion to modify provided in pertinent part:
2. In October, 2002, Respondent (hereafter
Helen) moved to Tennessee and failed to
notify him of her intention to move. At
that time, the children were uprooted from
their 3 bedroom, 2-bath house in Barren
County and from the school they were
attending and had attended and were moved to
a town where they had no friends or family.
3. Since that time, he has noted a marked
change in Nicole; she is quiet and withdrawn
and no longer the vivacious out-going child
she once was.
4. Helen has been allowing her boy-friend to
stay all night while the children are
present and Jerry believes that this sudden
change and insertion of a new adult male in
their lives has been damaging to the
children and it is not in their best
interest that they remain with Helen.
An affidavit of Jerry’s sister, Sue Jester, was also
submitted.
This affidavit stated in pertinent part:
2. She is familiar with Helen Guffey and has
observed her in the company of her boyfriend whose name affiant does not know;
affiant has also seen the vehicle which Mrs.
Guffey’s boyfriend drives.
3. During the night on February 20, 2003,
she saw the vehicle at the residence of Mrs.
Guffey in Lebanon, Tennessee; the children
were there that night.
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Whether a party has alleged sufficient facts to
warrant a hearing on modification of custody is a matter within
the discretion of the trial court.
948 (Ky.App. 1984).
See West v. West, 664 S.W.2d
A court’s decision to hold a modification
hearing will be upheld so long as the affidavits submitted
contain facts which establish adequate cause for such a hearing.
Gladish v. Gladish, 741 S.W.2d 658 (Ky.App. 1987).
“Given the
trial court’s reluctance to change custody, the movant must
present facts in his affidavit that compel the court’s
attention.”
West, 664 S.W.2d at 949.
From our review of the
above affidavits, we believe they contained facts which brought
James’ well-being into question as a result of two changes in
his life - the sudden move to Tennessee and Helen’s new
boyfriend.
Accordingly, the court acted within its discretion
in holding the hearing to further inquire into whether a
modification of custody was necessary to serve the best
interests of the child.
Modification of Custody
Helen’s next argument is that the trial court erred in
modifying custody and designating Jerry as the primary
residential custodian.
A court’s findings of fact made pursuant
to a custody decision will not be overturned unless they are
clearly erroneous.
(Ky. 1986).
CR 52.01; Reichle v. Reichle, 719 S.W.2d 442
Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if they are
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manifestly against the weight of the evidence.
412 S.W.2d 568 (Ky. 1967).
Wells v. Wells,
The trial court’s ultimate decision
as to custody will not be disturbed absent an abuse of
discretion.
Cherry v. Cherry, 634 S.W.2d 423 (Ky. 1982).
A
court will be deemed to have abused its discretion if its
decision is unreasonable or unfair.
S.W.2d 679 (Ky. 1994).
Kuprion v. Fitzgerald, 888
The party seeking modification of
custody under KRS 403.340 must bear the burden of proof.
Wilcher v. Wilcher, 566 S.W.2d 173 (Ky.App. 1978).
Helen, who was 31 years old at the time of the
hearing, represented herself at the modification hearing.
In
her testimony, she admitted that she did not tell Jerry that she
and the children had moved to Tennessee.
Helen maintained that
she never told him because he and his family were harassing her
and she wanted to get away from them.
Helen testified that she
chose to move to Lebanon, Tennessee because she had many
Philippine friends there.
Helen stated that before moving
there, she and the children had visited friends in Lebanon on
multiple occasions.
When Helen and the children first moved to Tennessee
Helen did not have a job.
Shortly thereafter, she got a job as
a waitress at a Mexican restaurant.
Helen admitted that on a
couple of occasions when her children were not in school, she
would take them to the Mexican restaurant when she worked
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because she did not have childcare.
She testified, however,
that she now has an older woman friend who watches the children
when she must be gone.
After the Mexican restaurant closed, she
worked other jobs – selling Mary Kay cosmetics, as a
receptionist, and occasionally cleaning houses.
Helen testified
that at the time of the hearing, she was not working because she
was a full-time student at Cumberland College in Tennessee.
She
stated that with going to school and taking care of the
children, she had no time to work outside the home.
Helen testified that she has a friend and mentor in
Lebanon named Dr. Larry Menifee, who is a professor at
Cumberland College.
According to Helen, Dr. Menifee is married
and has several children and grandchildren.
She testified that
three or four times a week, he would come to her apartment after
the children were in bed.
She stated that he was tutoring her
to help her pass her GED so she could get into college.
She
said that the tutoring was necessary because of her difficulties
with the language.
Helen testified that her children call Dr.
Menifee “grandfather” and that he once went to Grandparents Day
at the children’s school when Jerry’s parents could not come.
Helen admitted that Dr. Menifee often brought groceries for her
when he came to her apartment and that she had on occasion
borrowed money from him.
She insisted, however, that she had
paid him back.
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Peter Cash, a private detective hired by Jerry,
testified at the hearing that he observed Dr. Menifee on March
3, 2003, leave Cumberland College, go to Kroger, and then
proceed to Helen’s apartment at around 8:30 p.m.
Cash stated
that Helen was not there when Dr. Menifee arrived and that Dr.
Menifee apparently let himself in with his own key.
Cash
testified that at around 9:56 p.m., Helen and both children
arrived at the apartment.
According to Cash, he observed the
lights go out in the apartment at 11:20 p.m., and the lights
were still out at 12:15 a.m. when Cash left and ended his
surveillance for the evening.
Cash testified that he conducted
surveillance of Helen’s apartment two other evenings that same
week and observed Dr. Menifee arrive after 9:00 p.m. and the
lights go out at 11:30 p.m.
When Cash ended his surveillance on
those evenings between 12:15 a.m. and 1:30 a.m., Dr. Menifee was
still at the apartment.
Jerry’s sister, Sue Jester, testified that she had
gone to Tennessee twice to see what cars were at Helen’s
apartment.
She stated that she had observed Helen’s boyfriend’s
car during the day on one date and in the evening on another
date.
Jerry also called as a witness Donnie Owen, the
principal at Eastern Elementary School, the school the children
attended in Kentucky before moving to Tennessee.
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Owen testified
that both children were well-behaved and model students.
Owen
noted that there were a couple of instances of transportation
problems with the children getting home from school.
Owen
stated that the interaction he observed between the children and
Jerry was positive.
He also testified that Helen’s involvement
with the children at school was supportive, concerned, and
positive.
As to how the children were doing in school since
moving to Tennessee, Helen offered to submit some of the
children’s schoolwork and awards from their new school.
On that
point, Jerry’s counsel agreed to stipulate that the children
were likewise doing well in school in Tennessee.
Jerry testified that he is a pilot for U.S. Airway
Express.
There was no evidence regarding his work schedule.
However, Jerry did testify that if he got primary residential
custody of the children, he intended to take advantage of the
Family Medical Leave Act for some time off to be home with the
children.
Relative to care for the children once he went back
to work, Jerry stated that he intended to contact the nanny the
parties had in Hong Kong or he might hire an au pair.
Jerry
testified that he owns a large eight-bedroom five-bathroom home
in West Virginia and that Helen could stay there for visitation
of the children if he had primary residential custody.
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Jerry
also testified that he has access to free flights for the
children and Helen that could be used for visitation.
Jerry testified that since the children moved to
Tennessee, he has noticed changes in the children.
However,
Jerry did not specify any changes in the behavior of James.
The
only specific change he noted regarding Nicole was that she was
different to him when Helen was around.
Helen’s explanation for
any change in Nicole’s behavior toward Jerry was the fact that
Jerry had decided to tell Nicole that she was not his biological
child for the sole purpose of punishing Helen.
Jerry denied
telling Nicole he was not her father to punish Helen.
He stated
that he merely tried to comfort Nicole when she learned he was
not her biological father.
There was evidence presented of an instance of
domestic violence between the parties when Helen came to Jerry’s
parents’ home one evening to kiss the children goodnight when
Jerry was exercising his visitation there.
Helen alleged that
when she tried to enter the home, Jerry picked her up and threw
her down, bruising her side.
Jerry claimed that he had heard
from someone that she was doing drugs that night and did not
want her near the children, so he merely blocked her entry into
the house.
Relative to this incident, there is an agreed order
in the record from the Barren County District Court regarding a
fourth-degree assault charge against Jerry.
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In this order,
Jerry and Helen agree that the charge against Jerry will be
dismissed if:
Jerry does not have any contact or communication
with Helen except as specifically directed by Circuit Court
orders; Jerry does not engage in any other conduct to threaten,
harass, or harm Helen; and Jerry has no more violations of the
penal code.
Helen testified at the hearing that she does not
drink alcohol or do drugs.
In the trial court’s final written order, the court
summarizes the testimony of the various witnesses and then makes
the following general finding, “After considering the factors
enumerated in KRS 403.270(2), pursuant to KRS 403.340(3), the
Court finds that based upon events that have occurred since the
Decree, a change has occurred in the circumstances of the
children and modification is necessary to serve the best
interests of the children.”
In this order, the court did not
specify what change in the circumstances of the children
warranted modification.
However, on the record at the
conclusion of the hearing on the matter, the court made the
verbal finding that Helen’s relationship with Dr. Menifee was an
endangerment to the children.
The court also made much of the
fact that Helen had taken the children with her to work at the
Mexican restaurant.
Pursuant to KRS 403.340(3)(d), “[w]hether the child’s
present environment endangers seriously his physical, mental,
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moral, or emotional health” is indeed a proper factor the court
is to consider in determining whether a change has occurred in
the child’s life and whether a modification in custody is
necessary.
The question before us is whether the trial court’s
finding that Helen’s relationship with Dr. Menifee was an
endangerment to the children was clearly erroneous.
As there
was no evidence that Dr. Menifee was abusive to or neglectful of
the children or exhibited any negative conduct around the
children, we must assume that the court determined that Helen’s
relationship with Dr. Menifee was per se an endangerment to the
children.
KRS 403.270(3) provides that “[t]he court shall not
consider conduct of a proposed custodian that does not affect
his relationship to the child.”
In Powell v. Powell, 665 S.W.2d
312 (Ky. 1984), the Court stated as follows regarding the lower
court’s consideration of the custodial parent’s misconduct:
As stated in Krug v. Krug, Ky., 647 S.W.2d
790 (1983), the standard to be used in
consideration of misconduct on the part of
the custodian is not whether it has affected
the child but whether it is likely to
adversely affect the child. “If such a
determination is made, the trial court may
then consider the potential adverse effect
of such misconduct as it relates to the best
interests of the child.” Krug, Id., at 793.
Powell, 665 S.W.2d at 313.
In Powell, wherein the Court
adjudged that the lower court properly found that the mother
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engaged in sexual misconduct likely to adversely affect the
child, the mother had sexual relations twice with the child in
the house with men other than the man she was married to at the
time.
The lower court in Powell, however, considered other
evidence than the sexual misconduct in modifying custody.
There
was also evidence that the child was dirty, poorly clothed, and
hungry, and that the house in which he lived did not have heat
at certain times.
In Krug v. Krug, 647 S.W.2d 790 (Ky. 1983), it was
adjudged that the lower court properly awarded custody to the
father based, in part, on the mother’s sexual misconduct.
In
that case, the mother had admitted to three affairs, one with a
man who was an alcoholic and was ultimately imprisoned for
forgery.
In addition, there was evidence that she had used
drugs with this man.
In the present case, the evidence established that Dr.
Menifee usually came to Helen’s apartment later in the evening
when the children were in bed.
There was no evidence regarding
when Dr. Menifee left the apartment, only that he was still
there at around 1:00 a.m. and the lights were out.
Other than
the fact that Dr. Menifee came to the apartment in the evening
and the lights subsequently went out, there was no evidence
relative to a sexual relationship between Helen and Dr. Menifee.
The trial court never made a finding of fact regarding the
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existence of any sexual relationship.
The only evidence
regarding Dr. Menifee’s relationship with the children was that
they called him “grandfather” and that he came to their school
on Grandparent’s Day.
In our view, the above did not constitute
substantial evidence that Helen’s relationship with Dr. Menifee
adversely affected or was likely to adversely affect the
children.
Hence, the court’s finding that the relationship was
an endangerment to the children was clearly erroneous.
Given our ruling above, we must now look at the other
evidence in the case in light of the factors in KRS 403.340(3)
and KRS 403.270(2) to determine whether the court abused its
discretion in modifying custody and naming Jerry primary
residential custodian of James.
KRS 403.270(2)(c) – The interaction and interrelationship of the
child with his parent or parents, his siblings, and any other
person who may significantly affect the child’s interest
It is undisputed that Helen had been the primary
caregiver for both children during the marriage and after the
divorce, and that both children are very attached to her.
There
was also evidence that Nicole and James enjoyed a close sibling
relationship and that, up until the court’s modification of
custody, the two children had always lived together.
As to the
children’s relationship with the parents, the lower court found,
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“The children have a good relationship with Jerry and both
parties are loving parents.”
The evidence also established that
the children had close family ties and friends in Glasgow and
that the children had made new friends since moving to
Tennessee.
In particular, Jerry’s parents, who sometimes
babysat the children and to whom the children are very close,
live in Glasgow, which is much closer to Lebanon, Tennessee (65
miles away) than to Clarksburg, West Virginia (433 miles away).
There was evidence that the children maintained their
relationships with family and school friends in Glasgow even
after moving to Tennessee.
Other than his father, there was no
evidence that James had any family or friends in West Virginia.
KRS 403.270(d) – The child’s adjustment to his home, school, and
community
There was evidence that the children were doing well
in their school in Tennessee and had made friends there.
Additionally, there was evidence that there was a sizeable
Philippine population in Lebanon and that Helen and the children
had made friends within this community.
KRS 403.270(f) – Information, records, and evidence of domestic
violence as defined in KRS 403.720
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As noted earlier, there was an agreed order in the
record regarding an incident of domestic violence perpetrated on
Helen by Jerry.
KRS 403.340(3)(d) – Whether the child’s present environment
endangers seriously his physical, mental, moral, or emotional
health
Besides Helen’s relationship with Dr. Menifee, the
court also looked at the fact that Helen had taken the children
with her to work at the Mexican restaurant in determining that
their present environment was an endangerment to the children.
However, the evidence established that:
Helen no longer works
at the restaurant; those were isolated occasions when the
children were not in school; she brought videos for the children
to watch in an apartment above the restaurant; and she now has
adequate childcare for the children when she cannot be home.
KRS 403.340(3)(e) – Whether the harm likely to be caused by a
change in environment is outweighed by its advantages to him
As a result of the court’s custody order in this case,
James has been forced to move nearly 500 miles away to West
Virginia, where he has no friends or family besides his father.
Significant to this Court is also the fact that according to
Jerry’s testimony, after he has utilized his time under the
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Family Medical Leave Act, James will be looked after by a nanny
or an au pair when Jerry is away from home working as a pilot.
It was further acknowledged by the lower court in this case that
this ruling will likely result in the child traveling frequently
by air for visitation, whereas, when Helen was primary
residential custodian, Jerry was the one who flew for visitation
in Glasgow.
The lower court also apparently considered the
parties’ contrasting housing circumstances in its order, finding
that, “[u]pon her move to Tennessee, Helen left a three-bedroom
brick house in a nice area for a three-bedroom apartment.”
The
court then noted that Jerry’s house in West Virginia has eight
bedrooms and five baths and in the past, had been used as a bed
and breakfast.
Helen testified that the apartment complex in
Tennessee was nice, in a fine area and that a state trooper
lived in the same complex.
Helen offered as proof numerous
photographs of the apartment which show it to be roomy, clean,
and attractive.
Whether the court abused its discretion in modifying custody
given all of the relevant factors
In reviewing the record, we believe the trial court
abused its discretion in changing primary residential custody
from Helen to Jerry.
The court changed primary residential
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custody from the parent who had been the child’s primary
caregiver since birth (and away from his only sibling) to the
parent who travels for a living and lives 500 miles away, where
the child has no other family or friends and will frequently be
cared for by a nanny.
In our view, such a drastic change in
custody was not justified and was thus unreasonable under the
facts.
The court based its decision on a relationship which, as
we have already discussed, was not shown to be an endangerment
to the child, and on some isolated instances of bad judgment
regarding childcare.
Accordingly, the order modifying custody
is reversed and the matter is remanded for any necessary further
proceedings.
Termination of Maintenance
We next turn to the court’s termination of Jerry’s
maintenance obligation.
Per the terms of the parties’
separation agreement, which was incorporated into the decree,
Jerry agreed to pay Helen $420 a month in maintenance.
There
was no end date for the maintenance provided in the agreement.
Also, per the separation agreement, when Helen moved out of the
marital residence, the residence was sold and the equity was
divided between the parties.
There was no evidence in the
record as to how much money Helen received from the sale of the
residence.
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The evidence established that when Helen came to the
United States with Jerry, she did not have the equivalent of a
U.S. high school education.
After the divorce, Helen worked for
short periods as a waitress, a receptionist, cleaning houses and
selling cosmetics.
Helen stated she had difficulty obtaining
and retaining employment because of her lack of education.
Sometime in 2002 or 2003, Helen obtained her GED and began
attending Cumberland College as a full-time student.
She
testified that she had no time to work outside the home while
she was going to school full-time and taking care of the
children.
Helen testified that while she is in school, she is
able to pay for her school and the family’s living expenses
through her maintenance, support, student loans, work study
programs, and scholarships.
Helen admitted that Dr. Menifee
often bought her groceries.
She also stated that she had on
occasion borrowed money from Dr. Menifee but had paid him back.
There was no evidence that Dr. Menifee provided any further
monetary support for Helen.
Jerry’s income at the time of the hearing was $48,000
a year.
There was no evidence that Jerry had experienced any
change in circumstances regarding his finances since the
divorce.
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In deciding to terminate maintenance, the trial court
found:
Helen has had adequate time in which to
prepare herself for work and additional
rehabilitative maintenance would not be
appropriate. Furthermore, there has been a
substantial and continuing change of
circumstances that make the continuation of
maintenance unconscionable.
Relative to modification of a maintenance award, KRS
403.250(1) provides:
Except as otherwise provided in subsection
(6) of KRS 403.180, the provisions of any
decree respecting maintenance may be
modified only upon a showing of changed
circumstances so substantial and continuing
as to make the terms unconscionable.
The party seeking modification of the maintenance award has the
burden of establishing that a change of circumstances has
occurred.
McKenzie v. McKenzie, 502 S.W.2d 657 (Ky. 1973).
Awarding maintenance is a matter within the discretion of the
trial court.
1977).
Browning v. Browning, 551 S.W.2d 823 (Ky.App.
A trial court’s findings of fact pursuant to a
maintenance award are subject to the clearly erroneous standard.
Adams v. Adams, 565 S.W.2d 169 (Ky.App. 1978).
The lower court does not state in its order what it
considered to be the change of circumstances which necessitated
termination of Helen’s maintenance.
We can only presume that
the court was of the belief that Dr. Menifee was now supporting
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Helen, although the evidence merely established that he bought
her groceries and sometimes loaned her money which she paid
back.
There was no evidence that he contributed to her
financial support beyond that.
As to Jerry’s claim that the short duration of the
marriage and Helen’s young age render the maintenance award now
unconscionable, we would point out that Jerry agreed to the
open-ended award of maintenance in the separation agreement and
thus must prove a “change of circumstances” to modify the award.
At the time of the hearing, Helen was not working so she could
attend college full-time, presumably to obtain a good job and
ultimately be self-supporting.
From our review of the record,
the court’s finding of a substantial and continuing change of
circumstances which rendered the maintenance award
unconscionable was clearly erroneous.
Hence, the decision to
terminate maintenance was an abuse of discretion, and the order
terminating maintenance is hereby reversed.
Applicability of UCCJA
As to Helen’s argument that the court improperly
exercised jurisdiction of the case under the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act (“UCCJA”), we would note that, as of
the time of Jerry’s custody motion in this case (March, 2003),
the children had not been in Tennessee for six months.
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KRS
403.420(1)(a); KRS 403.410(5).
Therefore, Kentucky was still
James’ home state at the time of that motion.
For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the
Barren Circuit Court is reversed relative to its decisions to
modify custody and terminate maintenance, and the case is
remanded for any necessary further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
John Corey Morgan
Glasgow, Kentucky
Cheryl Berry
Glasgow, Kentucky
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