INSTEEL WIRE PRODUCTS v. CHARYL CRADDOCK; HON. LLOYD R. EDENS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED:
OCTOBER 15, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-000316-WC
INSTEEL WIRE PRODUCTS
v.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-02-76323
CHARYL CRADDOCK;
HON. LLOYD R. EDENS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE;
AND WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; BUCKINGHAM AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
TACKETT, JUDGE:
Insteel Wire Products (“Insteel”) petitions
this Court to review an opinion of the Workers’ Compensation
Board (“Board”) entered on January 14, 2004.
In the Board’s
opinion, it affirmed an opinion, order, and award of the Hon.
Lloyd R. Edens, Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) entered on
August 4, 2003.
The ALJ had determined that Charyl Craddock
(“Craddock”), a former employee of Insteel, did not retain the
physical capacity to return to the type of work that she had
performed at the time of her work related injury.
After making
this determination, the ALJ applied the three-multiplier found
in KRS 342.730(1)(c)1 to enhance Craddock’s benefits.
The ALJ
also ordered Craddock to be evaluated by the Department of
Vocational Rehabilitation at Insteel’s expense.
Finally, the
ALJ awarded Craddock medical benefits to treat her depression
that was caused by her injury.
In Insteel’s petition for review, the company argues
that uncontroverted evidence shows that after her injury
Craddock returned to the same type of work that she did before
her injury.
Based on this uncontroverted evidence, Insteel
insists that the ALJ erred when it applied the three-multiplier
to Craddock’s award.
Insteel also argues that, since Craddock
retained the physical capacity to return to the same type of
work, she was not eligible for vocational rehabilitation.
So
the ALJ erred when he referred her for vocational
rehabilitation.
Insteel also argues that Craddock’s depression
was not caused by her injury.
Since her depression was not
related to her injury, Insteel concludes that the ALJ erred when
it awarded her medical benefits.
Contrary to Insteel’s
assertions, substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s decision.
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Therefore, this Court affirms the Board’s opinion, which
affirmed the ALJ’s decision.
Charyl Craddock began working for Insteel Wire
Products in January of 1996.
By 2001, she was the purchasing
and safety manager for the company’s Hickman plant.
On the
morning of April 12, 2001, Craddock’s supervisor asked her to
count the number of steel rods that had been delivered to the
plant.
The rods were on the back of a large flatbed truck.
To
count the rods, Craddock was forced to climb onto the truck’s
bed.
After finishing the job, Craddock jumped down.
When
Craddock landed, she twisted her left ankle and her left knee
bent completely sideways.
pain and could not get up.
Craddock immediately felt intense
A co-worker took Craddock to a local
emergency room.
A few months after the emergency room visit, Craddock
began to receive treatment from Dr. Spindler.
When Dr. Spindler
first examined Craddock, he initially diagnosed her with an ACL
rupture and a lateral meniscus tear.
He performed arthroscopic
surgery to release the scar tissue that had built up in her left
knee.
After the surgery, Dr. Spindler diagnosed Craddock with
an S/P anterior cruciate ligament tear in her left knee and with
arthrofibrosis.
At Craddock’s insistence, he released her back
to work without any restrictions.
But, later in September of
2002, Dr. Spindler restricted Craddock from walking more than
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two hours at a time with a maximum of four hours each day.
He
restricted her to lifting no more than forty-nine pounds
occasionally.
And he restricted her from jumping, climbing, and
repetitive lifting.
He also opined that Craddock was ten
percent functionally impaired.
After the surgery, Craddock began intensive physical
therapy to regain the use of her knee, but she soon became very
depressed because of the constant pain she was experiencing and
the slow rate of improvement.
On July 12, 2002, Craddock meet
with Dr. Shurling, a psychologist.
Dr. Shurling examined
Craddock and diagnosed her with major depressive disorder,
recurrent and moderate.
Even though he noted that she had prior
incidents of depression, Dr. Shurling concluded these incidents
had been resolved well before the time of her injury.
Dr.
Shurling stated unequivocally that Craddock’s depression was
caused by her work related injury.
He opined that Craddock
suffered from a fifteen percent functional impairment due to
depression.
Craddock filed a workers’ compensation claim in
December of 2002.
depression.
Later, she amended her claim to include
As stated above, the ALJ found in Craddock’s favor.
Insteel appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Board but the
Board affirmed the ALJ’s decision.
Court for review.
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Now Insteel petitions this
FIRST ARGUMENT: APPLICATION OF THE THREE-MULTIPLIER
Insteel points out that KRS 342.730(1)(c)1 provides
that if an employee has suffered a work related injury and as a
result no longer retains the physical capacity to return to the
type of work that the employee performed at the time of the
injury, then the employee’s permanent partial disability
benefits will be multiplied by three.
According to Insteel’s
interpretation, KRS 342.730(1)(c)1 does not require an employee
to retain the physical ability to return to the exact same job
with the exact same duties.
According to Insteel, the statute
merely requires the employee to retain the physical capacity to
do the same type of work.
Insteel insists that Craddock retained the ability to
return to the same type of work.
To support its claim, Insteel
points out that Craddock returned to work as the company’s
purchasing and safety manager.
It points to her testimony
during the final hearing and claims that she testified that the
majority of her work was done on computer.
In addition to
Craddock’s testimony, the company also points to the testimony
of Reed Vernon (“Vernon”).
Vernon was Craddock’s former
supervisor and he testified on Insteel’s behalf.
that Craddock’s job was mostly sedentary.
He testified
Insteel claims that
Craddock’s testimony and Vernon’s testimony constitute
uncontroverted evidence that because she retained the capacity
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to do computer work, she retained the capacity to do the same
type of work that she did at the time of her injury.
Based on
this uncontroverted evidence, Insteel concludes that the ALJ
erred when it applied the three-multiplier to Craddock’s
benefits.
When reviewing one of the Board’s decisions, this
Court will only reverse the Board’s decision when it has
overlooked or misconstrued controlling law or so flagrantly
erred in evaluating the evidence that it has caused gross
injustice.
Daniel v. Armco Steel Company, Ky. App., 913 S.W.2d
797, 798 (1995).
To properly review the Board’s decision, this
Court must ultimately review the ALJ’s underlying decision.
Where the ALJ has found in favor of the employee, who had the
burden of proof, this Court must determine whether the ALJ’s
findings were supported by substantial evidence.
Special Fund
v. Francis, Ky., 708 S.W.2d 641, 643 (1986); See also Wolf Creek
Collieries v. Crum, Ky., 673 S.W.2d 735 (1984).
The Supreme
Court of Kentucky has defined substantial evidence as, “some
evidence of substance and relevant consequence, having the
fitness to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable people.”
Smyzer v. B.F. Goodrich Chemical Co., Ky., 474 S.W.2d 367, 369
(1971).
In other words, substantial evidence is, “evidence
which would permit a fact-finder to reasonably find as it did.”
Special Fund v. Francis, supra at 643.
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And as the fact-finder,
the ALJ, not this Court and not the Board, has sole discretion
to determine the quality, character, and substance of the
evidence.
Whittaker v. Rowland, Ky., 998 S.W.2d 479, 481
(1999), quoting Paramount Foods, Inc. v. Burkhardt, Ky., 695
S.W.2d 418 (1985); See also Snawder v. Stice, Ky. App., 576
S.W.2d 276 (1979).
Not only does the ALJ weigh the evidence but
the ALJ may also choose to believe or disbelieve any part of the
evidence, regardless of its source.
Whittaker v. Rowland, supra
at 481, quoting Caudill v. Maloney’s Discount Stores, Ky., 560
S.W.2d 15, 16 (1977).
At the final hearing, Craddock testified that she
spent the majority of her time doing computer work, placing
orders, and managing the company’s inventory.
Record (“TR”) at 323.
Transcript of the
As part of her managerial duties, she was
responsible for ordering new parts and shelving them as they
arrived.
TR at 324.
According to Craddock, maintaining the
parts room was the major part of her job.
TR at 326.
To do
this job, she routinely lifted objects between thirty and forty
pounds.
But when she returned to work she could no longer
routinely lift that much weight. TR at 324.
According to
Craddock, maintaining the parts room required her to routinely
climb to stock the top shelves and to kneel to stock the bottom
shelves.
TR at 326.
But when she returned to work, she could
no longer climb or kneel.
TR at 326.
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Craddock testified that
as safety manager she was required to do a walking safety tour
of the plant on a regular basis.
But after the injury, she was
no longer capable of doing the safety tour. TR at 325.
Vernon, who testified for Insteel, testified that
after Craddock returned to work, the company accommodated
Craddock’s physical limitations as much as possible.
TR at 361.
He testified that before Craddock was injured, she routinely
lifted items in excess of fifty pounds.
TR at 362.
But after
her injury, Vernon or a janitor or another supervisor would
carry and shelve the new parts that Craddock could not lift.
at 361-362.
TR
Vernon testified that, before her injury, Craddock
routinely climbed and knelt in order to stock the parts room.
TR at 370-371.
either.
But after her injury, he never saw her do
TR at 371.
According to the Supreme Court of Kentucky, “[i]f the
evidence indicates that a worker is unlikely to be able to
continue earning a wage that equals or exceeds the wage at the
time of injury for the indefinite future, the application of
[KRS 342.370(1)](c)1 is appropriate.”
103 S.W.3d 5, 12 (2003).
Fawbush v. Gwinn, Ky.,
Craddock testified that she was no
longer physically able to perform the major part of her job,
maintaining the parts room.
Along with Craddock’s testimony,
Vernon also testified that Craddock could no longer maintain the
parts room as she did before her injury.
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In addition, as the
Board noted, Dr. Spindler opined that Craddock was no longer
physically capable of performing her various job duties on an
indefinite basis.
All of this constitutes substantial evidence
that supported the ALJ’s decision that Craddock no longer
retained the physical ability to do the same type of work that
she did before her injury.
And given this substantial evidence,
the ALJ’s decision to apply the three-multiplier was reasonable.
SECOND ARGUMENT: ELIGIBILITY FOR VOCATIONAL REHABILITION
According to Insteel, since Craddock clearly retained
the physical capacity to perform the same type of work that she
did at the time of her injury, then she was not entitled to
vocational rehabilitation benefits under KRS 342.710.
But, as
previously discussed, the ALJ’s finding that Craddock lacked the
physical capacity to return to the same type of work was
supported by substantial evidence.
Since she could not do the
same type of work as before, she was eligible for vocational
rehabilitation.
Thus, the ALJ’s decision to refer Craddock to
vocational rehabilitation was reasonable.
THIRD ARGUMENT: CAUSE OF CRADDOCK’S DEPRESSIVE DISORDER
Insteel insists that the ALJ’s finding regarding
Craddock’s depression was not supported by substantial evidence.
Insteel points out that Dr. Shurling and Dr. Shraberg, two
psychologists, examined Craddock.
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Dr. Shurling examined
Craddock and diagnosed her with a major depressive disorder,
recurrent.
He also found that she had suffered various
depressive episodes prior to her injury.
But he opined that
these past episodes had been resolved long before Craddock’s
work related injury.
He also opined that the work related
injury had triggered Craddock’s current depressive disorder.
Sometime after Dr. Shurling’s examination, Dr. Shraberg examined
Craddock on Insteel’s behalf.
He diagnosed Craddock with a
major depressive disorder, recurrent, as well.
But he believed
that her current depressive disorder had been caused by the
various traumatic events that had occurred throughout Craddock’s
life.
Insteel argues that because both Drs. Shurling and
Shraberg used the word “recurrent” in their diagnoses,
Craddock’s depressive disorder must have existed prior to her
work related injury.
According to Insteel, this constitutes
substantial evidence that Craddock’s depression was not caused
by her injury.
In reality, Insteel is asking this Court to
ignore Dr. Shurling, who was only one of the experts upon which
the ALJ relied, in favor of Dr. Shraberg, Insteel’s expert.
this Court is prohibited from making such a choice.
Only the
ALJ can weigh the quality, character, and substance of the
evidence.
Whittaker v. Rowland, 998 S.W.2d at 481.
The ALJ
considered all the evidence and chose to rely upon Dr.
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But
Shurling’s diagnosis and opinion.
As the fact-finder, the ALJ
had the discretion to make this choice and to rely upon Dr.
Shurling’s opinion.
Id.
Shurling’s opinion.
The ALJ also relied on the opinion of Mr.
But the ALJ did not just rely on Dr.
Runyon, who has a master’s degree in psychology.
Mr. Runyon
examined Craddock and opined that she was suffering from
situational depression but he noted that she was responding well
to anti-depressants.
own testimony.
In addition, the ALJ relied on Craddock’s
Craddock testified that she felt very depressed
since the surgery because of the constant pain and the fact she
could no longer support her family.
She testified that she had
trouble sleeping and concentrating, although she admitted that
medication had helped these problems.
constituted substantial evidence.
Obviously, this
Given this evidence, the
ALJ’s decision to award Craddock medical benefits to treat her
depression was reasonable.
CONCLUSION
This Court finds that all of the contested decisions
made by the ALJ in this case were supported by substantial
evidence.
Since the ALJ’s decisions were supported by
substantial evidence, the ALJ did not err.
Thus, the Board
correctly affirmed the ALJ’s opinion, order and award.
Since
the Board neither misconstrued the law nor erred in evaluating
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the evidence, this Court affirms the Board’s opinion of January
14, 2004.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
David L. Murphy,
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE CHARYL
CRADDOCK:
Jackson W. Watts
Versailles, Kentucky
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