RITA OSBORNE v. CLARK REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER; HON. BONNIE C. KITTINGER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED: JULY 23, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-002652-WC
RITA OSBORNE
v.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-99-75897
CLARK REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER;
HON. BONNIE C. KITTINGER, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW JUDGE; AND THE WORKERS’
COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, KNOPF, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE.
Rita Osborne (Osborne) petitions for a review
of a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board, entered on
November 19, 2003, reversing and remanding to the Administrative
Law Judge (ALJ) with instructions to enter an order of dismissal
of her reopening claim.
controlling statutes.
We believe the Board misconstrued the
Therefore, we reverse and remand in order
to reinstate the ALJ’s opinion and order.
Osborne is fifty-nine years old and has an eleventh
grade education with a certificate in patient care.
She began
working as a patient care technician at the Clark Regional
Medical Center in 1977.
Osborne injured her back on two
occasions, October 28, 1998, and June 1, 1999, when she was
attempting to weigh patients.
workers’ compensation claim.
Osborne subsequently filed a
An opinion and award dated
October 19, 2000, awarded her temporary total benefits for
approximately four months, and permanent partial disability
benefits based on a finding that she had a 5% permanent partial
impairment.
In making the latter determination, the ALJ relied
on the report of Dr. Vaughan, who assessed the 5% impairment
using the DRE Model and the 4th edition of the American Medical
Association Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment
(AMA Guides).
The ALJ’s opinion also stated that the issue of
whether Osborne was totally disabled was “a close question.”
One year later, Osborne filed a motion to reopen her
workers’ compensation claim, on the grounds that her condition
had worsened as a result of the back injury.
She attached a
letter from her primary care physician that stated that she had
developed severe deep vein thrombosis and massive pulmonary
embolus.
He attributed these developments to the immobility
caused by her back pain.
On December 14, 2001, the ALJ entered
an order granting the motion to reopen, stating that Osborne had
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made a prima facie showing that her condition had worsened.
The
matter was accordingly reopened.
Two evaluations were performed at the University of
Kentucky Medical Center, pursuant to KRS 342.315.
One expert
evaluated Osborne’s pulmonary condition; the other expert, Dr.
Prince, evaluated her back problems.
After considering the evidence presented, which
included Osborne’s own testimony, the reports of the two
experts, and reports by other physicians, the ALJ determined
that Osborne’s deep vein thrombosis and pulmonary embolisms were
not primarily caused by her back injury.
This issue is not
contested on appeal.
The ALJ also found, however, that there had been a
worsening in Osborne’s back condition.
In arriving at her final
decision to award total disability benefits, the ALJ relied in
part on the fact that the university evaluator, Dr. Prince, had
assessed a 7% impairment as compared to Dr. Vaughan’s original
diagnosis of a 5% impairment.
In arriving at the 7% impairment
rating, Dr. Prince had used a more recent edition of the AMA
Guides and a different assessment model (Range of Motion rather
than DRE) than those used by Dr. Vaughan.
Dr. Prince did not
explain in his report how his assessment, based as it was on
different standards and methodology, compared to that of Dr.
Vaughan.
The ALJ analyzed the issue as follows:
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Dr. Prince assessed a 7% impairment caused
by the work injuries. Although he used the
5th Edition of the AMA Guides, which was not
available during Plaintiff’s original claim
pendancy [sic], he also used the Range of
Motion Model for his assessment. He could
have used the DRE Model and explained any
difference in his impairment [rating] and
that of Dr. Vaughan [the physician who
performed the assessment on the original
claim]. He had, for review, the original
Opinion and Award showing a 5% impairment as
the basis of the award and how it was
determined. He also knew the purpose of the
university evaluation. He assigned a
greater impairment than had been determined
in 2000 and his opinion will be given
presumptive weight herein.
The ALJ also placed considerable weight on Osborne’s own account
of her current condition.
In addition to Dr. Prince’s opinion, the ALJ
relies on the very credible testimony of the
Plaintiff, who explained how her life has
changed since the award and how it is
governed by pain. Judge Nanney [the ALJ on
the original claim] thought the issue of
whether she was totally disabled was a close
call two years ago, yet he thought, at that
time, she could do sedentary work. It
appears to the undersigned that she would be
incapable of even light work at this time,
due in large part to the amount of pain
medication she must take to obtain any
relief from her back pain.
Clark Regional appealed the decision to the Workers’
Compensation Board.
The main issue that troubled the Board in
its review of the case was the ALJ’s assessment of Dr. Prince’s
report.
The Board reversed and remanded the case for further
findings, primarily on the grounds that the ALJ had not shown a
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change in Osborne’s impairment by means of objective medical
evidence.
The Board specifically cited the report of Dr.
Prince, and the different rating system and edition of the AMA
Guides he had used in performing his evaluation.
The Board
contended that this made it impossible to compare his findings
with those of Dr. Vaughan, and that therefore, the ALJ had erred
in finding that Prince’s report showed a worsening in Osborne’s
condition simply on the basis that 7% indicated a higher
impairment than 5%.
In a separate opinion, one member of the
Board also noted that the ALJ had failed to consider the report
of Dr. Sheridan, a physician retained by Clark Regional, who had
stated that if Dr. Prince and Dr. Sheridan had used the same
edition of the AMA Guides, their assessment of Osborne’s
impairment would have been the same.
Our review of this issue
is hampered by the fact that Dr. Sheridan’s report is not in the
record before us, so we must rely solely on the quotations and
references to his report contained in the ALJ and Board
opinions.
On remand, the ALJ reaffirmed her finding that Osborne
was totally disabled.
She rejected Dr. Sheridan’s explanation
of the difference between Dr. Prince’s and Dr. Vaughan’s
impairment rating as follows:
A significant issue in determining whether
Plaintiff has shown a change in her
impairment by objective medical evidence is
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whether the 7% impairment rating assessed by
Dr. Prince is, in fact, indicative of a
greater impairment than the 5% assessed by
Dr. Vaughan in 1999. The undersigned finds
Dr. Sheridan’s explanation for the
difference in the two impairment ratings to
be entirely inadequate. Dr. Sheridan merely
said that he thought the DRE model was
appropriate on both occasions, “so, the
reason for the discrepancy . . . is that I
believe Dr. Vaughan used the DRE II, which
gave her 5% from the 1993 AMA Guides, Fourth
Edition, and Dr. Prince gave her 7% using
the diagnostic Table 15-7, rather than the
DRE. If the same guidelines were used in
each case, the impairment would be the same,
that is comparing Dr. Vaughan’s and Dr.
Prince’s ratings.” Dr. Sheridan did not
attempt to explain why he thought the
ratings would be the same if the same
guidelines were used.
Clark Regional again appealed to the Board.
The Board
reversed the ALJ’s decision and remanded the matter for an order
of dismissal on the grounds that there was still insufficient
evidence to support the ALJ’s findings.
The Board’s opinion
stated in part as follows:
As we stated in our original opinion, KRS
342.125 mandates that by objective medical
evidence, a claimant, to be successful on
reopening, must show an increase in
impairment rating due to a condition caused
by the injury since the date of the award or
order. Therefore, we are of the opinion
that in order to succeed on reopening on the
merits, it must be established that the
change in impairment rating is not simply a
change based on the edition of the Guides
used. This finding can be made only if
evidence exists of record that provides the
ALJ a basis to validly compare evidence in
existence at the time of the original award
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with the medical evidence of impairment
produced on reopening. Again having
carefully scrutinized the evidence in the
original claim and on reopening and the
ALJ’s further analysis of the evidence, we
believe Clark Regional is correct in that
the ALJ’s decision is not supported by
substantial evidence in the record. Under
the DRE Model, Osborne’s impairment rating
would be the same.
It is from this order that Osborne appeals.
The duty of this Court is to correct the Board only
where it has overlooked or misconstrued controlling statutes or
precedent, or committed an error in assessing the evidence so
flagrant as to cause gross injustice.
Western Baptist Hospital
v. Kelly, Ky., 827 S.W.2d 685, 687-88 (1992); Whittaker v.
Rowland, Ky., 998 S.W.2d 479, 482 (1999).
We believe that the Board applied the wrong statutory
standard in its review of the ALJ’s findings of fact.
KRS
342.125(1)(d), as amended in 1996, allows reopening and review
of any award based upon:
Change of disability as shown by
medical evidence of worsening or
of impairment due to a condition
the injury since the date of the
order.
objective
improvement
caused by
award or
The purpose of this statute is to establish the grounds upon
which a motion to reopen may be granted, not to establish the
standard of evidence necessary for a finding of total permanent
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disability.
In a recent opinion, the Kentucky Supreme Court
explained the function of this statutory provision:
Effective December 12, 1996, the legislature
amended KRS 342.125(1) by enacting KRS
342.125(1)(a)-(d). KRS 342.125(1)(d)
permits the reopening of a final award upon
evidence of a “[c]hange of disability as
shown by objective medical evidence of
worsening or improvement of impairment due
to a condition caused by the injury since
the date of the award or order.” . . . As
we attempted to explain in our recent
decision in Woodland Hills Mining, Inc. v.
McCoy, [Ky., 105 S.W.3d 446 (2003)], the
amendment does not govern the type of
evidence necessary to establish the right to
greater benefits under KRS 342.730 with
respect to a reopened claim. It changes
only a procedural requirement, i.e., one of
the grounds upon which a motion to reopen
may be granted. In other words, KRS
342.125(1)(d) addresses the necessary prima
facie showing in order to prevail on a
motion to reopen that is filed on or after
December 12, 1996. . . . the merits of a
worker’s right to receive additional income
benefits at reopening are governed by the
version of KRS 342.730 that was effective on
the date of injury. (emphasis added.)
Dingo Coal Co. v. Tolliver, Ky., 129 S.W.3d 367, 370-71 (2004).
See also Stambaugh v. Cedar Creek Mining Co., Ky., 488 S.W.2d
681, 682 (1972).
In her order granting Osborne’s motion to reopen, the
ALJ found that she had made a prima facie showing of a worsening
in her condition based on an objective medical opinion.
This
objective medical opinion consisted of the letter from her
primary care physician regarding her pulmonary problems.
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Clark
Regional did not challenge the motion to reopen.
The issue is
not therefore preserved for appeal, and once the prima facie
showing has been made, the evidentiary standard of “objective
medical evidence of impairment” under KRS 342.125 is no longer
applicable.
In its review, the Board essentially adopted the
“objective medical evidence” standard under the reopening
statute, and interpreted it to mean that in order for a claimant
to succeed in obtaining total permanent disability benefits upon
reopening, she was required to show an increased impairment
under the AMA Guides.
The standard for determining whether the worker will
receive additional benefits once the case is reopened, however,
is controlled by KRS 342.730.
See Woodland Hills Mining, Inc.
v. McCoy, Ky., 105 S.W.3d 446 (2003).
Furthermore, the standard
differs significantly for findings of permanent partial and
permanent total disability.
When enacting the 1996 amendments, the
legislature employed different standards for
awarding benefits under KRS 342.730(1)(a)
and (1)(b). In Ira A. Watson Dept. Store v.
Hamilton, Ky., 34 S.W.3d 48 (2000), we
explained that although an impairment rating
due to the work-related injury is a
prerequisite to a finding of total
disability under the 1996 Act, some of the
Osborne v. Johnson, Ky., 432 S.W.2d 800
(1968), factors still remain relevant to the
determination. Thus, awards under KRS
342.730(1)(a) continue to be based upon a
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finding of disability. In contrast, an
award of permanent partial disability under
KRS 342.730(1)(b) is based solely on a
finding that the injury resulted in a
particular AMA impairment rating, with the
amount of disability being determined by
statute. In other words, KRS 342.730(1)(a)
requires the ALJ to determine the worker’s
disability, while KRS 342.730(1)(b) requires
the ALJ to determine the worker’s
impairment. Impairment and disability are
not synonymous. (emphasis added.)
Roberts Brothers Coal Company v. Robinson, Ky., 113 S.W.3d 181,
182-83 (2003).
“Permanent total disability” means the condition of an
employee who, due to an injury, has a permanent disability
rating and has a complete and permanent inability to perform any
type of work as a result of an injury[.]”
KRS 342.0011(11)(c).
[I]t is clear that the ALJ has very limited
discretion when determining the extent of a
worker’s permanent, partial disability. See
KRS 342.730(1)(b) and (c). However,
determining whether a particular worker has
sustained a partial or total occupational
disability as defined by KRS 342.0011(11)
clearly requires a weighing of the evidence
concerning whether the worker will be able
to earn an income by providing services on a
regular and sustained basis in a competitive
economy.
Ira A. Watson Dept. Store v. Hamilton, Ky., 34 S.W.3d 48, 51
(2000), (reh’g denied 2001) (emphasis added.)
Clearly, therefore, the ALJ did not err in relying on
factors other than the impairment rating in deciding whether
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Osborne is totally permanently disabled as a result of her work
injury.
As to the evaluation by Dr. Prince, the Board
correctly noted that it is to be given presumptive weight under
KRS 342.125:
Except as otherwise provided in KRS 342.316,
the clinical findings and opinions of the
designated evaluator shall be afforded
presumptive weight by administrative law
judges and the burden to overcome such
findings and opinions shall fall on the
opponent of that evidence. When
administrative law judges reject the
clinical findings and opinions of the
designated evaluator they shall specifically
state in the order the reasons for rejecting
that evidence.
KRS 342.315(2) (emphasis added.)
In reversing the ALJ’s opinion and order, the Board
stated that she had improperly shifted the burden to Clark
Regional to prove that Dr. Prince’s assessment was not proper.
Instead, the Board wrote,
it was incumbent upon Osborne to provide
evidence as a basis to validly compare the
rating in existence at the time of the
original award with an increased impairment
produced on reopening. Dr. Prince’s
evidence simply does not support a finding
of an increase in impairment on reopening.
The Board was persuaded instead by Dr. Sheridan’s explanation of
the ratings, and found that the ALJ had erred in not adopting
his interpretation.
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Dr. Sheridan’s explanation of the
significance of the 5% and 7% impairment
ratings in comparison to the application of
the Fourth and Fifth Editions of the Guides
constituted an uncontradicted medical
opinion that could not be casually
disregarded by the ALJ without providing a
sufficient explanation for her rejection.
No explanation was provided because there
was none available inasmuch as neither Dr.
Prince’s report, nor any other medical
evidence contained in the record, provided a
basis for the ALJ to reject Dr. Sheridan’s
clearly stated medical conclusions
addressing pre- and post-award impairment
ratings.
We disagree with the Board’s analysis.
Although a party may
note evidence [such as Dr. Sheridan’s] which would have
supported a conclusion contrary to the ALJ’s decision, such
evidence is not an adequate basis for reversal on appeal.
McCloud v. Beth-Elkhorn Corp., Ky., 514 S.W.2d 46 (1974).
The
ALJ, rather than the reviewing court, has the sole discretion to
determine the weight, credibility, quality, character, and
substance of evidence and the inference to be drawn from the
evidence.
Paramount Foods, Inc. v. Burkhardt, Ky., 695 S.W.2d
418, 419 (1985).
The ALJ has the discretion to choose whom and
what to believe.
Addington Resources, Inc. v. Perkins, Ky.
App., 947 S.W.2d 421, 422 (1997).
In instances where the
medical evidence is conflicting, the sole authority to determine
which witness to believe resides with the ALJ.
Brothers, Ky., 547 S.W.2d 123, 124 (1977).
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Pruitt v. Bugg
The ALJ was free to
disregard Dr. Sheridan’s interpretation of Dr. Prince’s report.
Dr. Prince did assess a higher impairment rating, for whatever
reason.
The burden therefore shifted to Clark Regional to prove
that the higher impairment rating was potentially illusory due
to the use of a different methodology and more recent edition of
the Guides.
Furthermore, we believe that there was substantial
evidence to support the ALJ’s finding that Osborne is totally
permanently disabled because KRS 342.730(1)(a) permits the
consideration of factors other than the change in the numerical
impairment rating.
The ALJ found that there had been a change in
Osborne’s degree of disability because she could no longer
perform even sedentary work, “due in large part to the amount of
pain medication she must take to obtain any relief from her back
pain.”
In her second opinion, the ALJ also found that Osborne’s
activities are highly restricted due to her pain.
It takes her
45 minutes to change the sheets on her bed because she has to
stop, sit down, and wait for the pain to subside before
continuing.
She must sit in a chair to wash dishes because of
her back pain.
She now uses a cane and wheelchair.
“A worker’s
testimony is competent evidence of his physical condition and of
his ability to perform various activities both before and after
being injured.”
Hush v. Abrams, Ky., 584 S.W.2d 48 (1979).
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The ALJ also noted that Dr. Sheridan had pointed out
that Osborne’s lumbar MRI performed in 2002 showed additional
disc bulging that was not present in her 1999 MRI and that Dr.
Prince recommended additional restrictions on the weight Osborne
is permitted to lift.
Because we adjudge that the Board misconstrued the
controlling statutes, and that the ALJ’s opinion met the
standard for a finding of total permanent disability pursuant to
KRS 342.730 (1)(a), we reverse the opinion of the Board and
reinstate the opinion, award and order of the ALJ.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
Theresa Gilbert
Rachel Kennedy
Lexington, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, CLARK
REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER:
Charles E. Lowther
Lexington, Kentucky
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