ROLAND GAZAWAY v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
December 3, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-002530-MR
ROLAND GAZAWAY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS B. WINE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CR-001896
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; JOHNSON AND MINTON, JUDGES.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE:
Roland Gazaway, pro se, appeals from an
order of the Jefferson Circuit Court that denied his motion for
post-conviction relief pursuant to CR1 60.02.
We affirm.
In August 1997, Gazaway was indicted by a grand jury
on charges of capital murder, assault, and burglary.
Commonwealth sought the death penalty.
The
Following a four-day
trial, a jury found Gazaway guilty on all three counts of the
indictment.
1
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
Upon advice of counsel, Gazaway elected to waive his
right to jury sentencing and to permit the court to impose a
sentence.
He also agreed to waive his right to appeal any
pretrial or trial issues.
In exchange, the Commonwealth agreed
to recommend a life sentence with parole eligibility after
twelve years.
A lengthy and comprehensive sentencing hearing then
took place.
The trial court sentenced Gazaway as follows:
terms of imprisonment of ten years on the burglary conviction;
fifteen years on the assault conviction, to be served
concurrently with the burglary conviction; and thirty years for
the murder conviction, to be served consecutively as to the
other two sentences.
The total sentence extended to forty-five
years, rendering Gazaway eligible for parole in twelve years.
The final judgment and sentence were entered in December 1998.
In December 2001, Gazaway filed a motion pursuant to
the provisions of RCr2 11.42, contending that he had been denied
the effective assistance of counsel throughout his trial.
The
motion was denied by the trial court, and this court affirmed
the denial in February 2003.
In November 2003, Gazaway filed a motion pursuant to
the provisions of CR 60.02, again contending that he had been
denied the effective assistance of counsel.
2
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
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He also alleged
that he was entitled to relief because he had been subjected to
double jeopardy and because the trial court had failed to direct
a verdict of acquittal.
The trial court denied the motion
summarily, and this appeal followed.
Gazaway argues that the trial court abused its
discretion by failing to grant him relief from his conviction
and sentence.
Because he has failed to assert his claims in
timely fashion, we are barred from reviewing them at this stage.
In Gross v. Commonwealth, Ky., 648 S.W.2d 853 (1983),
the Supreme Court of Kentucky set forth a detailed, sequential
procedure governing post-conviction proceedings.
The Court held
that a criminal defendant must first bring a direct appeal when
available, and only then should he utilize the provisions of RCr
11.42 by addressing every error of which he was (or should have
been) aware.
The Court emphasized that the provisions of CR
60.02 apply only to extraordinary situations not otherwise
subject to relief through direct appeal or RCr 11.42
proceedings.
CR 60.02 is not intended merely as an additional
opportunity to relitigate the same issues that could “reasonably
have been presented” by direct appeal or through RCr 11.42
proceedings.
McQueen v. Commonwealth, Ky., 948 S.W.2d 415, 416
(1997).
Gazaway has previously filed a motion pursuant to RCr
11.42 in which he should have raised all matters pertaining to
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the alleged ineffectiveness of his trial counsel. Consequently,
he is not allowed to raise the issue again in a subsequent CR
60.02 motion.
We are also unable to review Gazaway’s argument
regarding the court’s refusal to direct a verdict and the
contention that he was subjected to double jeopardy.
these issues involve alleged trial errors.
Both of
As the previous
panel of this court noted, Gazaway waived his right to appeal
trial issues when he agreed to waive formal jury sentencing and
to allow the trial court to determine his sentence.
The
consequences of the waiver have been established as the law of
the case.
Gazaway is prohibited from raising these alleged
errors.
Finally, Gazaway failed to exercise due diligence in
pursuing these claims.
Under the provisions of CR 60.02, a
motion must be filed within a reasonable time if the motion is
based upon an extraordinary reason justifying the relief sought.
Gazaway waited until November 2003 to file this CR 60.02 motion
with the trial court -– after the passage of nearly six years.
That period of delay is not reasonable under the circumstances
and does not comply with the requirements of CR 60.02.
The
trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion
since Gazaway failed timely and properly to invoke the
provisions of CR 60.02.
-4-
The order of the Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Roland Gazaway, pro se
Burgin, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Todd D. Ferguson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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