WILLIAM JOSEPH PHILLIPS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: MARCH 19, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-001645-MR
WILLIAM JOSEPH PHILLIPS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MUHLENBERG CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DAVID H. JERNIGAN, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 00-CR-00036
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
DYCHE, McANULTY, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
DYCHE, JUDGE.
Appellant, William Joseph Phillips, appeals pro
se from the Muhlenberg Circuit Court’s Order denying his RCr
11.42 motion.
Upon a full review of the matter, we affirm.
Phillips maintains on appeal that he is entitled to
relief under RCr 11.42 for ineffective assistance of counsel for
failure to present a defense or seek a change in venue.
He was
charged with bail jumping in the first degree for failing to
appear at a court ordered date.
See KRS 520.070.
He entered a
guilty plea under North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970),
and was sentenced to four years to run concurrently with a
sentence on separate charges.
Under the leading case in evaluating claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel, Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 669 (1984), we must “indulge a strong presumption that
counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance[.]”
Moreover, where a defendant
challenges a guilty plea based on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, he must show that counsel made serious
errors which fell outside the wide range of professionally
competent assistance.
(1970).
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771
Additionally, he must prove that counsel’s deficient
performance so seriously affected the outcome of the plea
process that, but for such errors, there is a reasonable
probability that the defendant would not have pled guilty but
instead would have insisted on going to trial.
Hill v.
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985); Sparks v. Commonwealth, Ky.
App., 721 S.W.2d 726, 727-28 (1986).
Phillips was scheduled to be tried by a jury on a
separate matter on December 30, 1999.
At an earlier court date,
his attorney asked for and was granted a continuance of the
trial date.
Phillips was not present.
The order granting the
continuance stated that “IT IS ORERED [sic] that the jury trial
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on December 30, 1999 is continued; however, the defendant and
attorney are under a continuing order to appear no later than
8:30 a.m., on said date.”
Phillips contends that there was no
date set for the trial, and he did not know when to appear.
Nonetheless, the order continuing the trial date includes that
Phillips was ordered to appear on “said date.”
The only date in
the order was December 30, 1999; therefore, a clear date was
set.
Although Phillips’s counsel appeared on December 30,
1999, Phillips did not because he contends that his counsel did
not inform him that he needed to appear at that time.
He
alleges that he did learn that the trial date had been changed
after his counsel informed one of his relatives of this fact,
but that he did not know when he needed to appear.
Assuming that Phillips’s version of the events is
true, we are not persuaded to grant the relief he seeks.
The
record is clear that he voluntarily entered an Alford plea.
The
transcript of the plea colloquy shows that he clearly understood
the charge against him.
He stated that he was pleading guilty
because he did not believe he could get a fair trial in
Muhlenberg County.
He was fully aware of what he was doing and
did not testify to any duress or dissatisfaction with his
counsel.
Further, he did not simply plead guilty out of
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ignorance to the charge.
Instead, Phillips’s Alford plea was
not admission of guilt, but an informed admission that the
evidence was sufficient to convict him of the offense charged.
The record supports a clear finding that Phillips understood
this distinction and voluntarily entered the plea,
notwithstanding whether he intentionally missed the court date.
Moreover, Phillips received the benefit of a
concurrent sentence.
Had he gone to trial and been found
guilty, he could have been sentenced to serve his sentence
consecutively.
Based on these facts, we cannot find a
reasonable probability that Phillips would have insisted on
going to trial regardless of any alleged errors by his counsel.
We also find no error on his counsel’s part in not
moving for a change in venue. “The determination of whether to
request a change of venue addresses itself to the discretion of
the trial lawyer.”
874, 877 (1969).
McKinney v. Commonwealth, Ky., 445 S.W.2d
On this, a reviewing court must be highly
deferential in scrutinizing an attorney’s performance, and the
tendency to second-guess the attorney’s decision must be
avoided.
Harper v. Commonwealth, Ky., 978 S.W.2d 311, 315
(1998).
Beyond the deference due the attorney’s decision, we
note that we are not persuaded in the least by Phillips’s
arguments.
He is conclusory in arguing that he could not have
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gotten a fair trial.
He totally fails to explain why he would
have been unable to obtain a fair trial in Muhlenberg County or
that he was prejudiced in any way by his attorney’s failure to
request a change in venue.
satisfy RCr 11.42.
Phillips’s vague assertions do not
The failure to provide the factual support
required by RCr 11.42 justifies the summary dismissal of that
part of his claim.
Sanders v. Commonwealth, Ky., 89 S.W.3d 380,
390 (2002).
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Phillips argues that he
is entitled to relief under Reynolds v. Commonwealth, Ky. App.,
994 S.W.2d 23 (1999).
This matter is decidedly different from
In Reynolds the defendant was found guilty after a
Reynolds.
jury trial.
However, this Court reversed after concluding that
the evidence was insufficient to convict the defendant because
the evidence was conclusive that he had not been informed of the
court date.
In the present matter, had Phillips elected to go to
trial and been convicted without evidence supporting notice for
him to appear in court, we might agree with him.
However, he
voluntarily entered an Alford plea, without duress and any other
circumstances entitling him to relief and elected to receive the
benefits of a guilty plea.
Thus, Reynolds does not mandate
reversal.
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Finally, we find no error in the trial court’s denial
of an evidentiary hearing.
Phillips’s claims could be refuted
by resort to the record alone in this matter.
Thus, it was
unnecessary for the trial court to conduct a hearing in this
matter.
Fraser v. Commonwealth, Ky., 59 S.W.3d 448, 452 (2001).
For the reasons stated, we affirm.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
William Joseph Phillips,
Pro Se
Eddyville, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
N. Susan Roncarti
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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