RICHARD ELAM and KATHERINE ELAM v. RANDY BICKNELL
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RENDERED: October 29, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-000244-MR
AND
NO. 2003-CA-000274-MR
RICHARD ELAM and KATHERINE ELAM
v.
APPELLANTS/CROSS-APPELLEES
APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL FROM WOODFORD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM T. JENNINGS, SPECIAL JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CI-00289
RANDY BICKNELL
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
OPINION
AFFIRMING APPEAL NO. 2003-CA-000244-MR,
REVERSING AND REMANDING CROSS-APPEAL NO. 2003-CA-000274-MR
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JOHNSON, TAYLOR, AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
TAYLOR, JUDGE:
Richard Elam and Katherine Elam (the Elams)
bring Appeal No. 2003-CA-000244-MR from a January 24, 2003,
judgment of the Woodford Circuit Court.
Randy Bicknell brings
Cross-Appeal No. 2003-CA-000274-MR from the same judgment.
affirm Appeal No. 2003-CA-000244-MR and reverse and remand
Cross-Appeal No. 2003-CA-000274-MR.
We
The controversy of this action is centered upon
property consisting of fifty acres located on Shyrock Ferry Pike
in Woodford County, Kentucky.
in fee by the Elams.
The property was originally owned
The only access to the property is by a
private bridge that crosses Grier’s Creek.
In 1986, the Elams
deeded a ten acre portion of the property to James Greer (Greer
deed).
In order to effectuate the transaction, the Elams hired
an engineer to survey and divide off the ten acres from the
remaining 40 acres.
The Elams retained an express easement over
the bridge and road for ingress and egress to the remaining 40
acres.
In 1994, the Elams deeded the remaining 40 acres to
Bicknell (Bicknell deed).
In the Bicknell deed, the description
of the conveyed property merely recited the description of the
fifty acres excepting therefrom the ten acres previously
conveyed by the Greer deed.
Sometime thereafter, Bicknell
became concerned as to the proper boundaries of his and of
Greer’s properties.
Thereupon, Greer and Bicknell agreed to
have the property surveyed according to the descriptions
contained in their deeds in order to determine the proper
boundary lines of their respective properties.
The survey
showed that the boundary line of the properties ran directly
through Greer’s home.
According to the Elams and Greer, the
property description of the ten acres supplied by the surveyor
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contained in the Greer deed was erroneous and failed to
represent the parties’ agreement concerning the boundaries of
the ten acres.
Most importantly, the description failed to
include Greer’s house, the road and the bridge.
In 1995, James Greer, Peggy Greer (collectively
referred to as the Greers) and the Elams filed a complaint
against Bicknell.
They alleged the Greer deed contained a
mutual mistake as to the description of the ten acres conveyed
therein.
Further, it was contended that the Bicknell deed
likewise contained an error in the description of the property
conveyed therein.
Specifically, the Elams and the Greers
maintained that “[t]he description of the real property as it
exists presently not only fails to encompass the acreage
intended by the parties, but further, fails to fully encompass
the residence of the Plaintiffs, James E. Greer, II and Peggy
Tolson Greer.”
The Greers and the Elams sought reformation of
both deeds.
Bicknell answered and counterclaimed against the
Greers and the Elams.
Bicknell specifically alleged the Greers
had trespassed upon his property.
He also claimed the Elams
breached the covenant of general warranty as provided in the
Bicknell deed.
Specifically, Bicknell contended:
Plaintiff[s] Richard L. Elam and Katherine
H. Elam breached their Covenant of General
Warranty to Defendant by filing the present
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action in which the Plaintiffs Richard L.
Elam and Katherine H. Elam allege a mistake
exists in their description of the real
property conveyed by the Deed. Plaintiffs
Richard L. Elam and Katherine H. Elam are
seeking in the present action to rescind the
Deed and to execute a new Deed containing
less real property and road frontage than
was originally conveyed to Defendant.
Eventually, the Greers, the Elams, and Bicknell
entered into a settlement agreement and release.
Therein, the
Greers, the Elams, and Bicknell agreed to settle all disputes
except “the counterclaim of Bicknell against the Elams for
breach of the Covenant of General Warranty.”
Pursuant to the
settlement agreement, deeds of correction were entered into by
the parties which reflected the Elams and the Greers
understanding of the correct boundary lines.
Thereafter, Bicknell made a motion for summary
judgment upon the issue of whether the Elams breached the
covenant of warranty and covenant of seisin.
In support
thereof, Bicknell argued the parties admitted that the legal
description provided by the surveyor in the Greer deed was in
error, and as a result, Bicknell was constructively evicted from
a portion of the property conveyed by the Bicknell deed.
The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of
Bicknell upon the legal issue of breach of the deed covenants,
and submitted the issue of damages to the jury.
The jury
returned a verdict in the amount of $18,043.56.
The circuit
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court ultimately awarded Bicknell total damages of $24,589.25,
which included $18,043.56 in property value diminution,
$6,250.27, in prejudgment interest, and $295.42 in costs.
These
appeals follow.
Appeal No. 2003-CA-000244-MR
The Elams argue the circuit court erroneously granted
summary judgment.
Specifically, the Elams contend the circuit
court improperly concluded the covenant of warranty of title
contained in the Bicknell deed was breached.
We disagree.
Summary judgment is proper where there exists no
material issue of fact and movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.
The Elams argue that material issues of fact
exist that precluded entry of summary judgment upon the issue of
whether the covenant of warranty of title in the Bicknell deed
was breached.
We disagree.
The covenant of warranty of title has been fluently
described as:
The covenant of warranty is an agreement by
the grantor that upon failure of the title
which the deed purports to convey, he will
make compensation in money for the loss
sustained. It is an assurance or guarantee
of title, or an agreement or assurance by
the grantor of an estate that the grantee
and his heirs and assigns shall enjoy it
without interruption by virtue of a
paramount title, and that they shall not, by
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force of a paramount title, be evicted from
the land or deprived of its possession.
20 Am. Jur. 2d Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions § 48
(1995).
Covenant of warranty of title is a prospective covenant
and thus, is broken only by eviction under paramount title.
In
some cases, constructive eviction, rather than actual eviction,
is sufficient to support an action for breach of the covenant of
warranty.
A constructive eviction is said to occur where a
grantee must yield possession to one asserting paramount title.
In this case, the Elams essentially contend that
Bicknell was not constructively evicted from the property
because the parties were “laboring under a mistake as to the
boundary lines of the property to be conveyed . . . .”
The
Elams assert that they have presented substantial evidence that
both parties (the Elams and Bicknell) were aware of the correct
boundary lines of the forty acres conveyed by the Bicknell deed.
It is well established that although a grantee knew at
the time of the conveyance that the grantor did not have good
title to the land conveyed, the grantee may still maintain an
action for breach of the covenant of warranty.
Rice, Ky. App., 411 S.W.2d 471 (1966).
Commonwealth v.
Even where the grantee
knew that the boundaries of the conveyed property were incorrect
leading to a shortage of acreage, such knowledge does not
prevent the grantee from maintaining an action for breach of the
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covenant of warranty of title.
266 S.W. 247 (1924).
Lashley v. Lashley, 205 Ky. 601,
Accordingly, Bicknell’s alleged knowledge
of the mistaken property description does not preclude him from
maintaining an action for breach of the covenant of warranty.
Additionally, the Elams argue that where a mutual or
unilateral mistake occurred as to the description of property in
a deed, the proper remedy is to have that deed reformed or
rescinded, rather than seeking damages for breach of the
covenant of warranty of title.
We disagree.
Where an action exists upon mutual mistake as to a
material element in the deed and upon a breach of the covenant
of warranty, we are convinced that the grantee may pursue either
rescission of the deed or an action for damages upon the breach
of covenant of warranty.
21 C.J.S. Covenants § 51 (2004).
As
such, we believe that Bicknell may properly pursue an action for
damages based upon breach of the covenant of warranty.
The Elams next contend the circuit court committed
reversible error by admitting into evidence Bicknell’s expenses
related to constructing a new bridge.
It appears Bicknell
submitted into evidence expenses he incurred for constructing a
new bridge over the creek in order to access his property.
The
expenses totaled $7,918.56.
The Elams contend expenses associated with improvement
of the property are not recoverable because “[t]he testimony of
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record in this case shows, by everyone’s admission that Bicknell
at least knew of the error in the deeds prior to and during his
expenditure of monies on the bridge.”
In support thereof, the
Elams cite to Finucane v. Prichard, Ky. App., 811 S.W.2d 348
(1991).
In Finucane, the Court held a grantee may recover the
costs for the “enhanced value” of the land by reason of
improvements thereupon, absent a showing of actual notice of the
error in the conveyance or of actual bad faith in making the
improvements.
Even if the circuit court erred in admitting this
evidence, we are of the opinion that such admission constituted
See Ky. R. Civ. P. (CR) 61.01.
harmless error.
Bicknell claimed damages for lost property value in
the amount of $20,250.00 and entered evidence to that effect by
expert testimony.
The jury’s award of $18,043.56 is well within
the amount Bicknell claimed as lost property value.
As such,
the jury’s verdict was within the range of damages supported by
properly admitted evidence.
See Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum
Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 791 F. 2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1986).
Accordingly, we are of the opinion that any error in admitting
evidence of Bicknell’s expenses related to construction of the
new bridge was harmless.
The Elams lastly argue the circuit court erred in
instructing the jury upon damages.
The circuit court instructed
the jury to determine “as of August 26, 1998[,] what is the
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difference, if any, between the fair market value of the 40.55
acre tract of property conveyed to Randy Bicknell in 1994 and
the 40.55 acre tract he now owns?”
The Elams contend this
instruction does not reflect the law in Kentucky upon the proper
measure of damage in a breach of covenant of warranty action.
The Elams maintain the proper measure of damages is “that
portion of the original purchase price which represents the
value, at the time of conveyance, of the part of the land lost
by the breach, together with interest from that time.”
We, however, note the Elams failed to indicate to this
Court in what manner the above argument was preserved for our
review.
In fact, it appears the Elams did not object to the
jury instructions and failed to submit alternative instructions.
It is recognized that a party’s failure to object to a jury
instruction waives that issue for appellate review.
CR 51(3);
Div. of Parks v. Hines, Ky., 316 S.W.2d 60 (1958).
As such, we
are of the opinion the Elams have waived any objection to the
jury instruction.1
Cross-Appeal No. 2003-CA-000274-MR
Bicknell argues the circuit court erred by failing to
award him reasonable attorney fees.
In a breach of covenant of
warranty action, Bicknell claims that an award of attorney fees
1
We note the Elams did not ask this Court to review the alleged error in the
jury instruction under the palpable error standard of Ky. R. Civ. P. 61.02.
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is proper, and the circuit court abused its discretion by
failing to award same.
A covenant of warranty carries with it an obligation
that the grantor will defend and protect the title against
lawful claims.
20 Am. Jur. 2d Covenants, Conditions and
Restrictions § 53 (1995).
Where the grantor had notice of an
adverse claim and failed to defend title, attorney fees are an
appropriate element of damage in a breach of covenant of
warranty action.
Gaines v. Poor, 3 Met. 503, 60 Ky. 503 (1861).
In this case, the grantor (the Elams) undeniably had
notice of the claim against the grantee (Bicknell) as the Elams
and the Greers instituted the action.
While the circuit court
certainly has discretion in the amount of attorney fees to be
awarded in a breach of covenant of warranty action, we think it
mandatory that the circuit court award a reasonable attorney fee
to the prevailing grantee where the grantor had notice of the
claim asserted against the grantee’s title.
Buckner, 629 N.E.2d 860 (Ind. 1994).
See Rieddle v.
Moreover, we observe the
grantee may only recover reasonable attorney fees associated
with defending his title and may not recover attorney fees
associated with the breach of covenant of warranty action
asserted in the counterclaim.
From review of the record, any
fees incurred in defense of Bicknell’s title would have ended at
the time of settlement on August 26, 1998.
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Upon remand, we direct the circuit court to determine
a reasonable attorney fee Bicknell incurred in defense of his
title prior to August 26, 1998, and to award same to Bicknell.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
Woodford Circuit Court is affirmed in part, reversed in part and
remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT/CROSSAPPELLEES:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT:
David A. Franklin
Paul D. Gudgel
McCoy, West, Franklin & Beal
Lexington, Kentucky
W. Keith Ransdell
Lexington, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANT/
CROSS-APPELLEES:
David A. Franklin
McCoy, West, Franklin & Beal
Lexington, Kentucky
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