RICHARD A. SWEET v. JANET M. SWEET and JANET M. SWEET; VICKI L. BUBA; AND STONE, PEGLIASCO, HAYNES, BUBA, LLP v. RICHARD A. SWEET
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RENDERED:
September 24, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-000203-MR
AND NO.2003-CA-000807-MR
RICHARD A. SWEET
APPELLANT
APPEALS FROM JEFFERSON FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE ELEANORE GARBER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-FC-002891
v.
JANET M. SWEET
AND:
APPELLEE
NO. 2003-CA-000239-MR
JANET M. SWEET;
VICKI L. BUBA; AND
STONE, PEGLIASCO, HAYNES, BUBA, LLP
v.
CROSS-APPELLANTS
CROSS-APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE ELEANORE GARBER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-FC-002891
RICHARD A. SWEET
CROSS-APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART,
REVERSING IN PART, AND REMANDING
BEFORE:
** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
MINTON, SCHRODER, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
Richard A. Sweet filed two appeals and Janet
M. Sweet filed a cross-appeal from findings of fact and
conclusions of law entered by the Jefferson Family Court which,
among other things, established child support and maintenance
payments and distributed marital property.
consolidated said appeals.
Our Court
For the reasons stated below, we
affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
The issue remanded is limited to
the character of a $50,000.00 payment made by Richard to Janet
in December 2001.
The parties were married on February 15, 1980.
The
parties had two children during the marriage, Richard Alexander,
born July 23, 1985, and Samantha Alexander, born October 23,
1989.
On April 19, 2001, Richard filed a petition for
dissolution of marriage in Jefferson Family Court.
On January 15, 2002, the family court entered a final
decree of dissolution of marriage.
On November 13, 2002,
following a hearing on the contested issues, the family court
entered its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
supplemental decree awarding each of the parties fifty percent
of the value of the marital assets, including the value of
Richard’s medical practice, Richard’s retirement account, the
marital residence, investment accounts, closely-held business
2
interests, and the parties’ marital personal property.
The
family court also awarded maintenance to Janet in the amount of
$7,500.00 per month for a period of five years and $5,000.00 per
month for an additional five years.
In addition, the family
court awarded Janet child support of $3,000.00 per month less
25% of the agreed upon private school tuition for the children.
Subsequently, Richard and Janet each filed motions to
alter, amend, or vacate pursuant to CR1 59.
On December 30,
2002, the trial court entered an order setting forth minor
modifications to its original decision.
Richard and Janet each
filed appeals from the November 13, 2002 and December 30, 2002,
orders (No. 2003-CA-000203-MR and No. 2003-CA-000239-MR,
respectively).
In the meantime, Richard filed a motion to
alter, vacate or amend the family court’s December 30, 2002,
order.
On March 12, 2003, the family court entered an order
modifying Richard’s equalization payment.
Richard subsequently
appealed that order as well. (No. 2003-CA-000807-MR).
APPEAL NO. 2003-CA-000203-MR AND APPEAL NO. 2003-CA-000807-MR
We first address the issues raised by Richard in his
appeals in No. 2003-CA-000203-MR and No. 2003-CA-000807-MR.
The family court awarded maintenance to Janet in the
amount of $7,500.00 per month for a period of five years and
$5,000.00 per month for an additional five years.
1
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
3
Richard
argues that the family court erred in determining the amount and
duration of maintenance.
KRS2 403.200(1) permits an award to the
spouse seeking maintenance if he or she:
(a) Lacks sufficient property, including
marital property apportioned to him, to
provide for his reasonable needs; and
(b) Is unable to support himself through
appropriate employment or is the custodian
of a child whose condition or circumstances
make it appropriate that the custodian not
be required to seek employment outside the
home.
KRS 403.200(2) sets forth the factors the family court
must consider in setting the amount and duration of a
maintenance award:
(2) [Maintenance] shall be in such amounts
and for such periods of time as the court
deems just, and after considering all
relevant factors including:
(a) The financial resources of the party
seeking maintenance, including marital
property apportioned to him, and his ability
to meet his needs independently, including
the extent to which a provision for support
of a child living with the party includes a
sum for that party as custodian;
(b) The time necessary to acquire
sufficient education or training to enable
the party seeking maintenance to find
appropriate employment;
(c) The standard of living established
during the marriage;
(d)
2
The duration of the marriage;
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
4
(e) The age, and the physical and emotional
condition of the spouse seeking maintenance;
and
(f) The ability of the spouse from whom
maintenance is sought to meet his needs
while meeting those of the spouse seeking
maintenance.
In its November 13, 2002, order the family court set
forth detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law in
support of its maintenance award:3
Janet Sweet is 50 years old. She was
employed as a registered nurse during the
first two years of the marriage. She would
need at least 6 months training in order to
reactivate her nursing degree. However, she
may well be unable to return to the nursing
profession as a result of the herniated disc
in her spine. Janet was interviewed by Dr.
Edward Berla’ an expert in vocational
assessments. Dr. Berla’ initially opined
that Janet was capable of earning $25,000.00
annually in the public work force including
the cost of benefits paid on her behalf. At
his deposition, he indicated that her
earning powers were between $25,000-$40,000
depending on whether she would be physically
able to return to nursing. Janet has stated
that she does not want to return to
employment at least until both children have
graduated from high school. She may
exercise that choice. In considering her
claim for maintenance, however, the Court
will impute to Janet the ability to earn
$25,000.00 annually or gross wages amounting
to $2,083.00 per month. Janet will also
receive an estimated $2,244,324.41 as her
share of the marital estate in this action
to be set forth more specifically below.
Assuming Janet is able to purchase a new
3
These factual findings were also, in part, relevant to the family court’s
awarding of child support which will be addressed later in the opinion.
5
residence outright without a mortgage while
smaller than the family residence on Greten
Lane but still very nice, the Court
estimates that she will have a net estate
remaining of at least $1.5-2 million.
Without consuming principal, the Court
estimates that at 4% per year per annum,
Janet will additionally receive interest
and/or dividend interest of approximately
$4,250.00 per month. Accordingly, she will
have over $6,250.00 per month in gross
income.
Janet has claimed living expenses for
herself and the parties’ children in the
amount of $42,000.00 per month. This amount
exceeds by a considerable amount [Richard’s]
total net monthly income. Additionally,
Janet has claimed certain expenses such as
$5,000.00 per month in Country Club expenses
and all expenses relating to the Florida
condominium and numerous expenses related to
the home on Greten Lane which will be
eliminated and/or significantly reduced.
She will not be responsible for more than
her proportionate share of the children’s
private educational expenses with [Richard]
remaining responsible for approximately 75%
of these expenses assuming the parties
agreed to continue to incur them.
[Richard] has claimed living expenses
of nearly $31,000.00 per month which the
Court also finds to be unreasonable. He has
included property taxes on the Greten Lane
home, the cost of furnishing and remodeling
for the Locust Lane home and significant
other expenses which are no longer existent
or non-recurring. The Court notes that
while the parties have enjoyed an upscale
lifestyle during the marriage, it is
unrealistic for either party to expect that
two separate households with the same income
between them will be able to enjoy exactly
the same lifestyle as the family previously
enjoyed as one unit, particularly if Richard
Sweet’s income decreases in spite of his
6
maintaining his present work schedule and
efficiency of his practice.
. . . .
Income at this level, considered
together with a paid for residence and
significant retirement investments places
Janet in a relatively comfortable position,
by comparison with most middle to uppermiddle income families. However, the
appellate courts have tended to define a
claimant’s “reasonable needs” in terms of
the standard of living established during
the marriage. In Drake vs. Drake, Ky. App.,
721 S.W.2d 728 [(1986)] the wife was a
beautician married to Mr. Drake, a CPA. At
dissolution, she received an interest in his
CPA practice and one-half of the marital
estate. Notwithstanding, the Court opined,
“. . . that even though Rebecca was able to
support herself, . . . it would nevertheless
award appellee maintenance in order to allow
her to maintain the standard of living
established during the marriage.[” Id. at
730.] (Emphasis added). The Court of
Appeals affirmed the award giving further
support by stating “. . . [t]here is
substantial evidence in the record to
support the Court’s finding that Mrs.
Drake’s salary as a beautician, even when
combined with an equal proportion of the
marital assets, is not sufficient to provide
for her in the manner to which the parties
had become accustomed.[”] Drake [at 730]
citing McGowan vs. McGowan, Ky. App., 663
S.W.2d 219 (1983) and Casper vs. Casper,
Ky., 510 S.W.2d 253 (1974).
Based upon this line of Kentucky
decisions, the Court finds that Janet Sweet
is entitled to maintenance in that she lacks
sufficient property to support herself and
cannot earn adequate income to support
herself considering the standard of living
established during the marriage. However,
the Court cannot fashion an appropriate
7
award of maintenance and child support to
permit two households to flourish at exactly
the same standard of living with all of the
same amenities that this family was able to
enjoy while living under one roof and
pooling their resources. . . .
. . . .
At trial, Janet reduced her claimed
need to $25,000.00 per month, or $300,000
annually to support herself and the
children. This would amount to 80% to 90%
of [Richard] Sweet’s net income. The Court
begins with the assumption that Janet can
generate at least $75,000 worth of income
with her own imputed income plus interest
and dividends while still having a
significant amount available to invest in
retirement accounts and a lovely residence.
Janet does have nursing skills which could
be updated or if she chooses she could build
on her horse training and show skills or
return to college and receive additional
training in a field of her own choosing.
The Court takes into consideration that by
agreement of the parties Janet has been
absent from the regular work force for
approximately 20 years and she is 50 years
old. Dr. [Richard] Sweet does not have the
earnings he had in prior years but he is
still a highly compensated and respected
physician in this community who can afford
substantial maintenance and support.
The Court orders [Richard] Sweet to pay
monthly maintenance to Janet in the amount
of $7,500 for a period of five years and
$5,000 a month for an additional five years.
The amounts and duration of this maintenance
award shall be modifiable pursuant to the
provisions of KRS 403.250(1) and (2).
Richard argues that the family court understated the
income Janet would be able to earn from her share of the marital
8
estate; failed to consider that Janet had not pursued employment
opportunities; failed to consider that Janet has no health
problems which would prevent her from returning to the work
force; imputed only the minimum end of Janet’s earnings range;
failed to consider Janet’s lack of effort and interest in
working; failed to consider that Janet remained voluntarily
unemployed; over-emphasized the parties’ standard of living
during the marriage; failed to consider that maintenance is to
be rehabilitative and is only to be awarded for a period of time
that will enable the recipient to acquire skills that will
permit self-support; and made no findings as to the amount of
time that would be required to enable Janet to meet her
reasonable needs for support through appropriate employment and
investment income.
A maintenance award will not be upheld if the findings
of fact upon which the award is based are clearly erroneous.
Powell v. Powell, Ky., 107 S.W.3d 222, 224 (2003).
If however,
the trial court’s findings of fact are not clearly erroneous,
the amount and duration of maintenance is within the sound
discretion of the trial court.
878 S.W.2d 24, 26 (1994).
Russell v. Russell, Ky. App.,
Hence, "we cannot disturb [the
maintenance determinations] of the trial judge unless the
discretion is absolutely abused."
S.W.2d 542, 543 (1987).
9
Platt v. Platt, Ky. App., 728
KRS 403.200 seeks to enable the unemployable spouse to
acquire the skills necessary to support himself or herself in
the current workforce so that he or she does not rely upon the
maintenance of the working spouse indefinitely.
Ky. App., 782 S.W.2d 56, 61 (1990).
Clark v. Clark,
However, "in situations
where the marriage was long term, the dependent spouse is near
retirement age, the discrepancy in incomes is great, or the
prospects for self-sufficiency appears dismal," our courts have
declined to follow that policy and have instead awarded
maintenance for a longer period or in greater amounts.
Id.
Further, KRS 403.200 specifically states that the trial court
should consider the standard of living to which the parties are
accustomed in determining the amount and duration of the award.
"It is especially acceptable for the trial court to consider the
impact of the divorce on the nonprofessional's standard of
living and award an appropriate amount that the professional
spouse can afford."
Clark, 782 S.W.2d at 61; Powell, 107 S.W.3d
at 224.
In this case, the marriage was long-term, 21 years,
and the discrepancy in income is great.
Janet has not
participated in the work force in twenty-years, and instead has
focused on maintaining the home and raising the parties’
children.
Her current earning capability is in the $25,000.00
to $40,000.00 range.
On the other hand, Richard’s earning
10
capacity is exceptional.
In recent years, from his orthopaedic
practice alone, Richard has averaged well in excess of
$500,000.00 per year.
In 1999, 2000, and 2001, Richard earned
$481,460.00, $539,061.00, and $560,107.25, respectively from his
orthopaedic practice.
We conclude that the family court properly considered
the factors set forth in KRS 403.200(2), and, based upon the
length of the marriage, the discrepancy in income, and the
quality of life enjoyed by the parties during the marriage, the
family court did not abuse its discretion in its maintenance
award.
Next, Richard contends that the family court erred in
the valuation of Richard’s interest in Louisville Orthopaedic
Clinic, PSC.
Louisville Orthopaedic Clinic is a professional
service corporation engaged in the practice of general
orthopedic surgery.
The Clinic consists of seven
physician/partners, including Richard Sweet, each with different
specialty areas.
Each of the partners has a percentage
ownership of 14.2857%.
The value of Richard’s interest in the
practice was the central dispute at trial, and the parties’
experts differed greatly as to the proper valuation approach to
the practice and their “bottom line” opinions as to the value of
the practice.
Ultimately, the family court valued Richard’s
11
interest in the practice at $332,171.00.
The family court’s
discussion of this issue in its November 13, 2002, order stated,
in part, as follows:
Dr. Sweet’s expert was Bonnie Ciresi,
CPA. Ms. Ciresi opines that the value of
[Richard] Sweet’s medical practice is the
amount he would receive if he left the
practice as of December 31, 2001, pursuant
to the buy/sell agreement among the surgeons
in his practice, approximately $123,202.00.
The agreement provides that upon retirement
or termination from the practice, the
departing shareholder is entitled to receive
an account [sic] equal to his accounts
receivable multiplied by his actual
collection rate. Dr. McAllister testified
that this is the formula which will be used
at the end of this year when he retires.
Ray Strothman, Janet Sweet’s expert,
calculates the value of Dr. Sweet’s interest
in the Louisville Orthopaedic Clinic at
$810,000.00 as amended. He initially
calculated the value of Dr. Sweet’s interest
at $981,000.00. He employed the
capitalization of excess earnings method,
described below, to arrive at his opinion.
. . . .
The primary difference between the parties
respecting the valuation of the medical
practice is whether good will exists as a
marital asset and its value if it does
exist. Ms. Ciresi maintains that the
restrictive buy/sell agreement between the
parties which does not contemplate any value
for good will is conclusive as to Dr.
Sweet’s interest in the practice. Mr.
Strothman contends that various valuation
approaches must be considered and he opined
that the most appropriate valuation approach
involves calculating the capitalization of
excess earnings in Dr. Sweet’s practice,
12
basically, the intangible asset defined as
good will. Mr. Strothman explains that the
“capitalization of Excess Earnings” method
is an income-oriented approach used to value
the interests of a physician in a medical
practice based on future estimated earnings
of the physician. Excess earnings are those
available after a fair return on tangibles
and are attributable to intangible assets or
good will.” [sic]
. . . .
Janet Sweet’s expert, Raymond
Strothman, used the capitalization of excess
earnings method to arrive at a value of
$810,000.00. While he stated initially that
the value purports to be the “fair market
value” of [Richard’s] interest in the
practice, he acknowledged that Dr. Sweet has
no current intention to sell his practice
and further acknowledges that if he did
leave the business he could not sell his
interest for $810,000.00. Mr. Strothman
further acknowledges that while he utilizes
“boiler plate” Internal Revenue Service
terminology defining fair market value, he
is in reality using a standard of value
often referred to as “intrinsic value” which
refers to the value as a going concern to
the owner, regardless of whether or not his
interest could be sold. Although Mr.
Strothman looked at Dr. Sweet’s income for
the past five years, he used only his wage
earnings for the year 2001 to perform his
evaluation. Mr. Strothman notes that the
value of a medical practice within the
context of a dissolution proceeding is the
value of the overall investment to the
shareholder rather than what, if any amount,
the practice could be sold for.
It is axiomatic that the findings of fact of the lower
court shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due
regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to
13
judge the credibility of the witnesses.
CR 52.01; Calloway v.
Calloway, Ky. App., 832 S.W.2d 890, 893 (1992).
Findings of fact
are not clearly erroneous if supported by substantial evidence.
Janakakis-Kostun v. Janakakis, Ky. App., 6 S.W.3d 843, 852
(1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 811, 121 S. Ct. 32, 148 L. Ed. 2d
13 (2000).
The test for substantiality of evidence is whether
when taken alone, or in the light of all the evidence, it has
sufficient probative value to induce conviction in the minds of
reasonable men.
Kentucky State Racing Commission v. Fuller,
Ky., 481 S.W.2d 298, 308 (1972).
It has been the general principle in both Kentucky and
other jurisdictions that the trial court's judgment and
valuations in an action for divorce will not be disturbed on
appeal unless it was clearly contrary to the weight of evidence.
Heller v. Heller, Ky. App., 672 S.W.2d 945 (1984); Carpenter v.
Carpenter, 657 P.2d 646 (Okla. 1983); Poore v. Poore, 75
N.C.App. 414, 331 S.E.2d 266 (1985).
Thus, it is the duty of
this Court to examine the methods utilized by the trial court to
see if it clearly erred in valuing the corporation's assets.
Clark v. Clark, Ky. App., 782 S.W.2d 56, 58-59 (1990).
There is no single best method to value the business
interest of a spouse.
The task of the appellate court is to
determine whether the trial court's approach reasonably
approximated the net value of the partnership interest.
14
Id. at
59 (citing Weaver v. Weaver, 72 N.C.App. 409, 324 S.E.2d 915
(1985) and Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257 (1975)).
Richard’s principal objections to the trial court’s
valuation of his interest in Louisville Orthopaedic Clinic are
that the trial court failed to consider the buy-sell agreement
as a factor in arriving at the fair market value of his interest
and that a good will component should not have been included in
the valuation because his practice is a referral-based practice
and he cannot expect his patients to return to him or to gain
additional patients through patient recommendations.
Though binding against the parties to the business, a
buy-sell agreement for a husband’s closely held medical
corporation, which establishes a method for valuing shares for
purposes of distribution, is not binding on his wife in a
dissolution proceeding, but is merely a factor to be weighed
with other factors in determining value.
App., 809 S.W.2d 710, 713 (1991).
Drake v. Drake, Ky.
Further, in general, good
will of a closely held medical corporation should be assigned
value in a dissolution proceeding.
Clark v. Clark, Ky. App.,
782 S.W.2d 56 (1990); Heller v. Heller, Ky. App., 672 S.W.2d 945
(1984); Drake, 809 S.W.2d at 713.
We conclude that the family court properly considered
the buy-sell agreement and good will in its valuation of
Richard’s interest in the practice.
15
In this regard we adopt the
family court’s discussion in its November 13, 2002, judgment,
wherein it thoroughly addressed these issues:
On several occasions . . . Kentucky
appellate courts have addressed valuations,
for purposes of dissolution of marriage, of
a professional association such as a medical
practice and have rejected arguments that
value is determined solely by or limited to
a so called “book-value” or the terms of a
buy-sell agreement between partners. In
Drake v. Drake, Ky. App., 809 S.W.2d 710,
713 (1991) the Court of Appeals considered a
physician-shareholder’s interest in a
women’s clinic and held that buy-sell
agreements are not binding on the nonshareholder spouse, although they are a
factor to be weighed with other factors.
The Court of Appeals had previously
concluded, in 1984, that physical assets and
accounts receivable are not the only assets
to be considered in valuation but that the
intangible factor of good will is also a
factor to be considered. It is stated as
follows in Heller v. Heller, Ky. App., 672
S.W.2d 945, 947-948 (1984) [quoting In re
Marriage of Nichols, 606 P.2d 1314, 1315
(Colo.Ct.App. 1979)]:
Professional practices that can be sold
for more than the value of their
fixtures and their accounts receivable
have saleable goodwill. A
professional, like any entrepreneur who
has established a reputation for skill
and expertise, can expect his patrons
to return to him, to speak well of him,
and upon selling his practice, can
expect that many will accept the buyer
and will utilize his professional
expertise. These expectations are a
part of good will, and they have
pecuniary value. . . . This limited
market ability distinguishes
professional good will from advanced
educational degree, which because it is
16
personal to its holder and nontransferable, was held not to be
property in [In re Marriage of Graham,
194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75
(1978)]. [. . .]
In Clark v. Clark, Ky. App. 782 S.W.2d
56 (1990) the Court of Appeals concluded
that the trial court had been correct in
rejecting a book value approach and in
adopting a “fair market value” approach
including the value of good will in an OBGYN medical practice and using the
capitalization of excess earnings method to
determine fair market value. Kentucky, in
short, has consistently approved
consideration of good will as a marital
asset.
Kentucky has not specifically made a
distinction between so-called “professional
good will” or “practice” or enterprise good
will as some jurisdictions have (and as
[Richard] Sweet requests the Court to do
here) nor has it approved a specific
standard of value, e.g., “fair market value”
or “intrinsic” or “investment” value. . . .
In Yoon v. Yoon, Ind. 711 N.E.2d 1265,
1269 (1999), the Supreme Court of Indiana
held as follows:
Enterprise good will is an asset
of the business and accordingly is
property that is divisible in a
dissolution to the extent that it
inheres in the business independent of
any single individual's personal
efforts and will outlast any person's
involvement in the business.
The Indiana Court differentiates
enterprise or practice good will from
personal, or professional good will. The
Court opines as follows:
17
“. . . the good will that depends on
the continued presence of a particular
individual is a personal asset, and any
value that attaches to the business of
[sic] a result at [sic] this personal
goodwill. . . .” is not divisible. Id.
This dichomy [sic] between practice
good will and “professional” or personal
good will is followed by the Supreme Court
of Florida, Thompson vs. Thompson, Fla., 576
So.2d 267 (1991) and the Court of Appeals of
Virginia in Howell vs. Howell, Va.App., 523
S.E.2d 514 (2000). On the other hand, the
highest courts of other jurisdictions hold
that professional or personal good will can
be divisible. In New Jersey, a
practitioner’s “reputation is at the core of
goodwill as property subject to equitable
distribution,” Dugan vs. Dugan, N.J., 452
A.2d 1, 13 (1983). In that case, the New
Jersey Supreme Court states as follows with
respect to evaluation of good will in a law
practice:
Future earning capacity per se is not
good will. However, when that future
earning capacity has been enhanced
because reputation leads to probable
future patronage from existing and
potential clients, good will may exist
and have value. When that occurs the
resulting good will is property subject
to equitable distribution.
. . . Good will is to be differentiated
from earning capacity. It reflects not
simply a possibility of future
earnings, but a probability based on
existing circumstances. Enhanced
earnings reflected in good will are to
be distinguished from a license to
practice a profession and an
educational degree. In that situation,
the enhanced future earnings are so
remote and speculative that the license
18
and degree have not been deemed to be
property. . . .
After divorce, the law practice will
continue to benefit from that good will
as it had during the marriage. Much of
the economic value produced during an
attorney's marriage will inhere in the
good will of the law practice. It
would be inequitable to ignore the
contribution of the non-attorney/spouse
to the development of that economic
resource. An individual practitioner's
inability to sell a law practice does
not eliminate existence of good will
and its value as an asset to be
considered inequitable distribution.
Obviously, equitable distribution does
not require conveyance or transfer of
any particular asset. The other
spouse, in this case the wife, is
entitled to have that asset considered
as any other property acquired during
the marriage partnership. Id.
The California courts also consider personal
or professional good will to be divisible.
In In re Marriage of Lopez, 38 Cal.App.3d
93, 107, 113 Cal.Rptr. 58, 67 (1974), in
discussing good will, the court quoted
approvingly the following language from
Golden v. Golden, 270 Cal.App.2d 401, 405,
75 Cal.Rptr. 735, 738 (1969):
[I]n a matrimonial matter, the practice
of the sole practitioner husband will
continue with the same intangible value
as it had during the marriage. Under
principles of community property law,
the wife, by virtue of her position of
wife, made to that value the same
contribution as does a wife to any of
[the] husband's earnings and
accumulations during marriage. She is
as much entitled to be recompensed for
that contribution as if it were
represented by the increased value of
19
stock in a family business.
added.)
(Emphasis
In this case, neither party offered
specific evidence concerning the value of
the good will of Louisville Orthopaedic
Clinic as an entity as distinct from Dr.
Sweet’s professional good will. This may be
because Kentucky does not appear to
recognize a distinction between
enterprise/practice and
professional/personal good will.
In Clark, 782 S.W.2d at 59, the Court
describes, approvingly, the capitalization
of excess earnings method for valuing a
medical practice focusing on the past
earnings of the individual professional as
follows:
Under this method, the good will value
is based in part on the amount that the
earnings of the professional spouse
exceed those which would have been
earned by a professional with similar
education, experience, and skill as an
employee in the same general area.
[Cites omitted.]
Specifically, four steps are involved
in the capitalization of excess
earnings method. First, the Court must
first ascertain what a professional of
comparable experience, expertise,
education and age would be earning as
an employee in the same general locale,
determining an average the
professional's net income before
federal and state income taxes for a
period of approximately 5 years,
compare the actual average with the
employee norm, and multiply the excess
by a capitalization factor. (Emphasis
added.)
Mr. Strothman, Janet’s expert, used
these steps in somewhat abbreviated fashion.
20
He concentrated on a one year period of Dr.
Sweet’s earnings, the year 2001 and then
subtracted from Dr. Sweet’s 2001 gross
compensation, the median salary as per
salary.com for orthopaedic surgeons in the
Louisville Metropolitan area. He calculated
Dr. Sweet’s excess earnings at $252,894.00
less taxes. He selected a capitalization
rate of 25% assuming a relatively low risk
in future earnings based on competition,
costs of practice such as insurance rates.
Mr. Strothman did not consider any discounts
for minority status or limited marketability
opining that as the business was not for
sale the concept of limited liquidity was
not relevant. Mr. Strothman concluded that
Dr. Sweet’s, before tax interest in the
clinic, is $810,000.00.
The use of the term “fair market value”
as the designated standard of value of the
clinic has generated considerable confusion
in this case. Ray Strothman initially
purported to estimate the “fair market
value” of Dr. Sweet’s interest in the
clinic. He defines fair market “the price
at which property will change hands between
a willing buyer and a willing seller when
the former is not under any compulsion to
buy and the latter is not under any
compulsion to sell, both parties having
reasonable knowledge of relevant
facts.” . . . He testified that the “fair
market value” of [Richard’s] interest in the
practice was $810,000. During skillful
cross-examination, however, Mr. Strothman
acknowledged that [Richard] Sweet could not
sell his interest for $810,000 and that his
use of the term “fair market value” was
“boiler plate” language in his report. He
testified that in reality this amount was
the value to [Richard] as a going concern or
a return on investment.
. . . .
21
The Court of Appeals decision in Clark vs.
Clark, infra, appears to use the term fair
market value interchangeably with the
concept of intrinsic or ongoing concern.
Clark cites with approval the following
language in a decision of the Supreme Court
of New Mexico, Hurley vs. Hurley, [94 N.M.
641,] 615 P.2d 256, 259 (1980):
Accordingly, we do not think that a
dispositive factor is whether Dr.
[Hurley] can sell his good will. His
good will has value despite its
immarketability, and so long as he
maintains his . . . practice . . . he
will continue to receive a return on
the good will associated with his name.
” [sic] (782 S.W.2d 60.)
Clark opines that age, health and
professional reputation of the practitioner,
the nature of the practice, the length of
time the practice has been in existence,
past profits, comparative professional
success and the value of its other assets
are all factors of good will. Id. at 59.
Clark, Heller, and Drake all appear to
approve the capitalization of excess
earnings approach to the evaluation of good
will.
Bonnie Ciresi submitted her own revised
calculations of the capitalization of excess
earnings approach using a capitalization
rate of 40%, opining that Dr. Sweet’s future
earnings are at significant risk of decline
because of reduced insurance reimbursements
and escalating costs. She also notes, as
Dr. Sweet and Dr. McAllister testified, that
their earnings have declined substantially
since the early 1990’s. Ms. Ciresi also
utilized the Medical Group Management
Association (MGMA) data which indicate that
the median earnings for hip and joint
surgeons nationally but as adjusted for the
Louisville area are approximately
22
$418,275.00 per year as opposed to the
figure of $307,213.00 used by Mr. Strothman
as the median salary for orthopaedic
surgeons generally in the area. General
orthopaedic surgeons have a median income of
$320,553.00 according to the MGMA
calculations.
This Court finds that Mr. Strothman’s
capitalization of excess earnings approach
is appropriate but that he has used a
capitalization rate that fails to take into
account the current risks in [Richard]
Sweet’s orthopaedic practice. The Court
accepts Ms. Ciresi’s opinion that the MGMA
data should be used comparing to Dr. Sweet’s
earnings the median income of a hip and
joint replacement specialist, not the median
income of a general orthopedist. Also, the
Court finds that the weighted average of Dr.
Sweet’s compensation over the past 5 years
should have been employed in this case. In
the Clark case, Dr. Macken did average 3
years of Dr. Clark’s practice.
The Court has taken Dr. Sweet’s
weighted average gross earnings over five
years, $531,466.00, and subtracted the
median salary for hip and joint specialist
within the orthopaedic surgery area as
adjusted for Louisville of $418,275.00. Dr.
Sweet’s excess earnings are $113,191.00.
His after tax earnings applying total taxes
of 40% are $67,915.00. Utilizing a
capitalization rate of 32.5%, this yields a
sub-total of $208,969.00 which when added to
the net accounts receivable attributable to
Dr. Sweet of $123,202.00, yield a
calculation of $332,171.00. The Court has
chosen a capitalization rate which is lower
than Bonnie Ciresi’s recommended rate but
higher than Ray Strothman’s. Strothman’s
optimistic capitalization rate does not
adequately consider the risk of even higher
costs and declining insurance reimbursement.
Ms. Ciresi’s rate does not adequately take
into account the fact that [Richard’s]
23
income has not declined over the past five
years.
The Court has applied no marketability
discount because marketability is not a
factor. Also, according to Shannon Pratt,
minority discounts are commonly not relevant
to small professional practices where each
partner exercises considerable decision
making regarding his practice even though he
does not have a majority interest. The
Court finds that the value of Dr. Sweet’s
interest in Louisville Orthopaedic Clinic,
PSC is $332,171.00.
Richard also argues that the family court, in valuing
his medical practice, failed to properly consider Richard’s
health and his ability to continue to generate income at the
same level into the future, the changes occurring in medical
reimbursement practices, and the impact of the restrictive
covenants contained in the buy-sell agreement.
We conclude,
however, that, to the extent the issues were raised by Richard,
the family court gave proper weight to these factors.
To sum up on this issue, we recognize that the trial
court heard testimony from two experts -- one who strictly
followed the corporation's buy/sell agreement among the surgeons
in the practice, and the other who applied the capitalization of
excess earnings method.
The two methods produced a wide
variation in the estimated value of the business, $123,202.00 to
$810,000.00.
This illustrates that there is no single best
mathematical formula for precisely calculating the value of a
24
closely-held medical practice such as Richard’s.
court established a value of $332,171.00.
The trial
This valuation falls
squarely within the range of values established by the expert
witnesses.
Although not calculated with mathematical
exactitude, the court's figure clearly falls within the range of
competent testimony.
Underwood v. Underwood, Ky. App., 836
S.W.2d 439, 444 (1992), overruled in part on other grounds by
Neidlinger v. Neidlinger, Ky. 52 S.W.3d 513 (2001).
We conclude
that the findings of fact made by the family court in its
valuation of the practice were not clearly erroneous, and that
the method used in arriving at the valuation was not an abuse of
discretion.
The last issue raised by Richard is that the family
court failed to decide whether a $50,000.00 payment made by
Richard to Janet in December 2001 was a maintenance payment or a
property distribution.
It is uncontested that the payment was made.
In the
course of the hearing, the family court held that the treatment
of the payment would be determined at the conclusion of the
trial.
The character of the payment was not addressed in the
family court’s order of November 13, 2002.
Richard raised the
issue in both his first and second motions to alter, amend, or
vacate.
However, in neither the family court’s order of
December 30, 2002, or March 12, 2003, does the family court
25
directly address this issue in detail.
While in its order of
March 12, 2003, the family court does state “[t]he court did
consider the payment of $50,000.00 made in 2001,” this does not
explain whether the distribution was determined to be
maintenance, child support, a property distribution, or a
combination of the foregoing.
As the family court has not squarely addressed this
issue, and its intended treatment of the payment is not readily
apparent from its orders, we remand as to this issue to give the
family court an opportunity to clarify its intended treatment of
the payment.
After its further consideration of the issue, the
family court should make any necessary adjustments to reflect
the proper treatment of the payment.
APPEAL NO. 2003-CA-000239-MR
Next, we address the issues raised by Janet in her
cross-appeal.
First, Janet contends that the circuit court erred in
its maintenance calculation because it failed to consider that
maintenance paid is taxable income to her and tax deductible to
Richard.
Maintenance awarded by the trial court was $7,500.00
per month for five years ($90,000.00 per year) and $5,000.00 per
month ($60,000.00 per year) for an additional five years.
Janet
argues that if the tax effects are taken into consideration,
Richard actually has $3,000.00 more per month in cash flow
26
($90,000.00 x 40% ÷ 12) and that proper consideration of this
additional cash flow would have resulted in a greater
maintenance award.
The living expenses originally tendered by Janet for
herself and the children were $42,620.71 per month.
At trial,
Janet reduced the combined expenses claimed to $25,000.00 per
month, or $300,000 per year.
In its November 13, 2002, order
the family court stated that “[t]his would amount to 80% to 90%
of Richard Sweet’s net income.”
Clearly the family court was
referring to after tax income, and the 80% to 90% of net income
calculations implies a range of after tax income of $333,000.00
(90%) to $375,000.00 (80%).
Janet notes that the family court
estimated elsewhere in its opinion that if Richard earned
$600,000.00, and at an assumed tax rate of 40%, this would
produce an after tax income of $365,000.00, which is within the
80% to 90% range (82%) of Janet’s claimed annual expenses.
We discussed maintenance issues extensively when we
addressed the matter in Richard’s appeal earlier in this
opinion.
Here, as then, we conclude that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in its maintenance award.
The family
court’s illustration that Janet’s claimed expenses amounted to
80% to 90% of Richard’s net income was intended to simply
demonstrate the excessiveness of Janet’s claimed monthly
expenses.
Though tax consequences are relevant in setting
27
maintenance, the purpose of the illustration was not to
demonstrate any tax benefit/deduction for Richard.
Next, Janet contends that the family court erred in
its child support calculation.
The family court awarded Janet
$3,000.00 per month in child support.
In its November 14, 2002,
order, the family court addressed this issue, in relevant part,
as follows:
Janet claims historical expenses for
the children of $11,250.00 per month. Sam
rides horses and is a developing equestrian.
The parties have spent freely in recent
years for these expenses. Alex, the 16 year
old son of the parties is an excellent
student and avid basketball player and
golfer. He drives the parties 1996 Volvo
and he attends Kentucky Country Day School.
Alex’s Kentucky Country Day tuition for the
year 2001-2002 school year was $10,000.00.
While the parties’ maximum legal obligation
for child support is not limited to the
amount designated for families earning a
total combined income of $15,000.00 per
month as their income exceeds that amount,
the Court declines to find that the
children’s reasonable needs approximate
$11,250.00 monthly or a total of $135,000.00
annually.
. . . .
In this case, based upon the Court’s
assessment of the children’s historic
standard of living, including private
schools for Alex and perhaps for Samantha in
the future, the golfing and other hobbies of
Alex and the fairly expensive horseback
riding and showing hobby for Alex, the court
finds the total monthly obligation for child
support excluding health insurance to be
approximately $4,000.00 per month. The
28
Court notes that this level is more than
double the child support guidelines for
families earning $15,000.00 per month.
The Court assumes that Janet Sweet’s
share of the family income is approximately
25% and that [Richard’s] share of the family
income is approximately 75%. This
calculation assumes Dr. Sweet generates
gross income of approximately $600,000.00
annually from his wages, interest and
dividends and income from his additional
partnerships. It assumes that after paying
Janet maintenance totaling $90,000.00
annually, he has gross income of
approximately $510,000.00 and Janet has
gross income of approximately $165,000.00,
including $25,000.00 annually of imputed
earned income, $50,000.00 in interest and
dividends and $90,000.00 approximately in
maintenance. The total combined parental
income is $675,000.00 of which [Richard’s]
earnings represent 75%. Accordingly, he
shall be required to pay Janet $3,000.00 per
month minus 25% of the agreed upon private
school tuition for the children. Child
support shall be paid from [Richard] to
Janet at this level until Alex becomes 18
years old or graduates from high school
whichever is later. If Alex is still in
high school at the time of his 18th birthday,
child support shall continue until Alex
graduates from high school but shall
terminate no later than the end of the
school year after Alex reaches his 19th
birthday. At that point, child support
shall be calculated for Samantha. Both
parties shall be responsible for
extraordinary medical expenses, [Richard]
Sweet at a level of 75% and Janet at a level
of 25%. . . .
The child support guidelines set out in KRS 403.212
serve as a rebuttable presumption for the establishment or
modification of the amount of child support.
29
Courts may deviate
from the guidelines only upon making a specific finding that
application of the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate.
KRS 403.211(2).
However, KRS 403.211(3)(e) specifically
designates that "combined monthly adjusted parental gross income
in excess of the Kentucky child support guidelines" is a valid
basis for deviating from the child support table.
Furthermore,
the trial court may use its judicial discretion to determine
child support in circumstances where combined adjusted parental
gross income exceeds the uppermost level of the guidelines
table.
KRS 403.212(5).
The child support table ends at the
$15,000.00 per month level, so deviation from the guidelines is
clearly appropriate in this case.
Kentucky trial courts have been given broad discretion
in considering a parent's assets and setting correspondingly
appropriate child support.
S.W.2d 463 (1992).
Redmon v. Redmon, Ky. App., 823
A reviewing court should defer to the lower
court's discretion in child support matters whenever possible.
See Pegler v. Pegler, Ky. App., 895 S.W.2d 580 (1995).
As long as the trial court's discretion comports with the
guidelines, or any deviation is adequately justified in writing,
this Court will not disturb the trial court's ruling in this
regard.
Commonwealth ex rel. Marshall v. Marshall, Ky. App., 15
S.W.3d 396, 400-401 (2000).
A judgment concerning child support
will not be disturbed "unless there has been a clear and
30
flagrant abuse of the powers vested in that court."
Bradley, Ky., 473 S.W.2d 117, 118 (1971).
court's discretion is not unlimited.
Bradley v.
However, a trial
The test for abuse of
discretion is whether the trial judge's decision was arbitrary,
unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Thompson, Ky., 11 S.W.3d 575,
581 (2000); Commonwealth v. English, Ky., 993 S.W.2d 941, 945
(1999); Downing v. Downing, Ky. App., 45 S.W.3d 449, 454 (2001).
In this case the family court thoroughly supported its
determination of the appropriate level of child support.
Janet
argues that the family court’s setting of child support at
$3,000.00 was arbitrary; however, to the contrary, the setting
of child support at $3,000.00 was a sound exercise of the family
court’s discretion.
Next, Janet contends that the family court’s valuation
of Richard’s life insurance policy was erroneous.
Richard owns,
and was awarded by the family court, a New England Life
Insurance Policy having a total cash value of $57,777.00.
Of
this amount, Richard could receive $36,040.00 upon cashing in
the policy.
The family court valued the policy at a net equity
Richard could receive if he cashed in the policy rather than the
total cash value.
The family court’s determination that the
policy should be valued at the amount it would bring if it were
cashed in currently was not clearly erroneous, nor was it an
31
abuse of its discretion to use this approach.
Janet does not
dispute the penalty associated with an early cash-in, and it is
reasonable to assign a value to the policy which reflects the
actual cash proceeds it could currently generate.
Next, Janet contends that the family court erred in
qualifying Richard’s business valuation expert, Bonnie Ciresi,
as an expert witness.
Janet contends that Ciresi has
insufficient education and experience to testify regarding
matters concerning the valuation of Richard’s interest in his
various medical practices.
The family court addressed this
issue as follows:
Janet Sweet challenged Ms. Ciresi’s
credibility/credentials and knowledge to
offer expert testimony with regard to
valuation of this practice. The Court held
a pre-trial hearing pursuant to Daubert vs.
Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S.
579, [113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469]
(1993). Ms. Ciresi received a Bachelor of
Arts Degree in Accounting from Eastern
Kentucky University in 1979. She became a
certified public accountant in 1981. She
has specialized in accounting practices
within the medical profession and has been
employed as a CPA by Carpenter, Mountjoy a
respected general certified public
accounting firm, since January 1990. She is
currently the partner in charge of
healthcare divisions and currently services
approximately 16 medical practices providing
traditional accounting services, management
consulting and reviewing practices for
efficiency and compliance with federal and
other regulations.
32
She does not have a certified valuation
administrator degree (CVA) and acknowledges
that she does not know the specific
qualifications for that certification. Mr.
Ray Strothman, CPA, CVA, the managing
partner of Strothman and Co., an accounting
firm does have the CVA degree; however, he
acknowledged the he performed numerous
valuations of various business entities
before he obtained this certification.
Other members of Ms. Ciresi’s firm have the
CVA and she has worked in collaboration with
them on business evaluations. While she is
more familiar with medical practices than
Mr. Strothman, she has little experience
independently, in performing general
business evaluations and has testified only
once before concerning the valuation of a
medical practice in a dissolution case. Ms.
Ciresi was asked by Petitioner to evaluate
Dr. Sweet’s practice only in relation to its
buy/sell agreement and also to review Ray
Strothman’s evaluation and prepare a
critique for counsel for [Richard] Sweet.
The Court entered an Interlocutory
Order in this case finding that Ms. Ciresi
was qualified to testify as an expert in the
area of business evaluation within the
context of buy/sell agreements among medical
partnerships. The Court considers that the
specific directions to Ms. Ciresi concerning
the narrow scope of her evaluation as well
of [sic] her lack of experience in valuation
of businesses generally goes to the weight,
not to the competency, of her testimony.
KRE 702, which governs the admission of expert
testimony, provides,
If scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
33
training, or education, may testify thereto
in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
Application of KRE 702 is addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court.
Ford v. Commonwealth, Ky., 665
S.W.2d 304, 309 (1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 984, 105 S. Ct.
392, 83 L. Ed. 2d 325 (1984).
An abuse of discretion occurs
when a "trial judge's decision [is] arbitrary, unreasonable,
unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.”
Goodyear
Tire and Rubber Co. v. Thompson, Ky., 11 S.W.3d 575, 581 (2000).
A trial court's ruling on the qualifications of an expert should
not be overturned unless the ruling is clearly erroneous.
Commonwealth v. Rose, Ky., 725 S.W.2d 588, 590 (1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 838, 108 S. Ct. 122, 98 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1987),
overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Craig, Ky., 783
S.W.2d 387, 389 (1990); Farmland Mut. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, Ky.,
36 S.W.3d 368, 378 (2000).
The family court’s determination that Ms. Ciresi was
qualified to testify as an expert in the area of business
valuation within the context of buy-sell agreements in a medical
partnership situation, and that she was qualified to review and
critique the opinion of the appellee’s expert based upon her
general knowledge and expertise in the area of business
valuation was not clearly erroneous.
Ciresi has a Bachelor’s
degree in accounting; she had been a CPA for approximately 21
34
years; had been employed by the respected CPA firm of Carpenter,
Mountjoy for approximately 12 years; she specializes in medical
profession accounting; and she is the partner at her CPA firm in
charge of healthcare accounting practice and services
approximately 16 medical practices providing traditional
accounting services, management consulting and reviewing
practices for efficiency and compliance with federal and other
regulations.
While she does not have a CVA qualification,
Janet’s own valuation expert testified that he had performed
numerous valuations of business entities prior to obtaining his
certification.
The trial court did not err in permitting Ms.
Ciresi to testify within the limits permitted.
Any lack of
experience or other qualification goes to the weight, not the
competency, of her testimony.
Janet also contends that Ciresi should not have been
permitted to testify because Richard failed to comply with the
trial court’s order requiring pretrial compliance regarding
expert witnesses in accordance with CR 26.
Janet contends that
despite repeated requests for disclosure, Richard repeatedly
failed to comply with the trial court’s order and, as a
sanction, the trial court should have excluded Ciresi’s
testimony.
The trial judge “has wide discretion in (the)
determination to admit and exclude evidence, and this is
35
particularly true in the case of expert testimony.”
Keene v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 516 S.W.2d 852, 855 (1974), (quoting Hamling
v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 94 S. Ct. 2887, 2903, 41 L. Ed.
2d 590, 615 (1974).
Sanctions relating to the violation of a
pretrial discovery order are governed by Kentucky Rule of Civil
Procedure CR 37.02 and are within the trial court's discretion.
Morton v. Bank of the Bluegrass and Trust Co., Ky. App., 18
S.W.3d 353, 360 (1999).
“The sanction imposed [for a violation]
should bear some reasonable relationship to the seriousness of
the defect."
Bridewell v. City of Dayton ex rel. Urban Renewal
and Community Development Agency of City of Dayton, Ky. App.,
763 S.W.2d 151, 153 (1988), (quoting Ready v. Jamison, Ky., 705
S.W.2d 479, 482 (1986).
It is conceded that the areas to be addressed by
Ciresi, the valuation of Richard’s interests in his medical
practice, were the most substantial of the contested issues.
Although the family court found that Richard’s initial
disclosures regarding Ciresi were not in compliance with the
trial court’s pretrial order, the family court also determined
that Janet’s counsel were “experienced and skilled” and were
“amply prepared to cross-examine Ciresi at trial on the basis of
their pretrial knowledge of Ciresi’s opinions.”
Given the
devastating consequences to Richard’s case in the event of the
exclusion of Ciresi’s testimony in comparison with the prejudice
36
to Janet by the admitting of the testimony, we conclude that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion by not excluding
Ciresi’s testimony.
Next, Janet contends that the family court erred in
its valuation of Richard’s interest in Surgecenter.
Janet
argues that the family court should have accepted her expert’s
valuation of $62,000.00 and should not have reduced the value to
$59,000.00 based upon anticipated competition to result from
Jewish Hospital’s completion of a facility to offer services
similar to those provided by Surgecenter.
Richard has a 1% interest in Surgecenter.
Based upon
the capitalization of earnings method and applying a
capitalization rate of 19.6%, Janet’s expert, Strothman, valued
Richard’s interest in the practice at $62,000.00.
Richard did
not obtain an expert opinion as to the value of his interest in
Surgecenter but submitted that he would be entitled to
$54,000.00 based upon his most recent K-1.
The family court
stated as follows:
[Richard] testified that an additional
capital contribution will be needed in order
to renovate and expand the Surgecenter in
order to stay competitive. He noted that
Jewish Hospital is building what he refers
to as a “Taj Mahal” which he believes will
offer serious competition for the
Surgecenter. Accordingly, he anticipates
some cutting of income. This Court finds
that Mr. Strothman did not consider the
competition from the new Jewish Hospital
37
facility or the additional capital
contribution which may increase the
capitalization rate somewhat based upon
additional risk considerations. The Court
additionally finds that no one has a crystal
ball or a precise measurement tool and sets
a value of $59,000.00 upon [Richard] Sweet’s
interest in Surgecenter.
The family court identified specific reasons for its
slight reduction to the valuation submitted by Strothman.
The
reduction was based upon Richard’s testimony regarding factors
not considered by Strothman.
The family court’s valuation was
supported by substantial evidence, and accordingly was not
clearly erroneous.
Finally, Janet contends that the family court’s
valuation of Richard’s interest in Louisville Orthopaedic Center
was incorrect.
Janet’s expert, Strothman, using the
capitalization of earnings method, valued Richard’s interest in
the practice as $810,000.00.
Richard’s expert, Ciresi, using a
calculation based upon the partnership’s buy/sell agreement,
valued the practice at $332,171.00.
Ultimately, the trial court
adopted the capitalization of earnings method proposed by
Strothman, but applied different calculation factors to arrive
at a value of $332,171.00.
We discussed the trial court’s valuation of Louisville
Orthopaedic Center extensively in our consideration of the issue
in Richard’s appeal.
Much of that discussion is applicable to
38
Janet’s appeal and we incorporate that discussion into the
present discussion.
Janet contends the family court erred by accepting the
tax rate and median salary for a Louisville Orthopaedic Surgeon
proposed by Ciresi rather than the tax rate and median salary
proposed by her expert.
The trial court, rather than this
Court, was in the better position to weigh the testimony and
judge the credibility of the witnesses.
Ciresi’s testimony is
substantial evidence supporting the tax rate and median salary
used in the family court’s calculation of the practice under the
capitalization of earnings method.
The family court’s decision
to use the values proposed by Ciresi was not clearly erroneous
nor an abuse of discretion.
Janet also contends that the family court erred by
using a capitalization rate of 32.5% rather than a rate of 25%
as proposed by her expert.
40%.
Richard’s expert proposed a rate of
Again, in light of the competing testimony of the experts,
the trial court was in the better position to resolve the
dispute concerning the proper capitalization rate.
The rate
applied by the family court was within the range proposed by the
experts.
Its decision was not clearly erroneous nor an abuse of
discretion.
For the foregoing reasons we affirm in part, reverse
in part, and remand for the trial court’s additional
39
consideration concerning the character of the payment made by
Richard to Janet in December 2001.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT/CROSSAPPELLEE:
Eugene L. Mosely
Anne Courtney Coorssen
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE/CROSSAPPELLANT, JANET M. SWEET AND
CROSS-APPELLANTS, VICKI L.
BUBA AND STONE, PREGLIASCO,
HAYNES, BUBA, LLP:
Vicki L. Buba
Louisville, Kentucky
40
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