MICHAEL L. NORMAN AND ELLEN NORMAN v. GALEN OF KENTUCKY, INC., D/B/A SUBURBAN MEDICAL CENTER; ROBERT WOLFE, C.R.N.A.; AND ANETHESIOLOGY ASSOCIATES, P.S.C. GALEN OF KENTUCKY, INC., D/B/A SUBURBAN MEDICAL CENTER v. HONORABLE TOM McDONALD MICHAEL L. NORMAN
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RENDERED:
SEPTEMBER 17, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-000003-MR
MICHAEL L. NORMAN
AND ELLEN NORMAN
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE TOM McDONALD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CI-004787
GALEN OF KENTUCKY, INC.,
D/B/A SUBURBAN MEDICAL CENTER;
ROBERT WOLFE, C.R.N.A.; AND
ANETHESIOLOGY ASSOCIATES, P.S.C.
AND
NO. 2003-CA-000086-MR
GALEN OF KENTUCKY, INC.,
D/B/A SUBURBAN MEDICAL CENTER
v.
CROSS-APPELLANT
CROSS-APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE TOM McDONALD
ACTION NO. 96-CI-004787
MICHAEL L. NORMAN
AND ELLEN NORMAN
AND
APPELLEES
CROSS-APPELLEES
NO. 2003-CA-000131-MR
ROBERT WOLFE, C.R.N.A.
v.
CROSS-APPELLANT
CROSS-APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE TOM McDONALD
ACTION NO. 96-CI-004787
MICHAEL L. NORMAN
AND ELLEN NORMAN
AND
CROSS-APPELLEES
NO. 2003-CA-000167-MR
ANESTHESIOLOGY ASSOCIATES, P.S.C.
v.
CROSS-APPELLANT
CROSS-APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE TOM McDONALD
ACTION NO. 96-CI-004787
MICHAEL L. NORMAN
AND ELLEN NORMAN
CROSS-APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING ON DIRECT APPEAL
AND DISMISSING THE CROSS-APPEALS
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
MINTON, SCHRODER, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
This is an appeal and three protective cross-
appeals from a jury verdict finding no medical malpractice in a
suit by a surgical patient against the hospital, the
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anesthesiologist’s nurse, and his anesthesiologist employer.
Because we affirm the trial court on direct appeal, we dismiss
the cross-appeals as moot.
On August 30, 1995, Michael Norman (Norman) was
operated on by Dr. E. Dean Canan for the repair of a bilateral
inguinal hernia.
The surgery was performed at Galen of
Kentucky, Inc., d/b/a Suburban Medical Center (Suburban), with
Robert Wolfe (Wolfe), a Certified Registered Nurse Anesthetist,
overseeing the anesthesia during the surgery.
Anesthesiology
Associates, P.S.C. (Anesthesiology Associates) was his employer.
The surgery lasted less than an hour and appeared to be
uneventful.
Wolfe transported Norman from the operating room to
the recovery room.
The day of surgery, Norman complained of
shoulder and arm pain that overshadowed the pain from surgery in
his groin area.
The testimony was conflicting as to when the
pain first appeared and the causation.
Norman’s medical experts
diagnosed a disruption of the nerve root in his neck at the C-5
level and theorize Norman had probably suffered a traumatic
injury to his neck while under the effects of anesthesia during
or around the time of surgery.
Several possibilities were
offered, such as the arm not strapped down and flopping over the
edge of the table, acting as a lever, or the gurney not being
locked, with Norman falling toward the floor and either being
caught with a jerk or landing on the floor.
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The defense had a different diagnosis and different
etiology.
The defense expert claimed the injury was not the
result of trauma, but a combination of Parsonage-Turner
Syndrome, an idiopathic condition of unknown cause, along with
diabetes and reflex sympathy dystrophy, another condition of
unknown cause.
The jury sided with the defense and unanimously
held all the appellees not liable.
Norman appeals to this Court
contending the trial court erred by refusing to give a res ipsa
loquitur instruction and by allowing the operating room
personnel to testify as to their routine or habit when they
could not remember the specifics of Norman’s surgery.
The
appellees filed protective cross-appeals contending the trial
court erred in allowing the jury to hear about Wolfe’s drug
addiction, certification, in not granting the appellees separate
trials, and finally, in not giving them directed verdicts.
Norman’s first allegation of error by the trial court
is its refusal to give the jury an instruction on the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur.
We disagree.
“In order for the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur to apply in a medical malpractice action,
the injury must be such as would not occur in the absence of
negligence.”
Turner v. Reynolds, Ky. App., 559 S.W.2d 740, 741
(1977), citing Jewish Hospital Association of Louisville, Ky. v.
Lewis, Ky. App., 442 S.W.2d 299 (1969).
The doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur is not usually applicable in malpractice cases,
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but may be invoked where accepted procedures produce abnormal
results.
Meiman v. Rehabilitation Center, Inc., Ky., 444 S.W.2d
78 (1969).
Negligence cannot be inferred simply from an
undesirable result.
655 (1992).
Perkins v. Hausladen, Ky., 828 S.W.2d 652,
“A res ipsa loquitur case is ordinarily merely one
kind of case of circumstantial evidence, in which the jury may
reasonably infer both negligence and causation from the mere
occurrence of the event and the defendant’s relation to it.”
Id. at 656, quoting the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Section
328D, comment 6, p. 157, (1965).
According to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,
Section 328D(1) (1965), several conditions must be met before
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can be applied:
It may be inferred that harm suffered by the
plaintiff is caused by negligence of the
defendant when [:]
(a) the event is of a kind which ordinarily
does not occur in the absence of negligence;
(b) other responsible causes, including the
conduct of the plaintiff and third persons,
are sufficiently eliminated by the evidence;
and
(c) the indicated negligence is within the
scope of the defendant’s duty to the
plaintiff. (emphasis added.)
The trial court found that there was a battle of the expert
witnesses which produced other possible causes that were not
sufficiently eliminated.
The trial court found:
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much evidence on the topic of ParsonageTurner Syndrome, which is a problem that is
unpredictable and unpreventable part of
surgery, and could occur whether or not the
Defendant’s were in complete control of the
instrumentality. Dr. David Preston,
Plaintiff’s own experts, first impression of
Mr. Norman’s injury was believed to be
attributable to this syndrome.
Additionally, Dr. William Berger, another
expert witness of the Plaintiff’s produced
five possible scenarios for the cause of Mr.
Norman’s injuries but was unable to state
which theory applied, and that the injury
could have occurred in the absence of
negligence.
We cannot say the trial court’s findings were clearly erroneous.
CR 52.01; Sommerkamp v. Linton, Ky., 114 S.W.3d 811, 815 (2003).
Even if we agreed with appellant that this was a case for
application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, he would not be
entitled to have a res ipsa loquitur instruction submitted to
the jury.
The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is an evidentiary
doctrine which allows a jury to infer negligence on the part of
the defendant.
Sadr v. Hager Beauty School, Inc., Ky. App., 723
S.W.2d 886, 887 (1987).
The doctrine creates a rebuttable
presumption of negligence under the following circumstances:
(1) the defendant had full control of the
instrumentality which caused the injury; (2)
the accident could not have happened if
those having control had not been negligent;
and (3) the plaintiff’s injury resulted
from the accident.
Id., citing Bowers v. Schenley Distillers, Inc., Ky., 469 S.W.2d
565 (1971).
On occasion, the rebuttable presumption may be
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strong enough to require a directed verdict.
Id.
Instructions
on res ipsa loquitur, however, should never be submitted to a
jury.
The Kentucky Supreme Court succinctly stated the
applicable rule in Meyers v. Chapman Printing Co., Inc., Ky.,
840 S.W.2d 814 (1992).
In that case, the Court recognized that:
In Kentucky, the burden of proof is always
on the party who would lose if no evidence
was presented. CR 43.01(2). In Kentucky
jury instructions do not include evidentiary
presumptions. Such presumptions alter the
burden of going forward with the evidence,
and thus may result in a directed verdict in
the absence of countervailing evidence, but
the jury instructions should be framed only
to state what the jury must believe from the
evidence in order to return a verdict in
favor of the party who bears the burden of
proof.
Id. at 824.
Clearly, this principle applies to the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur.
The appellants could request the application
of the doctrine to avoid a directed verdict or to win a directed
verdict, but the trial court properly refused to give a res ipsa
loquitur instruction.
See also Conley’s Adm’r v. Ward, Ky., 291
S.W.2d 568 (1955).
The appellants’ second argument is that the trial
court committed reversible error by allowing testimony of habit
to prove the appellees were not negligent in the actual
treatment of the appellant.
The witnesses supposedly did not
remember the surgery on the particular appellant but were
allowed to testify that it was their “habit” to conform to the
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standard of care required.
This is not exactly what happened.
Granted, the witnesses did not remember the particular surgery
but were allowed to testify as to the hospital’s policies and
customs requiring mishaps be noted on the chart.
were then asked what they would have done.
recorded, inferring nothing happened.
The witnesses
No mishaps were so
This case is similar to a
recently released case from another panel of this Court, Thomas
v. Greenview Hosp., Inc., Ky. App. 127 S.W.3d 663 (2004).
Thomas, our Court said:
In
It is undisputed that historically,
Kentucky case law has prohibited the use of “habit” evidence to
prove conformity with that conduct on a particular occasion.”
(citations omitted.)
The Court went on to distinguish “habit”
from “custom”:
“Habit” is generally defined as an
individual person’s specific regular or
consistent response to a repeated situation.
“Custom” is defined as the routine practice
or behavior on the part of a group or
organization that is equivalent to the habit
of an individual. (citations omitted.)
Id. at 669.
More importantly, the Thomas Court concluded that
“Kentucky law . . . excludes both personal habit and custom or
business routine practice in proving conforming conduct.”
(emphasis added.)
Id. at 670.
To the extent Kentucky has a
“custom” exception to the exclusionary rule, “custom” can only
be introduced for purposes other than to prove conforming
conduct on a specific occasion.
Id.
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If we were to stop here we
would be required to exclude both habit and custom evidence.
However, in our case, the appellant opened the door by
introducing the medical records and asking witnesses, including
appellee, Wolfe, what they would have done.
The same thing
happened in the Thomas case, and our Court responded with the
often quoted phrase, “One who asks questions which call for an
answer has waived any objection to the answer if it is
responsive.”
Id. at 671, quoting Mills v.
(citations omitted.)
Commonwealth, Ky., 996 S.W.2d 473, 485 (1999).
Under the
circumstances of our case, we believe Thomas is on point and the
trial court did not err.
With our decision to affirm the trial court on both
issues in the direct appeal, the issues raised by the appellees
in their respective cross-appeals become moot and we chose to
dismiss.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANTS/CROSS-APPELLEES,
MICHAEL L. NORMAN AND ELLEN
NORMAN:
COMBINED BRIEF FOR
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT,
GALEN OF KENTUCKY, INC., D/B/A
SUBURBAN MEDICAL CENTER:
Timothy J. Salansky
Louisville, Kentucky
B. Todd Thompson
Louisville, Kentucky
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Bradley R. Hume
Louisville, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT,
GALEN OF KENTUCKY, INC., D/B/A
SUBURGAN MEDICAL CENTER:
Bradley R. Hume
Louisville, Kentucky
COMBINED BRIEF FOR
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT,
ROBERT WOLFE, C.R.N.A.
Susan D. Phillips
William P. Swain
Louisville, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT,
ROBERT WOLFE, C.R.N.A.:
Susan D. Phillips
Louisville, Kentucky
COMBINED BRIEF FOR
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT,
ANESTHESIOLOGY ASSOCIATES,
P.S.C.:
Ronald G. Sheffer
Justin D. Clark
Louisville, Kentucky
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