STEPHEN R. MURPHY v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: July 16, 2004, 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO.
2002-CA-002453-MR
STEPHEN R. MURPHY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BOYD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE C. DAVID HAGERMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CR-00162
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; TACKETT AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
VANMETER, JUDGE:
Appellant, Stephen R. Murphy, appeals the
judgment of the Boyd County Circuit Court sentencing him to ten
(10) years in prison.
On September 25, 2002, the jury returned
a verdict finding appellant guilty of second degree manslaughter
for the death of Michael Shawn Johnson (“Johnson”).
For the
reasons stated hereafter, we affirm.
On August 3, 2001, appellant and Johnson entered a
Marathon gas station where they first met Pauletta Whitt
(“Pauletta”).1
Both appellant and Johnson soon learned that
Pauletta was trying to turn herself in to the police for a
criminal incident that occurred in Martin County.2
Pauletta
testified that appellant persuaded her to forego meeting with
the police until she first discussed the matter with an
attorney.
Subsequently, Pauletta left with appellant and
Johnson en route to appellant’s house.
Upon arriving at the house, appellant, Johnson and
Pauletta began to drink alcohol, and Pauletta also consumed
several narcotic pills and smoked marijuana.
Pauletta testified
that she soon passed out in the living room after trying to eat
a plate of food that appellant had made for her.
Pauletta awoke
in the bedroom, wearing only her bra and underwear, after
appellant apparently tried to have sexual intercourse with
Pauletta.
After this incident, appellant left the room because
Johnson was knocking on the kitchen door.
Pauletta wrapped
herself in a blanket and sat on the living room couch near
Johnson.
1
Appellant argues that Pauletta knew Johnson prior to meeting at the gas
station. However, Pauletta testified that she lied to the police about
knowing Johnson because she feared that the police would think wrongly of her
for leaving with two men that she had never met.
2
After learning that warrants were issued for her arrest, Pauletta left
Columbus, Ohio on a Greyhound Bus on her way to Ashland, Kentucky. Pauletta
testified that she first phoned the Pikeville Police Department, but the
officer was unable to find any warrants for her arrest. After contacting the
Kentucky State Police, Pauletta was told by a dispatcher to wait at the gas
station because an officer was on the way. Pauletta never met the officer.
2
Pauletta testified that up to this point, appellant
was very nice to her and in a good mood.
However, upon
Johnson’s return to the house, appellant had become very mean.
Pauletta testified that appellant threatened her with a gun, and
also threatened Johnson stating that if he did not return “the
gun,” then appellant would kill them both.
Appellant contends that at sometime during the
evening, Johnson stole a gun from his house.
Pauletta testified
that Johnson repeatedly assured appellant that he did not steal
the gun.3
Appellant testified that prior to Johnson returning to
the house, appellant retrieved his .410 rifle for protection and
placed it in the living room.
This is the rifle that was
ultimately used to kill Johnson.
Pauletta testified that prior to the killing, she and
Johnson went into the bedroom and shut the door because they
became afraid of appellant’s intentions.
As soon as the door
closed, two bullets were shot through the door that barely
missed Pauletta’s head.
Appellant maintains that he was
intending to fire into the ceiling.
However, a ballistics
expert testified that the shots were fired at approximately the
same height as that of Johnson’s head.
3
Apparently Johnson borrowed appellant’s car so that he could drive to work
that evening; however, Johnson returned to the house during the night and
knocked on the kitchen door. Appellant maintains that Johnson stole his .38
caliber pistol prior to leaving the house.
3
Subsequently, a fight erupted in the living room area
between appellant and Johnson.
Pauletta testified that she
heard Johnson yelling, “don’t do this.
best friend.”
I love you.
You’re my
Pauletta next remembered the gun exchanging hands
from appellant, to Johnson, and back to appellant before
appellant eventually shot Johnson in the neck.
A medical
examiner determined that Johnson’s cause of death was a gunshot
wound to the lower left side of the neck.
The jury returned a verdict finding appellant guilty
of second degree manslaughter.4
The trial court sentenced
appellant in conformity with the jury’s ten (10) year
recommendation.
This appeal followed.
Appellant first argues on appeal that the trial court
erred when it did not permit defense counsel to question
Pauletta about her criminal past, which would have exposed bias.
Appellant has requested that we review this issue for palpable
error.5
RCr 10.26.
In Commonwealth v. Pace, Ky., 82 S.W.3d 894, 895
(2002), the court held that the palpable error rule “is not a
substitute for the requirement that a litigant must
4
Appellant was on trial for two indictments: one, charging appellant with the
offense of murder for the shooting of Johnson and two, charging appellant
with first degree wanton endangerment for pointing the gun at Pauletta.
Appellant received a not guilty verdict as to the first degree wanton
endangerment charge.
5
Appellant initially argued that this issue was preserved for our review.
However, in appellant’s reply brief, he requests review for palpable error.
4
contemporaneously object to preserve an error for review.”
In
looking at the language of RCr 10.26, the Court stated that
“[a]n appellate court may consider an issue that was not
preserved if it deems the error to be a ‘palpable’ one which
affected the defendant's ‘substantial rights’ and resulted in
‘manifest injustice.’” Id. at 895 (citing RCr 10.26). In
determining whether an error is palpable, our review is “whether
on the whole case there is a substantial possibility that the
result would have been any different.” Id. (citing Commonwealth
v. McIntosh, Ky., 646 S.W.2d 43, 45 (1983)).
See also Brock v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 947 S.W.2d 24, 28 (1997).
In the instant case, appellant sought to show the
existence of possible bias of Pauletta contending that Johnson
and she had devised a plan to steal appellant’s gun but it was
unexpectedly interrupted when Johnson was killed.
To prove
this, appellant intended on questioning Pauletta about the
indictments pending against her in Martin County; however, the
trial court denied this request.6
Appellant specifically contends the trial court denied
his right to cross-examine witnesses against him in violation of
Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution and the Sixth Amendment
6
The Martin County incident involved a fight between some intoxicated men in
which one of them was severely beaten. Subsequently, one of the fighters
stole an automobile and a gun owned by the injured man. Pauletta was
apparently a passenger in this stolen vehicle.
5
to the United States Constitution.
And, appellant argues that
he was denied due process because the Martin County incident was
admissible under KRE 404 (b)(1).7
matter irrelevant to the case.
The trial court found the
We agree with the trial court.
"[A] criminal defendant states a violation of the
Confrontation Clause by showing that he was prohibited from
engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to
show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness, and
thereby ‘to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors . . .
could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability
of the witness.’"
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680,
106 S.Ct. 1431, 1436, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986) (citation omitted).
See also Caudill v. Commonwealth, Ky., 777 S.W.2d 924, 925-26
(1989).8
“The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due
process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to
defend against the State’s accusations. The rights to confront
7
Kentucky Rules of Evidence (“KRE”) 404 (b) provides: “Other crimes, wrongs,
or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to
prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible: (1) If offered for some other
purpose, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident . . . .”
8
Appellant cites Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1111, 39
L.Ed.2d 347 (1974), for the rule that “defense counsel should have been
permitted to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors, as the sole
triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating
to the reliability of the witness.” Nonetheless, the holding in Davis is
specific, as the Confrontation Clause “does not authorize a general
exploration of other criminal activity on the part of a witness where there
is no showing that the cross-examination would expose some motivation for the
testimony being given.” Bray v. Commonwealth, Ky., 703 S.W.2d 478, 479
(1985). See also Bowling v. Commonwealth, Ky., 942 S.W.2d 293, 304 (1997).
6
and cross-examine witnesses and to call witnesses in one’s own
behalf have long been recognized as essential to due process.”
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 1045,
35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973).
See also Justice v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
987 S.W.2d 306, 313 (1998).
Additionally, “the Confrontation
Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective
cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in
whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.”
Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20, 106 S.Ct. 292, 295, 88
L.Ed.2d 15 (1985) (emphasis in original).
In the instant case, however, the trial court’s
decision to preclude appellant from cross-examining Pauletta
about the Martin County incident did not cause him manifest
injustice.
RCr 10.26.
As cognizant as we are of the
fundamental importance of the constitutional right to confront
witnesses, we are not convinced that appellant was prejudiced.
Appellant first requested whether he could question
Pauletta about her involvement in the Martin County incident
during a pre-trial conference.
In recognizing the lack of
similarity between the two incidents, the prosecutor indicated
to the trial judge that he interviewed the Martin County
investigating officer who indicated that their case against
Pauletta was weak.
Even so, during a bench conference at trial,
defense counsel sought to narrow the issue by asking Pauletta if
7
the charges pending in Martin County were felony or misdemeanor.
In response, the trial court stated:
Well, it’s like trying to impeach her on
something that’s not final . . . I’m not
going to allow that. Not at this time. As
we agreed at the pre-trial, if you develop
this further to where I see enough
similarities in this triangle madness down
there in Martin County then we’ll revisit
it.
Particularly important here is the rule that “trial judges
retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is
concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination
based on concerns about, among other things, harassment,
prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or
interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.”
Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679, 106 S.Ct. at 1435.
Given that
Pauletta’s involvement in the Martin County incident was
considered weak and irrelevant to appellant’s current
indictment, the trial court was clearly concerned about the
Martin County incident confusing the jury.
Accordingly, upon a
careful review of the record, the trial court did not err, as
there is little, if any, possibility that the result of
appellant’s trial would have been any different if the questions
were permitted. Pace, 82 S.W.3d at 895.
Next, appellant argues that the trial court
erroneously overruled a motion for exculpatory evidence
8
concerning Johnson’s past criminal acts, specifically regarding
Johnson’s character for violence and drunkenness.
The trial
court held that if it granted the motion, “it would require the
Commonwealth to prepare part of the defendant’s investigation
for him.
The Commonwealth is already legally bound to turn over
any binding material.”
Again, we agree with the trial court.
Appellant relies on Brady v. State of Maryland, 373
U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196-97, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), for
the rule that “suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where
the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment,
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”
See also Ballard v. Commonwealth, Ky., 743 S.W.2d 21, 22 (1988).
Brady concerns a situation in which the prosecution
holds information that the defense does not and the
prosecution’s failure to disclose the information deprives the
defendant of a fair trial.
373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194.
Therefore, “reversal is required only where ‘there is a
reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to
the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.
A reasonable probability is the probability
sufficient to undermine the confidence in the outcome.’” Bowling
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 80 S.W.3d 405, 410 (2002) (quoting United
9
States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3383, 87
L.Ed.2d 481, 494 (1985)).
Here, it is highly unlikely that information regarding
Johnson’s drinking habits would have changed the result of the
trial.
Both prior to and during trial, defense counsel had
ample opportunity to question the witnesses about their
familiarity with Johnson’s violent and intoxicated tendencies.
Appellant also failed to produce any evidence contrary to the
trial court’s reasoning.
As such, there is simply nothing in
the record to suggest that the trial court abused its discretion
in overruling the motion.
Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Linda Roberts Horsman
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Ian G. Sonego
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
10
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