KENNETH MCBRIDE v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: MAY 28, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-002157-MR
KENNETH MCBRIDE
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MONTGOMERY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE BETH LEWIS MAZE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CR-00056
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, KNOPF, AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
McANULTY, JUDGE.
Kenneth McBride (hereinafter appellant)
appeals his conviction in the Montgomery Circuit Court for one
count of theft by unlawful taking and one count of being a
persistent felony offender in the first degree.
We affirm.
Appellant alleges that the trial court failed to
afford him his right to a speedy trial in violation of the Sixth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution, Section Eleven of the
Kentucky Constitution, and his right to be brought to trial
within 180 days under KRS 500.110.
Appellant was arrested on
March 14, 2001, and indicted by a grand jury on April 4, 2001.
Appellant was initially tried by a jury on February 19 and 20,
2002.
The jury became deadlocked, and a mistrial was declared.
Appellant filed a motion on February 28, 2002, for a speedy
trial pursuant to RCr 9.02, Kentucky Constitution Sections 11
and 14, and the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
A trial date was set for August 21, when it was
continued due to the failure of the Commonwealth’s expert
witness, under subpoena, to appear.
Appellant was retried on
September 9, 2002.
First, we agree with the Commonwealth that appellant
may not argue that he was not brought to trial within the 180
day period of KRS 500.110.
KRS 500.110 applies only when a
defendant is incarcerated for one offense and a detainer has
been lodged against him to answer for another offense, not where
a defendant is seeking a speedy trial of an offense for which he
is being held in pre-trial incarceration.
Commonwealth, Ky., 34 S.W.3d 63, 70 (2000).
Gabow v.
Appellant is
unaware whether or not a detainer had been lodged at the time of
his motion for speedy trial.
He never asserted a request for a
final disposition under that statute.
not properly before this Court.
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Thus, this argument is
Appellant preserved his argument that he did not
receive a speedy trial under the United States and Kentucky
Constitutions.
In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S. Ct.
2182, 2192, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972), the United States Supreme
Court established four factors for a court to analyze to
determining whether a defendant's right to a speedy trial has
been violated: (1) the length of delay, (2) the reason for the
delay, (3) assertion of the right, and (4) prejudice caused by
the delay.
The first step is to determine if the delay was
presumptively prejudicial to the defendant; if not, the
defendant’s speedy trial rights were not violated and the
inquiry ends.
Dunaway v. Commonwealth, Ky., 60 S.W.3d 563, 569
(2001), citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S. Ct. at 2192, 33 L.
Ed. 2d at 117.
Whether a delay was presumptively prejudicial depends
on the nature of the charges and the length of the delay.
Dunaway, 60 S.W.3d at 569.
Appellant was indicted for theft by
unlawful taking over $300, rape in the first degree and for
being a persistent felony offender (PFO) in the first degree.
In this case, consideration of the length of delay depends on
whether we look at only the span after the mistrial (which
coincides with the filing of appellant’s speedy trial motion)
until the retrial, or the entire length of time between
indictment and the retrial.
We determine that the only time we
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must consider is the interval between mistrial and retrial.
In
Tamme v. Commonwealth, Ky., 973 S.W.2d 13 (1998) and Ferguson v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 401 S.W.2d 225 (1965), Kentucky’s highest
court was only concerned in its speedy trial inquiry with the
period between the reversal of the defendant’s conviction and
the second trial.
In Icgoren v. State, 103 Md.App. 407, 653
A.2d 972, 978 (1995), the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
reviewed cases on this issue from various jurisdictions, and
found the weight of authority supported considering only the
period between declaration of mistrial and retrial.
Thus, we
examine only the interval between the mistrial on February 20,
2002, and the trial on September 9 and 10, 2002, a time period
of approximately six months and three weeks.
We do not perceive that a delay of less than seven
months, for a case of this degree of complexity, was
presumptively prejudicial.
Cf. Dunaway, 60 S.W.3d at 569 (13½
month delay in robbery and PFO case was presumed prejudicial).
Since the time of delay is not presumptively prejudicial, no
further analysis of the Barker factors is warranted.
We
conclude appellant was not denied the right to a speedy trial.
Appellant’s second argument is that there was
insufficient evidence of intent to deprive the victim of her
vehicle to support his conviction for theft by unlawful taking
over $300.
The Commonwealth responds that this claim is not
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preserved for review because appellant did not make this
particular argument in his motion for a directed verdict at the
close of the evidence, and there was sufficient evidence of
intent to deprive.
We agree.
Appellant made a general motion for directed verdict
of acquittal on the basis that the Commonwealth “failed to
sustain their burden of proof.”
A motion for directed verdict
is not the proper method of challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence on a particular issue.
754 S.W.2d 860, 862 (1988).
Anastasi v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
Appellant did not argue that there
was not sufficient evidence of intent to deprive his girlfriend
of her car.
Thus, appellant needed to do more to preserve the
specific issue he raises on appeal.
Furthermore, we find sufficient evidence on this
charge.
The appellate standard of review is whether under the
evidence as a whole it would be clearly unreasonable for the
jury to find the defendant guilty.
The evidence indicated that
appellant intended to leave Darnella Bradley for good following
their violent argument.
Ms. Bradley testified that appellant
said he was going to leave and asked her to have sex with him
“one last time.”
leave.
She testified that she complied so he would
Then, at his direction, they packed up appellant’s
belongings and put them in garbage bags.
Appellant forced Ms.
Bradley to leave in the truck with him and he drove to a
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friend’s house.
When that friend apparently was not home,
appellant drove onto the interstate highway.
Ms. Bradley
testified that at this point she begged appellant to go back and
offered him money to do so.
They drove to a hotel, and Ms.
Bradley was still trying to give appellant money.
“No, we are just going to go home.
here.”
He told her,
We are not going to stay
Ms. Bradley testified that she then ran into the lobby
of the hotel, and as she did so she observed appellant drive out
of the parking lot in her vehicle.
Ms. Bradley testified that appellant had no vehicle,
but she had given him duplicate keys to her vehicle.
that they had shared the vehicle.
She agreed
But she stated that she had
not given him permission to take the vehicle.
did not know where appellant intended to go.
She said that she
She testified
there was no agreement with appellant that he would come back
the next day and bring her the truck.
Ms. Bradley asserted that
he stole her truck, that she did not give consent for him to
take her truck to Tennessee.
Appellant was stopped by police in
the truck in Bell County, near the Tennessee border.
We find
sufficient evidence was produced at trial for a reasonable jury
to conclude appellant had intent to deprive Ms. Bradley of her
truck.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm appellant’s
convictions in the Montgomery Circuit Court.
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Kim Brooks
Covington, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Gregory C. Fuchs
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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