HAROLD R. DEATLEY, JR. v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: June 4, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-000230-MR
HAROLD R. DEATLEY, JR.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MASON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROBERT I. GALLENSTEIN, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 01-CR-00090
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JOHNSON, TAYLOR AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
VANMETER, JUDGE:
Harold R. Deatley, Jr., appeals from a
judgment entered by the Mason Circuit Court on January 9, 2002,
following his conditional plea of guilty to the charges of
trafficking in marijuana more than eight ounces but less than
five pounds1, driving while under the influence2, refusal to take
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 218A.1421(3).
2
KRS 189A.010.
an alcohol/substance test3 and trafficking in a controlled
substance within one thousand (1,000) yards of a school4.
On
appeal, Deatley argues that the trial court erred in denying his
motion to suppress evidence.
Finding no error, we affirm.
On July 5, 2001, Agent Timothy Fegan of the Buffalo
Trace Narcotics Task Force and Detective Andy Muse of the
Maysville Police Department observed Deatley drive his Chevrolet
pickup truck across the Maysville/Aberdeen Bridge at
approximately 2:30 p.m.
Agent Fegan and Detective Muse watched
Deatley turn right towards Manchester, Ohio after crossing the
bridge.
The officers were interested in Deatley’s trip to
Manchester, Ohio, because they had received information from the
FBI that Deatley routinely traveled to Manchester, Ohio to
retrieve marijuana to sell in Kentucky.
While Agent Fegan and
Detective Muse did not possess specific information concerning
Deatley’s July 5, 2001 trip to Manchester, Ohio, the officers
watched the bridge area for several hours and awaited Deatley’s
return.
However, they ultimately departed the area after
Deatley failed to return.
Later that afternoon, Agent Fegan observed Deatley
drive by the Maysville Police Station.
After spotting Deatley,
Agent Fagen decided to follow him in an unmarked vehicle.
3
KRS 189A.105.
4
KRS 218A.1411.
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While
following Deatley, Agent Fagen saw Deatley disregard a red
traffic signal at the intersection of Forest Avenue and
Lexington Street.
At this point, Agent Fegan unsuccessfully
attempted to contact a marked police unit to conduct a traffic
stop on Deatley’s vehicle.
Despite not receiving additional
police assistance, Agent Fegan continued to follow Deatley and
observed him drive to the left of the center area on Forest
Avenue5 on four occasions.
After witnessing these traffic
violations, Agent Fegan located a siren in the unmarked vehicle
and immediately activated it.
Deatley subsequently stopped his
vehicle.
After making the traffic stop, Agent Fegan approached
Deatley’s vehicle and requested Deatley’s operator’s license and
proof of insurance.
Deatley was only able to produce his
operator’s license.
Meanwhile, Agent Fegan discovered that
Deatley’s speech was slurred, but was unable to detect the smell
of alcohol on Deatley.
Agent Fegan, however, did detect a scent
that he recognized as “green marijuana”6 emanating from Deatley’s
vehicle.
From these observations, Agent Fegan ordered Deatley
to exit his truck, at which time Agent Fagen observed that
Deatley appeared to be unsteady on his feet.
At this point,
5
While the record is not entirely clear, the record implies that Forest
Avenue did not possess a yellow line indicating the center of the road.
6
According to Agent Fegan’s testimony during the suppression hearing,
“green marijuana” is marijuana that has not been burned in any capacity.
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Detective Muse arrived at the scene and administered four field
sobriety tests on Deatley.
Deatley failed three of the four
field sobriety tests, prompting Detective Muse to ask Deatley to
submit to a blood test.
test.
Deatley refused to submit to the blood
Detective Muse subsequently arrested Deatley for driving
under the influence of an intoxicant and placed him in the back
of a deputy sheriff’s cruiser.
Following Deatley’s arrest, Agent Fegan and Detective
Muse searched Deatley’s truck.
The officers found a large
garbage bag sitting behind the driver’s seat on the back
floorboard.
Agent Fagen noted in his written report that this
bag was located within arms reach of the driver’s seat.
The
officers looked inside the garbage bag and discovered 2,236.5
grams of marijuana packaged in shrink-wrapped, vacuum-sealed
packages.
Based on this evidence, the Mason County Grand Jury
indicted Deatley on July 20, 2001 for trafficking in marijuana,
driving under the influence and refusal to take an
alcohol/substance test.
The Grand Jury also indicted Deatley
for trafficking in a controlled substance within 1,000 yards of
a school7.
On August 7, 2001, Deatley filed a motion to suppress
evidence obtained against him as a result of the July 5, 2001
7
This charge was based upon evidence that was unrelated to Deatley’s July
5, 2001 arrest.
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traffic stop.
Upon the conclusion of a suppression hearing, the
trial court denied Deatley’s motion.
Subsequently, Deatley
entered a conditional guilty plea pursuant to Kentucky Rules of
Criminal Procedure (RCr) 8.09 to all of the pending charges.
On
January 4, 2002, the trial court rendered a final judgment
sentencing Deatley to a total of four years imprisonment.
This
appeal followed.
On appeal, Deatley argues that the trial court erred
in denying his motion to suppress the evidence because Agent
Fegan did not have probable cause to stop his truck, nor did
Agent Fegan or Detective Muse have probable cause for his
arrest.
Thus, Deatley believes that the July 5, 2001 search and
seizure was conducted in violation of the protections afforded
to him by the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, as well as Sections 1 and 10 of the Kentucky
Constitution.
We disagree.
Our standard of review for motions to suppress
evidence is set forth in Stewart v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 44
S.W.3d 376 (2000).
“First, the factual findings of the court
are conclusive if they are supported by substantial evidence.
The second prong involves a de novo review to determine whether
the court’s decision is correct as a matter of law.”
380.
(Footnotes omitted.)
-5-
Id. at
In Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116
S.Ct. 1769, 1772, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996), the Court held that the
temporary detention of a motorist, upon probable cause to
believe that he has violated the traffic laws, does not violate
the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable
seizures, even if a reasonable officer would not have stopped
the motorist absent some additional law enforcement objective.
Recently, the Kentucky Supreme Court embraced the Whren holding
by noting that “with regard to the traffic stop, that an officer
who has probable cause to believe a civil traffic violation has
occurred may stop a vehicle regardless of his or her subjective
motivation in doing so.”
Wilson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 37 S.W.3d
745, 749 (2001).
Here, the record is clear that even though Deatley was
the target of an ongoing investigation for drug offenses, Agent
Fegan had probable cause to stop Deatley’s vehicle on July 5,
2001 because he witnessed Deatley disregard a red traffic signal
at the intersection of Lexington Street and Forest Avenue in
Maysville, Kentucky.
KRS 189.338 prohibits drivers from
disregarding traffic control devices at intersections.
Moreover, while following Deatley on Forest Avenue, Agent Fegan
observed Deatley’s vehicle cross to the left of the center area
on four occasions as he rounded several curves.
KRS 189.300
requires a driver to operate his vehicle upon the right side of
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the highway whenever possible, unless the left side of the road
is clear and presents a clear vision of the road for at least
150 feet ahead.
Agent Fegan had probable cause to initiate the
traffic stop, as Deatley violated Kentucky traffic laws by
running a stoplight and driving on the left side of the road
while navigating curves.
Once stopped, Agent Fegan and Detective Muse had
probable cause to arrest Deatley for the offense of driving
under the influence of an intoxicant.
Detective Muse performed
four field sobriety tests on Deatley.
Deatley failed three of
those tests.
Further, Agent Fegan observed Deatley’s erratic
driving and noticed that his speech was slurred.
Based upon
these specific facts, it is apparent that the officers possessed
a reasonable and articulable suspicion that Deatley was driving
while intoxicated and therefore, Deatley was subject to being
stopped and ultimately arrested.
See Creech v. Commonwealth,
Ky. App., 812 S.W.2d 162 (1991).
Since the initial traffic stop and arrest were proper,
the issue becomes whether the search of Deatley’s truck was a
proper search made incident to arrest. A search “incident to
arrest” is an exception to the general rule requiring that
searches and seizures be accompanied by a warrant.
exception stands for the proposition that:
-7-
The
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for
the arresting officer to search the person
arrested in order to remove any weapons that
the latter might seek to use in order to
resist arrest or effect his escape. . . .
[and] to search for and seize any evidence
on the arrestee’s person to prevent its
concealment or destruction.
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2040,
23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969).
The exception applies only to those
areas “within [the] immediate control” of the arrestee. Id. at
763.
The incident to arrest exception has been extended to a
warrantless search of an automobile.
Specifically, in New York
v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 2864, 69 L.Ed.2d
768 (1981), the court stated:
When a policeman has made a lawful custodial
arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may,
as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest,
search the passenger compartment of that
automobile. It follows from this conclusion that
the police may also examine the contents of any
containers found within the passenger
compartment, for if the passenger compartment is
within reach of the arrestee, so also will
containers in it be within his reach.8
See also Commonwealth v. Ramsey, Ky., 744 S.W.2d 418 (1987).
In the instant case, Deatley’s stop and arrest were
clearly based on probable cause and thus, his arrest was lawful.
Also, the marijuana discovered during the search of the truck
8
In Belton, the court stated: “‘[c]ontainers’ here denotes any object capable
of holding another object. It thus includes closed or open glove
compartments, consoles, or other receptacles . . . as well as luggage, boxes,
bags, clothing, and the like.” 453 U.S. at 461 n.4, 101 S.Ct. at 2864.
Here, the marijuana was found in a garbage bag.
-8-
was found in bag located within arms reach of the driver’s seat.
Accordingly, we believe that the marijuana seized from Deatley’s
vehicle was within a container subject to his immediate control.9
Therefore, the trial court’s denial of Deatley’s motion to
suppress was correct and the findings were based on substantial
evidence.
For the aforementioned reasons, the judgment of the
Mason Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Dennis Stutsman
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Louis F. Mathias, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
9
While it may
investigation,
S.W.3d at 749,
not invalidate
appear that Agent Fagen stopped Deatley to further a drug
Whren, 517 U.S. at 810, 116 S.Ct. at 1772, and Wilson, 37
clearly provide that Agent Fegan’s subjective motivations do
this traffic stop.
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