JOANN BRUMMITT v. SOUTHEASTERN KENTUCKY REHABILITATION INDUSTRIES; HON. BONNIE KITTINGER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED:
October 24, 2003; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-001055-WC
JOANN BRUMMITT
v.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
CLAIM NO. WC-00-66642
SOUTHEASTERN KENTUCKY REHABILITATION
INDUSTRIES; HON. BONNIE KITTINGER,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: McANULTY, and SCHRODER, Judges; and HUDDLESTON, Senior
Judge1.
McANULTY, JUDGE:
Joann Brummitt (“Brummitt”) appeals from an
opinion of the Workers’ Compensation Board (the “Board”)
affirming a decision of an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) that
dismissed her claim for benefits against her employer,
1
Senior Judge Joseph R. Huddleston sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and Ky. Rev. Stat. (KRS) 21.580.
Southeastern Kentucky Rehabilitation Industries
(“Southeastern”), as insured by Century Insurance Company
(“Century Insurance”).
The ALJ found that Brummitt’s work-
related cumulative trauma injury manifested itself during a
period when Kentucky Employers’ Mutual Insurance (“KEMI”) was
the carrier at risk.
Having thoroughly reviewed the record, the
arguments presented herein and the applicable law, we affirm.
Brummitt began her employment with Southeastern in
October 1999.
During her employment with Southeastern,
Brummitt’s job duties included putting clips on strips of
cardboard, recycling greeting cards, sewing, placing labels
inside hats, inspecting ink labels and cleaning cardboard.
These tasks required Brummitt to use her hands in repetitive
motions, such as pinching, pulling and gripping.
While performing the tasks required by her employment,
Brummitt experienced pain in her hands and arms.
Specifically,
Brummitt complained of pain around the wrist areas and described
the pain as quick and throbbing around the thumb.
suffered pain in her neck and shoulders.
Brummitt also
Based upon these
complaints, Brummitt sought treatment from Jean Fee, a nurse
practitioner, during a visit to the White House Clinic in McKee,
Kentucky on April 17, 2000.
After examining Brummitt, Fee noted
that Brummitt suffered from “probable repetitive motion syndrome
of both extremities” caused by her employment.
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Fee prescribed
Celebrex and ordered Brummitt to wear wrist supports.
Fee did
not restrict Brummitt’s ability to work.
In October 2000, Brummitt returned to the White House
Clinic and sought additional treatment for the pain in her hands
from Dr. Daniel Adkins.
During his examination, Dr. Atkins
diagnosed Brummitt as having carpal tunnel syndrome.
Dr. Atkins
restricted Brummitt from performing activities that would
aggravate the carpal tunnel syndrome.
In December 2000,
Brummitt was unable to return to her employment.
Brummitt filed her application for workers’
compensation benefits on March 28, 2002.
In her initial
application, Brummitt alleged an injury date of April 17, 2000,
and attached nerve conduction and EMG reports from Dr. Paul
Brooks that showed bilateral, mild median neuropathies at the
wrists.
Brummitt also attached the April 17, 2000 medical records
from nurse practitioner Fee that linked Brummitt’s medical
condition to her employment.
It is not disputed that KEMI
provided workers’ compensation insurance coverage to
Southeastern on April 17, 2000.2
On June 21, 2002, Brummitt moved to amend her
application to allege an alternative injury date of October 6,
2000.
In her motion to amend, Brummitt alleged that October 6,
2000, was the first time that she had been specifically
2
KEMI cancelled Southeastern’s workers’ compensation policy on May 1, 2000.
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diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome.
Southeastern’s workers’
compensation insurance carrier during October 2000, Century
Insurance,3 did not object to Brummitt amending her claim.
However, Century Insurance asserted that Brummitt’s original
application for benefits correctly provides that her workrelated injuries manifested on April 17, 2000.
Brummitt testified both by deposition and at the final
hearing that her employment duties required pinching, pulling
and gripping.
Brummitt testified that she first experienced
pain in her hands in April 2000.
Moreover, during her
deposition, Brummitt testified that Fee was the first medical
professional to inform her that these symptoms were work
related.
Brummitt further testified that, at the time of Fee’s
diagnosis, Brummitt did not know what carpal tunnel syndrome
entailed.
According to Brummitt, Dr. Atkins was the first
person to explicitly inform her that she was suffering from
carpal tunnel syndrome.
In addition to the clinical records from the White
House Clinic, medical evidence was provided in three reports
filed in the record.
Dr. James Templin examined Brummitt on
April 26, 2002, and diagnosed her with chronic lower back pain
syndrome, depression, bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome,
bilateral upper extremity overuse syndrome, status/post right3
Century Insurance began providing workers’ compensation insurance coverage to
Southeastern around May 1, 2000.
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sided carpal tunnel release surgery and bilateral CMC arthritis.
Dr. Templin assessed a 15% whole person impairment to Brummitt
and further indicated that she would be unable to return to any
activity requiring extensive or repetitive use of the arms.
Dr.
Templin also opined that Brummitt retained no capacity to return
to her former type of work.
Dr. William O’Neill first examined Brummitt on
December 4, 2000.
During his examination, Dr. O’Neill diagnosed
bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and proceeded to perform a
right carpal tunnel release on May 17, 2001.
In a letter dated
March 27, 2002, Dr. O’Neill assigned Brummitt an 11% functional
impairment and restricted her from repetitive use of her hands.
Dr. O’Neill also restricted Brummitt from lifting more than
fifteen pounds on an occasional basis and ten pounds on a
frequent basis.
Finally, Dr. Joseph Zerga evaluated Brummitt on May
18, 2002.
During this evaluation, Brummitt indicated that her
right hand throbbed, was sore at the wrist and was sore upon
movement.
Brummitt also complained of difficulty turning and
gripping items.
Despite these complaints, Brummitt informed Dr.
Zerga that the numbness in her right hand had resolved since her
carpal tunnel surgery.
Dr. Zerga believed that Brummitt’s work
activities at Southeastern could have caused the development of
her carpal tunnel symptoms.
Accordingly, Dr. Zerga assigned a
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4.8% whole person impairment to Brummitt and restricted her from
highly repetitive activity.
However, Dr. Zerga stated that, as
long as the work activity was not highly repetitive, Brummitt
could return to regular employment as a production worker.
Prior to submitting this matter to the ALJ for a
decision, KEMI and Brummitt entered into a settlement agreement.
As a result of this agreement, KEMI paid Brummitt $5,000.00 for
the injuries manifesting on April 17, 2000.
Brummitt reserved
her claim against Century Insurance regarding Dr. Atkins’s
October 2000 diagnosis of carpal tunnel syndrome.
Accordingly,
the parties herein then submitted this matter to the ALJ for a
decision on whether Brummitt was entitled to any additional
benefits based upon the October 2000 diagnosis.
On October 28,
2002, the ALJ dismissed Brummitt’s claim against Southeastern
and Century Insurance after determining that Brummitt’s work
related injuries manifested on April 17, 2000.
The ALJ further
found that Brummitt was notified by nurse practitioner Fee in
April 2000 that Brummitt’s employment caused her medical
condition.
After having her motion for reconsideration denied,
Brummitt timely appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Board.
On
April 24, 2003, the Board affirmed the ALJ’s decision to dismiss
Brummitt’s claim.
This petition for review followed.
Kentucky law is extremely clear concerning the scope
of our review of decisions from the Board.
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The function of our
review is to correct the Board only where it has overlooked or
misconstrued controlling statutes or precedent, or committed an
error in assessing the evidence so flagrant as to cause
injustice.
Western Baptist Hospital v. Kelly, Ky., 827 S.W.2d
685, 687-88 (1992).
In pursuing workers’ compensation benefits,
the claimant bears the burden of proof and risk of nonpersuasion
with regard to every element of the claim, with the decision of
the ALJ being conclusive and binding as to all questions of
fact.
KRS 342.285; Carnes v. Tremco Mfg. Co., Ky., 30 S.W.3d
172, 175-176 (2000), citing Wolf Creek Collieries v. Crum, Ky.
App., 673 S.W.2d 735 (1984).
When the party with the burden of
proof is unsuccessful before the ALJ, the issue on appeal is
whether the evidence in that party’s favor is so compelling that
no reasonable person could have failed to be persuaded by it.
Carnes, 30 S.W.3d at 176.
Compelling evidence is defined as
evidence so overwhelming that no reasonable person could reach
the same conclusion as the ALJ.
Ky. App., 691 S.W.2d 224 (1985).
See Reo Mechanical v. Barnes,
Where there exists evidence of
substance supporting the ALJ’s finding, the conclusion cannot be
labeled “clearly erroneous.”
Special Fund v. Francis, Ky., 708
S.W.2d 641, 643 (1986).
Despite this high standard, Brummitt presents us with
the argument she unsuccessfully maintained before the Board.
Brummitt argues that the ALJ erred in dismissing her workers’
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compensation claim because the record supports her assertion
that she could not have known that she sustained a work-related
injury until October 6, 2000, when Dr. Atkins specifically
diagnosed her with carpal tunnel syndrome.
We disagree.
Brummitt has furnished no authority supporting her
assertion that no manifestation of disability can occur until
the injured worker receives an accurate diagnosis of her
condition.
In fact, our independent research reveals that
Brummitt’s assertion is simply incorrect.
In Alcan Foil
Products v. Huff, Ky., 2 S.W.3d 96 (1999), the Kentucky Supreme
Court determined that an injury or disability manifests when the
claimant discovers that a physically disabling injury has been
sustained and becomes aware that the cause of this injury was
work-related.
The entitlement to workers’ compensation benefits
arises with the work-related injury, even if that injury does
not result in a permanent functional impairment or permanent
disability.
Holbrook v. Lexmark International Group, Inc., Ky.,
65 S.W.3d 908, 911 (2001).
Thus, the notice and limitations
provisions for a gradual injury are triggered when the worker
becomes aware of the injury and knows that the injury was caused
by work, regardless of whether the symptoms that led to the
discovery of the injury later subside.
Id.
The worker,
however, must reasonably be apprised of the work-relatedness of
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her condition.
See Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc., v.
Czarnecki, Ky. App., 41 S.W.3d 868 (2001).
In this matter currently before us, it is clear that,
on April 17, 2000, Brummitt discovered that she was suffering
from repetitive motion syndrome and became aware that this
condition was caused by her employment.
The record reveals that
Brummitt began experiencing symptoms of numbness and swelling in
her hands and fingers before seeking medical treatment.
After
experiencing these symptoms for some period of time, Brummitt
sought treatment at the White House Clinic and informed the
nurse practitioner that her employment consisted of activities
requiring repetitive hand and arm motions.
Based upon her
examination of Brummitt and from the information Brummitt
provided concerning her employment duties, the nurse
practitioner believed this claimant probably suffered from
repetitive motion syndrome in the hands and arms.
Moreover,
Brummitt testified that the nurse practitioner informed her that
her employment was the cause of these medical conditions.
Based
upon this evidence, we believe that the record clearly shows
that Brummitt, on April 17, 2000, was fully aware that her
physical impairments were work-related.
Accordingly, Brummitt
is entitled to collect benefits only from KEMI since that
company was the carrier at risk on the date the injury in
question manifested.
Brummitt has since received the benefits
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due her from KEMI through a settlement agreement.
Hence, we
conclude that the ALJ’s decision to dismiss this matter as it
relates to Century Insurance was supported by evidence of
substance and that the other evidence of record fails to compel
a different result.
For the aforementioned reasons, the opinion of the
Workers’ Compensation Board upholding the ALJ’s dismissal of
Brummitt’s workers’ compensation claim is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
John E. Anderson
Cole, Cole, Anderson, P.S.C.
Barbourville, Kentucky
Ronald J. Pohl
Picklesimer, Pohl & Kiser,
P.S.C.
Lexington, Kentucky
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