CHRISTOPHER SHAWN GREEN v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: October 31, 2003; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-002404-MR
CHRISTOPHER SHAWN GREEN
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE HENRY M. GRIFFIN, III, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CR-00332
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JUDGE.1
McANULTY AND SCHRODER, JUDGES, AND HUDDLESTON, SENIOR
SCHRODER, JUDGE.
Christopher Shawn Green (Green) appeals the
denial of his RCr 11.42 motion in the Daviess Circuit Court
which left in place his conviction for manslaughter (KRS
507.030).
record.
We have considered his arguments and reviewed the
We agree with the trial court that there was no
ineffective assistance of counsel and, therefore, affirm.
1
Senior Judge Huddleston sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief
Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS
21.580.
Green was convicted of manslaughter for his
participation in the beating death of Timothy J. Smith on
August 19, 1998, for which he received a ten-year sentence.
His
conviction was appealed to this Court and the opinion affirming
was affirmed by the Supreme Court on April 16, 2002.
On
October 2, 2002, Green filed his RCr 11.42 motion alleging
ineffective assistance of counsel.
The motion was denied
without a hearing on November 7, 2002, and this appeal followed.
On appeal to this Court, Green presents seven
allegations of error which deprived him of effective assistance
of counsel at the trial level.
The first allegation of
ineffective assistance of counsel is error in allowing the jury
to hear Green’s prior criminal record.
in the direct appeal before this Court.
This argument was raised
In rejecting Green’s
argument, a panel of this Court concluded the prosecutor’s
comment was too vague to cause the jurors to assume there was
information concerning Green’s prior criminal record.
panel will not revisit the issue.
This
In Haight v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 41 S.W.3d 436, 441 (2001), our Supreme Court held “[a]n
issue raised and rejected on direct appeal may not be relitigated in these [RCr 11.42] proceedings by simply claiming
that it amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel.”
Green’s second argument is ineffective counsel “when
trial counsel allowed testimony from witness which was the same
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as his out of court statement.”
The argument was also brought
up and rejected in Green’s direct appeal.
Although the panel
did see error, it was harmless in light of Green’s testimony
which was consistent with the witness’s testimony, thus no
prejudice.
Again, for the reasons stated in Haight, we will not
disturb the earlier ruling of this Court.
Green’s third argument, ineffective counsel “when
counsel allowed the court to show irrelevant evidence of medical
treatment rendered to victim” was also addressed on direct
appeal by a panel of this Court.
In rejecting Green’s argument,
the panel concluded the photographs showed evidence of how the
victim died.
The pictures showed numerous injuries, none of
which were life-threatening alone, but with multiple assailants,
led to the victim’s death.
For the reasons stated in Haight, we
will not disturb the earlier ruling of this Court.
Green’s fourth argument is ineffective counsel “when
counsel allowed his client to be illegally sentenced, to (85)
percent.”
Green refers to KRS 439.3401, and argues that under
this statute, he was only supposed to receive 85% of his
sentence.
statute.
degree.
We think Green misinterprets the situation and the
Green was convicted of manslaughter in the first
(KRS 507.030).
Class B felony.
Manslaughter in the first degree is a
(KRS 507.030(2))).
KRS 439.3401 is the violent
offender statute that requires a violent offender who has been
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convicted of a Class B felony to serve at least eighty-five
percent of the sentences imposed.
The judge sentenced Green to
ten years as recommended by the jury.
The Parole Board deals
with service of the sentence, not the trial court.
The statute
does not authorize the judge to reduce any sentence.
Green’s fifth argument was that he was denied
effective assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to
investigate and prepare a defense, and failed to seek the
suppression of evidence in this case.
Green is complaining that
he and others were convicted of manslaughter when a more
thorough investigation may have revealed which defendant struck
the fatal blow, and it may not have been Green, which may have
resulted in an acquittal.
We cannot agree.
At trial, Green
testified that he and his friends beat up Tim Smith, and that he
hit the victim with his fists.
In his statement to the police,
Green stated they all kicked and hit the victim a number of
times, and that the victim did not fight back.
Under the
complicity statute, KRS 502.020, a person is guilty of
manslaughter when he aids or attempts to aid in causing serious
injury.
Therefore, even if the expert witness could have
isolated a particular blow by a particular assailant, it would
not matter.
By operation of law, Green is just a guilty as if
he struck the final blow.
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Green also complains in this argument about counsel
not investigating the amount of intoxicants in the victim’s
blood stream, the chain of custody of the hospital report on
intoxication, and the victim’s missing clothing at the morgue.
In Strickland v. Washington, 446 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80
L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), the United Stats Supreme Court announced a
two-pronged test for assessing ineffective assistance of counsel
claims:
First, the defendant must show that
counsel’s performance was deficient. This
requires showing that counsel made errors so
serious that counsel was not functioning as
the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by
the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant
must show that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense. This requires
showing that counsel’s errors were as
serious as to deprive the defendant of a
fair trial, a trial whose result is
reliable. Unless a defendant makes both
showings, it cannot be said that the
conviction or death sentence resulted from a
breakdown in the adversary process that
renders the result unreliable.
Id., 466 U.S. at 687.
Under Strickland, Green’s counsel’s
performance was not deficient as to this evidence.
Green
admitted Smith did not fight back so the level of intoxication
in the victim is not relevant to Green’s guilt, nor are the
missing clothes.
Green contends these facts are irregular.
Counsel’s lack of investigation into these matters was not
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deficient.
Green has not shown any prejudice to the defense.
Green has not shown counsel made errors.
Green’s claim of error in argument six was that
counsel tried the case before an all white jury and he is black.
Counsel did request a continuance, but it was denied.
Green
cannot complain that a jury is all white, all black, etc.
He
has to come up with some allegation and fact that there was a
systematic exclusion of African Americans from his jury before
there are grounds for objection.
See Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986).
In argument seven, Green contends ineffective counsel
“when counsel waived evidence pursuant to chain of custody.”
Green complains there was no showing that the testing done in
this case was reliable, that the physical items tested must show
the instruments used for testing and that the proper techniques
were used, and that since the victim used intoxicants, the cause
of death could have been drugs or intoxicants and the victim
probably would have died anyway.
Green is speculating but
offers no evidence of his “could haves,” or conclusionary
allegations.
Without more, Green has no claim.
Commonwealth, Ky., 975 S.W.2d 905 (1998).
inconsistently.
See Sanborn v.
Also Green is arguing
First, he does not want to stipulate chain of
custody as to the test results as to the victim’s blood levels
of intoxicants, and in the next breath wants to speculate that
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the levels were so high that the intoxicants would have been the
cause of death.
facts.
He cannot have it both ways, and he needs some
Without more, we cannot say Green has shown ineffective
counsel under either prong of Strickland.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Daviess
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Christopher Shawn Green, pro
se
West Liberty, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Kent T. Young
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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