BENNIE BAILEY v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 24, 2003; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-002204-MR
BENNIE BAILEY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE MARTIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DANIEL REID SPARKS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 91-CR-00015 & 91-CR-00025
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BAKER,1 SCHRODER AND MINTON, JUDGES.
BAKER, JUDGE:
Bennie Bailey brings this appeal from an October
8, 2002, order of the Martin Circuit Court denying his Ky. R.
Crim. P. (RCr) 11.42 motion.
We reverse and remand.
The facts are these: Bailey was indicted on various
sexual abuse charges.
Evidence was presented to the jury that
Bailey had raped and sodomized his three children, a daughter
and two sons.
1
On December 12, 1991, a Martin County jury found
This opinion was prepared and concurred in prior to Judge Baker’s
Bailey guilty of one count of rape in the first degree, two
counts of sexual abuse in the first degree, and two counts of
sodomy in the first degree.
The jury recommended a sentence of
twenty years for the rape charge, twenty years for each count of
sodomy, and one year for each count of sexual abuse.
On January
30, 1992, the trial court imposed the sentences recommended by
the jury and ordered the sentences to be served consecutively
for a total of sixty-two years imprisonment.
The trial court’s judgment was affirmed in Appeal No.
1992-SC-000116-MR by the Supreme Court on November 19, 1992.
On
February 28, 1995, Bailey moved the Martin Circuit Court to
vacate the order of conviction pursuant to RCr 11.42.
The trial
court denied Bailey’s motion on February 12, 1998, without
conducting an evidentiary hearing.
Bailey appealed to this
Court, and we reversed and remanded in Appeal No. 1998-CA000465-MR with directions to conduct an evidentiary hearing.
hearing was held on October 27, 2000, during which Bailey was
represented by counsel.
On September 10, 2002, the Martin
circuit court again denied Bailey’s motion.
supplemented his RCr 11.42 motion.
On October 8, 2002, the
trial court denied his supplemented motion.
follows.
leaving the Court effective December 17, 2003.
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Bailey, pro se,
This appeal
A
Bailey raises eight issues in his brief.
All are
predicated on the argument that his trial counsel’s
representation was ineffective.
We need only discuss his first
assertion that his counsel was ineffective for not objecting to
witnesses’ improper bolstering of the victims’ testimony.
Before we analyze the merits of Bailey’s claim, we
must examine the Commonwealth’s argument that Bailey is
procedurally barred from raising this issue.
The Commonwealth
contends that the Supreme Court’s decision in Haight v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 41 S.W.3d 436 (2001), prohibits Bailey from
bringing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim because
improper bolstering of the victims’ testimony by other witnesses
was raised on direct appeal.
The Commonwealth cites the
following language from Haight: “[I]neffective assistance of
counsel is limited to the issues that were not and could not be
raised on direct appeal.
An issue raised and rejected on direct
appeal may not be relitigated in these proceedings by simply
claiming that it amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel.”
Id. at 441.
The Commonwealth construes the Court’s language in
Haight too broadly.
Even though Bailey raised the issue of
improper bolstering of witnesses on direct review, this does not
preclude him from collaterally attacking his counsel for
ineffectiveness based on the counsel’s failure to object to the
improper bolstering.
This right of collateral attack is given
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to the movant under RCr 11.42 and is separate from his right of
direct appeal.
Certainly, if an issue raised on direct appeal
by the movant was upheld by the appellate court, it is likely
that an ineffectiveness claim based on the same foundation will
also be found to not rise to the level needed to provide the
movant relief.
However, this will not always be the case.
Thus, we reject the Commonwealth’s argument that Bailey is
procedurally barred from bring this issue on collateral review.
Now we turn to Bailey’s substantive argument.
Bailey
alleges that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object
when six different witnesses improperly testified to the
truthfulness of the victims’ out-of-court statements.
To
demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, Bailey must show
that his attorney was both deficient in performance and that his
attorney’s deficient performance prejudiced his defense.
See
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80
L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
Evaluation of defense counsel's performance
must be "highly deferential" to the judgment of counsel in light
of the circumstances at the time.
It is easy to find fault with
the benefit of hindsight, and courts must thus accord counsel's
conduct "a strong presumption that [it] falls within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance.”
Id. at 689.
The six witnesses consisted of a Clyde Steiner, an
investigator for the Department of Social Services, Marsha
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Castle and Lorna Cassady, two child protection workers for the
department, Keith Scott, a Kentucky State Police Detective, and
Dr. Daniel L. Kinzie and Dr. Stephen Croley, two child
psychiatrists.
“The general rule is that opinion evidence, in
order to be admissible, must not decide an ultimate issue of
fact.”
Hall v. Commonwealth, Ky., 862 S.W.2d 321, 322
(1993)(citation omitted).
This rule holds true whether the
witness is an expert or a lay witness.
“A witness’s opinion
about the truth of the testimony of another witness is not
permitted.
Neither expert nor lay witnesses may testify that
another witness or a defendant is lying or faking.
That
determination is within the exclusive province of the jury.”
Moss v. Commonwealth, Ky., 949 S.W.2d 579, 583 (1997).
Conversely, neither expert nor lay witness may testify that a
victim/witness is telling the truth.
Thus, we need not
determine which witnesses were testifying as experts and which
were testifying as lay witnesses.
We must, however, examine the
statements of the witnesses to determine if these statements
amounted to improper vouching for the truth of the victims’
testimony.
The issue as to whether the witnesses’ statements were
improper bolstering of the victims’ testimony was brought up on
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direct appeal (Appeal No. 1992-SC-000116-MR).2
Our Supreme Court
refused to review four of the five statements because they had
not been properly preserved and did not constitute palpable
error as required by RCr 10.26.
The Court did declare that
Bailey’s counsel‘s objection to Cassady’s statement that the
children “were telling the truth” was a proper objection and
should have been sustained.
However, when the Court considered
“all the other similar testimony admitted without objection,” it
held the improper statement to be harmless error.
We cannot perceive how our Supreme Court did not find
the unobjected to statements as palpable error.
Palpable error
is error that affects the substantial due process rights of a
defendant and results in a manifest injustice. RCr 11.42; Turpin
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 780 S.W.2d 511 (1989).
After examining
the case as a whole, the reviewing court must find that a
substantial possibility exists that the result of the trial
would have been different.
S.W.2d 511 (1986).
Jackson v. Commonwealth, Ky.App. 717
This standard is exceedingly similar to the
standard for measuring prejudice under Strickland.
The inquiry
under Strickland is whether there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.
2
446 U.S. at 694.
As our
On direct appeal, Bailey set forth only five witness statements, not
six. He later added the social services detective’s statements in his
RCr 11.42 motion.
-6-
examination below demonstrates, Bailey’s counsel committed
serious error by not objecting to testimony by several witnesses
that improperly bolstered the victims’ testimony.
Furthermore,
we are of the opinion that if this testimony had been excluded
from evidence that there is a reasonable probability that the
proceeding would have been different.
The import of the bolstering testimony cannot be
underestimated.
The truth of the victims’ testimony was
affirmed by witnesses that the jury would have seen as credible
lay witnesses or at even as credible experts.
Thus, we would
have recognized the unobjected to statements made by the
witnesses as palpable error.
It is evident that a substantial
possibility exists that the proceeding would have been different
absent the statements.
We now turn to our analysis of this
issue.
We first must examine the statements of the other
witnesses to determine if Bailey’s counsel was deficient for not
objecting to their admission and if this deficiency prejudiced
Bailey’s trial.
Cassady, Steiner and Castle were asked if the
victims were “forthcoming” or “forthright” in their testimony.
The prosecution defined the words’ meaning in its examination of
Cassady:
Q: Now, in interviewing Teareen and Benjamin, did they
appear to you to be forthright?
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A: Do you mean, telling the truth?
Q: Yes.
A: Yes.
(Trial TR at 129-30).
While the prosecution defined the word “forthright” only when
questioning Cassady, we believe the jury could also have
reasonably applied this definition to Steiner and Castle’s
answers that the victims were “forthcoming” or “forthright.”
Thus, we are of the opinion that the statements of Cassady,
Steiner, and Castle unequivocally vouched for the truth of the
victim
The two child psychiatrists, Kinzie and Croley, also
testified to the veracity of the victims’ testimony, as noted by
the Supreme Court.
Kinzie stated: “This, by all accounts, this
is bonafide actual testimony, that seems to ring true to me.”
(Trial TR at 178).
Croley, speaking of the youngest victims’
testimony stated that “our evaluation did not indicate that he
was fabricating information” and that “I don’t believe he was
fabricating this [testimony].”
(Trial TR at 197-98).
Again, we
believe that these statements can be construed no other way than
as impermissible bolstering of the victims’ testimony.
However, we do not believe that the statements made by
Scott, the state police detective, amounted to testimony
supporting the veracity of the victims’ statements.
-8-
Scott said
that the victims’ stories “compared pretty well” with each
other, and that “nothing stood out in their testimony to
indicate falsehoods.”
(Trial TR at 159).
These statements are
more ambivalent than those made by the other five witnesses and
do not constitute an unequivocal endorsement of the truthfulness
of the victims’ statements.
Bailey’s counsel’s failure to object to the statements
of Steiner, Castle, Cassady, Kinzie and Croley was ineffective
in that it fell outside the range of reasonable professional
assistance.
Thus, he failed to meet the first part of the
Strickland test.
We must now look at the second prong of the
Strickland test and determine if this deficient performance
prejudiced Bailey’s trial.
There were no eyewitness to the crimes charged nor was
any physical evidence introduced.
The trial hinged upon the
credibility of the testimony of the victims and their supporting
witnesses versus the testimony of the defendant and his
supporting witnesses.
Thus, the credibility of the victims was of paramount
importance to the jury.
Undoubtedly, the testimony of the
witnesses discussed above concerning the truthfulness of the
victims weighed heavily on the mind of the jury during
deliberations.
We believe that the trial counsel’s errors were
so serious that they deprived Bailey of “a fair trial, a trial
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whose result is reliable.”
Strickland, 466 US. at 687.
As
such, we hold that Bailey’s trial counsel was indeed
ineffective.
For the foregoing reason, the order of the Martin
Circuit Court is reversed and this case is remanded for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
SCHRODER, JUDGE, CONCURS.
MINTON, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
MINTON, JUDGE, DISSENTING:
I would affirm the trial
court’s denying Bailey’s RCr 11.42 motion.
The overarching
prejudice analysis under Strickland, has failed to demonstrate
unprofessional performance by trial counsel that was
constitutionally defective.
On a direct appeal concluded more
than ten years ago our Supreme Court determined that the trial
testimony elicited from these witnesses did not rise to the
level of substantial or palpable error applied by the Supreme
Court to these facts is any less stringent than the standard for
finding ineffective assistance of counsel.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Richard Edwin Neal
Assistant Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
Wm. Robert Long, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
Frankfort, KY
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