KENNETH MAURICE WILLIAMS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 5, 2003; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-001901-MR
KENNETH MAURICE WILLIAMS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JUDITH E. MCDONALD-BURKMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 93-CR-002491
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
DYCHE, JOHNSON AND PAISLEY,1 JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Kenneth Maurice Williams has appealed from an
opinion and order of the Jefferson Circuit Court entered on
August 19, 2002, which, without conducting an evidentiary
hearing, denied his RCr2 11.42 motion to vacate, set aside, or
correct his sentence.
Having concluded that the trial court did
not err in denying Williams’s RCr 11.42 motion and that an
evidentiary hearing was not necessary, we affirm.
1
This opinion was prepared and concurred in prior to Judge Paisley’s
retirement effective December 1, 2003.
2
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
At approximately 10:00 p.m. on September 20, 1993,
James Long, Stacy Boggs, James Love, and Jesse Garon were
shooting pool in a downtown Louisville bar when they decided to
walk to another nearby club.
Shortly after exiting the bar,
Williams and a co-defendant, Reginald Wiley, allegedly
approached the four men, brandished pistols, and demanded that
they hand over their money and wallets.
According to testimony
introduced at trial, Williams held his gun to Garon’s head,
while Wiley pointed his gun toward Long’s head.
Williams
allegedly pulled the trigger twice, but the pistol did not fire.
Suspecting that the assailants did not have loaded
weapons, Long yelled for someone to call the police.
Williams
responded by allegedly striking Long in the face with his
pistol.
Long tried to flee, but Wiley caught up with him,
struck him in the head for a second time, and took Long’s
wallet.
In the meantime, Boggs, who had also been pistol-
whipped during the robbery, sought refuge in a nearby bar and
called the police.
As the two robbers ran from the scene, Love and Garon
pursued them on foot.
At some point during the chase, the four
men ran in front of a jail transport vehicle driven by
Corrections Officer Scott Colvin.
After briefly speaking with
Love, Officer Colvin continued the pursuit, but the two suspects
were able to elude him.
A few days later, Detective Larry
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Schmidt of the Louisville Police Department received a tip from
a confidential informant which implicated Williams and Wiley in
the robbery.
Det. Schmidt invited the four victims to the
police station to view a photographic line-up.
After viewing
the line-up separately, Garon, Long, and Love positively
identified Williams and Wiley as the men who had robbed them.3
On November 11, 1993, a Jefferson County grand jury
indicted Williams on four counts of robbery in the first degree,4
and on one count as being a persistent felony offender in the
second degree (PFO II).5
Following a jury trial held on February
21-23, 1996, Williams was found guilty on four counts of robbery
in the first degree.
Pursuant to a plea agreement reached with
the Commonwealth, Williams pled guilty to the PFO II charge in
exchange for the Commonwealth’s recommendation that Williams
receive the minimum sentence of ten years’ imprisonment on each
robbery conviction, with each sentence then enhanced to a total
sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment pursuant to the PFO II
conviction.6
The Commonwealth also agreed to recommend that
Williams serve each 20-year sentence concurrently.
3
Boggs was unable to provide a positive identification of either Williams or
Wiley based on the photographic line-up.
4
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 515.020.
Class B felony.
5
Robbery in the first degree is a
KRS 532.080(2).
6
Wiley was charged with identical offenses under the same indictment and both
men were tried together. The jury also found Wiley guilty on four counts of
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On March 4, 1996, the trial court followed the
Commonwealth’s recommendation and sentenced Williams to
concurrent 20-year sentences.
Two days later, on March 6, 1996,
despite the fact that Williams had agreed to waive his right to
appeal as part of his plea agreement, Williams filed a pro se
notice of appeal.
On October 18, 1996, Williams filed a pro se RCr 10.06
motion for a new trial.
As the basis for this motion, Williams
argued that he had obtained newly discovered evidence to support
his claimed innocence.
Specifically, Williams claimed that
after his trial, someone from the Office of Corrections faxed a
copy of an “Extraordinary Incident Report” to Williams’s trial
counsel.
This report, which was completed by Officer Colvin on
the night of the robbery, contained a description of the robbery
suspects in which the taller of the two suspects was listed as
being 5’9” in height.7
Since Williams is 6’3” tall, he asked for
a new trial based on this newly discovered exculpatory evidence.
On October 29, 1996, the trial court entered an order denying
Williams’s motion for a new trial.
robbery in the first degree. Wiley accepted the same plea agreement from the
Commonwealth and pled guilty to the PFO II charge. On March 4, 1996, the
trial court followed the Commonwealth’s recommendation and sentenced Wiley to
concurrent ten-year sentences on each robbery conviction, which was then
enhanced to a total sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment pursuant to the PFO II
conviction.
7
According to the record, Williams is 6’3” in height, and Wiley stands
approximately 5’5” tall.
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Thereafter, Williams appealed the denial of his motion
for a new trial to this Court.
At that time, Williams’s direct
appeal was still pending before the Supreme Court of Kentucky.
This Court recommended that Williams’s appeal of the denial of
his motion for a new trial be transferred to the Supreme Court,
so that both appeals could be heard together.
The Supreme Court
agreed and granted transfer.
In a decision rendered on April 16, 1998, the Supreme
Court affirmed the denial of Williams’s motion for a new trial,
stating that the Extraordinary Incident Report and the possible
exculpatory evidence contained therein could have been
discovered with the exercise of “due diligence.”8
The Supreme
Court also dismissed Williams’s direct appeal on the grounds
that Williams had agreed to waive the right to appeal as a
matter of right under his plea agreement with the Commonwealth.9
On April 3, 2001, Williams filed a pro se RCr 11.42
motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his judgment.
Williams
argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at
trial when his defense attorney failed to discover and introduce
the Extraordinary Incident Report and Officer Colvin’s
accompanying testimony into evidence.
8
1997-SC-000075-TG, non-published.
9
1996-SC-000293-MR, non-published.
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On July 19, 2002, after being appointed counsel,
Williams filed a supplemental RCr 11.42 motion.
In addition to
restating the ineffective assistance of counsel claims contained
in Williams’s pro se motion, the supplemental motion added a
claim that Williams had been denied due process of law by the
Commonwealth’s failure to turn over the Extraordinary Incident
Report.
Williams argued that this amounted to a violation of
the principles announced in Brady v. Maryland,10 which held that
the suppression of evidence by the prosecution that is favorable
to the defendant violates due process.
On August 19, 2002,
after denying Williams’s motion for an evidentiary hearing, the
trial court rejected all of Williams’s claims and denied his RCr
11.42 motion.
This appeal followed.
Williams first claims that the trial court erred by
concluding that he did not receive ineffective assistance of
counsel at trial.
Specifically, Williams argues:
[Williams] was denied his right to effective
assistance of counsel . . . when counsel
failed to fully investigate and prepare and
was therefor[e] unable to properly examine
and present substantial exculpatory
evidence, that in all probability would have
created sufficient reasonable doubt to
result in acquittal or a different outcome
[emphasis omitted].
According to Williams, his defense counsel was ineffective for
failing to discover and introduce the Extraordinary Incident
10
373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196-97, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).
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Report and Officer Colvin’s accompanying testimony.
We
disagree.
In order to establish an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim, an accused must show that his counsel’s
representation fell below the standard of objective
reasonableness,11 and that but for the attorney’s mistake, the
outcome would have been different.12
In Moore v. Commonwealth,13
our Supreme Court stated that a defense attorney’s failure to
present evidence that was merely cumulative in nature did not
rise to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel:
[I]t was not unreasonable for counsel to
fail to find and present Tonya Benet, a
former girlfriend of Blair’s. Counsel
presented seven witnesses to testify to the
same information Benet would have testified
to. Any additional testimony on this issue
would have been merely cumulative, and the
decision to forego a search for additional
witnesses to bolster this point was
strategically sound.
Similarly, in the case sub judice, the description of
the robbery suspects in the Extraordinary Incident Report and
any related testimony by Officer Colvin would have been mere
cumulative evidence.
At trial, three of the four victims
offered testimony regarding how they had described the suspects
11
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80
L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
12
Id. at 694.
13
Ky., 983 S.W.2d 479, 484 (1998).
See also Gall v. Commonwealth, Ky., 702 S.W.2d 37 (1985).
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to the police on the night in question.
Love testified that he
described the taller of the two suspects as being between 5’8”
and 5’10” tall.
Garon testified that he estimated the taller of
the two robbers as being close to his height, or around 5’11”.
In addition, Boggs testified that the taller suspect was around
6’0” in height.
Further, Det. Schmidt provided testimony
regarding an incident report that had apparently been made on
the night in question by an investigating officer.14
This report
listed the taller suspect as being between 5’8” and 5’10” in
height.
Therefore, since the Extraordinary Incident Report and
Officer Colvin’s testimony would have been mere cumulative
evidence, we cannot conclude that there is a reasonable
probability that the outcome at trial would have been different
if the report and testimony had been offered into evidence.
Accordingly, even if it were conceded that trial counsel’s
representation fell below the standard of objective
reasonableness, Williams has failed under the second prong of
the two-part test to show that but for the attorney’s mistake,
the outcome would have been different.
Williams next argues that a Brady violation occurred
when the Commonwealth failed to turn over the Extraordinary
Incident Report prior to trial.
We reject this claim of error
14
This incident report was not the Extraordinary Incident Report which had
been completed by Officer Colvin.
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for two reasons.
First, as our Supreme Court noted in affirming
the trial court’s denial of Williams’s motion for a new trial,
defense counsel for Williams was given a copy of an incident
report made on the night of the robbery which listed Officer
Colvin as a witness to the crime.15
Hence, Williams’s attorney
knew of the possibility that Officer Colvin might be able to
provide exculpatory evidence.
“Brady only applies to ‘the
discovery, after trial, of information which had been known to
the prosecution but unknown to the defense’" [emphases
original].16
Moreover, as we stated above, Officer Colvin’s report
and accompanying testimony would have constituted mere
cumulative evidence.
Under Brady, the failure of the
prosecution to disclose possible exculpatory evidence justifies
setting aside a conviction only where there is a reasonable
probability that the result would have been different.17
In the
case at bar, even if it can be said that the Commonwealth
committed a Brady violation, we cannot conclude with reasonable
probability that the use of this cumulative evidence would have
15
In addition to naming Officer Colvin as a witness to the crime, the report
listed Officer Colvin’s occupation, address, and two phone numbers where he
could be reached.
16
Bowling v. Commonwealth, Ky., 80 S.W.3d 405, 410 (2002)(quoting United
States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2397, 49 L.Ed.2d 342, 349
(1976).
17
Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1, 5, 116 S.Ct. 7, 10, 133 L.Ed.2d 1 (1995).
See also Taylor v. Commonwealth, Ky., 63 S.W.3d 151, 159 (2001).
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resulted in a different outcome.
Accordingly, we reject
Williams’s Brady claim.
Finally, Williams argues that the trial court erred by
not granting his motion for an evidentiary hearing.
However,
“[a]n evidentiary hearing is not required when the issues
presented may be fully considered by resort to the court record
of the proceeding. . . .”18
Since all of Williams’s claims were
capable of being resolved by resort to the court record, no
evidentiary hearing was necessary.
Based on the foregoing, the order of the Jefferson
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Brian Thomas Ruff
LaGrange, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Perry T. Ryan
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
18
Newsome v. Commonwealth, Ky., 456 S.W.2d 686, 687 (1970).
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