EDWARD PRELL v. JIM NASI CUSTOMS COMPANY d/b/a SAXON CYCLE ACCESSORIES
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RENDERED: October 31, 2003; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-001580-MR
EDWARD PRELL
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS J. KNOPF, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CI-005695
v.
JIM NASI CUSTOMS COMPANY
d/b/a SAXON CYCLE ACCESSORIES
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JUDGE.1
BAKER AND SCHRODER, JUDGES; and HUDDLESTON, SENIOR
BAKER, JUDGE:
Edward Prell brings this appeal from a July 18,
2002, Opinion and Order of the Jefferson Circuit Court.
We
affirm.
1
Senior Status Joseph R. Huddleston sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution.
Prell is a Kentucky resident, and Jim Nasi Customs
Company d/b/a Saxon Cycle Accessories (“Jim Nasi”) is an Arizona
corporation.
Jim Nasi is in the business of building and
selling custom motorcycle parts and accessories.
Jim Nasi’s
only place of business is in the state of Arizona where all of
its employees are located.
No representative of the corporation
has ever been in Kentucky.
Additionally, the corporation had
never been involved in litigation in Kentucky and had never
registered for authorization to do business in Kentucky
Prell became interested in Jim Nasi’s products after
an article he saw in Easy Rider magazine; thereafter, he
telephoned Jim Nasi
and ordered a custom built part.
The part
cost $3,100.00 and was subsequently shipped to Prell in
Kentucky.
Prell initiated the instant action in the Jefferson
Circuit Court against Jim Nasi alleging that the motorcycle part
was defective and claiming breach of warranties and unfair trade
practices.
Jim Nasi then filed a motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction.
The court allowed the parties to conduct
limited discovery upon the issue of jurisdiction.
On July 18,
2002, the circuit court entered an Opinion and Order granting
Jim Nasi’s motion to dismiss for lack of in personam
jurisdiction.
This appeal follows.
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Prell initially argues that Jim Nasi “regularly
engages in the sale of products in interstate commerce.”
Prell,
however, fails to advance an argument as to why the circuit
court’s dismissal was erroneous.
cite a single case or statute.
Indeed, Prell also fails to
We are simply unable to discern
Prell’s first argument.
Prell next argues the circuit court erred by
concluding that in personam jurisdiction over Jim Nasi offends
the due process clause. We disagree.
In order to determine whether our exercise of
jurisdiction over Jim Nasi
is proper under the due process
clause, we must consider the three-pronged test enunciated in
Tube Turns Division of Chemetron Corp. v. Patterson Co., Ky.
App., 562 S.W.2d 99, 100 (1978):
First, the defendant must purposely avail
himself of the privilege of acting in the
forum state or causing a consequence in the
forum state. Second, the cause of action
must arise from the defendant’s activities
there. Finally, the acts of the defendant
or consequences by the defendant must have a
substantial enough connection with the forum
state to make the exercise of jurisdiction
over the defendant reasonable.
Indeed, as pointed out by our Supreme Court in Wilson v. Case,
Ky., 85 S.W.3d 589, 593 (2002), “this test synthesized the
relevant factors set forth by (International Shoe Company v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945))
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and its progeny into a more succinct and workable three-pronged
analysis to determine the outer limits of personal jurisdiction
based upon a single act.”
It is well-established that all three
prongs of the test must be met before the due process clause is
satisfied.
In the case at hand, we are unable to conclude that
all three prongs of the test are satisfied.
It is undisputed
that Prell contacted Jim Nasi to purchase the part.
The record
indicates that the terms of delivery were free on board at Jim
Nasi’s Arizona location; therefore, Prell paid to have the part
shipped to his address in Kentucky.
Also, Jim Nasi’s sales
records reflect that it has had no income from transactions in
Kentucky for the last three years.
Utilizing the above three-
prong test, we are simply unable to conclude that the cause of
action arose from Jim Nasi ’s activities in Kentucky and that
there exists a “substantial enough connection to the
Commonwealth to make jurisdiction” over Jim Nasi
reasonable.
Indeed, we do not view the exercise of personal jurisdiction
over Jim Nasi as comporting with traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice under the due process clause. See
Wilson, 85 S.W.3d 589.
Prell further asserts that Kentucky’s long arm statute
(Kentucky Revised Statutes 454-210(2)(a)) authorizes the
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exercise of personal jurisdiction over Jim Nasi.
As pointed out
in Wilson:
[C]ourts have determined that the “long-arm
statute within this jurisdiction allows
Kentucky courts to reach to the full
constitutional limits of due process and
entertaining jurisdiction over non-resident
defendants.” Mohler v. Dorado Wings, Inc.,
Ky. App., 675 S.W.2d 404, 405 (1984); Infomed, Inc. v. National Healthcare, Inc., 669
F. Supp. 793 (W.D. Ky. 1987). At the same
time, the limits of due process serve as a
safeguard to insure that state courts comply
with the federal Constitutional
requirements. Therefore, Kentucky’s
jurisdictional reach cannot exceed those
prescribed limits.
Id. at 592.
As we have determined the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over Jim Nasi would offend the due process clause,
we consider Jim Nasi ’s contention that Kentucky could exercise
personal jurisdiction under our long-arm statute as moot.
For the foregoing reasons, the Opinion and Order of
the Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
Bruce A. Brightwell
Louisville, Kentucky
Frank P. Hilliard
Louisville, Kentucky
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