BILLY AKERS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
NOVEMBER 26, 2003; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-001019-MR
BILLY AKERS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM PIKE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE EDDY COLEMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CR-00234
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART,
VACATING IN PART, AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, GUIDUGLI, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE.
This is an appeal from a judgment convicting
appellant of first-degree stalking, fourth-degree assault, and
two counts of second-degree unlawful imprisonment.
Due to a
discovery violation and error with regard to the jury
instructions on the misdemeanors, we vacate the convictions for
second-degree unlawful imprisonment and fourth-degree assault.
However, we affirm the conviction for first-degree stalking.
Accordingly, we affirm in part and vacate in part and remand the
matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
On June 13, 2001, Ranie Akers and her fifteen-year-old
daughter, Melissa, returned home from running errands at around
7:00 p.m.
When they arrived, Ranie’s husband, appellant, Billy
Akers (who was not Melissa’s father) was there.
Some months
earlier, Ranie had obtained an emergency protective order
against Billy as a result of an incident wherein he choked her,
threw her on a bed, and threatened her life.
The order mandated
that Billy refrain from further acts of violence, have no
firearms in the home, and stay 1,000 yards away from Ranie.
Subsequently, however, Ranie asked the court to drop the
requirement that he stay 1,000 yards away from her so they could
try to make the marriage work, which the court granted.
Upon arriving home on the evening in question, Melissa
tried to use the telephone.
asked Billy about it.
unhooked.
When the phone did not work, she
He replied that he had had the telephone
An argument then ensued between Ranie and Billy
during which Ranie noticed a gun sitting beside Billy.
Thereupon, Ranie fled the trailer with Billy giving chase.
Ultimately Billy caught up with Ranie who was hiding behind a
truck.
According to Ranie, Billy then grabbed her by the arm
and the hair and drug her across the gravel driveway back to the
house.
All the while, her left leg was scraping on the gravel
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which caused abrasions to her knee.
After throwing Ranie inside
the trailer, Billy went looking for Melissa.
According to
Melissa, who was pregnant at the time, when Billy caught up to
her, he hit her in the head with the butt of the gun several
times and after dragging her by the hair back to the trailer,
repeatedly banged her head against the side of the trailer.
At that point, Billy had Melissa and Ranie sit on
opposite ends of the couch while he sat at the kitchen table
with his gun.
When it got dark, Billy instructed Melissa and
Ranie to go to the bedroom where he handcuffed them together to
the entertainment center.
When Ranie had to use the bathroom,
he allowed her to do so but watched and made sure that Ranie and
Melissa remained handcuffed together.
After using the bathroom,
Billy handcuffed the two to the chest of drawers, after which he
tried to handcuff them to the foot of the bed.
When that would
not work, he again handcuffed them to the chest of drawers.
Billy eventually allowed Ranie and Melissa to lay on the bed
handcuffed together where they stayed for the rest of the night.
During the night, Billy told Melissa and Ranie that he was going
to kill them and gave them detailed accounts of the various ways
he proposed to do so (putting Melissa in the trunk of the car
and having Ranie drive over a cliff, handcuffing them to a tree
and shooting them, and handcuffing them to an axle under the
trailer and burning it down).
According to Melissa and Ranie,
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they could not escape during the night because Billy was asleep
in the hallway in front of the bed with his gun and they could
not get past him.
In the morning, Billy got up and put the gun in his
truck.
He then came back in the trailer, stood against the
closet door and cried, stating that his heart hurt.
Ranie told
him that he would have to undo her handcuffs if he wanted her to
help him.
At that point, Billy unlocked the handcuffs and let
Melissa and Ranie go.
Billy then got a shower while Melissa and
Ranie packed an overnight bag for Billy to go to the hospital.
The three next proceeded to the hospital.
At the hospital,
Ranie signed a registration form for Billy, left the overnight
bag with hospital employees, and left with Melissa.
According
to Ranie, upon leaving the hospital, she stopped at a pay phone
to call 911 but did not have any money, so she could not make
the call.
Ranie and Melissa then proceeded directly home.
Upon
arriving at the trailer, they were greeted by Kentucky State
Trooper Kevin White who was there on a welfare check because
Ranie had not made it to work that day.
Ranie and Melissa then
told Trooper White about the events of the preceding evening.
Billy was indicted on two counts of unlawful
imprisonment in the first degree, one count of assault in the
fourth degree, and one count of stalking in the first degree.
Pursuant to a jury trial, he was found guilty of two counts of
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second-degree unlawful imprisonment, one count of fourth-degree
assault, and one count of first-degree stalking.
He was
sentenced to twelve months on each count of second-degree
unlawful imprisonment, nine months on the fourth-degree assault
conviction, and four years’ imprisonment on the first-degree
stalking conviction.
All sentences were to run concurrently for
a total of four years’ imprisonment.
This appeal by Billy
followed.
Billy’s first argument is that the trial court erred
in failing to grant his motion for a mistrial based on a
discovery violation by the prosecution.
At trial, Trooper White
testified on direct regarding the injury to Ranie’s knee that he
observed on the day after the incident.
He stated that he saw
gravel marks and little indentations on Ranie’s leg that day.
On cross-examination, defense counsel attempted to impeach that
testimony by presenting him with the uniform offense report
completed by Trooper White in which he checked the box labeled
“no injury”.
Trooper White pointed out that said report was for
the offense of unlawful imprisonment and that he had most
assuredly indicated the presence of an injury either on a wound
report for the assault charge or in the uniform offense report
for the assault charge.
At that point and at the close of the
Commonwealth’s case-in-chief, defense counsel moved for a
mistrial on grounds that the Commonwealth had committed a
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discovery violation by failing to provide him with this witness
statement.
Defense counsel argued that its entire defense was
that there was no physical proof of the incident in question
(which was consistent with the one uniform offense report it
received from the Commonwealth) and that Trooper White’s
testimony regarding the existence of Ranie’s injury essentially
stripped him of this defense.
The prosecution countered that it
was unaware of and never had the documents referred to by
Trooper White.
However, the prosecution conceded that it was
nevertheless required to provide those documents to the defense
if they existed.
The trial court denied the motion for
mistrial, reasoning that the defense could not show that it had
been prejudiced by the failure to provide the police reports at
issue.
At some point, the Commonwealth offered as
supplemental exhibits in the case six photographs of Ranie’s
claimed injuries and the uniform citation reports for the other
charged offenses besides the unlawful imprisonment charge,
including the report for the fourth-degree assault charge which
indeed contained a check next to the box labeled “apparent minor
injury”.
Apparently, these photographs and reports were in the
possession of the police and had not been provided to the
prosecution or defense counsel prior to trial.
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We would note
that the photographs were of poor quality and showed very little
in the way of injury to Ranie.
Prior to trial, a general discovery order was entered
requiring the Commonwealth to provide the defense with, among
other things, any exculpatory evidence.
In addition, RCr
7.26(1) provides:
Except for good cause shown, not later than
forty-eight (48) hours prior to trial, the
attorney for the Commonwealth shall produce
all statements of any witness in the form of
a document or recording in its possession
which relates to the subject matter of the
witness’s testimony and which (a) has been
signed or initialed by the witness or (b) is
or purports to be a substantially verbatim
statement made by the witness. Such a
statement shall be made available for
examination and use by the defendant.
The uniform citation report for the fourth-degree
assault charge constituted a discoverable witness statement in
this case under the above rule since it clearly related to the
subject matter of Trooper White’s testimony and was signed by
Trooper White.
See Maynard v. Commonwealth, Ky., 497 S.W.2d 567
(1973).
Thus, it should have been made available to defense
counsel.
The question now is, was the defense prejudiced by
this discovery violation such that it constituted reversible
error?
See McRay v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 675 S.W.2d 397
(1984).
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Billy argues on appeal, as his defense counsel did
below, that the failure to provide the document at issue denied
him the ability to adequately prepare a defense and undermined
the defense that was presented.
Billy points to his counsel’s
opening statement wherein he emphasized the fact that there was
no physical evidence of the crime, in particular, no evidence of
any injury.
Defense counsel argued that the case was therefore
essentially a swearing match between the victims and Billy.
Upon review of the trial, we see that the defense theory of the
case at trial was that the incident described by the victims did
not occur at all.
Billy testified in his own defense that
although he and Ranie got into an argument on the evening in
question, no physical altercation occurred.
We agree that Billy was prejudiced by the
Commonwealth’s failure to provide him with the uniform offense
report on the fourth-degree assault charge with regard to his
defense of the assault charge (KRS 508.030) since proof of an
actual injury was an element of the crime.
Indeed, the evidence
as to whether Ranie sustained a physical injury would have been
critical to preparation of the defense to the assault charge.
Hence, we must vacate the fourth-degree assault conviction.
However, as to the stalking (KRS 508.140; KRS 508.150)
and unlawful imprisonment charges (KRS 509.020; KRS 509.030), we
do not believe Billy was prejudiced by the discovery violation
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since an actual injury was not required for proof of those
offenses.
We reject Billy’s claim below that the discovery
violation affected his defense of the whole case (all of the
charges) because the lack of injury discredited the victims’
testimony and tended to show that the entire incident did not
occur.
We would point out that the evidence of the other
offenses, even in the absence of any evidence regarding the
physical injury to Ranie, was overwhelming.
Billy’s next argument is that the trial court erred in
failing to excuse for cause a juror who worked for the County
Attorney’s office and a juror who had been represented in a
civil matter by an attorney from a law firm where an attorney
for the Commonwealth had been formerly employed.
As to the
latter juror, defense counsel failed to ask that the juror be
stricken for cause.
waived.
Hence, any error related to this juror was
RCr 9.36.
During voir dire, potential juror Delia Lucas informed
the court that she presently worked for the Pike County
Attorney’s office, although she did not specify what her
position was in that office.
Upon further examination of Lucas,
it was learned that she now works in the child support division,
but formerly worked in the criminal division.
When asked if she
was in any way familiar with the case at hand, she replied that
she was not and further that she had been on maternity leave
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from her job from April 2001 through August 2001.
It was
determined by the trial court that the case would have been in
district court during that time period.
Defense counsel moved
to have Lucas stricken for cause, citing an implied bias by
virtue of her employment with the County Attorney’s office.
The
trial court denied the motion, reasoning that the Commonwealth
Attorney and the County Attorney are two distinct offices and it
was the Commonwealth Attorney who was trying the case.
Subsequently, defense counsel renewed his motion, noting that he
had used all of his peremptory challenges, one of which was on
Lucas.
It has been held that an Assistant County Attorney has
an implied bias in a criminal case in circuit court “because his
position as a prosecutor for the Commonwealth gives rise to a
loyalty to his employer.”
Farris v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 836
S.W.2d 451, 455 (1992), overruled on other grounds by Houston v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 975 S.W.2d 925 (1998).
Likewise, a former
County Attorney who held said position at the time of the
preliminary hearing in the case was determined to have an
implied bias in the case in circuit court and, thus, should have
been stricken for cause.
S.W.2d 2, 4-5 (1983).
Godsey v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 661
It has further been held that a secretary
for the Commonwealth Attorney’s office had an implied bias in a
case being prosecuted by said office because of her loyalty to
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her employer and the fact that she was in a position to have
known about the case prior to trial.
Randolph v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 716 S.W.2d 253 (1986), overruled on other grounds by
Shannon v. Commonwealth, Ky., 767 S.W.2d 548 (1988).
In the present case, we agree with appellant that
Lucas had an implied bias and, thus, should have been stricken
for cause.
Although she was on maternity leave when the County
Attorney was prosecuting the case at the district court level,
she nevertheless had a loyalty to her employer who had
prosecuting authority over the matter at one time.
However,
despite the fact that the defense used all of its peremptory
challenges in this case, Billy failed to demonstrate that the
use of the peremptory challenge on juror Lucas “resulted in a
subsequent inability to remove further unacceptable jury panel
members.”
Farris, 836 S.W.2d at 455, (quoting Smith v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 734 S.W.2d 437, 444 (1987), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 1036, 108 S. Ct. 762, 98 L. Ed. 2d 778 (1988) and Rigsby v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 495 S.W.2d 795, 799 (1973), overruled on
other grounds by Pendleton v. Commonwealth, Ky., 685 S.W.2d 549
(1985)).
In fact, defense counsel expressed no objection to any
other jurors.
Hence, we do not adjudge that the error was
reversible.
Billy’s next assignment of error relates to a comment
made by the prosecution during closing argument referring to
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Billy as a dangerous man.
Billy maintains that this comment was
evidence of his future dangerousness which was in violation of
KRE 404.
In our view, the prosecution’s reference to Billy as a
“dangerous man” was not character evidence pursuant to KRE
404(a) which provides that evidence of a person’s character is
not admissible “for the purpose of proving action in conformity
therewith.”
In the instant case, the prosecution was not
referring to Billy’s known dangerous character for the purpose
of proving that he committed the offenses at issue or to warn of
Billy’s future dangerous propensity.
Rather, he was simply
commenting on the evidence presented in the case, evidence
which, indeed, showed Billy to be a dangerous man.
Accordingly,
the prosecution’s remarks in question did not constitute error.
Billy’s fourth claim of error is that the jury
instructions on the stalking charge failed to require the jury
to specify which of the alternate elements in KRS 508.140(1)(b)
they relied on in finding him guilty of first-degree stalking.
Billy contends that failing to have the jury specify which
element(s) it relied on may have resulted in the verdict not
being unanimous.
Billy concedes that this alleged error was not
preserved for review.
Nevertheless, he urges us to review the
issue under the palpable error rule, RCr 10.26.
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In Halvorsen v. Commonwealth, Ky., 730 S.W.2d 921
(1986), our Supreme Court was faced with the same issue relative
to a murder instruction which did not require the jury to
specify which defendant was the principal and which one was the
accomplice.
The Court stated, “A verdict cannot be attacked as
non-unanimous where both theories are supported by sufficient
evidence.”
Id. at 925.
In the instant case, the instruction for first-degree
stalking required the jury to find that when Billy stalked
Ranie, he either:
(1) Knew that a protective order had been
issued against him by the Pike Family Court
to protect Ranie Akers from such conduct;
Or
(2) Had a deadly weapon on or about his
person.
The evidence in the case established the existence of
both elements – that Billy knew a domestic violence order had
been entered forbidding him from committing any further acts of
violence against Ranie and that he had a gun on or about his
person – when Billy was stalking Ranie.
Accordingly, the
stalking instruction as given was not in error.
Billy’s remaining argument is that the jury
instructions improperly gave the penalty range for all of the
charged misdemeanor offenses in violation of KRS 532.055(1).
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In
the recent case of Commonwealth v. Philpott, Ky., 75 S.W.3d 209
(2002) (decided on May 16, 2002, some three months after the
trial in the instant case), our Supreme Court confirmed that
informing the jury of the penalty range for any misdemeanor
tried with a felony, either as a lesser included offense or as a
primary offense, violates the truth-in-sentencing statute (KRS
532.055(1)).
Billy concedes that this alleged error was not
preserved.
However, we recognize that Philpott had not been
decided at the time of the trial, thus, knowledge of its holding
could not be imputed to Billy’s counsel at that time.
Further,
since the case at hand was not yet final at the time Philpott
was decided, its holding is to be applied retroactively.
Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 107 S. Ct. 708, 93 L. Ed. 2d
649 (1987).
Accordingly, we vacate the two convictions for
second-degree unlawful imprisonment and cite this issue as
additional grounds for vacating the conviction for fourth-degree
assault (vacated above due to discovery violation).
For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the Pike
Circuit Court is affirmed in part (as to the first-degree
stalking conviction) and vacated in part (as to the seconddegree unlawful imprisonment and fourth-degree assault
convictions) and the matter remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
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GUIDUGLI, JUDGE, CONCURS.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE, CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN
PART.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE, CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING
IN PART:
The majority opinion vacates the misdemeanor
convictions but affirms the felony stalking conviction.
I agree
that the misdemeanor convictions should be vacated, but the
felony stalking conviction should also be vacated in my opinion.
Thus, I concur in part and respectfully dissent in part.
The majority concluded in its opinion that Juror Lucas
should have been stricken for cause.
I agree.
However, the
majority further states that this was not reversible error, even
though Akers had used all his peremptory challenges, because he
did not demonstrate that there was an inability to remove
further unacceptable jurors.
I must respectfully but strongly
disagree with this portion of the opinion.
As I understand Kentucky law, it is automatically
reversible error where the trial court erroneously failed to
strike a juror for cause and the defendant had used all his
peremptory challenges.
This principle was clearly stated by the
Kentucky Supreme Court in Thomas v. Commonwealth, Ky., 864
S.W.2d 252 (1993).
Pursuant to RCr 9.40(1) a defendant is entitled to
eight peremptory challenges.
According to our supreme court in
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the Thomas case, “a defendant has been denied the number of
peremptory challenges procedurally allotted to him when forced
to use peremptory challenges on jurors who should have been
excused for cause.”
Id. at 259.
This principle has been
reaffirmed by our supreme court in numerous cases since the
Thomas case.
For example, in Furnish v. Commonwealth, Ky., 95
S.W.3d 34 (2002), our supreme court held that “[i]f the trial
court abuses its discretion by improperly failing to sustain a
challenge for cause, it is reversible error because the
defendant had to use a peremptory challenge and was thereby
deprived of its use otherwise.”
Id. at 44-45.
See also Stopher
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 57 S.W.3d 787, 796 (2001).
The majority cites Farris v. Commonwealth, Ky. App.,
836 S.W.2d 451 (1992), overruled on other grounds by Houston v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 975 S.W.2d 925 (1998), and Rigsby v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 495 S.W.2d 795 (1993), overruled on other
grounds by Pendleton v. Commonwealth, Ky., 685 S.W.2d 549
(1985), to support its position.
In the Farris case this court
concluded that the trial court abused its discretion by not
striking a juror for cause.
However, relying on Smith v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 734 S.W.2d 437, 444 (1987), this court
concluded that the error was harmless because the appellant “did
not even attempt to demonstrate that the use of a peremptory
challenge on Juror Harrod ‘resulted in a subsequent inability to
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remove further unacceptable jury panel members.’”
Farris, 836
S.W.2d at 455, quoting Smith, supra.
In the Smith case our supreme court held that there
was no abuse of discretion by the trial court’s refusal to
strike for cause six potential jurors who were either connected
with law enforcement or had an alleged predisposition to the
prosecution.
Id. at 444.
The court went on to state that
forcing Smith to remove the six jurors by peremptory challenges
did not require him to use all his peremptory challenges and
that he had not demonstrated that the use of the challenges
“resulted in a subsequent inability to remove further
unacceptable jury panel members.”
Id., citing Rigsby, supra.
In the Rigsby case the court held that “[a] defendant
who fails to exhaust such [peremptory] challenges cannot
complain concerning the jury selection.”
Id. at 498-99.
See
also Williams v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 829 S.W.2d 942 (1992),
wherein this court held that, in order to prevail on the issue,
the appellant had to demonstrate that all his peremptory
challenges had been exhausted and that an incompetent juror was
allowed to sit who should have been stricken for cause.
Id. at
943.
Each of the cases relied upon by the majority were
prior to our supreme court’s decision in the Thomas case.
I
believe the Thomas case and the many cases citing it thereafter
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clearly hold that it is reversible error where a trial court
failed to properly strike a juror for cause and where the
defendant used all his peremptory challenges.
Therefore, I
respectfully dissent from this portion of the opinion and would
vacate and remand for a new trial on all charges.
I would vacate the felony stalking conviction for a
second reason.
The majority concluded that Akers was prejudiced
by the Commonwealth’s failure to provide him with the Uniform
Offense Report on the fourth-degree assault charge.
However,
the majority concluded that he was not prejudiced by the
discovery violation as to the stalking and unlawful imprisonment
charges because an actual injury was not required for proof of
those offenses.
The majority rejected Akers’ claim that the
discovery violation affected his entire defense.
Further, the
majority stated that the evidence of guilt was overwhelming even
in the absence of any evidence regarding physical injury.
I
disagree.
Akers’ defense was that the incident never occurred.
Going into the trial, his attorney hoped to persuade the jury
that the incident never occurred because of the absence of any
evidence of a physical injury.
His attorney even obtained
discovery of a document signed or initialed by the trooper in
which he had checked the box labeled “no injury.”
When the
undisclosed document came to light at trial, Akers’ defense was,
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as he stated in his brief, “gutted.”
The disclosure of the
document destroyed Akers’ attempt to cross examine the trooper
based on his notation in the disclosed document that no injury
had occurred.
Had the trooper confirmed that there was no
injury as he had stated in his other report, then the case would
have simply been a “he said/she said” case.
In any event, the
evidence against Akers would not have been overwhelming as
stated by the majority.
I would vacate and remand for a new
trial on all charges on this ground as well.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
David T. Eucker
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Brian T. Judy
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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