DAVID HIX v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JUNE 6, 2003; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-000935-MR
DAVID HIX
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MASON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROBERT I. GALLENSTEIN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CR-00084
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BAKER, BARBER AND JOHNSON, JUDGES.
BAKER, JUDGE:
David Hix (“Hix”) appeals from a judgment entered
by the Mason Circuit Court on April 9, 2002, following his
conviction for receiving stolen property valued at three hundred
dollars ($300.00) or more and carrying a concealed weapon.
Hix
was sentenced to a total of five years’ imprisonment as a result
of this conviction.
We affirm.
During the early morning hours of June 25, 2001,
Maysville Police Officer Mark Branham responded to an alarm
being activated at the local Mitsubishi plant.
Upon arriving at
the scene, Officer Branham discovered that a chain that secured
a pressure washer and trailer had been cut and left in the
parking lot.
Thirty minutes after Officer Branham’s discovery,
Maysville Police Officer Michael Fogleman saw a Ford dualwheeled pickup truck enter the Mitsubushi plant parking lot.
This pickup truck was pulling a trailer containing a pressure
washer.
Officer Fogelman further observed Hix at the rear of
the truck preparing to set the stand down on the trailer.
Based
upon these observations, Officer Fogelman, with assistance from
the Maysville and Aberdeen, Ohio, police departments, detained
Hix and Teddie Weeks (“Weeks”), and proceeded to search Hix’s
truck.
This search uncovered two bolt cutters, a camera, a key,
a magazine for a .45 caliber pistol, a book entitled “Ohio
Arrest Search and Seizure Handbook,” and a knife stuck between
the driver’s seat and the console.
Hix and Weeks were
immediately arrested and taken into custody.
The grand jury
subsequently indicted Hix for receiving stolen property over
$300.00, carrying a concealed deadly weapon and being a
persistent felony offender (PFO) in the first degree1.
The PFO
charge was eventually dismissed.
1
Weeks was also indicted for receiving stolen property over
$300.00 and tried jointly with Hix. Weeks was convicted of this
indicted charge and sentenced to one year in prison. Weeks’s
conviction will not be addressed in this opinion.
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At trial, Kevin Richards and Gary Wilms, employees of
Cincinnati United Contractors, testified that the pressure
washer and trailer belonged to their company.
This equipment
was being used by Cincinnati United Contractors to complete an
ongoing job at the Maysville Mitsubishi facility.
Richards
described the pressure washer as a “huge” machine used for
degreasing.
The pressure washer was also used at the Mitsubishi
plant to pressure wash parking lots.
Wilms estimated the value
of this equipment at approximately five thousand dollars
($5,000.00).
At trial, Hix testified concerning the events leading
up to his arrest.
During his testimony, Hix stated that, on
June 24, 2001, an unknown man approached him at his Ohio home
and hired him to deliver a pressure washer and trailer from the
Maysville Mitsubishi plant to a location in Cincinnati.
The
unknown employer agreed to pay Hix one dollar per mile to
transport this equipment.
Hix, despite being in the business of
moving and transporting equipment, failed to obtain his
employer’s identity.
However, the employer directed Hix to meet
him either at the Maysville plant or at a truck stop in
Aberdeen. After they retrieved the equipment, Hix was to follow
the employer to Cincinnati.
After having contracted with the unnamed stranger to
move the equipment, Hix enlisted Weeks’s help to retrieve and
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transport the pressure washer and trailer.
Around 2:00 a.m. on
June 25, 2001, Hix and Weeks arrived at the Mitsubishi plant and
located the equipment matching the description provided by the
unidentified employer.
Hix hooked the trailer up to his truck
and waited for fifteen minutes for his contact to appear.
After
this waiting period, Hix decided to go to the Aberdeen truck
stop and wait for the employer.
During the trip to Aberdeen,
Hix noticed that his taillights were not working.
Hix
immediately stopped at a Marathon station in Aberdeen and
attempted to fix the taillights.
Hix was not able to fix the
lights without a fuse, forcing him to visit an Aberdeen Citgo
truck stop and purchase a fuse.
While buying the fuse, Hix
parked the truck, with the trailer attached, under some bright
lights in front of the store so the employer could easily find
him.
Hix waited at this truck stop for twenty minutes before
determining that he missed his employer.
At this point, Hix
returned to Maysville, but did not locate his employer.
Hix
immediately began to unhitch the trailer with attached pressure
washer, but stopped after being surrounded by the police.
After considering the evidence produced at trial, the
jury found Hix guilty of receiving stolen property over $300.00
and carrying a concealed weapon.
The jury recommended a
sentence of five years in prison for the receiving stolen
property charge and one year for the offense of carrying a
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concealed weapon.
The trial court sentenced Hix to a total of
five years in prison.
This appeal followed.
Hix presents three arguments for our review.
First,
Hix asserts that the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient
evidence concerning the value of the pressure washer and
trailer.
He contends that the trial court should have granted
his motion for a directed verdict on the charge of receiving
stolen property over $300.00 because the Commonwealth failed to
present sufficient evidence that this equipment had a value
exceeding $300.00.
We disagree.
Generally, the Commonwealth bears the burden of
establishing each and every element of an offense beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Brown v. Commonwealth, Ky., 890 S.W.2d 286,
288 (1994); Commonwealth v. Hamilton, Ky. App., 905 S.W.2d 83,
84 (1995); KRS 500.070(1).
More specifically, in a prosecution
for receiving stolen property, the Commonwealth has the burden
of proving the value of the property received.
Macklin v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 687 S.W.2d 540, 542 (1984); Lee v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 547 S.W.2d 792, 795 (1977).
Moreover,
the Commonwealth must establish the fair market value of the
stolen property at the time the offense is committed.
Tussey v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 589 S.W.2d 215 (1979); Perkins v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 409 S.W.2d 294 (1966).
The property stolen,
or a photograph depicting such property, need not be produced at
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trial since verbal testimony describing the stolen property is
sufficient to support a conviction.
446 S.W.2d 570, 572 (1969).
Irvin v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
In fact, the owner of the stolen
property may offer an opinion on the value of the property in
order to establish the dollar amount at issue.
Reed, Ky., 57 S.W.3d 269, 270 (2001).
Commonwealth v.
This testimony, however,
must be of sufficient detail so that the jury can make a value
determination.
Id., at 271.
In Commonwealth v. Benham, Ky., 816 S.W.2d 186 (1991),
the Kentucky Supreme Court set forth the standard for handling a
motion for directed verdict.
It stated:
On a motion for a directed verdict, the
trial court must draw all fair and
reasonable inferences from the evidence in
favor of the Commonwealth. If the evidence
is sufficient to induce a reasonable juror
to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant is guilty, a directed verdict
should not be given. For the purpose of
ruling on the motion, the trial court must
assume that the evidence for the
Commonwealth is true, but reserving to the
jury questions as to the credibility and
weight to be given to such testimony.
816 S.W.2d at 187.
Ky., 660 S.W.2d 3 (1983).
See also Commonwealth v. Sawhill,
When considering a criminal
defendant’s motion for directed verdict, a court must not
substitute its own opinion about the credibility of witnesses or
the weight that should be given to the evidence presented.
Rather, a court should be mindful of the rule that “[q]uestions
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of credibility and weight of the evidence are for the jury.”
Brown v. Commonwealth, Ky., 789 S.W.2d 748, 749 (1990)(citation
omitted).
(1996).
See also Partin v. Commonwealth, Ky., 918 S.W.2d 219
In addition, the standard for appellate review
concerning the denial of a motion for directed verdict dictates
that, if under the evidence as a whole, it would not be clearly
unreasonable for a jury to find the defendant guilty, the
defendant is not entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal.
Benham, 816 S.W.2d at 187; Baker v. Commonwealth, Ky., 973
S.W.2d 54, 55 (1998).
Finally, a conviction may properly be
based on circumstantial evidence when that evidence is of such
character that reasonable minds would be justified in concluding
that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Baker
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 860 S.W.2d 760 (1993); Bussell v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 882 S.W.2d 111, 114 (1994), cert. denied, 513
U.S. 1174, 115 S.Ct. 1154, 130 L.Ed.2d 1111 (1995).
In this matter, Wilms testified that while serving as
a project superintendent for his employer, Cincinnati United
Contractors, he learned that the pressure washer and trailer
were worth approximately $5,000.00.
Wilms established this
value for the pressure washer on the fact that this piece of
equipment was of industrial size and capable of producing steam.
Wilms, however, possessed no knowledge concerning how much
Cincinnati United Contractors paid to purchase this equipment,
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whether the equipment was purchased new or used or from whom the
equipment was purchased.
Nevertheless, Wilms expressed that the
pressure washer and trailer are worth more than $300.00 because
a person “couldn’t put tires on the trailer for $300.00.
I have
bought the tires.”
We believe that Wilms’s testimony was of sufficient
detail to allow a reasonable juror to find that the value of the
equipment at issue exceeded $300.00.
Wilms, as an agent of his
employer, knew enough about this particular piece of equipment
to place a value on it.
Also, Wilms testified that he purchased
tires for this equipment, with the purchase price of those tires
exceeding $300.00.
Finally, Wilms noted that this equipment was
used primarily for industrial purposes.
Viewing this evidence
in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, sufficient
evidence existed for a reasonable juror to believe and infer
that the market value of the equipment stolen from the Maysville
Mitsubishi plant on June 25, 2001, exceeded $300.00.
Consequently, the trial court did not err in denying the motion
for a directed verdict.
For his second argument, Hix asserts that the trial
court erred by not granting his motion for a directed verdict
concerning the charge of carrying a concealed weapon.
Hix
argues that the Commonwealth failed to present evidence that the
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knife found in his truck was concealed or that the weapon found
constituted a deadly weapon as defined by KRS 500.080.
KRS 527.020(1) states that a person is guilty of
carrying a concealed weapon when he carries concealed a firearm
or other deadly weapon on or about his person.
The words “on or
about his person” mean concealed in such proximity to a person
as to be of convenient access and within immediate physical
reach.
Collier v. Commonwealth, Ky., 453 S.W.2d 600, 601
(1970); Hampton v. Commonwealth, Ky., 257 Ky. 626, 78 S.W.2d 748
(1934).
In this matter, the knife at issue herein was found in
Hix’s truck, stuck down between the driver’s seat and the
console.
Hix acknowledges that the knife was found in his truck
at that location.
We believe that Hix, as the operator of his
truck, could easily access the knife by simply placing his hand
between the seat and the console.
This evidence clearly
indicates that the knife was on or about Hix’s person.
Thus,
the knife was concealed for purposes of KRS 527.020(1).
We also believe that the evidence presented at trial
sufficiently demonstrated that the knife at issue herein was, in
fact, a deadly weapon.
KRS 500.080(4)(b) provides that any
knife other than an ordinary pocket knife or hunting knife is
considered to be a deadly weapon.
In this case, Hix testified
that he did not use this knife for hunting.
Additionally, there
was no testimony that this knife was simply an ordinary pocket
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knife.
This knife was introduced into evidence by the
Commonwealth and submitted to the jury for its inspection.
This
evidence, when viewed in a light favorable to the Commonwealth,
could cause a juror to reasonably infer that the knife was
anything other than a deadly weapon.
Hence, we believe that the
evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict convicting
Hix of carrying a concealed deadly weapon.
Finally, Hix argues that the trial court abused its
discretion by not granting his motion for a continuance.
We
reject this argument.
A continuance may be granted upon a showing of
sufficient cause. RCr 9.04. The decision to grant or deny a
continuance rests solely within the trial court's discretion.
Snodgrass v. Commonwealth, Ky., 814 S.W.2d 579, 581 (1991). We
will not disturb a trial court's ruling on a continuance motion
unless it appears that there was a clear abuse of discretion
such as to deny substantial justice to the accused. Williams v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 644 S.W.2d 335, 336 (1982). The factors the
trial court should consider in exercising its discretion include
"length of delay; previous continuances; inconvenience to
litigants, witnesses, counsel and the court; whether the delay
is purposeful or is caused by the accused; availability of other
competent counsel; complexity of the case; and whether denying
the continuance will lead to identifiable prejudice." Snodgrass,
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814 S.W.2d at 581. The appropriateness of granting a continuance
in any case depends on the facts and circumstances involved. Id.
We do not find any abuse of discretion in this case.
From the transcript of his February 15, 2002 motion, it appears
that the court weighed the factors specified for consideration
in Snodgrass. The trial court concluded that there would be
inconvenience to all the litigants and to the court if a
continuance were granted in this matter.
Furthermore, the trial
court did not discern that this matter warranted additional time
since the Commonwealth agreed to make its records available for
inspection by Hix’s newly retained trial counsel2. The court also
believed that Hix had sufficient time to confer with counsel
during the four weeks remaining before trial.
Therefore, we
find no prejudice to Hix resulting from the denial of his motion
for a continuance.
For the aforementioned reasons, the judgment of the
Mason Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Matthew Sanning
Maysville, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General
David A. Smith
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
2
Hix retained attorney Debra Rigg to represent him on
February 14, 2002.
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