JENNIFER HICKS, BY AND THROUGH HER PARENTS AND NEXT FRIENDS, LINDA HICKS AND DOUG HICKS; DOUG HICKS, INDIVIDUALLY; AND LINDA HICKS, INDIVIDUALLY v. T & M JEWELRY, INC., D/B/A THE CASTLE; CAROL'S SPORTING GOODS, INC., AND CAROL HARLIN
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: August 1, 2003; 2:00 p.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-000845-MR
JENNIFER HICKS, BY AND THROUGH HER PARENTS
AND NEXT FRIENDS, LINDA HICKS AND DOUG HICKS;
DOUG HICKS, INDIVIDUALLY; AND LINDA HICKS,
INDIVIDUALLY
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE, SHEILA R. ISAAC, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CI-02617
v.
T & M JEWELRY, INC.,
D/B/A THE CASTLE;
CAROL’S SPORTING GOODS, INC.,
AND CAROL HARLIN
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART
REVERSING IN PART
AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BAKER, BARBER AND JOHNSON, JUDGES.
BARBER, JUDGE:
Appellants, Jennifer Hicks, by and through her
parents and next friends, Linda Hicks and Doug Hicks, and Linda
Hicks, Individually and Doug Hicks, Individually, seek review of
a summary judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court in favor of the
Appellees, T & M Jewelry, Inc., d/b/a The Castle, Carol’s
Sporting Goods, Inc., and Carol Harlin.
We affirm in part,
reverse in part, and remand.
On July 24, 1997, Appellants filed a complaint in the
Fayette Circuit Court alleging that on or about July 25, 1996,
Scott Greer, then age 18, purchased a Jennings .22 caliber semiautomatic pistol from the defendant, T & M Jewelry, Inc., d/b/a/
The Castle and/or the defendant Carol’s Sporting Goods.
Appellants further alleged that on or about July 26, 1996, Greer
fired the weapon hitting the Appellant, Jennifer Hicks, in the
face and head causing serious injury.1
Appellants maintained
that the purchase of the handgun was accomplished by reason of
Appellees’ negligence and by reason of violations of Kentucky
and Federal law2 and regulations.
On June 12, 1998, Appellees moved for summary judgment
on the grounds that the claims asserted against them for alleged
violations of the Federal Gun Control Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922, et
1
On September 5, 1997, the trial court granted Appellees’ motion to
file a third party complaint against Scott Greer. On September 19,
1997, Greer filed an answer.
2
18 U.S.C. 922 (b) provides: It shall be unlawful for any licensed
importer, licensed manufacturer, licensed dealer, or licensed
collector to sell or deliver ─
(1) any firearm or ammunition to any individual who the licensee
knows or has reasonable cause to believe is less than eighteen years
of age, and, if the firearm, or ammunition is other than a shotgun or
rifle, or ammunition for a shotgun or rifle, to any individual who the
licensee knows or has reasonable cause to believe is less than twentyone years of age[.]
-2-
seq., did not give rise to a private cause of action under KRS
446.070, citing Alderman v. Bradley;3 further, that any alleged
negligence or violations by the Appellees were not a substantial
factor in, or proximate cause of, Greer’s firing the handgun.
In an Opinion and Order entered September 2, 1998, the
trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of
Appellees:
Defendant argues that the recent Kentucky
Court of Appeals decision, Alderman v.
Bradley, Ky. App., 957 S.W.2d 264 (1997) is
controlling and dispositive of this case and
therefore, summary judgment must be granted.
Courts across the country are divided on the
issue of whether Congress intended to create
a private cause of action for victims
injured by firearms obtained in violation of
Federal Gun Control Legislation. This Court
agrees that Alderman clearly holds that a
violation of 18 U.S.C., subsection 922, does
not give rise to a claim for negligence per
se under Kentucky law. However, Plaintiffs
also present their claims under the theory
of ordinary negligence. Citing Waldon v.
Housing Authority of Paducah, 854 S.W.2d 777
(1991). Plaintff’s [sic] argue that common
law negligence will lie in an action
involving the criminal use of firearms that
results in personal injury. This Court
agrees.
Therefore, Defendants motion for summary
judgment is sustained in part and overruled
in part. The Plaintiffs may proceed with
the case on ordinary negligence theory, but
may not use the theory of negligence per se
pursuant to Federal or state statutes or
regulations.
3
Ky. App., 957 S.W.2d 264 (1997).
-3-
On March 28, 2002, the trial court entered an
Opinion and Order deciding the remaining issue of whether
Appellants could maintain a claim for common law negligence.
The decision contains a detailed summary of the facts
necessary to an understanding of the issues before us:
On July 18, 1996, Scott Greer and Jennifer
Hicks went to The Castle on Nicholasville
Road. Scott Greer completed the required
documentation in order to purchase a
handgun. The documents contained proof that
Greer was 18 years old. The employee,
despite training to the contrary, sold the
gun to the 18 year old. On July 25, 1996,
Greer picked up the Jennings .22 caliber
semi-automatic pistol he had purchased.
Again at the time of the purchase he showed
identification that confirmed his age. The
following day, July 26, 1996, Scott Greer
was in possession of the pistol while riding
in the front passenger seat of a car that
Jennifer Hicks was driving. Greer, who
thought the gun was unloaded, pointed the
gun at Hicks’ head and pulled the trigger in
order to scare her. Instead, he shot her in
the face, causing a serious head injury.
Criminal charges were brought and Greer pled
guilty to Assault in the Fourth Degree.
Carol Harlin, previously a bookkeeper for T
& M Jewelry, Inc. d/b/a The Castle, took
over the firearms business from prior
owners, Jimmy Lambert and Philip Block,
convicted felons, who could no longer hold a
federal firearms license. Carol Harlin,
subsequently began Carol’s Sporting Goods,
Inc., in order to possess a federal firearms
license, and operated that business on site
in The Castle. Carol’s Sporting Goods had
two employees. However, the employees of T
& M Jewelry, Inc. d/b/a, The Castle, were
also trained to sell firearms, as well. In
fact, it was both a T & M Jewelry employee
-4-
who began the sale on July 18, 1996, and who
completed the actual sale transaction on
July 25, 1996.
* * *
In analyzing whether a simple negligence
claim can be made under the facts of this
case, the Court must decide whether the
Defendants owed a legal duty to the
Plaintiffs and if they did, would the breach
thereof be the proximate cause of the
injury.
[The Court noted its struggle with the issue
of foreseeability, commenting that “it is
even clearer than ever why the Federal Gun
Control Act restricts the sale of firearms
to those 21 years or older, and that the
statistics are “astonishing,” in reference
to the Report on Gun Crime in the Age Group
18-20 by the Department of Treasury and the
Department of Justice, June 1999, attached
as Appendix C to Plaintiff’s response] . . .
It may be that such actions as were taken by
Greer might be foreseeable and if so, the
universal duty would then apply to the
Defendants, allowing the cause to proceed.
However, it is undeniable, as already ruled
upon, that the Federal Gun Control Act does
not provide a private right of action.
Further, Kentucky law does not possess the
same restrictions as federal law, and it is
permissible to sell a firearm to a person
who is under 21 years of age.
The Plaintiffs cannot meet their burden of
proving that they have the right to a common
law negligence claim. Defendants did not
have a common law duty to refuse to sell the
handgun to Scott Greer. Even if it were
found that Defendants did have such a duty,
the law does not consider Scott Greer’s
conduct to be foreseeable and thus, as a
superseding cause, Defendants are relieved
of liability in this case.
-5-
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
Appellees, concluding that duty and causation were “clearly
absent.”
On April 23, 2002, Appellants filed a notice of appeal
to this Court.
The standard of review on appeal of a summary
judgment is whether the trial court correctly found that there
were no genuine issues as to any material fact and that the
moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
There
is no requirement that we defer to the trial court, because
factual findings are not at issue.4
On appeal, Appellants ask that we “decline to follow”
this Court’s recent decision in Alderman.5
Alderman holds that
KRS 446.0706 is limited in its reach to violations of Kentucky
statutes and does not give rise to a private cause of action for
violation of the Federal Gun Control Act.
Citing Baker v.
White,7 this Court construed the term “statute,” as presently
4
Scifres v. Kraft, Ky. App., 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (1996).
5
Supra.
6
KRS 446.070 provides: “A person injured by the violation of any
statute may recover from the offender such damages as he sustained by
reason of the violation, although a penalty or forfeiture is imposed
for such violation.”
7
251 Ky. 691, 65 S.W.2d 1022 (1933). In Baker, the issue was whether
violation of a city ordinance gave rise to a cause of action
predicated on section 466, Kentucky Statutes, which provided: "A
person injured by the violation of any statute may recover from the
offender such damage as he may sustain by reason of the violation,
-6-
used in KRS 446.070, to apply to “laws enacted by the supreme
lawmaking body of the state.”8
The legislature did not expressly include
federal laws within the purview of KRS
446.070, and as related in Baker, supra,
“statute” as utilized in Chapter 446, et
seq., refers to those laws enacted by our
General Assembly. . . . When read in its
entirety Chapter 446 clearly demonstrates
the legislature’s intention and attempt to
establish rules for construing, interpreting
and applying the statutes enacted by it –
the supreme law-making body of our
Commonwealth.9
Appellants argue that Alderman should be disregarded,
in part, because Baker v. White, cited therein, has “never been
cited by the Supreme Court of Kentucky as authority on any
issue. . . .”
Alderman.
That is neither correct, nor reason to disregard
We do not have the authority to declare that
decisions of the Supreme Court of Kentucky or its predecessor
court have implicitly been overruled because of age.10
although a penalty or forfeiture for such violation be thereby
imposed." (Emphasis added). The high court construed the words, “any
statute,” according to “common usage and understanding” to apply to
“laws enacted by the supreme lawmaking body of the state.” Id., at
695.
8
Alderman, 957 S.W.2d at 266-67.
9
Id.
10
Revenue Cabinet v. Kentucky-American Water Co., Ky.,
997 S.W.2d 2 (1999).
-7-
Appellants contend that Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P.R.R. v.
Gregg,11 “found . . . [KRS 446.070] to apply to federal statutes”
not long after its enactment.
We cannot assume, from our
reading of Gregg, that the issue of whether Section 466 Ky.
Statutes applied to federal statutes was actually litigated in
that case.
Notwithstanding, Gregg was decided 29 years before
Baker.
Appellants also cite decisions from various federal
and state courts, in an attempt to dissuade us from following
Alderman.
Those cases all predate Alderman, and unlike
Alderman, do not have stare decisis effect, here.
Moreover,
this Court, in deciding Alderman, “reviewed cases from various
state and federal courts that have considered the scope and
effect of the federal legislation.”12
the issue before us.
Alderman is dispositive of
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s
September 2, 1998 Opinion and Order granting partial summary
judgment in favor of Appellees, on the ground that KRS 446.070
does not give rise to a cause of action for violations of the
Federal Gun Control Act.
However, Alderman is not determinative of whether or
not Appellants can maintain a common law claim.
To maintain a
cause of action based on negligence, Appellants must establish:
11
Ky. App., 80 S.W. 512 (1904).
12
957 S.W.2d at 267.
-8-
(1) a duty on the part of the defendant; (2) a breach of the
duty; and (3) a causal connection between the breach and an
injury suffered by the plaintiff.
presents an issue of law.
“The question of duty
57A Am.Jur.2d Negligence § 20;
Prosser and Keeton on Torts, § 37 (5th ed. 1984).
When a court
resolves a question of duty it is essentially making a policy
determination.”13
Here, Appellants assert that Appellees had a duty to
exercise ordinary care in their actions to ensure the safety of
others.
Ordinary care varies with the nature of the business
and the use to which the premises are put.
It is “‘a care
commensurate with the particular circumstances involved in the
given case.’"14
We agree with Appellants that 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)
is relevant to this inquiry.
The fact that violation of the
federal statute does not give rise to a private cause of action
under Kentucky law does not mean that the federal statute should
be disregarded entirely.
We believe that the reasoning in Decker v. Gibson
Products Company of Albany, Inc.,15 is applicable to the facts of
this case.
Decker involved the sale of a pistol in violation of
13
Mullins v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., Ky., 839 S.W.2d 245, 248
(1992).
14
Murphy v. Second Street Corp., Ky. App. 48 S.W.3d 571, 574 (2001),
citing Sidebottom v. Aubrey, 267 Ky. 45, 101 S.W.2d 212, 213 (1937).
15
679 F.2d 212 (11th Cir. 1982).
-9-
18 U.S.C. 922(d)(1).
That section of the statute prohibits a
licensed dealer from selling firearms to felons.
The purchaser,
Etheridge, had been convicted of the felony of aggravated
assault in 1967; at the time of purchase, he produced a
restoration of civil rights form issued by the State of Florida
in 1972.
The sheriff had advised the salesperson when the sale
was made that it was permissible to sell the pistol to
Etheridge; however, the sale was in violation of the federal
statute.
Within 48 hours of purchasing the pistol, Etheridge
used it to murder his former wife.
The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of
Georgia had rejected a statutorily-created cause of action;
further, the district court had failed to address plaintiff’s
argument that the Federal Gun Control Act created a standard
against which to measure the seller’s conduct for purposes of
determining negligence.
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit
concluded that:
Regardless of whether a violation of the Gun
Control Act constitutes negligence per se in
Georgia, a legal determination we leave to
the trial court, plaintiffs are entitled to
have the jury consider whether defendant’s
sale of the pistol to a person known to have
been convicted of aggravated assault was
reasonable in light of the federal statute,
the restoration of civil rights shown to the
salesperson, the response received from the
sheriff, the alleged duty of the corporate
defendant to properly instruct its employees
concerning these matters, and all of the
-10-
other facts surrounding the gun
transaction.16
In Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,17 cited by
Appellants, the plaintiff sued Sears for selling a shotgun to a
mentally-impaired individual, who fired the gun into a
nightclub, injuring the plaintiff and killing her husband.
The
Nebraska court explained that “[p]roof that Sears violated the
federal Gun Control Act does not establish negligence per se.
A
violation of a statute is merely evidence of negligence which is
considered by the trier of fact with all the other evidence.”18
The other evidence in the case sub judice includes the
admitted failure of Carol’s Sporting Goods to follow its own
rules.
Carol’s trained its employees and employees of The
Castle not to sell handguns to 18 year olds:
Carol Hardin testified by deposition:
Q314 As the owner, operator, sole
proprietor of a corporation which sold
weapons in July of 1996, did you have any
personal knowledge as to how old an
individual had to be before your corporation
could legally sell a firearm to them?
A. Yes.
Q315 And how old did they have to be?
A
Eighteen for a hand—a long gun and
twenty-one for a –handgun.
Q316 So you were aware in July of 1996 that
it would have been illegal for your company
16
Id. at 216.
17
497 F.Supp. 185 (D. Neb., 1980).
18
Id. at 196.
-11-
or corporation to sell a handgun to Scott
Greer?
A
Yes.
Q317 What, if any, written policies did
Carol’s Sporting Goods have regarding the
sale of handguns in July of 1996?
A
The ATF books. They give you a book
that has all the rule and regulations in it,
and we use that.
* * *
Q319 Other than the ATF book, did you,
Carol’s Sporting Goods, provide any written
policies to any of your employees regarding
the sale of handguns?
A
No.
Q320 What, if any, training did you give to
your employees regarding the sale of
handguns?
A They went over the – the highlights of
the book, you know, the—like the age and the
forms. . . . So they’d go over all the
forms and the questions. There’s questions
that you—that—that are asked of the people:
Are they a convicted felon; are they on
drugs; are they under mental; are they under
domestic violence, harassment.
Q321 Who, they, went over the highlights?
A
Marilyn.
Q322 So Marilyn, as the manager of Carol’s
Sporting Goods, went over these highlights
with all the employees of Carol’s Sporting
Goods?
A
Oh, yeah.
Q
Did anyone go over those highlights
with the employees of The Castle?
A
Yes, yes.
Q
Who?
A
Marilyn.
Q
Tell me the procedures Marilyn would
use to make sure that all employees of
Carol’s . . . and The Castle were aware of
all those highlights.
A
When you’d hire a new employee, they
would receive training in sales, and then
Marilyn would go over the forms and the
book.
-12-
Hardin was asked what employees were instructed about
selling handguns to 18 year olds.
couldn’t do it.”
Hardin responded, “That you
Hardin’s testimony reflects that when sales
personnel got a date of birth, they were instructed to calculate
how old a person was before selling a gun.
Hardin testified
there were calculators “all over the place” to do this.
Kentucky law recognizes that rules governing the
conduct of a business may be considered as evidence of standard
of care where an injured party seeks to recover for injuries
inflicted because of violation or nonobservance of the rule.
In
Williams v. St. Claire Medical Center,19 we held that by failing
to enforce its own rules and regulations, a hospital may breach
its duty to a patient.
In Ray v. Hardee's Food Systems, Inc.,20
an off-duty employee brought a common law action against his
employer, alleging that the negligence of the employer’s agent
was a substantial causative factor of his injuries, where the
agent failed to comply with the employer’s policy, thereby
depriving him of adequate protection against an assailant.
Court held:
Viewing the evidence most favorably to . . .
[the plaintiff], we think there was
sufficient evidence to put Hardee's to its
proof as to precisely what information was
received as to the impending disaster and
19
Ky. App., 657 S.W.2d 590, 595 (1983).
20
Ky. App., 785 S.W.2d 519 (1990).
-13-
This
whether it followed its own rules
promulgated for employee safety. . . . The
allegations in the case sub judice charged
more than the mere failure to provide a safe
place to work. Rather, this case is
premised upon Hardee's failure to provide a
safe place to work by not enforcing its own
rules promulgated for employee safety. That
violation of safety rules may properly be
considered in a negligence action by an
employee against his employer was long ago
established. . . .
It has been so often decided by this
court that the rules governing the
conduct of a business may be read in a
suit between the employer and employee
by either party, when the injured party
is suing to recover for injuries
inflicted because of the violation or
nonobservance of the rule . . . .21
Next, Appellants assert that the negligent sale of the
handgun to Greer was a substantial factor in the shooting
resulting in Jennifer Hicks’ injuries.
In determining whether
summary judgment was properly granted, we must determine whether
Greer’s act was a superseding cause of the injuries to Jennifer
Hicks.
The issue is a question of law to be resolved by the
court.22
The trial court stated that if Greer’s actions were
foreseeable, then “the universal duty would then apply to the
Defendants allowing the cause to proceed.”
21
Noting the
Id., at 520.
22
Hall v. Midwest Bottled Gas Distributors, Inc., Ky., 532 S.W.2d 449,
452 (1975).
-14-
intentional nature of Greer’s act and the fact that he pled
guilty to assault in the fourth degree,23 the court concluded
that “the law presumes Scott Greer’s conduct was not foreseeable
and was indeed a superseding event that caused Jennifer Hicks’
injury and that the Defendants could not have been expected to
foresee it.”
We disagree.
In Britton v. Wooten, our Supreme Court rejected “any
all-inclusive general rule that . . . ‘criminal acts of third
parties ... relieve the original negligent party from
liability.’"
The Court noted that “[t]his archaic doctrine has
been rejected everywhere.”24
We agree with the reasoning in Decker that “[t]he Gun
Control Act would seem to militate against” a determination that
the conduct was not foreseeable.25
“Citing statistics linking
the use of firearms with the increase in violent crime, Congress
stated the purpose of the Act was to restrict the availability
of firearms to ‘those not legally entitled to possess them
23
KRS 508.030 provides:
(1) A person is guilty of assault in the fourth degree when:
(a) He intentionally or wantonly causes physical injury to another
person; or
(b) With recklessness he causes physical injury to another person by
means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument.
(2) Assault in the fourth degree is a Class A misdemeanor.
24
Ky., 817 S.W.2d 443, 449 (1991).
25
Supra, at 215.
-15-
because of age, criminal background, or incompetency.’”26
Accordingly, we cannot say, as a matter of law, that Greer’s act
was so extraordinary and unforeseeable as to relieve Appellees
of liability, in the event it is determined by a jury that they
were negligent.27
We therefore reverse the trial court’s March 28, 2002
Opinion and Order and remand this case for trial.
Appellants
are entitled to have the jury consider whether the sale of the
handgun to the 18 year-old Greer was reasonable in light of the
federal statute, the rules governing the business, and all of
the other relevant facts surrounding the subject transaction.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANTS:
Robert L. Elliott
Lexington, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
James D. Ishmael, Jr.
Barry Miller
Lexington, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEES:
James D. Ishmael, Jr.
Lexington, Kentucky
26
Id.
27
Midwest Bottled Gas, supra.
-16-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.