CARRIE D. FRANK v. BIG RIVERS ELECTRIC CORPORATION
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RENDERED: JULY 3, 2003; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2001-CA-002474-MR
CARRIE D. FRANK
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BRECKINRIDGE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SAM H. MONARCH, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CI-00052
BIG RIVERS ELECTRIC CORPORATION
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, JOHNSON AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Carrie D. Frank has appealed from the findings
of fact, conclusions of law, and interlocutory judgment entered
by the Breckinridge Circuit Court on November 13, 2001, which
ruled that Big Rivers Electric Corporation was authorized to
condemn a permanent easement across a portion of Frank’s
property, which consists of approximately 233 acres,1 for the
1
Frank’s entire tract of land is located in Breckinridge County near the city
limits of Hardinsburg. The eastern most tip of Frank’s property runs parallel
to Kentucky State Highway 261. The northern most tip of her property abuts
U.S. Highway 60.
purpose of constructing an electric transmission line.
The
trial court also ruled that Big Rivers was entitled to the right
of ingress and egress, where reasonably necessary, across
Frank’s remaining property for the purpose of maintaining and
operating its easement.
Having concluded that the trial court
did not err in its disposition of this matter, we affirm.
Big Rivers is a non-profit rural electric cooperative
corporation organized pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 279.010, et seq.
On March 9, 2001, Big Rivers filed a
petition to condemn a permanent easement across Frank’s land
pursuant to the Eminent Domain Act2 and KRS 279.110(4).
The
petition alleged that a permanent easement across Frank’s land
was necessary “for the construction and operation of an electric
transmission line which will provide electric power to a newly
constructed Meade County RECC substation [ ] located in Grayson
County, Kentucky[.]”
The petition further alleged that the
transmission line was necessary due to an increase in the demand
for electricity in the Rough River area.
In particular, Big
Rivers stated that it intended to install four wooden electric
poles on Frank’s property.
Big Rivers also sought to acquire
the right of ingress and egress across Frank’s remaining
property for the purpose of operating and maintaining the
easement it sought to condemn.
2
On March 23, 2001, the trial
KRS 416.540, et seq.
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court entered an order appointing three commissioners, who
assessed the reduction in the fair market value of Frank’s
property by reason of the taking at $16,236.00.
On April 27, 2001, Frank filed a motion to dismiss the
condemnation petition filed by Big Rivers on the ground that Big
Rivers had failed to provide a particular description of the
property sought to be condemned as mandated by KRS 416.570(2).3
Frank also filed an answer to the condemnation petition in which
she averred, among other defenses, that Big Rivers had failed to
prove that a “general easement to enter upon and across [her
property] at all locations” was necessary.4
On May 11, 2001, Big
Rivers filed a motion for interlocutory judgment.
Big Rivers
insisted that it had in fact complied with the particularity
requirements of KRS 416.570(2), and that Frank’s motion was
3
KRS 416.570 provides in relevant part as follows:
Except as otherwise provided in KRS 416.560, a
condemnor seeking to condemn property or the use and
occupation thereof, shall file a verified petition in
the circuit court of the county in which all or the
greater portion of the property sought to be
condemned is located, which petition shall state that
it is filed under the provisions of KRS 416.550 to
416.670 and shall contain, in substance:
. . . .
(2) A particular description of the property and
the use and occupation thereof sought to be
condemned[.]
4
In other words, Frank denied that Big Rivers had a right to ingress and
egress upon her property “at all locations” for the purpose of maintaining
and operating the easement it sought to condemn. The general right to
ingress and egress upon a servient estate for the purpose of operating and
maintaining a permanent easement is sometimes referred to as a “secondary
easement.” See e.g., 25 Am.Jur.2d, Easements and Licenses, § 95 (1996).
-3-
merely an attempt to delay the proceedings.
In its motion for
interlocutory judgment, Big Rivers described the easement it
sought to obtain as follows:
The easement is 100 feet in width, being 50
feet on either side of the aforementioned
centerline. The easement crosses the Frank
property for a distance of 3,216.3 feet.
Big Rivers further alleged that it was not required to establish
necessity for the right of ingress and egress across Frank’s
remaining property; Big Rivers claimed that it was only required
to establish necessity for the easement itself and not for the
limited right of ingress and egress.
On June 6, 2001, a hearing was held for the purpose of
resolving these issues.
At that time Frank requested additional
time to file a memorandum in support of her motion to dismiss.
The trial court granted Frank’s request and on June 15, 2001,
she tendered a memorandum in support of her motion to dismiss.
On June 27, 2001, the trial court entered an order denying
Frank’s motion to dismiss and an order denying Big Rivers’
motion for interlocutory judgment.
As for Frank’s motion to
dismiss, the trial court reasoned that dismissal was unwarranted
as the errors alleged by Frank were curable through the
amendment process.
As for Big Rivers’ motion for interlocutory
judgment, the trial court reasoned that Big Rivers had failed to
describe the easement it sought to obtain with the requisite
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degree of particularity.
More specifically, the trial court
pointed out that Big Rivers had failed to describe a “point of
origination and point of termination” for the easement it had
requested.
In respect to the right of ingress and egress sought
by Big Rivers, the trial court ruled as follows:
If the condemnor desires the right to
ingress and egress by means other than over
the [dominant] estate, then it must describe
that easement in its complaint in
particularity and be responsible for the
diminution in value to the whole resulting
from that easement. In the event that the
petitioner wishes to impose the right of
ingress and egress upon the entire tract of
land (230 acres, plus or minus), it may do
so but should not then complain of the
compensation awarded to the condemnee. The
case of Tennessee Gas Transmission v.
Teater, Ky., 252 S.W.2d 674 (1952), clearly
stands for the proposition that the right of
ingress and egress is a right subject to
condemnation and is compensable to the
landlord.
The trial court granted Big Rivers leave to file amended
pleadings.
On July 12, 2001, Big Rivers filed an amended petition
and a motion for interlocutory judgment.
In its amended
petition, Big Rivers attempted to further describe the easement
it sought to obtain as follows:
Easement Tract No.1
The easement acquired shall be 100 feet
in width and shall be 50 feet on either side
of the following described centerline:
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Beginning at a corner marked by a dead
tree and a corner fence post, as shown on
the attached plat, thence in a northwest
direction a distance of 337.5 feet to a
point in the property line, marked by a
fence, of Carrie Frank, which marks the
beginning point of the easement; thence
along the following centerline and 50 feet
on either side thereof south 10 degrees 43
minutes 35 seconds west 372.1 feet to the
property line marked by a fence, of Carrie
Frank.
Easement Tract No.2
The easement acquired shall be 100 feet
in width and shall be 50 feet on either side
of the following described centerline:
Beginning at the intersection of two
fences at a corner of the Carrie Frank
property, thence in a southeast direction
712 feet to a point in the fence line of the
Carrie Frank property, which marks the
beginning point of the easement; thence
along the following centerline and 50 feet
on either side thereof south 10 degree[s] 43
minutes 35 seconds west a total of 1784.9
feet; thence south 20 degrees 43 minutes 23
seconds west 1059.3 feet to a point in the
property line of Carrie Frank, marked by a
fence, which point is 910.8 feet from a
corner fence post on the southwest corner of
the Frank property.
In total, Easement Tract No.1 and
Easement Tract No.2 contain 7.38 acres, more
or less.
On July 18, 2001, a second hearing was held for the
purpose of addressing Big Rivers’ amended petition and motion
for interlocutory judgment.
The trial court heard extensive
arguments from both parties, after which it concluded that Big
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Rivers had failed to describe the right of ingress and egress it
had requested with any degree of particularity.
The trial court
acknowledged that Big Rivers had a right to ingress and egress
upon Frank’s remaining property for the purpose of maintaining
and operating its easement, however, the trial court determined
that Big Rivers had failed to describe, with any specificity,
the area it sought to condemn for this purpose.
The trial court
also took issue with an allegation in the amended petition which
claimed that Big Rivers had the right to access the easement at
any location for the purpose of removing any obstructions
located within or without the easement “in such proximity to the
installed electric facilities so as to endanger those facilities
or create the threat of a service interruption.”5
The trial
court was of the opinion that this particular provision was
overly broad in the sense that it failed to delineate precisely
how far outside of the easement Big Rivers was permitted to go.
Consequently, the trial court denied Big Rivers’ motion for
interlocutory judgment.
Once again, however, the trial court
granted Big Rivers leave to file amended pleadings.
On August 1, 2001, Big Rivers filed a motion
requesting the trial court’s permission to file an amended
petition, which purported to restrict its right to access the
easement under the aforementioned “danger tree provision” to a
5
Counsel for Big Rivers labeled this provision the “danger tree provision.”
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“maximum distance of seventy-five (75) feet from the centerline
of the easement.”
On August 8, 2001, the trial court granted
Big Rivers’ motion and entered an order requiring the previously
appointed commissioners to file a supplemental report assessing
the fair market value of Frank’s property in light of the
amended petition.
August 9, 2001.
Big Rivers filed its amended petition on
On August 14, 2001, the commissioners filed a
report which assessed the total reduction in the fair market
value of Frank’s property at $19,501.00.
On August 18, 2001, Frank filed an answer to the
amended petition, in which she averred, among other defenses,
that Big Rivers had failed to prove that it needed an “access
easement across and upon all of [her land.]”6
Frank further
averred that Big Rivers had failed to “describe[ ] a particular
route by metes and bounds of the exact location of where [Big
Rivers], its agents, employees, and all other persons in behalf
of [Big Rivers] will travel in crossing [her] property in
getting to and from the primary easement.”
On August 27, 2001,
Frank filed a motion for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of
necessity in respect to the general right of ingress and egress
sought by Big Rivers.
Frank also requested the trial court to
issue an order requiring Big Rivers to provide a “metes and
6
In other words, Frank once again denied that Big Rivers had a right to
ingress and egress upon her property “at all locations” for the purpose of
maintaining and operating the easement it sought to condemn.
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bounds” description of the right of ingress and egress it sought
to obtain.
On August 29, 2001, Big Rivers filed a motion for
interlocutory judgment.
Big Rivers insisted that it was
“entitled to the limited right of ingress and egress[.]”
Big
Rivers described the right of ingress and egress it sought to
obtain as follows:
The right of reasonable ingress and egress
across [Frank’s remaining lands] to
facilitate performance of the rights sought
in this amended verified petition, except
that ingress and egress shall be along
existing public roads and farm roads, where
practicable.
Big Rivers also insisted that the trial court had already
decided the issue of ingress and egress in its favor.
Big
Rivers claimed that the only issue then before the trial court
concerned the so-called “danger tree provision.”
Big Rivers
further alleged that it had amended its petition to address the
concerns expressed by the trial court in this respect.
On September 5, 2001, yet another hearing was held for
the purpose of addressing Big Rivers’ amended petition and
motion for interlocutory judgment.
Once again, the trial court
heard arguments from both parties, after which it suggested that
Big Rivers omit the words “where practicable” from its
description of the right of ingress and egress it sought to
obtain.
The trial court opined that the phrase “where
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reasonably possible” provided a more precise description.
The
trial court did not rule on Frank’s motion for an evidentiary
hearing at that time.
On September 10, 2001, Frank filed a memorandum in
support of her motion for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of
necessity.
Frank insisted that she was entitled to an
evidentiary hearing on this issue pursuant to KRS 416.610(4),
which provides in relevant part as follows:
If the owner has filed answer or pleading
putting in issue the right of the petitioner
to condemn the property or use and
occupation thereof sought to be condemned,
the court shall, without intervention of
jury, proceed forthwith to hear and
determine whether or not the petitioner has
such right.
Frank further insisted that it was not within the trial court’s
discretion to decide whether to hold a hearing on the issue of
necessity; she claimed that such a hearing was mandatory under
the statute.
On October 15, 2001, the trial court entered an
opinion and order denying Frank’s motion for an evidentiary
hearing.
The trial court reasoned that Frank had failed to
allege any “factual basis which would put at issue the right of
[Big Rivers] to condemn the secondary easements.”
The trial
court stated that “[Frank’s] objections with respect to whether
the secondary easements are condemnable are questions of law,
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not fact.”
The trial court went on to note that Frank “has been
afforded every opportunity to present her side of the case
through numerous briefs and several oral arguments[,]” thereby
satisfying the hearing requirements of KRS 416.610(4).
In
respect to Frank’s contention that a right of ingress and egress
across her entire property was unnecessary, the trial court
ruled as follows:
[I]t may be that during the life of the
primary easement it will never be necessary
for [Petitioner] to encroach upon any other
portion of Respondent’s lands. This would
seem likely given that there are currently
two country roads which provide access to
the primary easement.
However, it may also be that some now
unforeseeable need to encroach upon another
portion of the land may arise in the future.
For this reason, it would be impossible for
this Court to determine this issue
prospectively. The better option is to
include the concept of “necessity” in the
description of the secondary easement, and
to allow a fact-finder to determine the
necessity if a dispute arises in the future.
Therefore, the Court recommends that the
right of ingress and egress be described as
follows:
“the right of ingress and egress
across the remaining lands of
respondent where reasonably
necessary to facilitate
performance of the rights sought
in this Petition, except that
ingress and egress shall be along
then existing public roads, and if
none, then existing farm roads,
and if none, then where reasonably
possible subject to any actual
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damage caused by petitioner, its
successors or assigns” [emphases
original].
Petitioner would thus have a standard
by which to conform its actions.
On November 13, 2001, the trial court entered findings
of fact, conclusions of law and an interlocutory judgment in
conformity with its opinion and order entered on October 15,
2001.
Specifically, the trial court concluded that Big Rivers
had the authority to condemn the easement described in its
amended petition and that Big Rivers was entitled to the right
of ingress and egress across Frank’s remaining property for the
purpose of operating and maintaining its easement, “but [that]
such right of ingress and egress [was] a factor to be considered
in determining the after value of [Frank’s] property in the
event of a trial with respect to the issue of just
compensation.”7
This appeal followed.8
Frank claims that she was entitled to an evidentiary
hearing on the issue of necessity in respect to the right of
ingress and egress requested by Big Rivers.
Frank claims the
burden was on Big Rivers to establish that it needed the right
7
“Such a burden is an encroachment on the dominion, reduces the marketable
value of the property, and is a damage for which compensation must be paid.”
Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. Million, 314 Ky. 137, 143, 234 S.W.2d 152,
156 (1950)(citing Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. Jackman, 311 Ky. 507,
509, 224 S.W.2d 660 (1949)).
8
Frank and Big Rivers filed exceptions to the Commissioner’s report pursuant
to KRS 416.620 along with a request for a jury trial on the issue of damages.
Ratliff v. Fiscal Court of Caldwell County, Ky., 617 S.W.2d 36, 39 (1981),
recognized the right of an interlocutory appeal.
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of ingress and egress across and upon her remaining property for
the purpose of maintaining and operating its easement.
Frank
insists that Big Rivers failed to satisfy its burden in this
respect.
We disagree.
First and foremost, it has long been the law of this
Commonwealth that the right of ingress and egress is a right
subject to acquisition by condemnation.9
The following
annotation adequately summarizes the issue:
In order that the owner of an easement
may perform the duty of keeping it in
repair, he has the right to enter the
servient estate at all reasonable times to
effect the necessary repairs and
maintenance, or even to make original
constructions necessary for enjoyment of the
easement. Such right is an incident of the
easement, and is sometimes called a
“secondary easement.” Such secondary
easements can be exercised only when
necessary, and in such a reasonable manner
as not to increase needlessly the burden on,
or go beyond the boundaries of, the servient
estate [footnotes omitted].10
9
See e.g., Rogers v. Tennessee Gas & Transmission Co., 304 Ky. 863, 202
S.W.2d 737 (1947).
10
25 Am.Jur.2d, Easements and Licenses, § 95 (1996). See also SMB
Investments v. Iowa-Illinois Gas and Electric Co., Iowa., 329 N.W.2d 635, 638
(1983)(quoting Thompson, Real Property, § 428 (1961)):
“The right to enter upon the servient tenement
for the purpose of repairing or renewing an
artificial structure, constituting an easement, is
called a “secondary easement,” a mere incident of the
easement that passes by express or implied grant, or
is acquired by prescription. The owner of the
dominant estate may enter on the servient tenement,
and there do any act necessary for the proper use of
the easement. This secondary easement can be
exercised only when necessary, and in such a
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Since the right to reasonable ingress and egress upon
a servient estate for the purpose of maintaining and operating a
permanent easement is a right that flows with the easement by
implication, it necessarily follows that an entity seeking to
condemn an easement for any authorized purpose need only
establish necessity for the easement itself, and not for the
limited right of ingress and egress.
In other words, because
Big Rivers was entitled to a permanent easement across Frank’s
land for the purpose of constructing and operating an electric
transmission line, it was also entitled to such use of Frank’s
land as reasonably necessary to enjoy that easement.11
Thus,
Frank was not entitled to a hearing on the issue of necessity in
respect to the right of ingress and egress requested by Big
Rivers in its condemnation petition.12
Nevertheless, we agree
with the trial court that Frank had “every opportunity to
reasonable manner as not to needlessly increase the
burden upon the servient tenement.
The grant of the easement carries with it by
implication whatever incidental right is necessary to
its beneficial enjoyment, provided the grantor has
power to bestow it.”
11
See Farmer v. Kentucky Utilities Co., Ky., 642 S.W.2d 579 (1982). “It is
evident, however, that the Kentucky Utilities Company is limited in the
manner and extent of its usage of the servient estate in that only so much
thereof may be encroached upon as is necessary to the natural and reasonable
use of its primary easement.” Id. at 581.
12
Furthermore, the party challenging a condemnation petition bears the burden
of establishing the lack of necessity. See e.g., Decker v. City of Somerset,
Ky.App., 838 S.W.2d 417, 423 (1992); Embry v. City of Caneyville, Ky., 397
S.W.2d 141, 143 (1965); and McGee v. City of Williamstown, Ky., 308 S.W.2d
795, 797 (1957).
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present her side of the case through numerous briefs and several
oral arguments[.]”
In addition, we hasten to point out that the
limited right of ingress and egress possessed by Big Rivers may
only be exercised in the event that Big Rivers is unable to
access its easement via “then existing public roads and, if
none, then existing farm roads[.]”
Moreover, Frank is entitled
to any “actual damage” caused by Big Rivers in the exercise of
this right.
That is to say, Big Rivers is not permitted to roam
at will over Frank’s property.
Quite the contrary, Big Rivers
must exercise its limited right of ingress and egress “only when
necessary, and in such a reasonable manner as not to increase
needlessly the burden on . . . the servient estate” [footnote
omitted].13
As for Frank’s contention that Big Rivers failed to
establish that the limited right of ingress and egress across
her property is necessary, the following observation provided by
the Supreme Court of Virginia is particularly on point:
Whenever an electric transmission line
is erected, many citizens of the areas
served become dependent upon that facility
for light, heat and power. Once installed,
its maintenance is necessary for their
health, comfort and welfare.
It is common knowledge that hurricanes
and tornadoes of unusual violence cause
widespread destruction. It is also known
that transmission lines are among the chief
13
25 Am.Jur.2d, Easements and Licenses, § 95 (1996).
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victims of that character of elemental
disturbance. When extensively damaged,
prompt repair of electric transmission lines
and resumption of service becomes urgent
public necessities.14
Based upon the foregoing reasons, the findings of
fact, conclusions of law, and interlocutory judgment entered by
the Breckinridge Circuit Court on November 13, 2001, is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Herbert M. O’Reilly
Hardinsburg, Kentucky
Frank Stainback
James M. Miller
Owensboro, Kentucky
14
Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. Webb, 196 Va. 555, 84 S.E.2d 735, 740
(1954).
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