DODD & DODD ATTORNEYS, PLLC v. WILLIAM R. BURKETT, JR; HEATHER BURKETT; WILLIAM R. BURKETT, III; ESTATE OF DOROTHY BURKETT, (ALLEN P. DODD III AND MARTIN N. KUTE, PSC, CO-ADMINISTRATORS); ESTATE OF WILLIAM R. BURKETT, SR (ALLEN P. DODD III AND MARTIN N. KUTE, PSC, CO-ADMINISTRATORS); AND MARY ALICE RAISOR and WILLIAM R. BURKETT, III; AND HEATHER BURKETT v. MARY ALICE RAISOR AND WILLIAM R. BURKETT, JR
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RENDERED: JULY 3, 2003; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-002471-MR
DODD & DODD ATTORNEYS, PLLC
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JUDITH McDONALD-BURKMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CI-001718
WILLIAM R. BURKETT, JR; HEATHER
BURKETT; WILLIAM R. BURKETT, III;
ESTATE OF DOROTHY BURKETT, (ALLEN P.
DODD III AND MARTIN N. KUTE, PSC,
CO-ADMINISTRATORS); ESTATE OF WILLIAM
R. BURKETT, SR (ALLEN P. DODD III AND
MARTIN N. KUTE, PSC, CO-ADMINISTRATORS);
AND MARY ALICE RAISOR
and
NO.
WILLIAM R. BURKETT, III;
AND HEATHER BURKETT
v.
APPELLEES
2001-CA-002561-MR
CROSS-APPELLANTS
CROSS-APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JUDITH McDONALD-BURKMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CI-001718
MARY ALICE RAISOR AND
WILLIAM R. BURKETT, JR
CROSS-APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART
REVERSING IN PART,
AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BAKER, GUIDUGLI, AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
Heather Burkett and William R. Burkett, III,
named beneficiaries in a will their grandfather executed in
1985, seek to intervene in the action their father commenced to
test the validity of that will.
By orders entered September 17,
2001, and October 11, 2001, the Jefferson Circuit Court denied
their request.
The grandchildren contend that the denial was an
abuse of the trial court’s discretion.
We agree and so reverse
and remand.
William R. Burkett, Sr., died on February 13, 2001.
He was survived by his wife, Dorothy Burkett, and by his son,
William, Jr.
For several years prior to William Sr.’s death, he
had employed a caretaker, Mary Alice Raisor, to assist him with
housekeeping and with the care of Dorothy, who suffered from
Alzheimer’s disease.
Raisor claims that in 1999 William Sr.
executed trusts and a will leaving virtually all of his estate
(in excess, apparently, of $600,000.00) to her.
On March 9,
2001, William Jr. filed suit in Jefferson Circuit Court
contesting Raisor’s claim and seeking a declaration as to the
validity of Raisor’s alleged instruments as well as a 1985 will
in which William Sr. left his estate to Dorothy if she survived
2
him for ninety days and otherwise to William Jr., William III,
and Heather.
While the suit was pending, on April 1, 2001, less
than ninety days after William Sr.’s death, Dorothy died.
Her
estate, too, it is alleged, passes to Raisor under the 1999
instruments and to William Jr., William III, and Heather under a
1985 will the companion to William Sr.’s.
Notwithstanding the fact that upon Dorothy’s death
William III and Heather became beneficiaries with present
interests under the 1985 wills, neither William Jr. nor Raisor
moved to join them in the suit or served them with formal
notice.
Instead, on May 10, 2001, William Jr. and Raisor agreed
to divide the estates evenly between themselves and to submit
the 1985 wills to probate.
By agreed judgment entered May 11,
2001, the circuit court approved the settlement.
On June 25, 2001, William III and Heather moved,
ostensibly under CR 60.02, to intervene in the suit and to have
the settlement vacated or at least to have their rights under
the 1985 wills declared.
their motion.
As noted above, the trial court denied
The court explained that “because Movants are not
party to this action, Movants have no standing to bring a motion
under CR 60.02, and the Court has no jurisdiction to determine
their substantive rights.”
It is from that determination that
William III and Heather have appealed.
3
As far as it goes, the trial court’s ruling is
correct.
A non-party does not have standing to invoke CR 60.02.
A non-party whose interests are sufficiently affected by a law
suit may intervene in the suit, however, in some circumstances
even after judgment has been entered.
by CR 24, not CR 60.02.
Intervention is governed
Notwithstanding their invocation of the
later rule, William III and Heather clearly sought intervention
and duly referred to CR 24 as well.
The trial court’s ruling
erroneously ignores their request to intervene.
CR 24.01 provides in part that
[u]pon timely application anyone shall be
permitted to intervene in an action (a) when
a statute confers an unconditional right to
intervene, or (b) when the applicant claims
an interest relating to the property or
transaction which is the subject of the
action and is so situated that the
disposition of the action may as a practical
matter impair or impede the applicant’s
ability to protect that interest, unless
that interest is adequately represented by
existing parties.
Obviously William III and Heather claim a sufficient
interest in their grandfather’s and his wife’s estates to invoke
this rule,1 and just as obviously William Jr.’s suit solely on
his own behalf did not adequately represent William III’s and
Heather’s interests.2
But was their application for intervention
1
West v. Goldstein, Ky., 830 S.W.2d 379 (1992); Ambassador
College v. Combs, Ky., 636 S.W.2d 305 (1982).
2
Lischy v. Schrader, 104 Ky. 657, 47 S.W. 611 (1898).
4
timely, coming as it did some forty-one days after entry of the
agreed judgment?
Post-judgment intervenors bear “a special
burden of justifying the apparent lack of timeliness.”3
In assessing an intervention’s timeliness, courts have
found consideration of the following factors helpful:
(1)the point to which the suit has
progressed; (2) the purpose for which
intervention is sought; (3) the length of
time preceding the application during which
the proposed intervenor knew or reasonably
should have known of his interest in the
case; (4) the prejudice to the original
parties due to the proposed intervenor’s
failure, after he or she knew or reasonably
should have known of his or her interest in
the case, to apply promptly for
intervention; and (5) the existence of
unusual circumstances militating against or
in favor of intervention.4
Here, of course, the suit has progressed to judgment,
but judgment was entered only two months after the suit was
filed.
William III and Heather seek to prevent what they
believe is the misappropriation of substantial testamentary
gifts from their grandfather, a valid purpose with a firm claim.
Although William III and Heather were aware of
Raisor’s claims and of their father’s suit challenging them,
they did not, they assert, see their grandfather’s 1985 will or
3
Monticello Electric Plant Board v. Board of Education of Wayne
County, Ky., 310 S.W.2d 272, 274 (1958).
4
Cuyahoga Valley Railway Company v. Tracey, 6 F.3d 389, 396 (6th
Cir. 1993).
5
know of its gifts to them until after the settlement was
entered, at which time they immediately sought local counsel
(they are residents of Washington state) and in little over a
month filed their motion to intervene.
They have thus asserted
their rights with reasonable promptness.
Their intervention,
furthermore, will not unduly prejudice either William Jr. or
Raisor, both of whom should have recognized that the
grandchildren’s interests required express consideration.
Unlike most final judgments, moreover, which enjoy a
strong presumption of correctness, this judgment is subject to
KRS 394.280.
A person interested in a will contest but not
served or made a party to the contest may, under that statute,
“within three (3) years after the final decision in the Circuit
Court, by petition in equity, impeach the decision and have a
retrial of the question.”
The general assembly, in other words,
has sought to discourage settlements, such as the one before us,
among only some of the persons interested in a decedent’s estate
by making it possible for excluded beneficiaries to reopen the
matter.
The statute is an unusual circumstance strongly
favoring the grandchildren’s intervention.
For these reasons, we conclude that William III and
Heather’s motion to intervene was timely and should have been
granted, notwithstanding the fact that the agreed judgment was
already final.
6
Because William III and Heather have not yet become
parties in the trial court, this Court’s jurisdiction extends no
further than their motion to intervene.5
as to the merits of their claim.
We express no opinion
Upon remand, the trial court
will permit William III and Heather to file an intervening
complaint, in compliance with CR 24.03, which shall then be
responded to and tried according to the civil rules.
William Jr.’s former attorney, Allen Dodd, III, has
also appealed from the trial court’s order.
William Jr.
apparently agreed to pay Dodd fifty-percent of any amount
William Jr. recovered.
Dodd claims that William Jr.’s recovery
is the half of the estate apportioned to him under the agreement
with Raisor, regardless of whether William Jr. shares that half
with William III and Heather.
The trial court denied Dodd’s
motion for a ruling to that effect on the ground that William
III and Heather had not been made parties.
We agree with the
trial court that William III and Heather are entitled to an
opportunity to respond to Dodd’s claim, just as they are
entitled to an opportunity to respond to the purported agreement
between their father and Raisor.
them those opportunities.
Their intervention will give
In the meantime, Dodd’s motion is
premature.
5
Ashland Public Library Board of Trustees v. Scott, Ky., 610
S.W.2d 895 (1981).
7
Accordingly, we reverse the September 17, 2001, order
of the Jefferson Circuit Court denying William Burkett III and
Heather Burkett’s motion to intervene, affirm that order to the
extent that it denies attorney Dodd’s motion for fees, and
remand the matter to the Jefferson Circuit Court for additional
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
BAKER, JUDGE, CONCURS WITH RESULT.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE, CONCURS.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT DODD & DODD
ATTORNEYS, PLLC:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE WILLIAM R.
BURKETT, JR.:
Allan P. Dodd, III
Dodd & Dodd Attorneys, PLLC
Louisville, Kentucky
William R. Burkett, Jr., pro se
Des Moines, Washington
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE RAISOR:
BRIEF FOR CROSS-APPELLANTS
WILLIAM R. BURKETT, III AND
HEATHER BURKETT:
Philip C. Kimball
Louisville, Kentucky
Alan N. Linker
J. Gregory Troutman
Morris, Garlove, Waterman &
Johnson PLLC
Louisville, Kentucky
8
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