A.W., A CHILD UNDER EIGHTEEN v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
MAY 2, 2003; 10:00 a.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-002411-DG
A.W., A CHILD UNDER EIGHTEEN
v.
APPELLANT
ON DISCRETIONARY REVIEW FROM CAMPBELL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM J. WEHR, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-XX-00021
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JOHNSON, KNOPF, AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
This matter is on discretionary review from an
order of the Campbell Circuit Court which affirmed an order by
the juvenile division of the Campbell District Court holding a
public offender in contempt for violation of the conditions of
her probation.
Although we agree with the circuit court that
the juvenile court was within its authority to impose contempt,
we conclude that the juvenile court’s exercise of this authority
did not afford basic due process to the child.
Hence, we
reverse and remand for further proceedings.
The underlying facts of this action are not in
dispute.
In February of 2001, A.W., a juvenile (d.o.b. February
4, 1987), came before the juvenile division of the Campbell
District Court charged with one count of terroristic
threatening,1 and two counts of fourth-degree assault.2
She
admitted to the charges, and her case was continued for
disposition.
court.
On March 21, 2001, A.W. again appeared before the
At that time, the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ)
submitted the following recommendations, which the juvenile
court adopted:
[A.W.] will attend and complete anger
management counseling through Family
Services of Northern Kentucky.
[A.W.] will receive no new charges: public
status or curfew.
[A.W.] will abide by curfew. 8 PM during the
week and 9 PM on weekends, to be reviewed at
a later date by her worker.
30 days probated detention until the age of
18.
All parties to cooperate with the Department
of Juvenile Justice.
In May of 2001, A.W. was charged with an additional
count of harassment,3 to which she admitted.
1
KRS 508.080.
2
KRS 508.030.
3
KRS 525.070.
2
On June 24, 2001,
the DJJ filed an affidavit alleging that A.W. had failed to
abide by her curfew, in violation of the conditions of her
probation.
The following day, the juvenile court held a
hearing, at which the court advised A.W. that it was a contempt
hearing for violation of her probation conditions.
admitted to the violations.
A.W.
The juvenile court found A.W. in
contempt and imposed sixty days of detention, but it probated
all but fifteen days for the contempt of court.
A.W. then appealed from this ruling to the Campbell
Circuit Court, arguing that the juvenile court lacked the
authority to sentence her to sixty days in detention for
contempt of court.
She asserted that the juvenile court was
limited to revoking her probation and imposing no more than
forty-five days of detention.
In an order entered on October
24, 2001, the circuit court rejected these arguments, and held
that the juvenile court has the authority to punish violations
of probation conditions through its contempt powers.
This Court
accepted A.W.’s motion for discretionary review.
A.W. concedes that she did not object to the juvenile
court treating her probation violation as a contempt.
Furthermore, and contrary to the argument in her brief, the
juvenile court clearly informed A.W. at the start of the hearing
that this matter would proceed in that manner.
Consequently,
she failed to properly preserve the issue for appellate review.
3
Nevertheless, A.W. contends that the juvenile court’s
action in holding her in contempt amounted to palpable error.
Under RCr 10.26, “[a] palpable error which affects the
substantial rights of a party may be considered by the court on
motion for a new trial or by an appellate court on appeal, even
though insufficiently raised or preserved for review, and
appropriate relief may be granted upon a determination that
manifest injustice has resulted from the error.”
A.W. primarily
argues that the juvenile court lacked the authority to punish
her violation of probation conditions as contempt.
Even if the
juvenile court had such authority, A.W. further asserts that the
juvenile court violated her due process rights by failing to
follow the proper procedures for a finding of criminal contempt.
In either case, A.W. contends that the juvenile court’s action
rises to the level of palpable error.
We agree.
It is well established that the juvenile court has the
inherent authority to punish violations of its orders as
contempt.4
Furthermore, there is express statutory authority
which anticipates that a juvenile court has the power to hold a
child in contempt.
Indeed, KRS 610.010(10) specifically
provides that “[n]othing in this chapter shall prevent the
District Court from holding a child in contempt of court to
enforce valid court orders previously issued by the court.”
4
Young v. Knight, Ky., 329 S.W.2d 195, 200 (1959).
4
KRS
610.265(1), KRS 610.265(5) and KRS 635.055 each set out
provisions for the detention of a juvenile who is charged with
being in contempt of court.
Finally, KRS 635.083(1) gives the
juvenile court continuing jurisdiction over a juvenile who is
convicted or adjudged delinquent of three or more offenses.
“This jurisdiction shall continue even after the service of
incarceration or other court-ordered punishment in the form of
conditional discharge.
Violation of the terms and conditions of
conditional discharge shall be punished as contempt of court.”
Based upon these statutes, we conclude that the General Assembly
clearly intended for the juvenile court to exercise its inherent
contempt powers.
A.W. concedes that the juvenile court has the inherent
authority to punish violations of its orders as contempt.
However, she asserts that it was inappropriate for the court to
use that authority to punish her violations of the conditions of
her probation.
Furthermore, A.W. contends that the juvenile
court circumvented the probation process by finding her in
contempt.
Rather, she asserts that the juvenile court was
limited to revoking her probation.
A.W. notes that KRS 635.060 sets out the options
available to a juvenile court at a dispositional hearing
regarding a public offense, including (1) restitution or
reparation, (2) probation, home incarceration, or supervision,
5
(3) commitment to the custody or guardianship of the Department
of Juvenile Justice or another suitable child-caring facility or
person, and (4) confinement in an approved juvenile detention
program or facility.
A juvenile court may order any combination
of such dispositions.5
Because the statute does not list contempt as a
permitted disposition for violations of conditions of probation,
A.W. argues that the General Assembly did not intend for the
juvenile court to exercise such powers.
But as noted by the
circuit court, KRS 635.060 merely addresses the dispositional
alternatives which are available to the juvenile court when a
child is adjudicated as a public offender.
That statute does
not address the court’s contempt powers.
A.W. also cites authority from other jurisdictions
which hold that contempt of court should not be superimposed as
an additional remedy in a probation violation setting if the act
that occasions the violation itself is not otherwise criminal.6
These cases all deal with the use of criminal contempt to
sanction an adult’s violation of the conditions of his or her
probation.
5
As noted above, there is specific statutory
KRS 635.060(6).
6
People v. Johnson, 20 Cal.App.4th 106, 24 Cal. Rptr.2d 628 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1993); State v. Williams, 560 A.2d 100, 104, 234 N.J.Super.
84 (N.J. Super. App. Div., 1989); Alfred v. State, 758 P.2d 130
(Alaska App., 1988); Williams v. State, 72 Md. App. 233, 528 A.2d 507
(1987).
6
authority which recognizes that a juvenile court may use its
contempt powers to punish violations of its orders.
Furthermore, the juvenile court’s relationship with a
public offender is significantly different than a court’s
relationship with an adult offender.
In the adult context,
probation is essentially an agreement between the court and the
defendant.
The defendant agrees to be supervised and to live
under the conditions imposed by the court in exchange for the
court’s agreement to suspend imposition of the defendant’s
sentence.
If the defendant is not willing to accept the court’s
conditions, the defendant is free to refuse probation and insist
on a normal sentence.7
If a defendant violates the conditions of
probation and the violation is not a separate criminal offense,
the court may not impose any additional sentence; it is limited
to revoking probation and imposing the probated sentence.8
In contrast, public offender dispositional provisions
are intentionally more lenient than the youthful or adult
offender provisions.9
But at the same time, the juvenile system
is much more focused on treatment and rehabilitation than is the
7
8
9
See State v. Aulilye, 57 P.3d 711 (Alaska App., 2002).
Commonwealth v. Tiryung, Ky., 709 S.W.2d 454, 456-57 (1986).
Commonwealth v. W.E.B., Ky., 985 S.W.2d 344, 345 (1998).
7
adult system.10
To this end, the juvenile court has much broader
and longer-lasting authority over a public offender than a court
could exercise over an adult offender.
As noted above, KRS
635.083 authorizes a juvenile court to retain jurisdiction over
certain minors even after the service of incarceration or other
court-ordered punishment.
Thus, juvenile probation does not precisely mirror
adult probation.
While, in theory, a juvenile could refuse to
accept the court’s conditions of probation and insist upon
detention, the court has the authority, in certain
circumstances, to impose conditions on the juvenile’s release
even after the period of detention is served.
In sum, juvenile
probation is not a contract between the court and the defendant,
but it is an extension of the court’s parens patriae authority
over a child who has been committed to the care of the
Commonwealth.
Consequently, we hold that a court may impose contempt
upon a juvenile who has violated the court’s orders, including
conditions of probation.11
Nonetheless, A.W. raises a legitimate
10
Jefferson County Dept. for Human Services v. Carter, Ky., 795
S.W.2d 59, 61 (1990).
11
We have found authority from other jurisdictions which has
allowed a juvenile court to punish violations of conditions of
probation as contempt, subject to various statutory and due process
limitations. See In the Interest of Jane Doe, 96 Haw. 255; 30 P.3d
269 (2001); In re Michael G., 44 Cal. 3d 283, 747 P.2d 1152, 243 Cal.
Rptr. 224 (1988); In the Interest of D.L.D., 110 Wis.2d 168, 327
8
point about the juvenile court’s use of its contempt powers in
this case.
As long as she is on probation, the juvenile court
has the authority to revoke her probation upon a finding that
she failed to comply with the conditions which the court has
imposed on her.
In addition, if the probation violations amount
to a separate offense, A.W. may be charged accordingly.
However, we caution that a contempt proceeding under
these circumstances is not the functional equivalent of a
probation revocation.
The juvenile court should refrain from
using its contempt authority to punish violations of probation
conditions unless it finds that the other options are either
inappropriate or unavailable.
Clearly, the court may use its
contempt authority to sanction a juvenile’s repeated defiance of
the court’s orders.
And as we have already noted, the juvenile
court has the authority to punish violations of its orders as
contempt, even after she completes her period of probation.
But
using contempt as the first sanction for a probation violation
diminishes the effectiveness of the threat of revoking probation
and may undermine the credibility of the court with the
juvenile.
N.W.2d 682 (1983); In the interest of Darlene C., 278 S.C. 664, 301
S.E.2d 136 (1983); State v. Norlund, 31 Wash. App. 725, 644 P.2d 724
(1982); State ex rel. L.E.A. v. Hammergren, 294 N.W.2d 705 (Minn.
1980). See also Maggie L. Hughey, Note, Holding a Child in Contempt,
46 Duke L.J. 353 (1996).
9
Moreover, there are significant due process
considerations when a juvenile court chooses to impose contempt
instead of merely revoking the juvenile’s probation.
Although
A.W. did not object at the hearing, we find that the procedures
which the court followed in finding A.W. in contempt did not
comply with her substantive due process rights.
Before a guilty plea or an admission by a juvenile in
a juvenile proceeding may be accepted by the court, it must be
determined that the plea was voluntarily and intelligently made
by a competent person.12
In fact, RCr 8.08 states that the court
“shall not accept the plea without determining that the plea is
made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the
charges.”
Pleading guilty involves a waiver of significant
constitutional rights, and a waiver of these rights may not be
presumed from a silent record.13
“The court must question the
accused to determine if he has a full understanding of what the
plea connotes and of its consequences, and this determination
should become part of the record.”14
There is no indication in
12
See Centers v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 799 S.W.2d 51, 54
(1990).
13
Centers, supra.
14
Id., citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709,
1712, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). The principles of Boykin v. Alabama
apply to juvenile adjudications. D.R. v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 64
S.W.3d 292, 294, n. 2 (2001).
10
the record that the court explained to A.W. the consequences of
her admission to the facts alleged in the DJJ’s affidavit.
Furthermore, KRS 610.080(1) requires that an
adjudication “shall be made on the basis of an admission or
confession of the child to the court or by the taking of
evidence.”
A review of the transcript shows that A.W. did not
speak at the contempt hearing except to state her name and birth
date.
Thereafter, her attorney stated that he had reviewed the
DJJ’s affidavit with A.W., and while A.W. “does not admit each
and every allegation, . . . she substantially admits at [sic]
the contempt.”
Although the juvenile court could have been
authorized to accept counsel’s statement as a stipulation to a
probation violation, the court was not authorized to accept it
as A.W.’s admission of guilt to contempt of court.
In addition, contempt of court involves more than a
mere violation of a court directive.
Contempt is the willful
disobedience toward, or open disrespect for, the rules or orders
of a court.15
And criminal contempt, which has as its purpose to
punish noncompliance rather than to coerce compliance, is
conduct “which amounts to an obstruction of justice, and which
tends to bring the court into disrepute."16
15
16
Furthermore,
Commonwealth v. Burge, Ky., 947 S.W.2d 805, 808 (1996).
Id.
11
indirect criminal contempt, which is committed outside the
presence of the court, may be punished only in proceedings that
satisfy due process.17
The juvenile court failed to make any
finding that A.W.’s conduct amounted to indirect criminal
contempt.
Consequently, the juvenile court’s order finding A.W.
in contempt must be set aside and this matter must be remanded
for a new hearing.
In addition to affording A.W. the rights to
which she is entitled, the court should also make it clear that
less restrictive alternatives were considered and rejected.18
Finally, we come to A.W.’s argument that the juvenile
court sentence of sixty days for contempt exceeds the forty-five
day maximum sentence allowed by KRS 635.060(4).
On the one
hand, KRS 635.060(4) provides that a juvenile offender who is
older than age fourteen but younger than age sixteen may be
confined for a period not to exceed forty-five days.
On the
other hand, KRS 600.060 states that “[n]ot withstanding any
other provision of KRS Chapter 600 to 645, the inherent contempt
power of the court shall not be diminished.”
Because KRS
600.060 specifically addresses the juvenile court’s contempt
powers, we conclude that it controls over the more general
17
Id., citing Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 45 S.Ct. 390,
69 L.Ed. 767 (1925).
18
See KRS 600.010(2)(c).
12
limitation on sentencing of public offenders contained in KRS
635.060(4).19
Therefore, we conclude that the juvenile court had
the authority to order A.W. placed in juvenile detention for up
to sixty days upon a proper finding of contempt of court.
Accordingly, the order of the Campbell Circuit Court
is reversed, and this matter is remanded to the juvenile
division of the Campbell District Court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
JOHNSON, JUDGE, CONCURS.
McANULTY, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
Timothy G. Arnold
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
Robert E. List
Assistant Campbell County
Attorney
Newport, Kentucky
19
See Commonwealth v. Phon, Ky., 17 S.W.3d 106, 107 (2000).
13
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