DAVINA JO WHEELER v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: August 29, 2003; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-002157-MR
DAVINA JO WHEELER
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BOYD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE C. DAVID HAGERMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CR-00201
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JUDGE.1
GUIDUGLI AND JOHNSON, JUDGES; AND HUDDLESTON, SENIOR
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Davina Jo Wheeler has appealed from the final
judgment and sentence entered by the Boyd Circuit Court on
September 28, 2001, following her conditional plea of guilty to
the charges of trafficking in a controlled substance within 1,000
yards of a school,2 selling a controlled substance to a
1
Senior Judge Joseph R. Huddleston sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 218A.1411.
minor,3 and trafficking in a controlled substance in the second
degree.4
Having concluded that the trial court properly denied
Wheeler=s motion to suppress, we affirm.
On September 8, 2000, at approximately 4:00 a.m.,
Officer Kenny Diamond of the Boyd County Police Department
received information from Jonathan Alexander, who was 16-years
old at the time, indicating that he had purchased marijuana from
Wheeler at her residence on Bellefonte Road in Ashland, Kentucky,
earlier that morning.5
Shortly thereafter, Officer Diamond
prepared a search warrant which described Wheeler=s residence on
Bellefonte Road as a place to be searched for marijuana and any
items used in the preparation, packaging and sale of marijuana.
The search warrant was based on the following affidavit signed by
Officer Diamond:
On the 8 day of September, 2000, at
approximately 0401 a.m., affiant received
information from Jonathan Matthew Alexander
that he had bought marijuana at the abovedescribed residence at approximately 0200
hours this date from Davina Wheeler.
Alexander stated he bought a $20 bag and that
he, another juvenile and Wheeler had consumed
the marijuana. Alexander stated that when
[Wheeler] sold him the marijuana, he could
hear her filling his [ ] order from a
quantity in the back room. Alexander stated
that he has bought marijuana from her at this
3
KRS 218A.1401.
4
KRS 218A.1413.
5
The information elicited from Alexander was obtained pursuant to a traffic
stop, the validity of which is not subject to collateral attack.
2
address over the past year. Based upon the
statement of Alexander, Affiant believes that
other marijuana my be found in the house,
along with evidence of the sale of marijuana.
The location is, to the belief of Affiant,
within 1,000 yards of Fairview High School.
The affidavit was reviewed by the Boyd District Court
judge and the search warrant was signed by the judge on the
morning of September 8, 2000.
The search was executed at
approximately 6:30 a.m. that morning.
Chief Paul Helton,
Sergeant Steve Sturgill and Officer Tony Moore assisted Officer
Diamond with the search.
Wheeler was present when the search was
conducted and she was read her Miranda6 rights, after which
Officer Diamond claims she admitted to Aselling drugs for about a
month.@7
According to Officer Diamond, Wheeler then directed the
officers to her bedroom where several bags of marijuana, an
unmarked bottle of pills, and drug paraphernalia were found.
Wheeler was subsequently taken to the Boyd County police station
where she signed a written statement waving her Miranda rights.
Officer Diamond then obtained a sworn statement from Wheeler in
which she admitted to transferring marijuana to Alexander, but
she denied selling it to him.8
6
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
7
Officer Diamond attributed this statement to Wheeler in his written report,
which was submitted on September 10, 2002.
8
Wheeler claimed she gave Alexander the drugs and told him, Anot to worry
about paying for it, that [she] had some extra marijuana and not to worry
about it.@
3
Wheeler was subsequently indicted by a Boyd County
grand jury on November 17, 2000, for trafficking in a controlled
substance within 1,000 yards of a school, selling a controlled
substance to a minor, and trafficking in a controlled substance
in the second degree.
On April 5, 2001, Wheeler filed a motion
to suppress the evidence seized from her residence arguing that
the search was violative of Section 10 of the Kentucky
Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.9
A suppression hearing was held on April 17, 2001,
and the trial court entered an order denying Wheeler=s motion on
April 19, 2001.
On April 27, 2001, Wheeler filed a motion pursuant to
RCr10 9.78 asking the trial court to enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law explaining why her motion to suppress was
denied.
On May 1, 2001, the trial court entered an order setting
forth the following specific findings and conclusions of law:
A review of the affidavit executed in
support of the search warrant reveals a
number of facts which the district judge was
able to consider. First of all, the alleged
sale of marijuana to the juvenile [Alexander]
occurred only two hours prior to the officer
interviewing the juvenile. The juvenile was
9
Wheeler also challenged the admissibility of the statements she made to
Officer Diamond during the search of her residence and she challenged the
validity of Count III of the indictment, (trafficking in a controlled
substance in the second degree). More specifically, Wheeler claimed that she
was entitled to a hearing on the issue of whether the statements she made to
Officer Diamond were obtained voluntarily and she claimed Count III of the
indictment was a lesser-included offense of Count I or II.
10
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
4
able to describe sufficient details about how
the transaction occurred including the back
room where the marijuana he purchased had
been obtained. The juvenile also made a
statement against interest when he
acknowledged that he and his friends had
consumed marijuana at that time with the
defendant. All of these statements by such a
young unsophisticated informant were
certainly sufficient for the district judge
to form a substantial basis for concluding
that a search would uncover evidence of a
crime.11
Wheeler subsequently filed a motion asking the trial
court to address (1) whether there was any duty to include in the
affidavit the veracity and basis of knowledge of the hearsay
information obtained from Alexander; and (2) whether any
independent investigation was required of Officer Diamond to
corroborate the information provided by Alexander, who the trial
court had labeled as an Aunsophisticated informant.@
On May 8,
2001, the trial court denied Wheeler=s motion stating that, Athere
was sufficient information before the district judge to allow him
to form a substantial basis for concluding that the search would
uncover evidence of a crime.@
The trial court further stated
that under the totality of the circumstances, Ait was not
necessary that any independent corroborating investigation occur
prior to issuance of the search warrant.@
11
The trial court cited Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76
L.Ed.2d 527, reh. den. 463 U.S. 1237, 104 S.Ct. 33, 77 L.Ed.2d 1453 (1983) and
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960),
overruled on other grounds, United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 100 S.Ct.
2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980), in support of its ruling.
5
On August 24, 2001, Wheeler entered a conditional
guilty plea to the charges contained in the indictment and a
final judgment and sentence was entered on September 28, 2001.
Wheeler received a prison sentence of five years on her
conviction for trafficking in a controlled substance within 1,000
yards of a school, six years on her conviction for selling a
controlled substance to a minor, and five years on her conviction
for trafficking in a controlled substance in the second degree.
The sentences were ordered to run concurrently for a total of six
years.
This appeal followed.
Wheeler claims the trial court erred by denying her
motion to suppress because the police search conducted on
September 8, 2000, violated the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and Section 10 of the Kentucky
Constitution.12
More specifically, Wheeler claims that the
affidavit upon which the search warrant was based did not provide
the issuing judge with a substantial basis for concluding that
probable cause existed to search her residence.
Thus, Wheeler
maintains that the items seized during the search should have
been suppressed.
12
We note at the outset that Section 10 of the Kentucky Constitution does not
provide any greater protection than the Fourth Amendment. See Colbert v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 43 S.W.3d 777, 780 (2001) (citing LaFollette v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 915 S.W.2d 747, 748 (1996)).
6
The proper standard of review was set forth in
Commonwealth v. Neal:13
An appellate court=s standard of review
of the trial court=s decision on a motion to
suppress requires that we first determine
whether the trial court=s findings of fact
are supported by substantial evidence. If
they are, then they are conclusive. RCr
9.78. Based on those findings of fact, we
must then conduct a de novo review of the
trial court=s application of the law to those
facts to determine whether its decision is
correct as a matter of law.14
The trial court determined in the case sub judice that
under the totality of the circumstances the affidavit was
sufficient to allow the issuing judge to make a practical
determination that a fair probability existed that contraband
would be found at Wheeler=s residence.
The trial court relied on
several factors in arriving at this conclusion: (1) the alleged
sale of marijuana had occurred only two hours prior to Officer=s
Diamond=s encounter with Alexander; (2) Alexander was able to
describe in particularity when and where the transaction took
place; and (3) Alexander had made a statement against his penal
interest when he admitted to smoking marijuana with Wheeler.15
Clearly, the trial court=s findings of fact were supported by
13
Ky.App., 84 S.W.3d 920, 923 (2002).
14
Id. (citing Adcock v. Commonwealth, Ky., 967 S.W.2d 6, 8 (1998); and
Commonwealth v. Opell, Ky.App., 3 S.W.3d 747, 751 (1999)).
15
The trial court did not mention that Alexander stated that he had bought
marijuana from Wheeler at this address over the past year.
7
substantial evidence.
The critical issue is A>whether the rule of
law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated.=@16
In Kentucky, the probable cause inquiry is limited to
the affidavit supporting the search warrant.17
In testing the
sufficiency of an affidavit, the Supreme Court of Kentucky has
adopted the Atotality of the circumstances@ approach set forth in
Gates.18
In Gates, the two-pronged test of Aguilar v. Texas,19
and Spinelli v. United States,20 was replaced by the lessstringent Atotality of the circumstances@ evaluation.21
Under
this standard, an issuing judge is required to examine the
Atotality of the circumstances@ as set forth in the affidavit to
determine whether, Athere is a fair probability that contraband
or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.@22
In
a case involving hearsay information, the veracity and basis of
knowledge of the person supplying the hearsay information plays
an important role in this analysis.
Nonetheless, when reviewing
16
Adcock, 967 S.W.2d at 8 (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690,
697, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996)).
17
Robinson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 550 S.W.2d 496, 497 (1977) (citing Caslin v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 491 S.W.2d 832, 834 (1973); and Bowen v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
251 S.W. 625 (1923)).
18
Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. (adopted for purposes of the Kentucky Constitution
in Beemer v. Commonwealth, Ky., 665 S.W.2d 912, 914 (1984)).
19
378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 273 (1964).
20
393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969).
21
Gates, supra.
22
Id. See also Commonwealth v. Hubble, Ky.App., 730 S.W.2d 532, 534 (1987)
(citing Beemer, supra).
8
the sufficiency of a search warrant affidavit, we must bear in
mind that the role of an appellate court is, Asimply to ensure
that the issuing [judge] had a substantial basis for concluding
that probable cause existed.@23
In the case sub judice, Wheeler claims the affidavit
upon which the search warrant was based did not contain any
evidence of Alexander=s veracity or any evidence supporting the
basis of his knowledge.
Thus, Wheeler maintains that the
information contained in the affidavit failed to establish a
substantial basis for the issuing judge to conclude that probable
cause existed to search her residence.
The Commonwealth,
however, argues that since Alexander was a named informant,
hearsay can provide the basis for probable cause to search
without any specific showing of Alexander=s veracity.
The
Commonwealth further argues that the incriminating nature of the
information provided by Alexander provides a valid reason for
accepting his statements as truthful.
In Hubble, this Court was presented a case similar to
the case at bar.
The affidavit in Hubble was based on hearsay
information obtained from Travis Evans and his wife Linda, both
of whom had confessed to several burglaries.
Travis informed the
affiant, who was a police officer, that he had traded stolen
goods with Hubble, and that he had purchased cocaine from Hubble
23
Hubble, 730 S.W.2d at 534.
9
at his residence in Graves County.
Linda informed the officer
that she had been at Hubble=s residence the previous week and had
observed mass quantities of illegal drugs on the premises.
Linda
also informed the officer that she had seen Hubble hiding drugs
in his utility room.24
Based on this information, the district
judge signed a search warrant authorizing the search of Hubble=s
residence.
A search was conducted and evidence of criminal
activity was found at Hubble=s residence.
Hubble subsequently
filed a motion to suppress and the trial court determined that
suppression of the evidence was required.25
This Court disagreed and concluded that the affidavit
was sufficient to provide the issuing judge with a substantial
basis for concluding that probable cause existed to search
Hubble=s residence.
In arriving at this conclusion, this Court
focused on the fact that the Evanses were both named informants.
This Court went on to hold that when an informant=s name is
given, hearsay can provide the basis for probable cause to search
without any showing of a named informant=s reliability.26
In
addition, this Court also concluded that A[t]he fact that the
24
Hubble, 730 S.W.2d at 533.
25
Id.
26
Id. at 534 (citing Embry v. Commonwealth, Ky., 492 S.W.2d 929 (1973); and
Edwards v. Commonwealth, Ky., 573 S.W.2d 640 (1978)).
10
information given by the Evans[es] was against their penal
interest, is reason to accept it as truthful.@27
Wheeler attempts to distinguish Hubble on the facts.
Wheeler argues that the information proved by Alexander is not as
specific or as detailed as the information provided by the
informants in Hubble.
Moreover, Wheeler argues there is no
evidence indicating the basis of Alexander=s knowledge, as there
was in Hubble.
We disagree with both of Wheeler=s contentions.
According to the affidavit, Alexander informed Officer
Diamond that he had recently, Abought a $20 bag@ from Wheeler and
that he, Acould hear her filling his [ ] order from a quantity in
the back room . . . .@
The affidavit also stated that Alexander
informed Officer Diamond that he had recently consumed marijuana
with Wheeler at her residence.
According to Alexander, these
events took place approximately two hours prior to his encounter
with Officer Diamond.
Furthermore, the affidavit stated that
Alexander informed Officer Diamond that he had purchased
marijuana from Wheeler at her residence in the past.
In
addition, the affidavit contained information pertaining to the
location of the drugs, i.e., Ain the back room,@ much in the same
way the affidavit in Hubble contained a description of where the
drugs were located, i.e., Ain the utility room.@
Thus, we
conclude that the information provided by Alexander was
27
Id. (citing United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 583, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 29
L.Ed.2d 723 (1971)).
11
sufficiently detailed to provide the issuing judge with a
substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed to
search Wheeler=s residence.
Similarly, we conclude that the
basis of Alexander=s knowledge was clearly indicated on the face
of the affidavit.
Wheeler also attempts to distinguish Hubble on the
ground that the information provided by Alexander was not
corroborated by any showing of his veracity.
Wheeler claims that
Alexander=s statements should be viewed as unreliable due to the
fact he, Awas scared out of his wits and may have been willing to
say anything to get out of trouble.@
This argument appears to be
premised on Wheeler=s contention that the statements made by
Alexander were not actually against his penal interest, as were
the statements made by the informants in Hubble.
This argument
is apparently based on the mistaken belief that the mere purchase
or consumption of marijuana, in and of itself, does not establish
a crime.28
This argument contains a critical flaw, however, as
the relevant inquiry is not whether Alexander=s statements were
in fact against his penal interest, but rather, whether the
28
Wheeler claims the record is devoid of any evidence indicating that
Alexander was found to be in the possession of any marijuana. Interestingly
enough, we found the following statement contained in her motion to suppress,
AHere, we have a sixteen-year-old kid caught with a bag of pot in the middle
of the night by a badge wearing, gun toting policeman.@ Apparently, Wheeler
has changed her position on appeal and now seeks to argue that Alexander did
not have any marijuana in his possession when he was questioned by Officer
Diamond.
12
underlying circumstances showed that the informant’s information
was reliable.
As Professor Wayne R. LaFave suggests in Search and
Seizure, A[a]lthough it is the Harris admission-against-penalinterest technique which has received frequent attention in the
appellate decisions, it must be remembered that the fundamental
inquiry is whether the underlying circumstances show that the
informant=s information is >reliable.=@29
Reliability in this
regard can be demonstrated in a number of ways as the focus of
the inquiry is on the informant=s motivation for supplying the
information.
It necessarily follows that consideration may be
given to any circumstance which suggests the probable absence of
any motivation to falsify.
In the case sub judice, Alexander was pulled over
pursuant to a valid traffic stop.
After being questioned by
Officer Diamond, he stated that he had recently smoked marijuana
with Wheeler and that he had purchased marijuana from her earlier
that morning.
Alexander also stated that he had purchased
marijuana from Wheeler at her residence in the past year.
Alexander=s conversation with Officer Diamond took place only two
hours after the alleged sale of marijuana took place.
Under
these circumstances, we simply cannot conclude that the trial
29
See Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, Vol. II, Chap. 3, ' 3.3(c), p. 136
(3d ed. 1996). The AHarris admission-against-penal-interest technique@ is a
reference to United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 583, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 29
L.Ed.2d 723 (1971).
13
court erred by determining that Alexander had no motive to lie or
to mislead the police.
Certainly, sending the police on a
fruitless search would not have benefitted his cause.
Furthermore, a person=s willingness to give his name on the face
of the affidavit demonstrates his willingness to stand behind his
story.
Thus, the circumstances surrounding the statements made
by Alexander to Officer Diamond support the reliability of those
statements.
To hold otherwise would constitute a clear departure
from a well-established principle in favor of securing search
warrants.
As was stated by the former Court of Appeals in Embry,
A[i]n the interest of law enforcement,[ ] the securing of
warrants should be encouraged and not discouraged by
hypertechnical mouse-tracking of the language of the affidavit on
which the warrant is based.@30
Moreover, even if we were to conclude that the
affidavit did not provide the issuing judge with a substantial
basis for concluding that probable cause existed to search
Wheeler=s residence, we would uphold the search under the Agoodfaith exception@ to the exclusionary rule created in United
States v. Leon,31 and adopted by the Supreme Court of Kentucky in
Crayton v. Commonwealth.32
In Leon, the Supreme Court of the
30
Embry, 492 S.W.2d at 932.
31
468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984).
32
Ky., 846 S.W.2d 684 (1992).
See also Edwards, 573 S.W.2d at 641.
14
United States held that the exclusionary rule Ashould be modified
so as not to bar the admission of evidence seized in reasonable,
good-faith reliance on a search warrant that is subsequently held
to be defective.@33
Only where the evidence is Aso lacking in
indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its
existence entirely unreasonable,@ will the evidence be
suppressed.34
There is nothing in Officer Diamond=s affidavit
that suggests it was wholly deficient.
Similarly, Officer
Diamond=s reliance on the search warrant could not be said to be
Aentirely unreasonable.@
The probable cause decision was
properly submitted to the district court judge, Awho by
longstanding Fourth Amendment doctrine is viewed as the preferred
decisionmaker on the probable cause issue. . . .@35
Accordingly, the trial court properly denied Wheeler’s
motion to suppress and the judgment and sentence of the Boyd
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
33
Leon, 468 U.S. at 905.
34
Id. at 923.
35
LaFave, supra at 88.
15
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
Michael J. Curtis
Ashland, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Janine Coy Bowden
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE:
Janine Coy Bowden
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
16
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