CHARLES HELTON v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JULY 3, 2003; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO.
NO.
2001-CA-001679-MR
AND
2001-CA-002236-MR
CHARLES HELTON
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM PULASKI CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DANIEL J. VENTERS, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 82-CR-00061 AND 82-CR-00121
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
EMBERTON, CHIEF JUDGE; JOHNSON AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Charles Helton has appealed from two orders
entered by the Pulaski Circuit Court on July 16, 2001, and on
September 25, 2001, which denied his motions for modification of
sentence filed pursuant to CR1 60.02.
Having concluded that the
issues presented by Helton either were not properly raised under
CR 60.02 or were insufficient to justify relief, we affirm.
1
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
On March 25, 1982, Helton was indicted by a Pulaski
County grand jury in Case No. 82-CR-061 for rape in the first
degree2 involving sexual intercourse with his step-daughter, J.
K. K.
On April 22, 1982, Helton appeared with his appointed
attorney, James Cox, and was arraigned on that indictment.
trial date was scheduled for September 22, 1982.
A
On September
22, the trial was continued with a new trial date of January 26,
1983.
On November 10, 1982, a Pulaski County grand jury
returned a second indictment in Case No. 82-CR-121, charging
Helton with rape in the first degree involving sexual
intercourse with another step-daughter, R. K.
On December 17,
1982, Helton was arraigned on the second indictment and Mary
Obermeyer indicated she had been appointed to represent him.
At
that time, the two cases were consolidated and joined for trial
because of the similarity in the facts and circumstances giving
rise to the charges.
On January 26, 1983, a trial was held on both
indictments with Cox alone representing Helton.
During the
trial, five witnesses testified for the Commonwealth, including
J. K. K. and R. K., and five witnesses testified for the
defense, including Helton.
The jury found Helton guilty of both
charged offenses and recommended sentences of life imprisonment
on each conviction to run consecutively.
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 510.040.
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A subsequent motion
for a new trial was denied.
On February 24, 1983, the trial
court sentenced Helton to two consecutive terms of life
imprisonment on the two convictions of rape in the first degree
consistent with the jury’s recommendation.
On December 22, 1983, the Supreme Court of Kentucky
rendered an opinion affirming the convictions on direct appeal.3
In its opinion, the Supreme Court rejected Helton’s claims that:
(1) the trial court erred in excluding evidence about the sexual
activity of J. K. K. and R. K. with persons other than Helton;
(2) he could be convicted of only incest and not rape in the
first degree; (3) the instructions were erroneous for failing to
require the jury to make specific findings that the victims were
under the age of 12; and (4) running the life sentences
consecutively was illegal.
With respect to issues (2) and (3),
the Supreme Court held they were not properly preserved because
Helton had failed to object to the rape in the first degree
instruction as required by CR 9.54(2).
On July 27, 1984, Helton filed a motion in circuit
court seeking to have the two sentences to run concurrently,
rather than consecutively.
3
On January 7, 1995, the trial court,
Helton v. Commonwealth, 1983-SC-000675-MR (not to be published).
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after considerable delay, finally granted the motion and amended
the judgment to require the sentences to run concurrently.4
While the above-mentioned motion was pending, on
September 27, 1984, Helton filed a motion to vacate, set aside
or correct sentence pursuant to RCr5 11.42.
In the motion,
Helton asserted several complaints of alleged ineffective
assistance of counsel with respect to the issues raised on
direct appeal including counsel’s failure to object to the
instructions not being limited to incest and not requiring a
finding on the victims’ ages.
Helton also asserted that counsel
was ineffective for not seeking a competency hearing because he
alleged that he was under the influence of prescription drugs
and incompetent on the day of the trial.
On February 28, 1985,
the trial court denied the motion rejecting Helton’s arguments.
On September 27, 1985, this Court affirmed the trial court’s
opinion denying the RCr 11.42 motion.6
On September 7, 1999, Helton filed a pro se motion for
modification of sentence pursuant to CR 60.02 and/or KRS
532.070.
In the two-page memorandum in support of the motion,
Helton sought modification of his concurrent life sentences to
4
The Supreme Court’s rejection of Helton’s challenge to the consecutive life
sentences was based on counsel’s failure to object and Shannon v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 562 S.W.2d 301 (1978). Subsequent to the Supreme Court’s
decision affirming Helton’s convictions, the Supreme Court overruled its
decision in Shannon in Wellman v. Commonwealth, Ky., 694 S.W.2d 696 (1985).
5
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
6
Helton v. Commonwealth, 1985-CA-002440-MR (not to be published).
-4-
concurrent terms of 20 years because (1) neither of his
appointed attorneys, Cox and Obermeyer, were members of the
Kentucky Bar Association (KBA) and duly licensed to practice law
in the Commonwealth of Kentucky at the time of his arraignments;
(2) both of the female victims were allegedly over the age of 12
on the date of the alleged offenses; and (3) he was allegedly
incompetent on the day of trial because of depression and
paranoia.
On September 14, 1999, the trial court denied the
motion stating it lacked jurisdiction to modify the sentence
beyond the time period for a shock probation motion.
On May 4, 2001, this Court rendered an Opinion
vacating the trial court’s order and remanding the case for
further proceedings.7
This Court extensively discussed the
jurisdictional and procedural aspects for post-judgment review
in criminal cases in holding the trial court had subject-matter
jurisdiction under CR 60.02.
This Court noted that the limited
appellate record, which failed to contain any relevant documents
between the 1982 indictment and the 1999 CR 60.02 motion,
precluded adequate review of the motion.
The case was remanded
to the trial court for further proceedings.
On May 30, 2001, the Commonwealth filed its memorandum
in opposition to the CR 60.02 motion to modify sentence.
It
argued that the motion was precluded as untimely based on the
7
1999-CA-002372-MR (not to be published).
-5-
prior RCr 11.42 motion.
Attached to the memorandum were the
Supreme Court’s decision on direct appeal and the trial court’s
order denying the RCr 11.42 motion.
On July 16, 2001, the trial
court entered a nine-page order denying the CR 60.02 motion on
both procedural and substantive grounds.
On September 25, 2001,
Helton filed another CR 60.02 motion in Case No. 82-CR-121
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel because attorney
Obermeyer was not licensed to practice law in Kentucky on the
date he was arraigned in that case.
court denied the motion.
On the same day, the trial
This Court has consolidated the
appeals of the trial court’s July 16 and September 25, 2001,
orders denying the related CR 60.02 motions.
Unfortunately, the record on appeal still does not
contain the entire circuit court record.
The Commonwealth
indicates that the circuit court record was released to a former
Assistant Attorney General for filing in the federal district
court in connection with a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
filed by Helton.
It is unclear whether the federal court
proceeding has been completed or why the record has not been
returned to the circuit court.
While we would prefer a more
complete record, the current appellate record does contain a
transcript of the trial and sufficient documentation to render a
decision in this appeal.
-6-
The trial court correctly denied the motions on both
procedural and substantive grounds.
As this Court discussed in
the previous opinion, in Gross v. Commonwealth,8 the Supreme
Court set out the procedure for post-judgment review in criminal
cases.
The Supreme Court stated that the structure for
appellate review is not haphazard or overlapping.9
It held that
a criminal defendant must first bring a direct appeal when
available, then utilize RCr 11.42 by raising every error of
which he should be aware, and only utilize CR 60.02 for
extraordinary situations not otherwise subject to relief by
direct appeal or by way of RCr 11.42.10
More recently, in
McQueen v. Commonwealth,11 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
procedural requirements set out in Gross, when it stated:
A defendant who is in custody under sentence
or on probation, parole or conditional
discharge is required to avail himself of
RCr 11.42 as to any ground of which he is
aware, or should be aware, during the period
when the remedy is available to him. Civil
Rule 60.02 is not intended merely as an
additional opportunity to relitigate the
same issues which could Areasonably have been
presented@ by direct appeal or RCr 11.42
proceedings.[12] The obvious purpose of this
8
Ky., 648 S.W.2d 853 (1983).
9
Id. at 856.
10
Id. See also Bowling v. Commonwealth, Ky., 981 S.W.2d 545, 549 (1998); and
Sanborn v. Commonwealth, Ky., 975 S.W.2d 905, 908-09 (1998);.
11
Ky., 948 S.W.2d 415 (1997).
12
RCr 11.42 (3); Gross, supra at 855.
-7-
principle is to prevent the relitigation of
issues which either were or could have been
litigated in a similar proceeding.13
In the case sub judice, Helton could have raised, or
did previously raise, the issues presented in his CR 60.02
motions.
In his direct appeal and RCr 11.42 motion, Helton
challenged the jury instructions with respect to the need for a
specific finding on the ages of the victims.
Helton was aware
of the children’s ages and should have raised the issue of the
sufficiency of the evidence as to the victims’ ages in the
direct appeal.
Similarly, Helton could, and should, have
questioned his competency to stand trial in the direct appeal.
He did, in fact, challenge his conviction based on incompetency
indirectly in the RCr 11.42 proceeding through a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel.
The only issue that Helton
arguably was not aware of at the time of the trial involves his
attorneys’ KBA membership and their licensing status. These
facts certainly could have been discovered earlier.
Helton has
failed to explain why it took him over 17 years to discover
these facts.
In addition to the procedural bar, each of Helton’s
complaints lacks substantive merit.
First, Helton asserts that
the victims were not less than 12 years of age at the time of
13
McQueen, 948 S.W.2d at 416. See also Land v. Commonwealth, Ky., 986 S.W.2d
440, 442 (1999); Barnett v. Commonwealth, Ky., 979 S.W.2d 98, 101 (1998); and
Commonwealth v. Gross, Ky., 936 S.W.2d 85 (1996).
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the offenses based on an alleged date for the two rape offenses
of February 1, 1982, which is taken from his prison Resident
Record Card.
misplaced.
His reliance on the Resident Record Card is
J. K. K. was born on May 4, 1968; R. K. was born on
December 11, 1966.
During the trial, J. K. K. testified that
Helton began forcing her to have sexual intercourse when she was
nine-years old and that it continued sporadically every few
weeks for several years up to approximately February 1982.
R.
K. testified that Helton had sexual intercourse with her
repeatedly every few weeks for four or five years starting when
she was 11-years old.
Additionally, Jimmy Helton, appellant’s
biological son, testified that his father had had sex with J. K.
K. when she was 11-years old.
Helton attacks the credibility of
the victims, but that was a matter for the jury.
It is unclear
why the prison resident card erroneously identifies February 1,
1982, as the date of the crime.
Nevertheless, there was
sufficient evidence presented at trial that the two victims were
under the age of 12 at the time of the offenses.
Helton’s attempt to invalidate his sentences based on
his attorneys’ bar membership and licensing status is equally
unavailing.
The documents submitted by Helton indicate that
Cox was granted a license for limited practice in May 1981, and
was admitted to the KBA by examination in October 1982.
Thus,
he was duly licensed to practice law in Kentucky throughout the
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prosecution proceedings.
The Rules of the Supreme Court provide
for a limited license to practice law for persons employed by a
public defender program, such as the one Cox was participating
in at the time, without KBA membership.14
The fact that Cox did
not become a member of the KBA until after the trial is
insignificant.
The documents also state that Obermeyer was granted a
limited license to practice law in January 1983, and was
admitted to the KBA by exam in June 1984.
While this
information indicates that Obermeyer may not have been licensed
at the time of Helton’s arraignment in Case No. 82-CR-121, that
fact does not invalidate the convictions or sentences.
A
defendant is constitutionally entitled to effective assistance
of counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution at every “critical stage” of a criminal
proceeding.15
Constitutional error exists without any showing of
prejudice when counsel was either totally absent or prevented
from assisting the defendant during a critical stage of the
prosecution.16
Although somewhat imprecise, the United States
Supreme Court has articulated a test for determining whether a
14
See Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 2.112. Cox apparently had been admitted to
and practiced law in Tennessee prior to moving to Kentucky.
15
See, e.g., Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 629-30, 106 S.Ct. 1404, 140708, 89 L.Ed.2d 631 (1986); and United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659,
104 S.Ct. 2039, 2047, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984).
16
Cronic, supra at 689, n.25.
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particular time period is a critical stage based on an
assessment of whether, at the time in question, “the accused
required aid in coping with legal problems or assisting in
meeting his adversary.”17
Arraignment may be a “critical stage”
where “what happens there may affect the whole trial” or
implicates the “substantial rights” of the defendant, such as
the loss of defenses or the entry of a guilty plea.18
Kentucky
cases have held that under Kentucky criminal procedure,
arraignment does not represent a “critical stage,” so that
absence of counsel would not constitute grounds to invalidate a
conviction.19
In the current case, Obermeyer was present and
assisted Helton at his arraignment in Case No. 82-CR-121.
Helton has not alleged any prejudice or ineffective assistance
of counsel because of the arraignment proceeding, he merely
complains that Obermeyer was not officially licensed or a member
of the KBA at the time.
Because Helton’s arraignment is not a
“critical stage” requiring representation of counsel and he was
17
United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 313, 93 S.Ct. 2568, 2575, 37 L.Ed.2d 619
(1973).
18
See Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 88 S.Ct. 254, 19 L.Ed.2d 336 (1967); White
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 83 S.Ct. 1050, 10 L.Ed.2d 193 (1963); and Hamilton
v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 82 S.Ct. 157, 7 L.Ed.2d 114 (1961).
19
See Parrish v. Commonwealth, Ky., 472 S.W.2d 69 (1971); Collins v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 433 S.W.2d 663 (1968); and Maise v. Commonwealth, Ky., 380
S.W.2d 230 (1964).
-11-
in fact assisted by counsel, he has not shown a constitutional
violation with respect to his arraignment in Case No. 82-CR-121.
Helton’s third argument is that he was incompetent and
unable to participate adequately in his own defense at the trial
because of medication he had taken.
He identifies a few of his
answers to questions during cross-examination as examples that
he was confused and had a faulty memory.
First, several of the
excerpts merely represent attempts to avoid responding to the
questions.
A review of Helton’s entire testimony reveals that
his memory of events was quite good.
As this Court stated in
its August 1996, Opinion on the RCr 11.42 motion:
A careful review of appellant’s testimony
clearly establishes that he was fully aware
of and had the capacity to appreciate the
nature and consequences of the proceedings
against him, and to rationally and
effectively participate in his own defense.
We conclude, therefore, that the record
refutes appellant’s claim that on the date
he was tried, he was under the influence of
drugs and narcotics and incompetent to stand
trial.
Nothing presented in the current appeal dissuades us that this
Court’s earlier observations were not correct.
Our standard of review on a CR 60.02 motion is whether
the trial court abused is discretion.20
A movant is not entitled
to a hearing on the motion unless he “affirmatively alleges
20
Brown v. Commonwealth, Ky., 932 S.W.2d 359, 361 (1996); White v.
Commonwealth, Ky.App., 32 S.W.3d 83, 86 (2000).
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facts which, if true, justify vacating the judgment and further
allege[s] special circumstances that justify CR 60.02 relief.”21
Helton’s motion was properly denied on both procedural and
substantive grounds based on the record.
Accordingly, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion without
a hearing.
For the foregoing reasons, the orders of the Pulaski
Circuit Court are affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Charles Helton, Pro Se
LaGrange, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Gregory C. Fuchs
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
21
McQueen, 948 S.W.2d at 416; Gross, 648 S.W.2d at 856.
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