BILLY BROWN v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: MAY 9, 2003; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2001-CA-000182-MR
BILLY BROWN
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LETCHER CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CHARLES E. LOWE, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CR-00087
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, COMBS AND JOHNSON, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Billy Brown has appealed from the orders of the
Letcher Circuit Court which denied his motion for shock
probation and his motion to reconsider and motion to set for
argument.
Having concluded that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in denying Brown’s motions, we affirm.
On November 13, 1998, a Letcher County grand jury
indicted Brown for sodomy in the second degree,1 and unlawful
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 510.080.
transaction with a minor in the second degree.2
The indictment
alleged that on November 4, 1999, Brown provided a juvenile with
a controlled substance and on November 5, 1999, Brown engaged in
deviate sexual intercourse with a juvenile less than 14 years of
age.
Following several delays, including the appointment of two
special judges, Brown filed on August 2, 2000, a motion to enter
a guilty plea to unlawful transaction with a minor in the second
degree and the amended charge of sodomy in the third degree.3
Brown was on probation at the time of his arrest on the
underlying charges, and as a part of the plea agreement, he
agreed to revocation of that probation.
On October 6, 2000, the trial court entered a final
judgment and order of imprisonment, sentencing Brown to prison
terms of three and one-half years on each count, with the prison
terms to run concurrently.
On December 20, 2000, Brown filed a
motion for shock probation.
The trial court summarily denied
Brown’s motion in an order entered on January 10, 2001.
Brown
then filed a motion to reconsider the trial court’s denial of
his request for shock probation and a motion to set for
argument.
On January 17, 2001, the trial court denied Brown’s
2
KRS 530.065.
3
KRS 510.090.
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motions.
This appeal followed.4
On appeal, Brown alleges that the trial court erred
when it summarily, without giving him the opportunity to be
heard and without making any findings, denied his motion for
shock probation.
Brown recognizes that probation, including
shock probation, is a discretionary sentencing option for the
trial court, but he contends that the trial court abused its
discretion by failing to allow him the opportunity to put forth
his evidence as to his entitlement to shock probation.
KRS 439.265(2) relating to shock probation provides, in
pertinent part:
The defendant may, in the discretion of the
trial court, have the right to a hearing on
any motion he may file, or have filed for
him, that would suspend further execution of
sentence. Any court order granting or
denying a motion to suspend further
execution of sentence is not reviewable.
In Schroering v. McKinney,5 the trial court granted
shock probation, and the widow of the victim obtained a writ of
mandamus from this Court directing the trial court to reconsider
the order for shock probation, to allow the Commonwealth to
request a hearing or file written objections and to state in its
4
In the notice of appeal Brown refers only to the order of January 17, 2001.
However, in an effort to afford Brown full review of the trial court’s
rulings, we will consider the motion to reconsider as a motion pursuant to
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 59.05, whereby this appeal includes
the trial court’s order entered on January 10, 2001, which denied the motion
for shock probation.
5
Ky., 906 S.W.2d 349 (1995).
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order the extent of consideration given to the victim impact
statements.6
In reversing this Court, the Supreme Court held
that pursuant to KRS 439.265(2) appellate review of the
procedural issues or the merits of an order granting or denying
shock probation is not permissible.7
Furthermore, even if we were to review the denial of
Brown’s motions for an abuse of discretion, clearly the trial
court did not abuse its discretion.
“Abuse of discretion in relation to the
exercise of judicial power implies arbitrary
action or capricious disposition under the
circumstances, at least an unreasonable and
unfair decision.” . . . The exercise of
discretion must be legally sound.8
Brown pled guilty to engaging in deviate sexual
intercourse with a 13-year-old girl consisting of her performing
oral sex on him, and to providing her with marijuana.
Clearly,
the trial court’s denial of Brown’s motion for shock probation
without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing or findings cannot
be viewed as an abuse of discretion.
Based on these facts, it
was certainly reasonable for the trial court to not desire to
hear any evidence concerning Brown’s basis for requesting shock
6
Id. at 350.
7
Id. at 351.
8
Kuprion v. Fitzgerald, Ky., 888 S.W.2d 679, 684 (1994) (quoting Kentucky
National Park Commission v. Russell, 301 Ky. 187, 191 S.W.2d 214 (1945)).
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probation and there was no requirement that it provide findings
denying his motion.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Letcher
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
James W. Craft III
Whitesburg, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Louis F. Mathias, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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