JERRY WAYNE WILLIAMS v. MANALAPAN COAL COMPANY, INC.; HON. J. LANDON OVERFIELD, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED: NOVEMBER 8, 2002; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2002-CA-000643-WC
JERRY WAYNE WILLIAMS
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-00-56908
v.
MANALAPAN COAL COMPANY, INC.;
HON. J. LANDON OVERFIELD,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE;
AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, MCANULTY, AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
TACKETT, JUDGE:
Jerry Wayne Williams petitions for review of an
opinion of the Workers’ Compensation Board that affirmed an
opinion and order of the Administrative Law Judge dismissing
Williams’ claim against Manalapan Coal Company, Inc., for failure
to provide timely notice of an alleged work-related injury to his
back.
We affirm.
In his petition for review, Williams argues that the
ALJ and Board erred in holding that his delay in notifying
Manalapan of his work-related injury was not legally justified.
The duty of this Court on review “is to correct the Board only
where the . . . Court perceives the Board has overlooked or
misconstrued controlling statutes or precedent, or committed an
error in assessing the evidence so flagrant as to cause gross
injustice.”
Western Baptist Hospital v. Kelly, 827 S.W.2d 685,
687-88 (1992).
After reviewing the record, the law, and the
arguments of counsel, we have concluded that this Court could not
improve upon the well-written opinion of the Board.
Inasmuch as
we believe the Board did not overlook or misconstrue controlling
precedent and properly assessed the evidence, we adopt it as our
own.
BEFORE: LOVAN, Chairman, STANLEY and GARDNER,
Members.
STANLEY, Member. Petitioner, Jerry Wayne
Williams (“Williams”), appeals from an
opinion and order rendered September 20,
2001, by Hon. J. Landon Overfield,
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), dismissing
his claim against the respondent, Manalapan
Coal Co., Inc. (“Manalapan”), for failure to
provide due and timely notice of an alleged
work-related injury to his low back. Williams
also appeals from an order issued October 23,
2001 by the ALJ overruling his petition for
reconsideration.
On appeal, Williams contends he had
reasonable grounds for not providing due and
timely notice and that the evidence compels a
finding in his favor. He also contends the
ALJ erred in dismissing his claim for
cumulative trauma. We disagree, and therefore
affirm.
As the questions raised on review are
narrow in scope, we will limit our discussion
of the facts to those that are pertinent to
the issues. Williams was born November 29,
1959 and is a resident of Dayhoit, Harlan
County, Kentucky. He has a ninth grade
education and no other vocational or
specialized training. Williams testified that
on July 17, 2000, while working as an
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underground coal miner for Manalapan, he
injured his low back moving rock off a miner
and pulling cable. He stated he experienced a
sudden sharp pain in his low back that
radiated down his left hip into his leg and
foot.
Williams testified that he first sought
medical treatment for his injury in October
2000. He allegedly did not miss any work as a
result of the injury until December 27, 2000.
He has not worked since that date.
Williams testified that he did not
report his alleged back injury to his
supervisor until sometime in November 2000.
Thereafter, Williams, through his attorney,
sent a letter dated December 8, 2000 to
Manalapan advising of his alleged workrelated injury. Williams stated in his
December 8, 2000 letter that he did not
report the injury earlier because he did not
want to “knock the entire shift out of the
safety bonus.” He also stated in the letter
that, even though he experienced his initial
pain on the job, he did not know his back
condition was work-related until December
2000, when Dr. James Bean diagnosed
degenerative disc disease.
In support of his claim, Williams
submitted the medical testimony of Dr. Jameel
A. Butt and Dr. James Bean, a neurosurgeon.
Additionally, he submitted lay testimony from
David Partin. In response, Manalapan
presented lay testimony from Jim Enlow.
Dr. Butt first saw Williams upon selfreferral for complaints of back pain on
October 10, 2000. At that time, Williams
recounted having experienced left hip and
groin pain, “going on for three months.”
Apparently, on that occasion, however, the
doctor either did not receive or did not
record any history of injury. Thereafter, on
October 24, 2000, Dr. Butt interpreted an MRI
as showing a moderate left disc protrusion at
L5-S1 and mild bulging at L3-4. Based on
these findings, Dr. Butt prescribed pain
medication and referred Williams to Dr. Bean.
Dr. Bean performed a discectomy on
Williams on December 29, 2000. Dr. Bean
received a history of pain in the lower back
radiating into the left hip and leg of
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approximately six months duration that had
steadily worsened over time. The doctor
further reported that an MRI scan revealed a
left-sided herniated disc at L5-S1, and
degenerative changes present at L2-3 and L34. Consequently, Dr. Bean ordered Williams
hospitalized and a lumbar microendoscopic
discectomy was performed. Williams was
discharged from the hospital the following
day.
Dr. Bean testified that Williams' back
condition was the result of his years of
employment involving heavy labor from 1982 to
the present. He stated Williams provided him
with a history of problems with low back pain
that had worsened over time, but Williams did
not indicate any specific work-related
incident. Dr. Bean assessed a 10% permanent
impairment rating.
Williams also submitted the testimony of
Mr. David Partin, safety director for
Manalapan. Through Mr. Partin’s testimony,
Williams introduced a written first report of
injury dated December 20, 2000 completed by
Partin and signed by both Williams and
Partin. The report indicates that “at or near
July 19, 2000” Williams suffered a workrelated injury to his low back when he bent
down to remove a rock from under a jack head.
The report reflects that Willaims had been
initially treated by Dr. Butt at Harlan ARH
and then later referred to Dr. Bean. The
report records that Williams complained of
low back pain radiating into his left leg. A
Form SF-1 was also introduced through
Partin’s testimony which indicated Williams
notified Manalapan of the injury on December
12, 2000.
Also submitted as an exhibit to Partin’s
deposition were wage records spanning May 23,
2000 through December 2000. These records
demonstrate that Partin suffered no lost time
from work as a result of any injury until
December 27, 2000, and in fact document
significant amounts of overtime hours on the
job. Additionally, a document informing
employees that on the job injuries must be
reported on the same date as they occur,
signed by Williams and dated January 22,
2000, was also introduced.
During the deposition, Partin was asked
to explain the safety bonus program at
-4-
Manalapan. He stated that if an employee
suffers no lost time due to an accident in a
quarter, the employee receives a bonus of
fifty cents per hour. Partin testified that
this bonus related to each individual
worker’s performance and not his entire shift
crew. Partin further indicated that an
employee’s right to a safety bonus was
affected by a lost time accident only and not
simply by reporting a work-related injury.
Manalapan introduced the testimony of
Jim Enlow, its workers’ compensation
administrator. Enlow testified that the first
notice he received of Williams’ injury was
the letter from Williams and his attorney
dated December 8, 2000. Enlow stated he
received that letter on December 11, 2000.
Enlow confirmed that only injuries resulting
in lost work time would cause an employee to
lose his safety bonus.
Upon review of the medical and lay
evidence, and after providing a thorough
summary of that evidence, the ALJ concluded:
Plaintiff had a work related
injury on July 17, 2000 and that
was in the nature of a work related
traumatic event which occurred when
he lifted a rock from a miner. In
making this finding I have relied
on Plaintiff’s testimony. In making
this finding I also specifically
find that Plaintiff did not have a
cumulative trauma injury as
reported by Dr. Bean. I reject Dr.
Bean's testimony on that account as
it was based on an inaccurate
history.
Plaintiff failed to sustain
the burden of proving to the
satisfaction of the trier of fact
that he gave due and timely notice
of his claimed work related injury.
This failure to give notice defeats
Plaintiff’s claims for the work
related traumatic event and injury
that occurred on July 17, 2000 and,
since Plaintiff first had a
manifestation of significant pain
on July 17, 2000, it would also
defeat any claim for cumulative
trauma. Plaintiff has argued that
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he failed to give due and timely
notice in an effort to benefit his
co-workers. While this may have
been a noble effort, it has
resulted in a tragic circumstance
for Plaintiff. Pursuant to K.R.S.
342.185 a plaintiff is required to
give notice of the accident ‘as
soon as practicable after the
happening thereof.’ There are, of
course, circumstances which will
excuse a plaintiff from giving
notice immediately or within a
reasonable amount of time. The
burden of proof is on the Plaintiff
to explain why he did not give
notice sooner. Plaintiff’s excuse,
in this instance, is not an excuse
which would have made it not
practicable to give notice far
closer in time to the incident in
question than November or even
October after the injury in mid
July. Plaintiff has not shown that
it was not practicable to give
notice at the time of the
occurrence of the injury. Thus,
plaintiff’s claims must fail.
The finding . . . above
renders all other issues moot.
On appeal, Williams has offered a
variety of reasons that his delay in giving
notice was excusable. First and foremost is
that Williams did not wish to cause the other
employees on his shift to lose their safety
bonus. Second, Williams contends he did not
report the injury because he did not
understand the reporting requirements with
respect to work injuries. Third, Williams
argues he did not know his injury was workrelated until diagnosed by Dr. Bean and,
therefore, the ALJ erred in dismissing his
claim for cumulative trauma. Williams also
contends Manalapan was not prejudiced by his
delay in providing timely notice.
A determination of whether notice is due
and timely is a mixed question of law and
fact. Harry M. Stevens Co. v. Workman’s
Compensation Board, Ky. App., 553 S.W.2d 852
(1977). KRS 342.185 provides that notice of
an “accident” shall be given “as soon as
practicable.” Notice must be given within a
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reasonable time under the circumstances of
the particular case. Harlan Fuel Co. v.
Burkhardt, Ky., 296 S.W.2d 722 (1956);
Turnstall v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., Ky., 359
S.W.2d 614 (1962). Whether notice has been
given as “soon as practicable” depends upon
all the circumstances of the particular case.
Marc Blackburn Brick Co. v. Yates, Ky., 424
S.W.2d 814 (1968). Want of notice or delay in
giving notice shall not be a bar to
proceedings under the Act if it is shown that
the employer, his agent or representative had
knowledge of the injury or that the delay or
failure to give notice was occasioned by
mistake or other reasonable cause. Id. at
816. Broadly construed, a delay in providing
notice to an employer is excusable where the
worker could not have reasonably been
expected to know he had a claim against his
employer. Rowe v. Semet-Solvay Division of
Allied Chemical & Dye Corp., Ky., 268 S.W.2d
416 (1954). If there is a delay in giving
notice, the burden is upon the claimant to
establish it was not practicable to provide
notice sooner. T.W. Samuels Distillery Co. v.
Houck, 296 Ky. 323, 176 S.W.2d 890, (1943).
Discretion for making the determination of
whether notice was given “as soon as
practicable” is a factual determination and
lies properly with the ALJ. Buckles v. Kroger
Grocery & Baking Co., 280 Ky. 644, 134 S.W.2d
221 (1939).
In the case on review, we believe the
ALJ properly applied the above standards in
rejecting Williams’ excuse that he was only
trying to protect the pecuniary interests of
his friends at work. That excuse is simply
not legally viable. Williams, no doubt, was
aware in July 2000 that he had sustained a
work-related injury to his back. This was
demonstrated by the fact that in November and
December 2000, he readily related the event
to his supervisors and ultimately completed a
first report of injury on December 20, 2000,
some five months after the accident occurred.
In light of this information, we believe it
was reasonable for the ALJ to conclude that
Williams knew early on that he potentially
had a claim against Manalapan. Where an
employee knows he has an injury following an
episode at work, i.e., lifting a rock at
work, as a matter of law, the fact that he
does not wish to report that incident in
order to achieve a no time lost bonus for
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himself and his co-workers can never amount
to a reasonable excuse for failing to give
due and timely notice.
Furthermore, the ALJ was not bound to
believe Williams’ testimony that he did not
understand the requirements for reporting his
injury. The evidence reflects that this is
not Williams’ first work-related accident.
Williams testified that he received an injury
to his upper back while working for another
coal company in 1996. As a result, he
apparently reported the injury and received a
period of temporary total disability
benefits, as well as payment of medical
benefits pursuant to KRS 342.020. Moreover,
at Manalapan, he signed a policy statement
indicating that all work-related injuries
were to be immediately reported.
Additionally, Williams’ indicated he had seen
signs posted at Manalapan advising employees
that all accidents must be reported before
the end of the shift on the day they occur.
This evidence was sufficient, in our opinion,
to allow the ALJ to reject Williams’ claim of
ignorance with regard to proper procedures
for giving notice. So long as any evidence of
substance supports the ALJ’s decision, this
Board may not reverse. Special Fund v.
Francis, Ky., 708 S.W.2d 641 (1986).
Williams also claims he did not report
the injury earlier because he did not know
his condition was work-related until
diagnosed by Dr. Bean in December 2000. This
contention is obviously directed at Williams'
claim for cumulative trauma. However, it is
contradictory to his testimony that he
sustained a specific traumatic injury on July
17, 2000. Consequently, we find no error in
the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Bean’s history to
the contrary and Williams’ own contentions
that his injury is the result of work-related
wear and tear to his back over many years. It
is well established that the ALJ may choose
to believe parts of the evidence and
disbelieve other parts, even when it comes
from the same witness or the same party’s
total proof. Caudill v. Maloney's Discount
Stores , Ky., 560 S.W.2d 15 (1977). What’s
more, the ALJ has the sole authority to
determine the weight, credibility, substance
and inferences to be drawn from the evidence.
Magic Coal v. Fox, Ky., 19 S.W.3d 88 (2000);
Whittaker v. Rowland, Ky., 998 S.W.2d 479
-8-
(1999); Hall’s Hardwood Floor Co. v.
Stapleton, Ky.App., 16 S.W.3d 327 (2000).
While it is true Dr. Bean’s testimony
may have supported Williams’ cumulative
trauma claim, as a matter of law, the ALJ was
well within his authority to reject Dr.
Bean’s testimony in this regard based on an
erroneous history. Although, Dr. Bean
reported that Williams provided him with a
long history of low back pain and stated the
pain had increased gradually over time, he
also indicated that at no time did Williams
inform him of the July 2000 incident. By
contrast, Williams was certainly aware of the
incident because, within a matter of days
after first seeing Dr. Bean in December 2000,
he allegedly reported the July 17, 2000
episode to his supervisors and completed a
written first report of injury detailing the
incident.
Kentucky authority clearly holds that in
such instances where a physician receives an
inaccurate history, his opinions regarding
causation which are based on that history may
be disregarded by the ALJ. Osborne v. Pepsi
Cola, Ky., 816 S.W.2d 643 (1991). If the
history given to a physician is sufficiently
impeached, an ALJ need not follow that
doctor’s medical opinion even if
uncontradicted. Western Baptist Hospital v.
Kelly, Ky., 827 S.W.2d 685 (1992). Given the
contradictory information in this action
regarding the true nature of Williams’
alleged condition and, based on the fact that
Williams failed to relate all of these
conflicting facts to Dr. Bean, in our
opinion, the ALJ acted well within his
authority as fact-finder in discarding that
particular theory of events. We remind
Williams that the ALJ has the sole authority
to determine the weight and inferences to be
drawn from such evidence. Miller v. East
Kentucky Beverage/Pepsico, Inc., Ky., 951
S.W.2d 329 (1997); Luttrell v. Cardinal
Aluminum Co., Ky.App., 909 S.W.2d 334 (1995).
Finally, we turn to Williams’ argument
that Manalapan was not prejudiced by his
failure to provide due and timely notice. The
Court, in Harlan Fuel Co. v. Burkhardt,
supra, stated
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[N]otice must be given as soon as
practicable after the occurrence
of the accident and we have, with
some strictness, held claimants to
its requirement under the theory
that its purpose is (1) to give
the employer an opportunity to
place the employee under the care
of competent physicians in order
to minimize his disability and the
employer's subsequent liability;
(2) to enable the employer to
investigate at an early time the
facts pertaining to the injury;
and (3) to prevent the filing of
fictitious claims when lapse of
time makes proof of lack of
genuineness difficult.
Id. at 723.
As a general rule, the mere lack of
prejudice to an employer is not sufficient to
excuse delay in giving notice of a potential
worker's compensation claim. Blue Diamond
Coal Co. v Blair, Ky., 445 S.W.2d 869 (1969).
However, even if it were, given the
circumstances of this case, we cannot say
that the ALJ erred in finding the existence
of prejudice to Manalapan as a result of
Williams’ delay in providing due and timely
notice. Reliance Die Casting v. Freeman, Ky.,
471 S.W.2d 311 (1971) and Blue Diamond Coal
Co. v. Stepp, Ky., 445 S.W.2d 866 (1969).
In Whittle v. General Mills, Ky., 252
S.W.2d 55 (1952) the Kentucky Court of
Appeals [now the Kentucky Supreme Court],
rejected outright a claimant’s argument that
his employer suffered no prejudice due to his
delay in giving notice following a workrelated injury that produced a herniated
disc. In that instance, the claimant also did
not give notice for some five months after
sustaining his work-related injury. The
Court, in Whittle, concluded that, “We are
not prepared to say that a herniated disc is
such an injury that no prejudice would result
to the employer from delay in giving notice.”
Id. at 57. The Court, in making this
determination, reminded the parties that the
purpose of the notice requirement of the
statute is obvious. The employer is entitled
to an early opportunity to ascertain by
examination the nature and extent of any
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claimed injury. It is entitled to an
opportunity to ascertain whether or not any
given injury arises from an accident suffered
in the course of the employment and if such
an injury is found, to minimize the disabling
effects by early treatment. Id. at 57. Thus,
as did ALJ Overfield, we find no merit in
Williams’s argument that the evidence in this
case compels a finding that respondent
suffered no harm as a result of his
unwarranted lag in notifying them of the
events of July 2000. More precisely, under
the circumstances of this case, we, too, are
unprepared to say that Williams’ herniated
disc is such an injury that no prejudice
resulted to Manalapan from the petitioner’s
unreasonable delay.
Accordingly, the opinion and order
rendered September 20, 2001 by Hon. J. Landon
Overfield, Administrative Law Judge is hereby
AFFIRMED and this appeal is DISMISSED.
ALL CONCUR.
The opinion of the Workers’ Compensation Board is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: MANALAPAN
MINING CO., INC.
Phyllis L. Robinson
Manchester, Kentucky
Francesca L. Maggard
Barry Lewis
Lewis and Lewis Law Offices
Hazard, Kentucky
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