BILL R. NYGAARD v. GOODIN BROTHERS, INC.; WAUSAU INSURANCE COMPANY; IRENE STEEN, Administrative Law Judge; DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION FUNDS SUCCESSOR TO SPECIAL FUND); and WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED: JULY 12, 2002; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2002-CA-000363-WC
BILL R. NYGAARD
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-91-10449
v.
GOODIN BROTHERS, INC.;
WAUSAU INSURANCE COMPANY;
IRENE STEEN, Administrative Law Judge;
DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION FUNDS
SUCCESSOR TO SPECIAL FUND); and
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, McANULTY, and SCHRODER, Judges.
COMBS, JUDGE:
Bill Nygaard petitions for review of an opinion of
the Workers’ Compensation Board entered January 16, 2002,
affirming the dismissal of his motion to reopen as time barred
pursuant to KRS1 342.125(8).
We affirm.
In 1990, Nygaard sustained a back injury while working for
the appellee, Goodin Brothers, Inc.
He settled his workers’
compensation claim with his employer for benefits based upon a
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
72% occupational disability in 1994.
At that time, there was no
time limitation on his right to reopen his claim for a worsening
of his condition.
However, effective December 12, 1996, KRS
342.125 was amended as follows:
The time limitation prescribed in this
section shall apply to all claims
irrespective of when they were incurred, or
when the award was entered, or the settlement
approved. However, claims decided prior to
December 12, 1996 may be reopened within four
(4) years of the award or order or within
four (4) years of December 12, 1996,
whichever is later, provided that the
exceptions to reopening established in
subsections (1) and (3) of this section shall
apply to these claims as well.
In Meade v. Reedy Coal Co., Ky., 13 S.W.3d 619, 622 (2000), the
court held:
It is clear [] that the legislature intended
for the four-year limitation on re-opening
which is contained in KRS 342.155(8) to
apply, retroactively, to claims which arose
and were decided prior to December 12, 1996.
On August 23, 2001, many months after maximum
expiration date of December 16, 2001, for reopening pre-amendment
claims, Nygaard filed a motion to reopen, alleging that he was
totally disabled.
The Board affirmed.
The ALJ dismissed the motion as time-barred.
This appeal followed.
The crux of Nygaard’s appeal is that KRS 342.125(3) is
unconstitutional as applied to him because it acted as a statute
of repose, extinguishing his right to reopen before he became
totally disabled -- an event that he contends occurred at the
“end of 2000.”
He relies on Saylor v. Hall, Ky., 497 S.W.2d 218
(1973), which holds that the legislature does not have the power
“under the guise of a limitation provision, to cut off an
-2-
existing remedy entirely.”
However, as Goodin correctly points
out, while the principles articulated in Saylor concern “a
constitutionally protected right of action,” (Id. at 225), “there
is no constitutional impediment to repose provisions in the
workers’ compensation scheme.”
Wright v. Oberle-Jordre Co.,
Inc., Ky., 910 S.W.2d 241, 245 (1999).
KRS 342.125 survived constitutional challenges in
Brooks v. University of Louisville Hospital, Ky., 33 S.W.3d 526
(2000), and in McCool v. Martin Nursery & Landscaping, Inc., Ky.,
43 S.W.3d 256 (2001).
In McCool, the court held that application
of the 1996 amendments to claims of increased disability that
occurred after December 12, 1996, did not violate any provision
of the Kentucky Constitution.
Although it is true that when the claimant
was injured reopening was permitted at any
time upon evidence of increase in disability
that occurs after an award is entered. Any
right that a worker has to be compensated for
a post-award increase in disability is
inchoate until such time as he sustains a
post-award change of occupational disability,
at which point the right becomes vested. The
claimant’s award was entered after December
12, 1996, and what he sought to redress was
an increase in occupational disability that
occurred after December 12, 1996. Because
the alleged increase in disability occurred
after the effective date of the amendment,
applying the amendment and dismissing the
motion to reopen did not affect a right that
vested before the amendment’s effective date.
Id., at 258.
(Emphasis added.)
As McCool is dispositive of Nygaard’s appeal, we
perceive no error in the decision of the Workers’ Compensation
Board.
See Western Baptist Hospital v. Kelly, Ky., 827 S.W.2d
685 (1992).
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The opinion of the Workers’ Compensation Board is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES GOODIN
BROTHERS, INC. AND WAUSAU
INSURANCE COMPANY:
Rodger W. Lofton
Paducah, Kentucky
Daniel S. Stratemeyer
Paducah, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR DIVISION OF WORKERS’
COMPENSATION FUNDS:
Joel D. Zakem
Frankfort, Kentucky
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