YAKOV G. DRABOVSKIY v. KENTUCKY BOARD OF MEDICAL LICENSURE
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RENDERED: DECEMBER 27, 2002; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2002-CA-000176-MR
YAKOV G. DRABOVSKIY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LAWRENCE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEPHEN N. FRAZIER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CI-00263
KENTUCKY BOARD OF MEDICAL LICENSURE
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, BUCKINGHAM, AND MILLER, JUDGES.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE.
Yakov G. Drabovskiy appeals pro se from an
order of the Lawrence Circuit Court which dismissed with
prejudice his petition of appeal of a final order that affirmed
an Emergency Order of Suspension issued by the Kentucky Board of
Medical Licensure suspending his medical license.
We affirm.
Prior to the suspension order, Dr. Drabovskiy was
licensed by the Medical Board to practice osteopathy in the
Commonwealth of Kentucky.
In August 2000, Dr. Drabovskiy began
treating patients in association with Dr. Frederick Cohn in
Paintsville, Kentucky.
In August and September 2000, the Medical
Board initiated an investigation in response to grievances it had
received from a local police officer and a local physician
concerning the drug prescribing practices of Dr. Cohn.
The
Medical Board suspended its investigation when it discovered
several state and federal law enforcement agencies were already
investigating Dr. Cohn.
In February 2001, the law enforcement agencies seized
patient records, sign-in sheets, and prescription records from
Dr. Cohn’s office pursuant to a search warrant.
In August 2001,
both Dr. Cohn and Dr. Drabovskiy were arrested by federal
authorities and indicted for various federal controlled
substances and money laundering offenses.
More specifically, Dr.
Drabovskiy was indicted in federal district court on four counts
of Conspiracy to Distribute and Distribution of Controlled
Substances without Legitimate Medical Purpose,1 one count of
Health Care Fraud,2 and two counts of Forfeiture.3
As part of
his conditions of release on bond, Dr. Drabovskiy was required to
not engage in private medical practice without court approval and
to make full disclosure of the pending charges if he sought
employment as a medical provider from a public entity.
On September 20, 2001, Inquiry Panel B of the Medical
Board convened a special meeting at which it considered a
memorandum prepared by a Medical Board investigator, the arrest
1
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 21 U.S.C. § 846, and 18 U.S.C. §
1956(h).
2
18 U.S.C. § 1347.
3
21 U.S.C. § 853 and 18 U.S.C. § 982.
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warrant and criminal complaint in the federal prosecution, and a
report from a Medical Board consultant.
Computer scheduling and
sign-in sheets revealed that on several occasions, Dr. Drabovskiy
saw over 120 patients in one day and prescribed the same
combination of drugs including Lorcet, Xanax, and Soma.
During
the office search, several preprinted prescription pads for the
above drugs were seized.
The Medical Board consultant, who was a
licensed physician, stated that based on his review of over 50
patient charts, Dr. Drabovskiy conducted little or no physical
examination of patients and prescribed the same controlled
substances regardless of the complaint.
He opined that this
conduct represented a past, present, and future threat to
patients by distributing controlled substances without sufficient
medical justification.
On September 25, 2001, the Inquiry Panel B issued an
Emergency Order of Suspension finding under KRS4 311.592(1) that
Dr. Drabovskiy’s practice constituted a danger to the health,
welfare, and safety of his patients or the general public based
on probable cause to believe that he had violated KRS 311.595(4)
and (9), as illustrated by KRS 311.597(1)(a), (b), and (d), (3),
and (4).
The panel then ordered an emergency hearing be held
within 10 days as provided by KRS 13B.125(3) and 201 KAR5 9:081.
On October 8, 2001, an emergency hearing was held
before a hearing officer at which Dr. Drabovskiy was present and
represented by counsel.
The Medical Board consultant testified
4
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
5
Kentucky Administrative Regulations.
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concerning his review of the medical records associated with Dr.
Drabovskiy’s practice.
He concluded Dr. Drabovskiy provided
controlled substances as the exclusive form of treatment without
performing any type of meaningful medical analysis or
consideration of alternatives.
He felt Dr. Drabovskiy endangered
his patients and the general public by over-prescribing
controlled substances that were dangerous and medically
unnecessary.
The Medical Board investigator also testified about
his visits to the Paintsville office during which he saw over 100
patients in the waiting room and the preprinted prescription
pads.
Dr. Drabovskiy offered no testimony at the hearing and
merely argued that he had acted at the direction of Dr. Cohn.
On October 12, 2001, the hearing officer entered a
final order affirming the prior Emergency Order of Suspension.
He held there was substantial evidence that Dr. Drabovskiy failed
to conform to the standards of acceptable and prevailing
osteopathic practice within the Commonwealth as defined under KRS
311.595, KRS 311.597, and 201 KAR 9:005 Section 1(1)(b).
He
found substantial evidence that Dr. Drabovskiy’s method of
prescribing controlled substances constituted his usual and
customary practice, represented a danger to the health, safety,
and welfare of patients by exposing them to unnecessary risks and
possible addiction, and endangered the public by increasing the
supply of sought after prescription drugs in the illegal
prescription drug trade.
The hearing officer noted that while the Medical Board
had the burden of proof, under KRS 13B.125(3), an “emergency
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order shall be affirmed if there is substantial evidence of a
violation of law which constitutes an immediate danger to the
public health, safety, or welfare.”
(Emphasis added).
He found
Dr. Drabovskiy’s practice represented a pattern of conduct
violating KRS 311.597(1), (3) and (4), and KRS 311.595(9).
He
rejected Dr. Drabovskiy’s defense as unpersuasive and as a
failure to comply with the professional responsibility of each
individual physician.
Finally, the hearing officer stated the
purpose of this hearing was merely to determine whether there was
substantial evidence to support the emergency order and another
final hearing would be available to determine the validity of the
substantive charges.
The final order concluded with notice to
the parties of their appeal rights as provided by KRS 13B.140,
KRS 311.593, and 201 KAR 9:081 Section 9(5).
On November 5, 2001, Dr. Drabovskiy, acting pro se,
filed a document in the Lawrence Circuit Court objecting to the
Emergency Order of Suspension as beyond the Medical Board’s legal
rights and being unjustified under the facts.
The Medical Board
was served with this document by certified mail on November 8,
2001.
On November 17, Dr. Drabovskiy filed a document entitled
“Motion” moving the court to review, stay, and revoke the
Emergency Order of Suspension and to conduct a hearing on the
motion.
On November 28, 2001, the Medical Board filed a motion
to dismiss the action based on improper venue.
On January 10,
2002, the circuit court entered its finding of fact and order
dismissing the action on procedural grounds as being untimely.
This appeal followed.
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Dr. Drabovskiy seeks review of the Medical Board’s
action in issuing an emergency order suspending his license on
substantive grounds arguing there were insufficient emergency
conditions to justify the order.
He contends that he poses no
danger because his practice has been limited by the federal
district court under his conditions of release.
Dr. Drabovskiy
maintains that the circuit court should not have dismissed his
petition as untimely because he was abandoned by his attorney and
was forced to pursue the appeal pro se.
Our review of the record raises serious questions with
regard to dismissal of the action as untimely.6
As the circuit
court correctly noted, under KRS 13B.140, a party seeking
judicial review of a final order of an agency “shall institute an
appeal by filing a petition in the Circuit Court . . . within
thirty (30) days after the final order of the agency is mailed or
delivered by personal service.”
The circuit court based its
decision by referencing October 12, 2001, as the date the final
order concerning the emergency order of suspension was mailed and
November 17, 2001, as the date Dr. Drabovskiy filed his appeal of
the agency order.
The record reveals, however, that Dr.
Drabovskiy filed a document challenging the Medical Board’s
action on November 5, 2001, in which he cited KRS 13B.140(1) and
asked the circuit court to revoke the Emergency Order of
Suspension.
Attached to this document were copies of the
Emergency Order of Suspension and the complaint seeking a hearing
6
We note that the Medical Board did not argue to the trial
court that the appeal was not timely filed.
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based on the emergency order.
Summons was issued, and these
documents were served on the Medical Board.
While the November
5, 2001, filing was not titled, we believe it was sufficient to
constitute compliance with KRS 13B.140(1), making the appeal
timely.7
Nevertheless, we believe the circuit court’s order of
dismissal may be affirmed on substantive grounds.
See, e.g.,
Commonwealth, Natural Resources & Environmental Protection
Cabinet v. Neace, Ky., 14 S.W.3d 15, 20 (2000)(appellate court
may affirm trial court under alternate theory not relied on by
trial court); Board of Education of McCreary County v. Williams,
Ky. App., 806 S.W.2d 649, 650 (1991)(appellate court will affirm
correct decision of trial court even if lower court reached its
decision through incorrect or different reasoning).
As in the
circuit court, our standard of review of agency action is limited
to whether the agency acted within its statutory powers, whether
the parties were afforded procedural due process, and whether the
agency’s decision was supported by substantial evidence.
See
Urella v. Kentucky Bd. of Medical Licensure, Ky., 939 S.W.2d 869,
873 (1997)(citing Kentucky State Racing Commission v. Fuller,
Ky., 481 S.W.2d 298 (1972)); Kentucky Bd. of Nursing v. Ward, Ky.
App., 890 S.W.2d 641, 643 (1994).
Substantial evidence is
defined as evidence of substance and relevant consequence having
the fitness to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable
people.
See Commonwealth, Cabinet for Human Resources v.
7
The document filed by Dr. Drabovskiy on November 17, 2001,
was entitled as a motion.
-7-
Bridewell, Ky., 62 S.W.3d 370, 373 (2001); Burton v. Foster
Wheeler Corp., Ky., 72 S.W.3d 925, 929 (2002).
An appellate
court should not engage in a de novo review of the evidence or
substitute its own judgment for that of the agency on factual
issues even though there may be contrary or conflicting evidence.
Urella, supra; Ward, supra; Bowling v. Natural Resources and
Environmental Protection Cabinet, Ky. App., 891 S.W.2d 406, 410
(1994).
The Medical Board clearly acted within its statutory
powers under KRS 311.592 and KRS 311.595.
The Board also had
authority to temporarily suspend Dr. Drabovskiy’s license without
a hearing under due process provided it conducted a reasonably
prompt post-deprivation hearing.
Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55,
99 S.Ct. 2642, 61 L.Ed.2d 365 (1979); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.
v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 108 S.Ct. 1780, 100 L.Ed.2d 265 (1988);
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S.
264, 101 S.Ct. 2352, 69 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981).
In this case, the
Medical Board did conduct a full evidentiary hearing on the
temporary suspension and emergency order on a date agreed to by
the parties with Dr. Drabovskiy present with counsel.
Thus, he
was afforded adequate procedural due process.
Dr. Drabovskiy’s major complaint is that the emergency
order was not supported by substantial evidence.
At the October
8 hearing, Dr. Drabovskiy offered no evidence to rebut the
Medical Board’s extensive evidence of his excessive prescription
practices.
We agree with the Medical Board that Dr. Drabovskiy’s
assertion that he was acting under the direction of Dr. Cohn was
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not sufficient to preclude temporary suspension of his license.
Dr. Drabovskiy has an individual duty to abide by the legal and
professional standards imposed on physicians. In addition, his
asserted defense was not supported by any evidence in the record.
The Medical Board’s decision that Dr. Drabovskiy engaged in an
ongoing pattern of unacceptable prescribing practices of
controlled substances in violation of Kentucky law and posed an
immediate danger to public health, safety, or welfare was
supported by substantial evidence.
Dr. Drabovskiy’s argument on appeal that he posed no
danger because he was not practicing medicine as a result of the
restrictions placed on him by the federal district court under
his conditions of release on bond is equally unpersuasive.
The
conditions did allow him some limited ability to practice for
public entities and were subject to modification or elimination
by the federal court at any time.
However, the Medical Board was
not required to rely on the federal court’s action in protecting
the citizens of the Commonwealth under its licensing authority.
Dr. Drabovskiy misunderstands the purpose and licensing authority
of the Medical Board to prevent prospective, as well as, past
violations in the public interest.
The fact that he is not
currently practicing medicine does not prevent the Medical Board
from temporarily suspending his license based on a valid finding
of potential violations.
In any event, Dr. Drabovskiy will be
accorded another full evidentiary hearing on the merits of the
charges against him, probably following resolution of the federal
prosecution.
Finally, we note that Dr. Drabovskiy has not shown
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that this defense was raised in the October 8 hearing, and
therefore, it was unpreserved.
See Urella, 939 S.W.2d at 873
(failure to raise an issue before an administrative body
precludes the assertion of that issue in an action for judicial
review).
Consequently, Dr. Drabovskiy’s petition for review of
the Emergency Order of Suspension was subject to dismissal on the
merits.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the
Lawrence Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT - PRO SE:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Yakov G. Drabovskiy
Lowmansville, Kentucky
C. Lloyd Vest II
General Counsel
Kentucky Board of Medical
Licensure
Louisville, Kentucky
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