ERIC STRATTON v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
November 1, 2002; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-002634-MR
ERIC STRATTON
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GEOFFREY P. MORRIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CR-000470
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
EMBERTON, Chief Judge, BUCKINGHAM, and GUDGEL, Judges.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE: Eric Stratton appeals from an order of the
Jefferson Circuit Court dismissing his petition for declaratory
judgment.
We affirm.
On February 18, 1999, Stratton was indicted by a
Jefferson County grand jury on charges of first-degree rape,
second-degree rape, second-degree sodomy, and first-degree sexual
abuse.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Stratton entered an Alford
plea of guilty to the first-degree sexual abuse charge, and the
remaining charges were dismissed.
On October 21, 1999, he was
sentenced to three years in prison for the offense.
According to
the judgment, Stratton voluntarily waived the pre-sentence
investigation (PSI) report.
The PSI report was apparently completed by corrections
officials on November 17, 1999.
Some time later, Stratton
requested notification of the factual contents and conclusions in
the report.
(1987).
See Commonwealth v. Bush, Ky., 740 S.W.2d 943
2001.
This information was supplied to Stratton on January 12,
Based on information in the report, Stratton immediately
submitted a request that the report be amended.
On March 20, 2001, Stratton’s attorney moved the trial
court to allow amendments to the PSI report.
On that same day,
the court entered an order allowing an amended report.
Corrections officials submitted an amended report to the trial
court on May 22, 2001.
Stratton had two complaints with the original PSI
report.
First, the report stated that the crimes were committed
between July 1, 1990, and June 30, 1994.
Stratton asserted that
he was in prison on a parole violation between July 1, 1990, and
August 8, 1991, and that, therefore, he could not have committed
the offenses during the early part of the time referenced in the
report.
Second, the report stated that Stratton had vaginal
intercourse and oral sex with the victim.1
Stratton asserted
that he pled guilty to first-degree sexual abuse and that the
charges relating to intercourse and oral sex had been dismissed
and were untrue.
Thus, he asserted that the report should have
been amended to delete these references.
1
The victim of the crime was Stratton’s daughter.
-2-
The amended PSI report, which was submitted to the
trial court on May 22, 2001, included Stratton’s statements
concerning both points of contention.
However, the information
contained in the original report that Stratton found
objectionable was not deleted in the amended report as desired by
Stratton.
Stratton claimed that the amended report did not
properly address the problems, and he filed a petition for writ
of mandamus in which he moved the trial court to compel
corrections officials to comply with the court’s prior order as
it pertained to the amending of the report.
The petition was
filed on June 15, 2001, and was dismissed by the trial court on
July 27, 2001.
Stratton subsequently filed a petition for declaratory
judgment with the trial court, asserting the same grounds as set
forth in the petition for writ of mandamus.
On October 26, 2001,
the trial court entered an order dismissing the petition.
This
appeal by Stratton followed.
Stratton argues on appeal that the trial court abused
its discretion in denying his petition for declaratory judgment.
He maintains that the relief he had requested had already been
granted by the trial court’s entry of the previous order allowing
the amendment of the PSI report.
He asserts that the manner in
which the amendments were addressed “in essence made it a nullity
as the problems remained and continued to effect appellant’s
classification and participation in the Sex Offender Treatment
Program.”
-3-
More specifically, he contends that he is now placed in
a position of having to admit the facts as they were presented in
the PSI report even though those facts are untrue.2
In support
of his argument that the facts are untrue, he notes that the rape
and sodomy charges were dismissed and that he pled guilty only to
the first-degree sexual abuse charge.
He asserts that these
matters are highly prejudicial to his prisoner classification and
to the treatment plans and that they will also have “serious
ramifications when appellant goes before the Parole Board.”
The statutory provisions governing PSI reports are set
forth in KRS3 532.050.
Unfortunately, the statute does not
address the issue before this court.
Rather, the statute
provides in pertinent part that “[t]he report . . . shall include
an analysis of the defendant’s history of delinquency or
criminality, physical and mental condition, family situation and
background, economic status, education, occupation, personal
habits, and any other matters that the court directs to be
included.”
KRS 532.050(2).
Further, Stratton has cited no
authority which would indicate that the manner in which the
report was submitted was improper.
In response to Stratton’s arguments, the Commonwealth
cites Aaron v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 810 S.W.2d 60 (1991).
Therein, the appellant sought to have information relating to
dismissed charges segregated from the PSI report.
2
His argument
Before Stratton may be paroled, he must complete a sexual
offender treatment program. In order to complete the program, he
must admit that the committed the offenses.
3
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
-4-
was rejected by the trial court, and this court affirmed the
trial court’s ruling on the issue.
Id. at 62.
We reject Stratton’s arguments for two reasons.
First,
we conclude that the Aaron case is authority for including
information concerning a dismissed charge in the PSI report.
Second, we believe the victim’s version of a crime properly
belongs in the PSI report even though the charges may be amended
or some charges may be dismissed.
Merely because the original
charges were subjected to the plea bargaining process and that
some charges were amended or even dismissed does not necessarily
mean that the crime was committed only in the manner in which a
defendant pleads guilty.4
In short, we conclude that the amended
PSI report was not improper and that the trial court did not err
in denying Stratton’s petition for declaratory judgment.
The order of the Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Eric Stratton, Pro Se
LaGrange, Kentucky
M. Lee Turpin
Frankfort, Kentucky
4
Plea bargaining may occur in sex offenses cases, as well
as in other types of cases, for a variety of reasons, including a
desire by the Commonwealth that the victim not be made to testify
and put through the ordeal of a trial. Because the victim was
Stratton’s minor daughter, that may have been the case herein.
-5-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.