DERLQUAN COVETTE PRICE v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
November 1, 2002; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-001812-MR
DERLQUAN COVETTE PRICE
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE BARRY WILLETT, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CR-000398
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS and DYCHE, Judges; and JOHN POTTER, Special
Judge.1
COMBS, JUDGE:
Following his entry of a conditional guilty plea,
Derlquan Covette Price (Price) appeals from an order of the
Jefferson Circuit Court denying his motion to suppress statements
made to police after he was taken into custody.
Arguing that his
statements resulted from coercive misrepresentations of the
police, he contends that they could not have been made
voluntarily and that failure of the trial court to grant his
motion to suppress violated his rights pursuant to the Fourth
1
Senior Status Judge John Potter sitting as Special Judge by
assignment of the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of
the Kentucky Constitution.
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Section 10 of the
Constitution of Kentucky.
Price's appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant to
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed. 493
(1967), in which she states that there appears to be no
meritorious basis for the appeal.
brief.
Price did not file a pro se
Upon reviewing the record, we agree that this appeal has
no merit.
Thus, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
On February 14, 2001, Price was indicted for three
counts of robbery in the first degree (KRS2 515.020 and 502.020)
and one count of theft by unlawful taking over $300 (KRS 514.030
and 502.020).
The charges resulted from evidence that on
December 30, 2000, he and co-defendant, Randall Scott Curry,
entered Karina's Jewelry store armed with a handgun, robbed the
business of more than $140,000 in jewelry, and robbed the
individual employees of the store.
The car which they were
driving had previously been stolen.
On May 16, 2001, Price filed a motion to suppress all
evidence obtained during the police investigation — including
statements he made to the police.
On June 4, 2001, an
evidentiary hearing was held on the motion, which the court
denied on June 7, 2001.
Price subsequently entered a conditional
guilty plea to three counts of robbery in the first degree and
theft by unlawful taking over $300.
The Commonwealth recommended
a sentence of eighteen years on each count of robbery and five
years on the theft count — all to run concurrently.
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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Under the
terms of his plea agreement and pursuant to RCr3 8.09, Price
reserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to
suppress.
On July 26, 2001, the circuit court entered final
judgment and sentencing pursuant to the plea agreement.
This
appeal followed.
Price contends that he made statements to the police
about the jewelry without having been advised of his Miranda
rights.
He maintains that he did not voluntarily and
intelligently waive his rights because of the police
misrepresentations to him — including an alleged assurance that
no criminal charges would be filed against him.
On January 2, 2001, Randall Scott Curry (Curry) was
arrested at the scene of a separate jewelry store robbery and
provided a statement implicating Price in the robbery that had
occurred only days earlier at Karina's Jewelry Store.
He gave
the police a general address for an apartment building where he
believed that Price lived.
On January 3, 2001, Detective Duncan
and three other detectives went to the apartment building and
found an apartment occupied by Price's father, William Henry
Price; Price's girlfriend was also present.
The detectives learned that Price was not there and
that he did not live there -- although visiting often and
sleeping on the couch.
The police informed the father and
girlfriend that they were investigating a robbery and that they
had information that led them to believe that Price was in
possession of the stolen jewelry.
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They confiscated jewelry from
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
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Price's girlfriend, which she stated had been given to her by
Price on New Year's Eve and which she had suspected was stolen.
When Price's father gave the detectives permission to search the
apartment, they found more evidence linking Price to the robbery
— including sweatpants matching the description given by one of
the employees of the store, a price tag, and a bullet.
The
police did not collect the evidence at this point so as not to
alert Price's father and girlfriend that they suspected Price in
the robbery.
Emphasizing that he was not saying that Price was
involved in the robbery, Detective Duncan left a message to have
Price call him when he returned about the jewelry he was believed
to be holding.
On January 4, 2001, Price contacted Duncan and asked
for a meeting.
When Duncan and Detective Wilfong arrived, Price
contends that the detectives did not then advise him of his
rights.
At the suppression hearing, Duncan and Wilfong testified
that Price was advised of his rights and that he waived them.
However, no written waiver was signed at that time.
Price first
admitted that Curry had given him the jewelry, but he denied
knowing what happened to the rest of the jewelry.
Detective
Duncan emphasized that he was not saying Price was involved in
the actual holdup; Price then volunteered to show where he was
holding the jewelry.
Price was placed under arrest and was put
in handcuffs before leaving the apartment.
Price initially took the police to a location where no
jewelry was found.
He next directed the detectives to the
apartment of Yashica Knight (Knight).
-4-
After stating that she was
not going to get into any trouble for Price or Curry, Knight
showed the detectives several thousand dollars’ worth of jewelry
hidden in a sock.
Knight told police that when she came home on
December 30, 2000, she had found Curry, Price, and her boyfriend,
Thomas Taylor, with hundreds of pieces of jewelry spread out on
the bed; Price and Curry had said they had robbed a jewelry
store.
Knight, Curry, Price, and Taylor each took some of the
jewelry; she was instructed to hide the rest.
recounted the same facts.
Thomas Taylor
He added that Price said he had gone
into the jewelry store to case it and later went back with Curry
to rob it.
The police recovered the stolen property and
proceeded to headquarters with Price.
Unaware of the statements of Knight and Taylor to the
police, Price continued to deny his involvement in the robbery as
the police questioned him en route to the police station.
Detective Duncan told him that store employees had identified him
as the person who had come into the store before the robbery;
Price admitted only that he had accompanied Curry -- still
denying actual participation in the robbery itself.
Upon arrival
at police headquarters, the police read Price his rights, and he
signed a waiver.
A taped confession followed in which he
admitted that he and Curry had committed the holdup and that he
and Curry had stolen the getaway vehicle.
In reviewing the decision of a circuit court on a
suppression motion following a hearing, our standard of review is
twofold.
First, we review the trial court's factual findings for
clear error; next, we examine its application of the law de novo.
-5-
Findings of fact of a trial court are conclusive if
they are supported by substantial evidence.
Commonwealth, Ky., 967 S.W.2d 6, 8 (1998).
RCr 9.78; Adcock v.
In this case, the
court found that Miranda warnings were given both at the time
Price was taken into custody and prior to his tape-recorded
statement.
It also found that Price knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily waived his right to counsel when he initiated the
contact with the detectives and agreed to meet with them to
discuss his involvement in the robbery.
It specifically found
that there was no credible proof that the detectives made any
intentionally false or misleading statements that would rise to
the level of compulsion so as to render the confession forced or
involuntary.
Substantial evidence in the record (including the
police report, the testimony of the detectives, the waiver-ofrights form, and the taped confession) supported these findings.
We find no clear error under the first part of our analysis.
The second aspect of our review involves a de novo
examination to determine whether the court's decision was correct
as a matter of law.
380 (2000).
Stewart v. Commonwealth, Ky., 44 S.W.3d 376,
To determine whether a confession was the result of
coercion, one must look at the totality of the circumstances to
assess whether police obtained evidence by bullying the defendant
with overbearing, credible threats.
Henson v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
20 S.W.3d 466 (2000), citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279,
286-88, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1252-53, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991).
Price makes no claim that any threats were made.
However, he argues that the police made numerous misrepresent-
-6-
ations to him and that, therefore, he believed that they were
only interested in recovering the jewelry.
He testified that he
believed that if he led the police to the jewelry, he would be
returned home in an hour.
He asks this court to consider his
mistaken impression of police intent as a tool that coerced his
confession.
The use of a ruse or strategic deception does not
render a confession involuntary as long as the ploy does not rise
to the level of compulsion or coercion. Springer v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 998 S.W.2d 439, 447 (1999), citing Illinois v. Perkins, 496
U.S. 292, 297, 110 S.Ct. 2394, 2397, 110 L.Ed.2d 243 (1990).
Detective Duncan admitted to making misrepresentations to Price
as to what the police actually knew about the extent of his
involvement in the robbery.
However, Price's taped confession
and waiver supported Detective Duncan's testimony that no
promises were made to Price.
The strategic deception of the
police did not remotely equate with compulsion or coercion.
We
conclude, therefore, that Price's statements to the police were
voluntary.
The judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Kim Brooks
Covington, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Anitria M. Franklin
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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