HEALTHESSENTIALS SOLUTIONS, INC. v. KINDRED HEALTHCARE OPERATING, INC.
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RENDERED: JULY 26, 2002; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-001436-MR
HEALTHESSENTIALS SOLUTIONS, INC.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE F. KENNETH CONLIFFE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-006192
v.
KINDRED HEALTHCARE OPERATING, INC.
(F/K/A VENCOR OPERATING)
APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
DYCHE, KNOPF, AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
In February 1999, HealthEssentials Solutions, Inc.
purchased 1000 shares of NPPA of America, Inc. preferred stock
from Vencor Operating, Inc.
Among other consideration,
HealthEssentials gave Vencor a promissory note for $500,000.00.
In September 2000, alleging that HealthEssentials had defaulted
on its note, Vencor brought suit seeking the full principal plus
interest.
Almost immediately, the suit was stayed pending
Vencor’s bankruptcy.
Vencor emerged from bankruptcy in April
2001 with a new name, Kindred Healthcare Operating, Inc., and
promptly moved to have its suit against HealthEssentials
recommenced.
In May 2001, HealthEssentials answered the
complaint and asserted counterclaims against Kindred on the
grounds, among others, of fraud and mistake.
By order entered June 14, 2001, the Jefferson Circuit
Court dismissed HealthEssentials’ fraud and mistake-based
counterclaims with prejudice.
The claims had not been pled, the
court explained, with the particularity CR 9.02 requires, and
HealthEssentials had failed to respond in time to Kindred’s
motion to dismiss.
The court made the dismissal of the
counterclaim final and appealable pursuant to CR 54.021 and
summarily denied HealthEssentials’ motion for reconsideration.
HealthEssentials thereupon appealed.
It contends that the trial
court misapplied CR 9.02's particularity requirement and that it
abused its discretion by dismissing the counterclaim with
prejudice before HealthEssentials had had an opportunity to be
heard.
Although we agree with the trial court that
HealthEssentials’ allegations of fraud and mistake have not been
pled with sufficient particularity, we are concerned that its
response to Kindred’s motion was apparently not tardy, contrary
to the court’s impression.
Dismissal with prejudice in these
circumstances, we believe, was an inappropriate sanction.
Accordingly, we shall vacate the court’s order of dismissal with
prejudice and remand to afford HealthEssentials an opportunity to
amend its answer and counterclaim.
1
The court’s order also struck fraud and mistake-based affirmative defenses from
HealthEssentials’ answer. That part of the order was not made final, however, and so is not
presently subject to review.
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CR 9.02 requires that “[i]n all averments of fraud or
mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be
stated with particularity.”
The rule thus creates an exception
to the general rule of notice pleading,2 but it does not require
a return to the strict fact pleading that prevailed prior to the
adoption of the civil rules.3
Rather, CR 9.02 requires that
enough of the facts constituting the alleged fraud or mistake be
pled to give the court some assurance that the claim or defense
is substantial4 and to enable the opponent to respond and prepare
for trial.5
It is often said that the rule requires only that
the basic circumstantial facts be pled, the who, what, when,
where, and how of the alleged occurrence.6
The rule requires the
pleading of more than mere conclusions but less than evidentiary
facts.7
What is sufficient between these extremes will vary from
case to case, depending in part upon what the pleader can be
expected to know.8
2
CR 8.05.
3
Scott v. Farmers State Bank, Ky., 410 S.W.2d 717 (1966); Michaels Building Company
v. Ameritrust Company, 848 F.2d 674 (6th Cir. 1988).
4
Mardini v. Viking Freight, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 378 (D. N.J. 1999); Bready v. Geist, 83
F.R.D. 432 (D. E.Pa. 1979).
5
Scott v. Farmers State Bank, supra; Michaels Building Company v. Ameritrust
Company, supra.
6
Hart v. Bayer Corporation, 199 F. 3d 239 (5th Cir. 2000); Woodard v. American Family
Mutual Insurance Company, 950 F. Supp. 1382 (N.D.Ill. 1997).
7
Scott v. Farmers State Bank, supra.
8
Hart v. Bayer Corporation, supra; Mardini v. Viking Freight, Inc., supra.
-3-
We agree with the trial court that HealthEssentials’
allegations of fraud and mistake do not meet the particularity
standard of CR 9.02.
With respect to the alleged mistake,
HealthEssentials averred only that at some point during contract
negotiations, someone in NPPA’s management somehow overstated
NPPA’s financial condition and that both parties to the note
relied, in some sense, on the overstatement.
There is no
indication of who made the statement, when, or what specific
misrepresentation occurred.
Such general allegations do not
suffice to put Kindred on notice of the alleged mistake, nor do
they assure the court that there is any substance to
HealthEssentials’ claim.
HealthEssentials’ allegations of fraud are little
better.
It averred that at unspecified times during
negotiations, unnamed Kindred employees or agents falsely
indicated, in some manner, that Kindred would continue and even
increase its business with NPPA.
Again, there is no indication
of particular people, particular times, or particular
representations, although presumably HealthEssentials knows most,
if not all, of the particular facts.
Because fraud may not be
predicated on representations of future events, it is crucial to
HealthEssentials’ claim that Kindred misrepresented a present
intention and not merely a hope for the future.
HealthEssentials’ general allegations, however, do not tend to
substantiate the former rather than the latter scenario.
The
trial court did not err by deeming HealthEssentials’ allegations
of fraud and mistake insufficiently particular.
-4-
However, the trial court did err in when it dismissed
HealthEssentials’ counterclaim with prejudice.
One of the
underlying purposes of the civil rules is that cases be decided
on their merits, and to that end CR 15.01 provides that leave to
amend technically deficient pleadings is to be freely given “when
justice so requires.”9
Justice does not so require, of course,
if the amendment would be futile or if the pleading party has
already had an opportunity to correct the deficiency.10
Here the
trial court entered its ruling on the eleventh day after Kindred
certified its motion to dismiss and stated that “[d]efendant has
failed to timely file a reply to Plaintiffs’ motions, and the
time for such filing has long since expired.”
If indeed HealthEssentials had missed the deadline for
responding, then dismissing its claim with prejudice would have
been within the spirit of CR 15 and well within the trial court’s
discretion.
HealthEssentials points out, however, that, under
the Jefferson Circuit Court’s Local Rule (JRP) 401, it had twenty
days in which to respond to a motion to dismiss.
Kindred does
not dispute that JRP 401 was the pertinent local rule, nor does
it offer an explanation other than mistake for the trial court’s
remark.
The trial court itself, although asked to do so, did not
address the issue in its summary denial of HealthEssentials
motion to reconsider.
Because the trial court seems to have
based its decision to dismiss with prejudice on an incorrect
perception of HealthEssentials’ tardiness, we agree with
9
Commonwealth ex rel. Stephens v. Stephenson, Ky. App., 574 S.W.2d 328 (1978).
10
First National Bank of Cincinnati v. Hartmann, Ky. App., 747 S.W.2d 614 (1988).
-5-
HealthEssentials that justice requires that it be given an
opportunity to amend its fraud and mistake-based counterclaims to
comply with CR 9.02.
It may also wish to state more clearly than
it has done so far its counterclaims based on grounds other than
fraud or mistake.
Of course, Kindred will again be free to
challenge the sufficiency of any amended pleading.
In sum, we affirm the trial court’s conclusion that
HealthEssentials has thus far failed to plead either a fraud or a
mistake-based counterclaim with the particularity CR 9.02
requires.
We are persuaded, however, that it should be given an
opportunity to amend its pleading.
Accordingly, we vacate the
June 14, 2001, order of the Jefferson Circuit Court dismissing
HomeEssentials’ counterclaim and remand for additional
proceedings.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
John E. Clontz
Clontz & Cox, LLC
Mt. Vernon, Kentucky
Patrick W. Michael
Angela Logan Edwards
Woodward, Hobson & Fulton,
L.L.P.
Louisville, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE:
Angela Logan Edwards
Louisville, Kentucky
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