WILLIAM DAVID PENNINGTON v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: JUNE 7, 2002; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2001-CA-000093-MR
WILLIAM DAVID PENNINGTON
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JOHNSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DANIEL R. SPARKS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CR-00008
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE; JOHNSON AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
William David Pennington has appealed as a
matter of right from a final judgment and sentence of
imprisonment entered by the Johnson Circuit Court.
Pennington
was found guilty by a jury of trafficking in a controlled
substance in the second degree,1 and sentenced to prison for one
year.
Having concluded that no reversible error occurred, we
affirm.
The evidence in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth was as follows:
On March 22, 1996, Johnny
Pennington, while working as a paid informant for the Kentucky
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 218A.1413.
State Police, attempted to purchase prescription pain pills2 from
the appellant, who is his first cousin.
In an attempt to gather
evidence against the appellant, Detective Doyle Wilson of the
Drug Enforcement Special Investigations unit of the Kentucky
State Police gave the informant marked bills to use in purchasing
the drugs and equipped him with a tape recorder to record the
conversations pertaining to the sale.
During the first attempted
drug buy, the appellant told the informant that he did not have
the pain pills that the informant had requested, but that he
would meet the informant at a later time after he had time to get
the pills.
The appellant contacted the informant the following day
on March 23, 1996, and the two men agreed to meet at Kelly’s Game
Room3 in Paintsville, Kentucky to transact the drug deal.
Det.
Wilson once again gave the informant marked bills to use in
purchasing the drugs, and he once again outfitted the informant
with a tape recorder to record the transaction.
Following the
sale of the pills in the bathroom of Kelly’s Game Room, the
informant left and went to meet Det. Wilson.
The informant gave
Det. Wilson the pills he had bought and the unused money that
Det. Wilson had given him for the purchase of the drugs.
The
pills recovered by Det. Wilson tested positive for the Schedule
III narcotic, hydrocodone.
2
The pills involved all contained hydrocodone, a schedule
III narcotic. Nine of the pills were the brand name, Lortab, and
eleven of them were the brand name, Lorcet.
3
According to testimony at trial, Kelly’s Game Room was an
establishment operated by the appellant at the time of the drug
buy. Testimony also indicated that Kelly’s Game Room may have
also gone by the name of Kelly’s Amusement.
-2-
The appellant was indicted by the Johnson County grand
jury on January 19, 1998, for trafficking in a controlled
substance in the second degree.
On April 7, 1999, the appellant
was convicted by a jury of the charge.4
The final order
sentencing the appellant to one year in prison was entered on
January 9, 2001.
The appellant has raised four claims of error: (1) that
the trial court erred by admitting the audio tapes into evidence
without first establishing a proper foundation; (2) that witness
Johnny Pennington was improperly permitted to interpret the audio
tapes for the jury; (3) that the trial court improperly admitted
the pills into evidence without proof of a complete chain of
custody; and (4) that the prosecutor made improper remarks in his
closing argument during the penalty phase of the trial.
We
affirm on all issues.
The appellant claims that the trial court erred by
admitting the audio tapes into evidence without first
establishing a proper foundation.
Specifically, he argues:
The Commonwealth clearly did not lay a
proper foundation for the introduction of the
two (2) audio tapes. The informant witness,
Johnny Pennington, merely testified that he
had recently had an opportunity to listen to
the audio tapes, and that, based upon that
earlier listening, that the tapes were a fair
and accurate recording of the conversations
4
Sentencing was originally scheduled for May 21, 1999. The
appellant filed several motions which have delayed his direct
appeal to this Court, including a motion for new trial on June 3,
1999. On June 4, 1999, a final judgment and sentence of
imprisonment was entered, but on November 20, 2000, a motion for
resentencing was filed, and a motion to vacate sentence was filed
two days later on November 22, 2000. The order providing for the
appellant’s “Final Sentencing” was signed on December 15, 2000,
and entered on January 9, 2001. This appeal then followed.
-3-
between the witness and the appellant. The
witness Johnny Pennington never made a proper
authentication of the tapes by testifying in
court that, after actually listening to the
tapes in court, that they were a fair and
accurate recording of the purported
conversations between him and the
appellant[.]
. . .
Present, in-court authentication is what is
contemplated and required by KRE5 901(a) and
Brock v. Commonwealth6 [citations to record
omitted].
The trial court ruled that in order for the informant to testify
as to the accuracy of the tapes, he need only have listened to
them at some prior time, and that it was not necessary for him to
actually listen to the tapes in court.
We agree.
The appellant’s reliance on Brock for the proposition
that a witness must first listen to an audio tape in court before
testifying as to the tape’s accuracy is misplaced.
In Brock, the
defendant attempted to introduce a tape recording to impeach one
witness and to refresh the memory of another witness.
The trial
court in Brock erred by not allowing the witnesses to hear the
audio tape, in court or otherwise.
Thus, the witnesses were not
qualified to testify as to the tape’s accuracy.
Our Supreme
Court stated:
Thus, if Della Partin’s voice on the tape
recording can be identified, and/or if either
Della Partin or Shirley Williams should
testify that the recording is an accurate
reproduction of their conversation, the
recording would be sufficiently authenticated
to permit its introduction into evidence.
Since Appellant was prevented from playing
5
Kentucky Rules of Evidence.
6
Ky., 947 S.W.2d 24 (1997).
-4-
the tape to either Della Partin or Shirley
Williams, he was never afforded the
opportunity to authenticate it.7
Thus, Brock does not stand for the proposition that a
witness must listen to a tape in court before testifying as to
its accuracy.
Obviously, the witness must be given an
opportunity to listen to a tape before testifying, but there is
no requirement that the witness listen to the tape in court.
Rather, in accordance with KRE 901(a), authentication requires
“only that evidence be introduced sufficient to support a finding
that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.”8
Further, in Woods v. Commonwealth,9 the Supreme Court
discussed the broad discretion afforded to a trial court judge in
determining the admissibility of evidence when authenticity is at
issue:
As stated in Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence
Law Handbook, 2d ed., § 7.10 (1984), the
cases from the federal courts hold the “trial
court has broad discretion in determining
admissibility and that his judgment will not
be disturbed on appeal if there is sufficient
evidence of the accuracy of the recording to
assure its reliability.”
We cannot say the
trial court abused its discretion in the
present case in admitting the tape recording.
7
Id. at 30.
8
Id. See also Campbell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 788 S.W.2d
260, 264 (1990)(holding that “testimony sufficient to support a
finding that tape recordings are what they are purported to be is
sufficient evidence of authenticity for introduction of the
recordings into evidence.”)(citing Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence
Law Handbook, § 7.10(III) (2d. ed., 1976)).
9
Ky., 793 S.W.2d 809, 815 (1990).
-5-
In the case at bar, the informant testified that he had
listened to the two audio tapes, that he did recognize his voice
and the appellant’s voice on those tapes, and that the tapes were
a fair and accurate recording of their conversations.
Accordingly, in light of both the informant’s testimony and the
lack of any evidence or even any allegation of tampering, we hold
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting
the audio tapes into evidence.
The appellant next argues that the trial court
impermissibly allowed the informant to interpret the
conversations on the audio tapes for the jury.
Specifically, he
argues:
The jury listened to the first audio
tape. The witness Johnny Pennington was then
asked[,] “Mr. Pennington, could you just tell
us. . . tell the jury what we just heard on
that tape?” The witness Johnny Pennington
then testified that it concerned his first
visit with the appellant, and stated what was
said on the tape. In reference to the second
tape, the witness Johnny Pennington
interpreted the tape by stating that it was
the appellant who said “.75” (meaning 75
milligrams). This amounted to improper
“interpretation” of the audio tape by the
witness, a practice which was condemned by
the Supreme Court of Kentucky in Gordon v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 916 S.W.2d 176 (1995), a
case in which a party to a recorded
conversation attempted to interpret what was
on a tape, after the tape had been played.
The appellant herein submits that this
practice is objectionable because it is for
the jury to determine and decide what it is
that they hear on an audio tape, if they are
able to hear and understand anything
[citations to record omitted].
-6-
We note that the appellant has conceded that this issue
was not properly preserved for appellate review.
As such, RCr10
10.26 dictates that relief should be granted from such an alleged
error only “upon a determination that manifest injustice has
In Partin v. Commonwealth,11 our
resulted from the error.”
Supreme Court explained what must be shown by a party seeking
review of an alleged error not properly preserved at trial:
[A]ppellant contends we should review the
alleged error of the Commonwealth Attorney in
closing argument under the palpable error
rule. RCr 10.26. A palpable error is one
which affects the substantial rights of a
party and relief may be granted for palpable
errors only upon a determination that a
manifest injustice has resulted from the
error. This means, upon consideration of the
whole case, the reviewing court must conclude
that a substantial possibility exists that
the result would have been different in order
to grant relief [citation omitted].
In the case sub judice, we do not believe that the appellant has
made the required showing of manifest injustice.
The appellant points to two instances in which he
contends the informant was impermissibly allowed to interpret the
conversation on the audio tapes while testifying.
The relevant
testimony reads as follows:
[Commonwealth’s Attorney]: Mr. Pennington,
could you just tell us. . . tell the Jury
what we just heard on that tape?
[Johnny]: That was the first visit to the
game room which David was telling me that he
didn’t have the pain pills; that he would
have them the next day. He would call me on
my mobile phone or pager.
10
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
11
Ky., 918 S.W.2d 219, 224 (1996).
-7-
Later on during the informant’s testimony, the following exchange
took place:
[Commonwealth’s Attorney]: Alright. Now,
who actually said .75?12 Was that you or the
Defendant?
[Johnny]:
David Pennington.
In Gordon, our Supreme Court discussed the prohibition
on permitting witnesses to interpret conversations on recordings:
From our examination of the transcript, it is
apparent that the witness purported to
interpret the tape recording rather than
testify from his recollection. This was in
error. Upon retrial, the court must
determine whether the tape should be admitted
and, of course, the witness should be
permitted to testify. The court should
refrain, however, from permitting the witness
to interpret what is on the tape. It is for
the jury to determine as best it can what is
revealed in the tape recording without
embellishment or interpretation by a witness
[citation omitted].13
We agree with the appellant that portions of the informant’s
testimony constitute his interpreting of what was being said on
the audio tapes, particularly his response to the Commonwealth’s
Attorney’s request that he “tell the jury what we just heard. . .
.”
However, we hold that this limited error does not rise to the
level of a manifest injustice.
We cannot say that “a substantial
possibility exists that the result would have been
different[.]”14
12
The phrase “.75” in the recorded conversations refers to
the strength of the pain pills. The chemist from the state crime
lab testified that the pills allegedly sold by the appellant were
in the range of 5.0 to 7.5 milligrams in strength.
13
Gordon, supra at 180.
14
Partin, supra at 224.
-8-
The evidence against the appellant was considerable
even without the improper interpretation of the audio tapes.
Before the audio tapes were played to the jury, the informant
testified extensively as to the events leading up to his purchase
of the pills, and he testified in some detail about the actual
money-for-drugs exchange between the appellant and himself.
Det.
Wilson also testified concerning the steps he took to help ensure
that the pills were in fact sold by the appellant to the
informant.
For example, before both the failed attempted drug
buy on March 22, 1996, and the successful drug buy the following
day, Det. Wilson stated that he searched the informant’s car and
his person to make sure the informant did not have any drugs or
money with him before going to meet the appellant at Kelly’s Game
Room.
Further, Det. Wilson testified that he followed the
informant to and from Kelly’s Game Room on both occasions.
Accordingly, we do not believe that this error resulted in a
manifest injustice.
The appellant next argues that the pills were
improperly admitted into evidence due to an insufficient showing
of the chain of custody.
Specifically, he argues:
The critical flaw in the Commonwealth’s
presentation of chain of custody evidence
regarding the pills which were tested by
witness Tom Morrow is that the witness could
not testify to whom he gave transferred [sic]
the pills after he tested them. In response
to a question as to the disposition of the
pills which were tested, the witness Tom
Morrow testified simply that “. . . they were
returned eventually. . .”, without saying to
whom. . . .
. . .
-9-
This is the type of evidence which is prone
to tampering or change, and the Commonwealth
should be required to complete the circle of
the various transfers of these pills so as to
reasonably establish their authenticity,
prior to being admitted into evidence and
displayed to the jury.
Although there may have been a gap in the chain of custody of the
evidence offered by the Commonwealth, a gap does not necessarily
preclude admission of the item into evidence.
In Grundy v. Commonwealth,15 our Supreme Court
discussed chain of custody as it relates to the admissibility of
evidence:
Grundy’s argument rests on a common
misconception regarding the authentication of
tangible evidence, and we must emphasize that
“a break in the chain of custody is not
necessarily fatal to the admissibility of
physical evidence” [footnote omitted].
. . .
We grant trial courts wide discretion over
issues relating to the admissibility of
tangible evidence because the foundation
sufficient for admissibility will vary based
on the nature of the item:
. . .
[I]f the offered evidence is of
such a nature as not to be readily
identifiable, or to be susceptible
to alteration by tampering or
contamination, sound exercise of
the trial court’s discretion may
require a substantially more
elaborate foundation. A foundation
of the latter sort will commonly
entail testimonially tracing the
“chain of custody” of the item with
sufficient completeness to render
it improbable that the original
item has either been exchanged with
15
Ky., 25 S.W.3d 76, 79-80 (2000).
-10-
another or been contaminated or
tampered with [footnote omitted].
Further, in Rabovsky v. Commonwealth,16 our Supreme
Court stated:
Even with respect to substances which
are not clearly identifiable or
distinguishable, it is unnecessary to
establish a perfect chain of custody or to
eliminate all possibility of tampering or
misidentification, so long as there is
persuasive evidence that “the reasonable
probability is that the evidence has not been
altered in any material respect.” Gaps in
the chain normally go to the weight of the
evidence rather than to its admissibility
[citations omitted].
The chain of custody established at trial regarding the
pills was as follows:
1. After purchasing the pills from the
appellant on March 23, 1996, the informant
turned the pills and the plastic baggy
container over to Det. Wilson. Both the
informant and Det. Wilson initialed the baggy
at that time, and identified the baggy
produced at trial as being the same baggy
each had previously initialed.
2. Det. Wilson locked the baggy containing
the pills inside the trunk of his car, where
they were kept until he turned them over to
Tom Morrow for testing on March 26, 1996.
Det. Wilson testified that he personally
handed the pills to Tom Morrow.
3. Tom Morrow testified that he received the
baggy containing the pills from Det. Wilson,
after which he placed his own label and
initials on the baggy. At trial, Morrow
identified the baggy produced by the
Commonwealth as being the same baggy he had
previously initialed.
4. After testing the pills, Morrow testified
that on June 27, 1996, he placed the pills
back into the baggy, and then placed the
16
Ky., 973 S.W.2d 6, 8 (1998).
-11-
baggy inside a locker at the lab, to which
only he had access.
5. Morrow stated that the baggy containing
the pills was turned over to the Kentucky
State Police on February 3, 1997.
6. Det. Wilson then brought the baggy
containing the pills into court for the
trial.
While Tom Morrow could not identify the individual at
the Kentucky State Police to whom he gave the pills after testing
was completed, this slight “gap” should have, at most, affected
the weight of the evidence and not its admissibility.
Thus,
based upon the chain of custody of the pills as established by
the Commonwealth, we hold that the trial court did not err by
ruling that there was a reasonable probability the evidence had
not been altered in any material respect, and that the pills were
properly admitted as evidence.
Finally, the appellant claims that the Commonwealth’s
Attorney made improper remarks in his closing argument during the
penalty phase of the trial.
Specifically, he argues:
In his closing remarks following the
penalty phase of the trial, counsel for the
Commonwealth spoke to the jury as follows:
“I want you to take into
consideration that [ ] you’re
dealing with a defendant who is
remorseless and who denies having
done this. Take that into
consideration,
I want you to consider the pervasiveness of
drug dealing in our society and I want you to
consider how easy it is for this crime to be
committed. All it takes is somebody with
money to walk in anywhere and do this. Take
that into consideration. What are we going
to do with this scourge of drug dealing in
our society?” [Citation to record omitted].
-12-
The first remark by the prosecutor
abridged the appellant’s right against selfincrimination, as William David Pennington
was entitled to deny his guilt. Thus, said
remark attempted to shatter the presumption
of innocence rule as well. This remark thus
violated the restrictions of KRE 511, which
prevents counsel from commenting on a claim
of privilege.
The second comment by the prosecutor
wrongly implies to the jury that the
appellant is a large-scale drug dealer,
involved in perpetuating and inflicting, by
himself, a massive “scourge” upon society.
This was not the evidence, and the
prosecutor’s comments were a direct attempt
to improperly inflame the jury’s passions and
ignite their fears. This is the type of
prosecutorial misconduct which was condemned
by the Supreme Court of Kentucky in Jacobs v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 551 S.W.2d 223 (1977) and
the cases cited therein. In Jacobs, a drug
case, the prosecutor admonished the jury that
it was their duty to keep this poison out of
the system of the citizenry, and that they
should send a loud message by their verdict.
We once again note that this alleged error was not
properly preserved for review on appeal; the appellant’s trial
counsel failed to make a contemporaneous objection to these
comments.17
Therefore, as previously discussed, relief will be
granted only “upon a determination that manifest injustice has
resulted from the error,”18 and that but for the alleged error,
“a substantial possibility exists that the result would have been
different[.]”19
We hold that the appellant has failed to meet
this burden.
17
Weaver v. Commonwealth, Ky., 955 S.W.2d 722, 728 (1997).
18
RCr 10.26.
19
Partin, supra at 224.
-13-
First, the apellant is correct that KRE 511 prohibits
comment by counsel upon a claim of privilege.
However, in the
case at bar, the apellant testified in his own defense.
Therefore, his credibility was then subject to attack in the same
manner as any other witness.
In Tamme v. Commonwealth,20 our
Supreme Court stated:
The prosecutor is entitled to attack a
defendant’s credibility if the defendant
testifies as a witness on his own behalf. An
accused who testifies on his own behalf is
subject to the same rules as an ordinary
witness [citation omitted].
Accordingly, since the appellant specifically denied having sold
drugs to the informant at any time, the Commonwealth’s Attorney
was entitled to attack his credibility.
Further, these comments
were not an attempt by the prosecutor to violate the presumption
of innocence, “because the presumption of innocence applies only
to the guilt phase of the trial,”21 and the appellant had already
been found guilty when the comments were made during the penalty
phase.
Second, the appellant’s argument that the
Commonwealth’s Attorney’s comments were an improper attempt to
“inflame the jury’s passions and ignite their fears,” is also
without merit.
The standard for determining prosecutorial
misconduct is “whether the conduct was of such an ‘egregious’
nature as to deny the accused his constitutional right of due
20
Ky., 973 S.W.2d 13, 39 (1998).
21
Tamme, supra at 39 (citing Delo v. Lashley, 507 U.S. 272,
278-79, 113 S.Ct. 1222, 1226, 122 L.Ed.2d 620 (1993)).
-14-
process of law.”22
Further, a prosecutor is allowed “reasonable
latitude in argument to persuade the jurors the matter should not
be dealt with lightly.”23
We do not believe that these comments
by the Commonwealth’s Attorney were of such an “egregious nature”
so as to deny the appellant due process; we note that the jury
recommended the minimum sentence for a Class D felony.24
We hold
that these comments did not constitute error.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Johnson
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Stephen W. Owens
Pikeville, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Janine Coy Bowden
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
22
Roberson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 913 S.W.2d 310, 317 (1994).
23
Harness v. Commonwealth, Ky., 475 S.W.2d 485, 490 (1971).
24
Class D felonies are punishable under KRS 532.060(2)(d) in
the range of a minimum of one year, to a maximum of five years.
-15-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.