DEERFIELD INSURANCE COMPANY f/d/b/a FIRST REINSURANCE COMPANY OF HARTFORD, INC. v. WARREN COUNTY FISCAL COURT ex rel CITY-COUNTY PLANNING COMMISSION; CITY OF BOWLING GREEN; JOSEPH KOCH; RISK MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATES, INC.; and VAN METER INSURANCE AGENCY WARREN COUNTY FISCAL COURT ex rel CITY-COUNTY PLANNING COMMISSION v. DEERFIELD INSURANCE COMPANY f/d/b/a and REINSURANCE COMPANY OF HARTFORD, INC.; JOSEPH KOCH; RISK MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATES, INC.; THE CITY OF BOWLING GREEN; and VAN METER INSURANCE AGENCY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
May 17, 2002; 2:00 p.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-002774-MR
DEERFIELD INSURANCE COMPANY f/d/b/a
and as SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST TO
FIRST REINSURANCE COMPANY OF
HARTFORD, INC.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS R. LEWIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CI-01181
WARREN COUNTY FISCAL COURT ex rel
CITY-COUNTY PLANNING COMMISSION; CITY
OF BOWLING GREEN; JOSEPH KOCH; RISK
MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATES, INC.; and
VAN METER INSURANCE AGENCY
AND
NO.
2000-CA-002823-MR
WARREN COUNTY FISCAL COURT ex rel
CITY-COUNTY PLANNING COMMISSION
v.
CROSS-APPELLANT
CROSS-APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS R. LEWIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CI-01181
DEERFIELD INSURANCE COMPANY f/d/b/a and
as SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST TO FIRST
REINSURANCE COMPANY OF HARTFORD, INC.;
JOSEPH KOCH; RISK MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATES,
INC.; THE CITY OF BOWLING GREEN; and
VAN METER INSURANCE AGENCY
AND
APPELLEES
NO.
CROSS-APPELLEES
2000-CA-002864-MR
VAN METER INSURANCE AGENCY, INC.
CROSS-APPELLANT
CROSS-APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS R. LEWIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CI-01181
v.
WARREN COUNTY FISCAL COURT ex rel
CITY-COUNTY PLANNING COMMISSION; CITY OF
BOWLING GREEN; DEERFIELD INSURANCE
COMPANY f/d/b/a and as SUCCESSOR IN
INTEREST TO FIRST REINSURANCE COMPANY OF
HARTFORD, INC.; JOSEPH KOCH; and RISK
MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATES, INC.
CROSS-APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART AND REMANDING;
DISMISSING AS TO CROSS-APPEALS
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, EMBERTON, and TACKETT, Judges.
Deerfield Insurance Company1 (Deerfield) f/d/b/a
COMBS, JUDGE:
First Reinsurance Company of Hartford (First Reinsurance),
appeals the summary judgment of the Warren Circuit Court which
resolved issues of insurance coverage in favor of the appellee,
Warren County Fiscal Court ex rel. City-County Planning
Commission.
The trial court concluded as a matter of law that
the insurer owed a duty to defend and indemnify the Planning
Commission in a lawsuit filed by Joseph Koch, a former employee
of the Planning Commission.
After our review of the record and
1
First Reinsurance was the name of the entity originally
insuring the Warren County Fiscal Court. It later became
Deerfield. Their names shall appear somewhat interchangeably in
this opinion as they do throughout the briefs. For all purposes,
they are the same entity.
-2-
the pertinent authorities, we affirm in part, reverse in part and
remand, and dismiss the cross-appeals as moot.
In 1997, upon receipt of an application from Warren
County (the County), First Reinsurance issued a public officials’
liability insurance policy.
The declarations page of the policy
identified Warren County as the named “Public Entity” entitled to
coverage.
The policy had a $10,000,000 limit of liability
coverage, and it included an endorsement for wrongful employment
practices.
In selecting and obtaining coverage, the County had
consulted appellee Van Meter Insurance Agency, a local,
independent insurance agency.
Van Meter then contacted appellee
Risk Management Associates, Inc., an insurance broker.
Risk
Management obtained a quote from First Reinsurance and signed the
County’s application for insurance.
The policy issued by First Reinsurance obligated the insurer
to pay on behalf of the County:
all Loss in excess of the deductible which
the Insured shall become legally obligated to
pay as a result of Claims first made against
the insured during the Policy Period . . .
because of any Wrongful Act committed by the
Insured. (Bold in original.)
“Loss” was defined in the policy as:
any amount including Claims Expenses which an
Insured is legally obligated to pay or which
the Public Entity shall be required or
permitted by law to pay on behalf of any
Insured Person, for any covered Claim,
including judgments and settlements. Loss
does not include: (1) punitive or exemplary
damages. . . (Bold in original; emphasis
added.)
-3-
The policy also specifically excluded “any Claim arising out of
defamation[.]”
The policy’s endorsement for employment-related
offenses committed by an insured provided rather extensive
coverage, including: (1) wrongful termination; (2) employment
discrimination; (3) sexual harassment; and (4) retaliation
defined as follows:
retaliatory treatment against an employee of
the Public Entity on account of such
employee’s exercise or attempted exercise of
his or her rights under law. (Bold in
original; emphasis added.)
The endorsement also amended the policy’s definition of “loss” to
include “any salary, wages or other employment related benefits
which the Public Entity is liable to pay any employee[.]”
On June 25, 1998, while the policy was in force, Koch
filed a complaint alleging that he had been fired in retaliation
for having reported that several of his co-workers at the
Planning Commission were committing waste and fraud.
He sought
damages for lost wages, emotional distress, damage to his
reputation, and punitive damages.
The Planning Commission, the
City of Bowling Green, and the Warren County Fiscal Court were
all named as defendants.
First Reinsurance undertook
representation of the County; it represented the Planning
Commission, however, under a reservation of rights.
Pursuant to CR2 12.02, the City moved to be dismissed
from Koch’s lawsuit.
2
The City argued that the Planning
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
-4-
Commission was a wholly independent entity over which it had no
control:
It is clear from the provisions of
[KRS]3 Chapter 100 and from the agreement
creating the joint City-County Planning Unit
that it is contemplated that the joint
planning unit is an independent entity with
its own finances, its own governing body and
with the ability to employ its own planners
or other staff. The City of Bowling Green
does not employ the staff at the Planning
Commission, the City of Bowling Green does
not pay the staff at the Planning Commission
and the City of Bowling Green does not
terminate employment of the personnel at the
Planning Commission.
The County joined in the City’s motion and stated that
it was “similarily [sic] situated” with respect to the Planning
Commission.
Based on the County’s contention/admission that it
had no responsibility for the operation of the Planning
Commission or, therefore, for Koch’s employment status with the
Commission, First Reinsurance gave notice of its intention to
withdraw its representation of the Planning Commission.
However,
it continued to defend its insured, Warren County, until the
County was dismissed from the litigation.
The County was
voluntarily dismissed from the retaliation suit.
Koch proceeded to trial solely against the Planning
Commission in June 1999.
He was ultimately awarded a judgment
totalling $272,710.00, including: $47,710 for back wages; $25,000
in compensatory damages; $50,000 for injury to his reputation;
and $150,000 in punitive damages.4
3
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
4
This Court affirmed the judgment on January 12, 2001, in
(continued...)
-5-
In September 1999, the County filed a petition for
declaration of rights in which it sought a judgment that First
Reinsurance was required to defend the Planning Commission in the
Koch lawsuit and to indemnify the County for the loss it incurred
because of the jury’s award.
Alternatively, it sought:
(1) a
judgment requiring the City of Bowling Green to satisfy 50% of
Koch’s judgment; or (2) a declaration that appellee Van Meter,
having failed to obtain suitable coverage about which it had been
specifically consulted, was responsible for satisfying the
judgment in favor of Koch.
Van Meter filed a third-party complaint against Risk
Management.
The County had made a direct request to list all
possible entities for which it sought coverage -- explicitly
seeking to include the Planning Commission.
However, Van Meter
alleged that Risk Management had advised the County that it was
not in the County’s best interest to list additional named
insureds on the policy in order to achieve the broadest possible
coverage, avoiding the inadvertent omission of an entity that
would have enjoyed coverage but for the failed recitation or
attempted litany of insureds.
Warren County moved for summary judgment.
Its sole
argument was that the County had a “reasonable expectation” of
coverage from First Reinsurance based on the assurances made by
4
(...continued)
appeal No. 1999-CA-001814-MR, in an opinion designated “not to be
published.” The Kentucky Supreme Court denied the Planning
Commission’s motion for discretionary review on December 12,
2001. At oral argument, counsel for the County advised this
court that Koch’s judgment has been satisfied, 50% by the County
and 50% by the City of Bowling Green.
-6-
Van Meter that it was afforded such broad coverage under its
policy.
The County argued that Van Meter — as the agent of First
Reinsurance — was vested with either the actual or the apparent
authority to bind the insurer and that indeed it had so bound
First Reinsurance by its representations contained in two letters
(hereinafter, the “Van Meter letters”) sent to the Warren County
Judge/Executive after Koch filed his lawsuit.
The first letter,
dated September 2, 1998, reads in relevant part as follows:
Dear Judge Buchanon,
We have confirmed that Warren County/Bowling
Green Planning & Zoning [sic] is a named
insured covered under the Public Officials[’]
Policy for Warren County of Kentucky.
Shane Caldwell of Risk Management Associates
is presently in the process of clearing up
any misunderstandings between the
underwriting department and the claims
department, so that we can proceed forward on
this current employment practices claim.
The insurance company’s claim’s department
originally was trying to deny coverage for
the Warren County/Bowling Green Planning &
Zoning office, because it was brought to
their attention by representing Warren County
attorneys that the Planning & Zoning was not
a controlled entity of Warren County. . . .
However, the coverage issue was not resolved according to the
second letter, dated April 1, 1999:
Dear Judge Buchanon:
This letter will serve to reiterate our phone
conversation of 03/29/99. As discussed, the
above referenced claim is covered under the
County’s Public Official [sic] Policy
according to Van Meter Insurance Agency’s
documentation. Please note the policy has a
$10,000 deductible in lieu of $5,000.
As of this writing, the insurance companies
have not accepted responsibility. We
-7-
continue to work diligently to resolve this
coverage issue.
Should any future clarification be needed,
please do not hesitate to give me a call.
Thanks. (Emphasis added.)
Warren County also moved for summary judgment against
the City of Bowling Green.
In its brief, the County described
the manner in which the Planning Commission had been created;
i.e., pursuant to an agreement between and among the County, the
City of Bowling Green, and other incorporated cities within the
County.
It is not disputed that both the County and the City
agreed to fund 50% of the Planning Commission’s expenditures.
Thus, the County maintained that the City should be required to
satisfy 50% of the judgment against the Planning Commission if
the trial court determined that the County did not have insurance
coverage.
The insurer, now Deerfield (formerly, First
Reinsurance), moved for a partial summary judgment on yet another
issue: if its policy were to be determined to apply to Koch’s
judgment, would it then provide coverage for the award of
punitive damages and defamation damages awarded to Koch?
The
County responded that the policy was internally ambiguous with
respect to the issue of these damages.
While the general policy
contained an explicit provision excluding punitive damages and
damages arising from defamation, the endorsement for wrongful
employment practices did not specifically repeat and reiterate
the policy’s exclusion for punitive and defamation damages.
On September 18, 2000, the Warren Circuit Court
entered the first of two orders under review in this appeal.
-8-
It
granted the County’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of
coverage (finding that coverage existed) and denied Deerfield’s
motion with respect to punitive damages (holding it liable for
the punitive damages portion of the award).
trial court determined:
In so ruling, the
(1) that Van Meter was — at all relevant
times — Deerfield’s agent; (2) that the Van Meter letters bound
the insurer to provide a defense and to indemnify the Planning
Commission for the entirety of the Koch lawsuit; (3) that the
policy was ambiguous with respect to the issue of punitive
damages; and (4) that under the doctrine of reasonable
expectations, the Planning Commission was entitled to be fully
indemnified for all damages awarded to Koch.
In addition, the
trial court awarded the Commission its attorneys’ fees incurred
in defending the Koch lawsuit as well those that resulted from
litigating the declaration of rights action.
Deerfield then moved for permission to file a crossclaim against Van Meter.
Van Meter moved the trial court to
amend its judgment so as to find that the policy was ambiguous
with respect to the named insured and to conclude as a matter of
law that the Commission was an insured under the policy.
Satisfied with the trial court’s ruling that the insurer was
estopped from denying coverage, the County sought to remain
neutral at this juncture and declined to take “any formal
position” with respect to Van Meter’s motion.
On November 2, 1998, the trial court entered the second
order involved in this appeal.
Granting Van Meter’s motion to
amend the judgment, the court concluded that the policy’s
-9-
definition of “insured” was ambiguous and accordingly interpreted
it to include the Planning Commission.
The trial court also
ordered that Deerfield’s motion to file a cross-complaint against
Van Meter be held in abeyance.
The remaining claim of Warren
County against the City was not addressed by the lower court; the
County’s claim against Van Meter and Van Meter’s third-party
complaint against Risk Management were dismissed as moot.
Deerfield appeals the two orders which were made final
by the inclusion of CR 54.02 recitals.
The County cross-appeals
the dismissal of its claims against Van Meter and Van Meter’s
third-party complaint against Risk Management.
Van Meter cross-
appeals the trial court’s ruling that it is the agent of
Deerfield.
If correct, the trial court’s amended judgment of
November 2, 1998, would render moot its original judgment basing
coverage on estoppel and agency theories — as well as mooting the
County’s protective cross-appeals and Van Meter’s cross-appeal.
We have outlined and shall address the coverage issues in
Deerfield’s direct appeal as follows:
I.
Ambiguity / The Definition of Insured
Did the trial court err in concluding that
the policy was ambiguous with respect to the
definition of “insured” and in further
concluding that the county had a reasonable
expectation of coverage for any wrongful acts
-10-
committed by employees of the Planning
Commission?
II.
Agency / Estoppel
Did the trial court err in concluding as a
matter of law that Deerfield was estopped
from denying coverage to the Planning
Commission because of the representations
contained in the letters from Van Meter?
III.
Punitive and Defamatory Damages
If there is coverage for the Planning
Commission under either theory, did the trial
court err in concluding that the policy was
ambiguous with respect to whether punitive
and defamatory damages are excluded from
coverage?
I.
Ambiguity/The Definition of Insured
The policy provisions relevant to the definition of
insured are the following:
E.
Insured persons means any person who is,
was, or shall become a lawfully elected,
appointed or employed official of the
Public Entity. Insured Persons also
includes any members of commissions,
boards or other units insured under this
Policy, employees, and volunteers who
perform services for and under the
direction and control of the Public
Entity, and in the event of the death,
incapacity or bankruptcy of any Insured
-11-
Persons, the estate, heirs, legal
representatives or assigns of such
Insured Persons.
F.
Insured means:
(1)
The Public Entity named in Item 1
of the Declarations;
(2)
All persons who were, now are, or
shall be lawfully elected,
appointed or employed officials of
the Public Entity.
(3)
Members of commissions, boards or
other units operated by and under
the jurisdiction of such Public
Entity and within apportionment of
the total operating budget of the
Public Entity provided that the
insurance afforded shall not extend
to any of the following boards,
commissions or units unless
specifically endorsed hereon:
schools, airports, transit
authorities, hospitals, municipally
owned utilities, or housing
authorities;
(4)
All employees and all persons who
perform a service on a volunteer
basis for the Public Entity and
under its direction and control,
and any persons providing services
to the Public Entity under any
mutual aid or similar agreement.
(Bold in original; emphasis added.)
The trial court found that these provisions were
ambiguous and construed them against the drafter to include the
Planning Commission as an insured.
In so concluding, it did not
explain or elaborate as to its reasoning.
Deerfield counters by
arguing that the policy is not ambiguous and that only those
entities “operated by” and “under the jurisdiction of Warren
County” are entitled to coverage.
-12-
We disagree with Deerfield and
believe that the trial court was correct in its determination
that the policy is ambiguous and that the doctrine of reasonable
expectations is properly implicated.
The trial court’s interpretation of the insurance
policy is a question of law which we review de novo.
Ward, Ky.App., 997 S.W.2d 474 (1998).
Cinelli v.
The goal of any court in
interpreting a contract is to ascertain and to carry out the
original intentions of the parties (Wilcox v. Wilcox, Ky., 406
S.W.2d 152, 153 (1966)) and to interpret the terms employed in
light of the usage and understanding of the average person.
Fryman v. Pilot Life Insurance Co., Ky., 704 S.W.2d 205, 206
(1986).
We must heed two principles of construction in
interpreting insurance policies: (1) they must be “liberally
construed” as a whole and (2) exceptions and exclusions must be
“strictly construed to make insurance effective.”
Kentucky Farm
Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. v. McKinney, Ky., 831 S.W.2d 164, 166
(1992), citing Grimes v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.,
Ky.App., 705 S.W.2d 926, 931 (1986).
Contracts of insurance
which are ambiguous (i.e., susceptible of more than one
reasonable meaning) are subject to the application of the
doctrine of reasonable expectations and must be interpreted so as
to provide the insured entity with all coverage that it may
reasonably expect under the policy.
Simon v. Continental
Insurance Co., Ky., 724 S.W.2d 210, 212 (1986).
Although the County did not originally assert the
existence of any ambiguity before the trial court and instead
-13-
relied on an estoppel theory (taking no position when the issue
was presented by Van Meter), it now argues that “the sound
reasoning of the trial court should be left undisturbed and the
Planning Commission should be deemed an insured.”
The County
also argues that the phrase “operated by and under the
jurisdiction of” should be construed against Deerfield because it
was not defined in the policy.
Both Van Meter, which tendered
the amended judgment to the trial court, and Risk Management
argue that a reasonable interpretation of the term insured would
include the Planning Commission because the County appoints four
of its twelve board members and provides one-half of its
operating expenses.
From our review of the policy, we are
persuaded that it is ambiguous with respect to coverage for
boards and commissions for which the County is legally liable and
that the Planning Commission is an insured under a reasonable
interpretation of the policy.
The purpose of the public officials’ liability policy
obtained by the County is to provide it with a defense and/or
indemnification for the wrongful acts committed by its officials,
employees, and even volunteers which may cause it to incur
liability.
As set out in Section F.(3) above, the policy
specifically excludes certain types of public agencies from its
scope of coverage, including schools, airports, hospitals, etc.
There is no exception for boards or commissions — such as the
Planning Commission — which are jointly operated in conjunction
with another public entity.
Instead, all other commissions and
boards “operated by and under the jurisdiction” of the County and
-14-
“within apportionment of the total operating budget” of the
County are included within the definition of insured.
There is
no question that the Planning Commission comes within the
apportionment of the total operating budget of the county.
Thus,
the issue narrows down to whether the Commission is “controlled”
by the County as a matter of law.
Deerfield contends that the Commission is not
controlled by the County, or in the alternative, that there has
been no evidence introduced by the County to establish as a
matter of law that it controls the Planning Commission.
Relying
on admissions made by the County in the underlying litigation,
Deerfield correctly argues that the County does not have
“exclusive” control over the Commission — nor does it have
control over the day-to-day activities of the Commission.
Nevertheless, there is no question (as the County now argues)
that it has oversight over the Commission by virtue of its role
in approving the Commission’s budget, providing 50% of the
Commission’s financial needs, and in appointing one-third of the
Commission’s board members.
To recapitulate, the policy listed a series of agencies
for which coverage was not provided.
In naming boards and
commissions as insured entities, the policy failed to list any
exclusion or limitations as to sub-entities over which the County
did not purport to exercise direct supervision or control.
We
hold that the County’s degree of control over the Planning
Commission is sufficient to qualify the Commission as an insured
under a reasonable interpretation of the policy.
-15-
Therefore, we
believe the terms “operated by,” “under the direction and control
of” and “under the jurisdiction of” are ambiguous and subject to
the doctrine of reasonable expectations.
Thus, we hold that the
trial court did not err in concluding that the Planning
Commission had the status of an “insured” under the policy or
that the County had a reasonable expectation of coverage for the
wrongful employment acts of the employees of the Planning
Commission.
II.
We affirm as to this issue on appeal.
Agency/The Van Meter letters and estoppel as to Deerfield
Deerfield next argues that the trial court erred in its
initial judgment requiring it to indemnify the county because of
the contents of the Van Meter letters.
Deerfield contends that
Van Meter lacked either actual or apparent authority to bind it
as the insurer.
Regardless of Van Meter’s agency status,
Deerfield contends that an agent cannot create insurance coverage
where it does not otherwise exist.
In its cross-appeal, Van
Meter also argues that the trial court erred in concluding that
it was the Deerfield’s agent.
Our resolution of the first issue
as to coverage under the policy has rendered Deerfield’s
remaining agency issue and the cross-appeals moot.
We dismiss as
moot cross-appeal 2000-CA-002823 and cross-appeal 2000-CA-002864.
-16-
III.
The Punitive Damages Issue
Deerfield argues that even if it must indemnify the
county for its losses attributable to the discharge of Koch, it
is entitled to enforcement of the policy’s exclusions for
punitive damages and damages arising from defamation.
In
refusing to apply those exclusions, the trial court reasoned that
the policy was ambiguous:
[T]he subject policy excludes coverage for
punitive damage and defamation claims while
the accompanying endorsement to said policy
states that coverage will be provided for
loss occasioned by “wrongful employment
practices.” The term “wrongful employment
practices” is defined in part in the
endorsement to include claims for employment
retaliation. These two provisions--the
punitive and defamation exclusions and the
endorsement language covering claims for
wrongful employment practices--are
inconsistent and ambiguous such that the
doctrine of reasonable expectations is
triggered.
After reviewing the entire policy, including the
endorsement for wrongful employment practices, we disagree with
the trial court’s conclusion that there is any inconsistency or
ambiguity with respect to punitive damages.
At the hearing, the
trial court suggested there should be coverage because a
retaliatory discharge case just “screams punitive [damages].”
However, the policy exclusions are clear and unambiguous in
denying coverage for punitive damages and defamation.
We cannot
agree that the overall exclusions contradict or otherwise affect
the endorsement dealing with wrongful employment practices.
While a large portion of the $272,000 award was comprised of
punitive and defamation damages, Koch was awarded a substantial
-17-
sum in compensatory damages and lost wages for which the County
is entitled to reimbursement pursuant to our earlier holding in
this opinion affirming the existence of coverage.
We hold that
Deerfield is entitled to enforcement of the policy’s specific
exclusion of punitive damages from coverage.
See, Hodgin v.
Allstate Insurance Co., Ky.App., 935 S.W.2d 614 (1996).
Additionally, our holding necessitates that we vacate,
in part, the award of attorneys’ fees.
On remand, the insurer
will be responsible for indemnifying the County for any
attorneys’ fees which it incurred in defending the Commission in
the retaliation lawsuit.
However, that award should not include
fees incurred in the declaratory judgment litigation.
Absent a
contractual agreement to pay fees or a fee-shifting statute,
Kentucky requires each party to be responsible for his or her own
attorneys’ fees.
S.W.2d 136 (1991).
Nucor Corp. v. General Electric Co., Ky., 812
The County has not presented any contract
obligating Deerfield to pay attorneys’ fees in the event of the
insurer’s breach of coverage.
The summary judgment of the Warren Circuit Court is
affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the matter is remanded
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
We affirm
that portion of the judgment holding that the Planning Commission
was an insured and that the County had a reasonable expectation
of coverage; we reverse that portion of the judgment holding that
the exclusions for punitive damages and damages arising from
defamation are not enforceable; we also reverse the award of
-18-
attorney’s fees incurred in the declaratory judgment action.
We
dismiss as moot the cross-appeals of the County and Van Meter.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT/CROSSAPPELLEE DEERFIELD INSURANCE
COMPANY:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE/CROSSAPPELLANT VAN METER INSURANCE
AGENCY:
Howard E. Frasier, Jr.
Bowling Green, Kentucky
Scott A. Bachert
David W. Mushlin
Bowling Green, Kentucky
William P. Bila
Jennifer A. Gallagher
Hugh S. Balsam
Chicago, Illinois
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT VAN
METER INSURANCE AGENCY:
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE
DEERFIELD INSURANCE COMPANY:
Amanda A. Young
Bowling Green, Kentucky
Hugh Balsam
Chicago, Illinois
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE RISK MANAGEMENT
SERVICES:
Penny Travelsted
Bowling Green, Kentucky
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
WARREN COUNTY FISCAL COURT ex
rel CITY-COUNTY PLANNING
COMMISSION:
John David Cole
Matthew P. Cook
Bowling Green, Kentucky
-19-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.