WILLIAM JOSEPH THOMPSON v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
October 12, 2001; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-002614-MR
WILLIAM JOSEPH THOMPSON
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WASHINGTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DOUGHLAS M. GEORGE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CR-00080
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, MILLER, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
MILLER, JUDGE:
William Joseph Thompson brings this appeal from a
October 5, 2000, judgment of the Washington Circuit Court.
We
affirm.
On October 24, 1998, Thompson returned home from an all
night fishing and drinking expedition.
Thompson's live-in
girlfriend, Beverly Gaines, (Gaines) was waiting for him.
At
some point thereafter, it appears an altercation ensued.
Thompson testified he passed out after being struck by Gaines.
He ended up with a gash above one eye, scratches on his neck and
chest, bruised elbows, and a bite mark on his arm; Gaines ended
up dead.
Injuries to her body were consistent with a physical
struggle.
Thompson testified he called “911" after regaining
consciousness.
Thompson was indicted for Gaines' murder by the
Washington County grand jury November 5, 1998.
Statutes (KRS) 507.020.
Kentucky Revised
On September 1, 2000, Thompson was
convicted of second degree manslaughter, KRS 507.040, by a jury,
and sentenced to ten years in the penitentiary.
entered its final judgment on October 5, 2000.
The trial court
This appeal
followed.
Thompson's first assignment of error is that the
circuit court improperly allowed a “partially inaudible” tape
recording of his 911 call to be played to the jury.
It is well
established that it is within the discretion of the trial court
to determine whether partially inaudible tape recordings must be
excluded.
Sanborn v. Commonwealth, Ky., 754 S.W.2d 534 (1988).
The circuit court reviewed the tape and determined it would be
helpful to the jury.
As such, we perceive no abuse of discretion
in allowing a partially inaudible 911 tape to be played to the
jury.
Thompson next asserts the circuit court erred by
permitting jurors to view a transcript of the 911 call prepared
by the Commonwealth while listening to the tape recording.
support of his argument, Thompson cites Sanborn.
In
Thompson
maintains Sanborn held that presenting to the jury any transcript
prepared by the Commonwealth is per se prejudicial.
the defendant was tried for first degree murder.
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In Sanborn,
After his
arrest, he made a tape recorded statement to police and the
commonwealth attorney.
Parts of the tape were inaudible.
At
trial, the prosecutor was allowed to furnish the jury a written
transcript of the tape.
The defense objected to some twenty-five
specific errors in the transcript, but no changes were made
therein.
Instead, the questionable parts of the transcript were
“highlighted” by a yellow marker.
We understand Sanborn to hold
that the circuit court abused its discretion in permitting the
Commonwealth's highlighted version of the inaudible portions of
the tape to be presented to the jury.
In the case sub judice,
the following exchanges took place among defense attorney Mrs.
Whitaker, prosecutor Mr. Metcalf, and the court concerning the
911 tape and transcript:
MRS. WHITAKER: ...THERE ARE A COUPLE OF
THE PORTIONS OF THE TAPE JUDGE THAT ARE
INAUDIBLE. OKAY. THROUGH ONE WAY OR THE
OTHER. THERE'S A SIREN GOING OFF AT ONE
POINT BUT I DON'T THINK THAT REALLY TAKES UP
ANY OF THE WORDS THAT WERE SAID BUT THERE
ARE, I MEAN, THERE'S PORTIONS IN THE
TRANSCRIPT PROVIDED BY THE COMMONWEALTH THAT
DO SAY INAUDIBLE.
. . . .
THE COURT: I'LL PROBABLY LISTEN.
PARTS TO (SIC) YOU OBJECT TO?
WHAT
MRS. WHITAKER: THERE'S A COUPLE OF
PARTS IN THERE, I'D HAVE TO GET A COPY OF IT.
THE COURT: IF YOU'LL STATE, TELL US ON
THE TRANSCRIPT WHAT YOU OBJECT TO THEN I'LL,
BUT I'M MORE THAN LIKELY GOING TO ALLOW ALL
OF IT.
. . . .
MRS. WHITAKER: ...KNOWING THAT THE
COURT OVERRULED THAT . . . - - AND IS GOING
-3-
TO GIVE THE TRANSCRIPT, I DID REQUEST ONE
THING BE ADDED, SUBJECT TO THAT.
THE COURT: WHAT ARE YOU ASKING?
MR. METCALF: WE'RE (SIC) EDITED THAT.
THE COURT: ALRIGHT. ALRIGHT. GO AHEAD
AND PASS IT AMONG THE JURY AND SOON AS THE
TAPE IS OVER TAKE THEM UP.
. . . .
From the above, it appears that, in at least some
instances, the transcripts simply used the word “inaudible” for
indistinct portions of the tape.
It likewise appears Thompson
had some input into the drafting of the transcript.
Thus, we
cannot say the transcript was the “Commonwealth's version.”
As
such, we view Sanborn as inapplicable to the case at hand.
Thompson also cites Norton v. Commonwealth, Ky. App.,
890 S.W.2d 632 (1994).
Thompson maintains Norton holds a
transcript is improper if it is merely one party's interpretation
of the recording.
trafficking.
In Norton, the defendant was tried for drug
Part of the evidence was a tape made by an
undercover officer wearing a “wire.”
indistinct.
Portions of the tape were
The lower court allowed a transcript prepared by the
Commonwealth to be handed out to the jury while the tape was
being played.
finished.
The transcripts were taken up after the tape
Indistinct portions of the tape were noted in the
transcript as “inaudible.”
The defendant neither argued specific
inaccuracies nor offered an alternative transcript.
The Norton
Court thus held that Commonwealth prepared transcripts may be
permitted when no attempt is made to “provide the prosecutor's or
anyone else's version or interpretation of the inaudible or
-4-
indistinct portions.”
Id. at 637.
We thus interpret the Norton
Court as holding there is no universal prohibition on the use of
Commonwealth-prepared transcripts with tape recordings.
In the present case, Thompson does not cite us to
specific inaccuracies in the transcript.
It is clear from the
record that certain indistinct portions of the tape were marked
in the transcript as “inaudible” and Thompson had input into the
transcript.
No alternative transcript was offered Thompson.
As such, we find Norton to be applicable in this case.
The
indistinct portions of the tape were marked in the transcript as
“inaudible,” no specific inaccuracies were argued, nor was any
alternative transcript offered by the defense.
As such, we
perceive no abuse of discretion on the part of the circuit court
in allowing the jurors to view a transcript during a playing of
the 911 recording.
Thompson's next contention is that the circuit court
erred in denying Thompson's motion to strike a juror for cause.
Specifically, Thompson complains one of the jurors had been
represented by the assistant commonwealth attorney in a civil
matter.
In support of his contention, Thompson relies on Riddle
v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 864 S.W.2d 308 (1993).
Thompson
argues that this Court in Riddle held that prospective jurors who
had attorney/client relationships with commonwealth's attorneys
were per se biased as a result of the attorney/client
relationship.
Thompson believes this is particularly true when a
prospective juror evinces a willingness to again engage the
services of the commonwealth attorney in a legal matter.
-5-
We
disagree.
This Court in Riddle said specifically that a prior
attorney/client relationship does not disqualify prospective
jurors automatically.
Id. at 310.
In Riddle, there was
inadequate opportunity to develop bias in the prospective jurors.
In the instant case, the record shows Thompson's counsel
questioned this prospective juror more than once as to whether
the juror could be impartial.
answered affirmatively.
The prospective juror at all times
Additionally, the prospective juror
informed Thompson's counsel her representation by the
commonwealth attorney had taken place “years ago.”
“It is the
probability of bias or prejudice that is determinative in ruling
on a challenge for cause,” (citation omitted).
Pennington v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 316 S.W.2d 221, 224 (1958).
Based upon the
above facts, we believe Thompson's counsel had ample opportunity
to develop bias or prejudice.
As such, we are of the opinion the
circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Thompson's
motion to strike the potential juror for cause.
Thompson's next assignment of error is that the circuit
court allowed two lay witnesses to testify as to body fluid
evidence.
First, Thompson complains that an investigating officer
testified that, in his opinion, stains on Gaines' underwear and
sweat pants were urine.
Lay witness testimony in the form of
opinion is appropriate where the opinion is rationally based on
the witness' perception, and helpful to a clear understanding of
a fact in issue.
Ky. R. Evid. (KRE) 701; Crowe v. Commonwealth,
Ky. 38 S.W.3d 379 (2001).
The officer observed stains on Gaines'
-6-
clothing as it was being removed at autopsy.
stains were urine.
He opined the
This testimony presumably helped determine
Gaines' position at the time of her death.
We believe this
testimony to be rationally based on the officer's perceptions and
helpful in determining a fact in issue.
Moreover, Thompson does
not indicate how he was harmed by the testimony.
Thus, we
perceive no abuse of discretion by the circuit court in allowing
the testimony.
Second, Thompson complains another Springfield police
officer testified that blood spatter patterns at the scene were
indicative of a struggle.
Thompson acknowledges this assignment
of error was not properly preserved for review.
As such, he
urges us to review his contention as palpable error. Ky. R. Crim.
P. (RCr) 10.26.
KRE 103(e).
If a substantial possibility exists
that the outcome of a case would not have been different, the
error complained of will be held non-prejudicial.
Jackson v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 717 S.W.2d 511 (1986).
In the present case, there is evidence that Thompson
suffered a laceration to the head, a bite to the arm, and
scratches and bruises on his body.
There was evidence Gaines
suffered defensive wounds, in addition to her fatal strangulation
injury.
Thus, we believe there was ample evidence of a struggle
independent of the blood spatter testimony.
We do not believe
the outcome would have been different absent the officer's
testimony.
As such, we are of the opinion the testimony of the
officer to blood spatter evidence does not rise to the level of
palpable error under RCr 10.26.
-7-
Thompson maintains the circuit court committed
reversible error in allowing autopsy photographs taken by a
police officer to be entered into evidence.
While admitting the
photographs might have been error, we are not convinced such
offended a substantial right of Thompson. KRE 103(a).
We observe
that of the two photos in issue, one was later offered to help
determine whether injury to Gaines' mouth might have been caused
by paramedics.
We are bolstered in our opinion in that two other
photos taken at autopsy were entered through the coroner.
As no
substantial right of Thompson was affected, we believe the
circuit court did not commit reversible error in allowing the
photos to be entered as evidence.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
Washington Circuit court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Linda D. Roberts
Frankfort, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Frankfort, Kentucky
Anitria M. Franklin
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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