PATRICIA WHITELOW v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
November 2, 2001; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-001777-MR
PATRICIA WHITELOW
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE REBECCA M. OVERSTREET, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CR-00578
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
Judge.1
KNOPF AND SCHRODER, Judges; and MARY COREY, Special
KNOPF, JUDGE:
Patricia Whitelow appeals from a judgment of the
Fayette Circuit Court, entered June 27, 2000, convicting her of
first-degree possession of a controlled substance (cocaine).2
In
accord with the jury’s decision, the court sentenced Whitelow to
four years’ imprisonment.
Whitelow contends that she is entitled
to a new trial for any one of three reasons: (1) the jury’s
verdict cannot be reconciled with the evidence; (2) the trial
1
Senior Status Judge Mary Corey sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief
Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution.
2
KRS 218A.1415 (1998).
court erred by permitting a police detective to characterize the
building wherein Whitelow was arrested as a “crack house” and to
describe in general terms what occurs in such houses; and (3) the
Commonwealth’s Attorney attempted during voir dire to define the
phrase “reasonable doubt,” and the trial court erred by
overruling Whitelow’s objection.
This last allegation of error,
we are convinced, does entitle Whitelow to a new trial.
We are
constrained, therefore, to reverse and remand.
At about 4:30 or 5:00 o’clock on the morning of
December 15, 1999, in response to an informant’s tip, Andrea
Carter, a narcotics detective with the Lexington Fayette Urban
County Police Department, and several uniformed officers forcibly
entered the residence at 155 Rand Avenue in Lexington and
arrested a man they had long suspected of trafficking in large
quantities of illegal drugs.
In the course of the officers’
protective sweep of the other rooms of the residence, Officer
Todd Johnson came upon the appellant lying on a sofa.
According
to Johnson, Whitelow’s hands were extended toward a washcloth
that lay partially concealed between a cushion and the sofa’s
arm.
Johnson described Whitelow as starting when she heard him,
“like a kid caught with h[er] hand in a candy jar.”
Wrapped in
the washcloth were two small pipes allegedly like those often
used for smoking crack cocaine.
Johnson arrested Whitelow, and
she was duly indicted on the charge of possession of drug
paraphernalia.3
When laboratory analysis of the pipes revealed
the presence of cocaine residue, the grand jury reindicted
3
KRS 218A.500 (1992).
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Whitelow for possession not only of the alleged paraphernalia but
also of the alleged controlled substance.
end of May 2000.
She stood trial at the
The jury acquitted her of the paraphernalia
charge, but found her guilty of having possessed cocaine.
It is
from that verdict, upheld by the court, that Whitelow has
appealed.
During his voir dire of the jury panel, the
Commonwealth’s Attorney said,
We can’t define “beyond a reasonable doubt”
for you, but does everyone agree that there
are usually going to be facts in dispute?
That’s why there is a case. The fact that
you have some dispute or facts that are
contested, that doesn’t mean that you
automatically have reasonable doubt. Can
everyone agree with that?
Whitelow promptly objected on the ground that the
prosecutor had violated the rule, well established at the time of
Whitelow’s trial, forbidding either court or counsel from trying
to explain or define the phrase “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
trial court overruled the objection.
The
Whitelow contends that the
prosecutor’s violation was patent and that it entitles her to a
new trial.
We agree.
RCr 9.56 prescribes the manner in which the
Commonwealth’s burden of proof shall be stated to the jury and
provides expressly that “[t]he instructions should not attempt to
define the term ‘reasonable doubt.’”
In Commonwealth v.
Callahan,4 our Supreme Court, noting that counsels’ tactical
commentaries on the meaning of “reasonable doubt” required far
4
Commonwealth v. Callahan, Ky., 675 S.W.2d 391 (1984).
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more judicial resources to police and review than they were
worth, construed RCr 9.56 as eliminating all such commentary from
criminal trials.
“Prospectively,” held the court, “trial courts
shall prohibit counsel from any definition of ‘reasonable doubt’
at any point in the trial.”5
Four years later, in Simpson v.
Commonwealth,6 the court reaffirmed this rule.
Although deciding
that the prosecutor’s request of the jury in that case not to
hold the Commonwealth to a standard of proof “higher than ‘beyond
a reasonable doubt’” did not amount to a violation, the court
pointedly observed that
[i]n Commonwealth v. Callahan, , , , we
denounced the practice of defining or
attempting to define reasonable doubt. We
followed the Callahan rule in Commonwealth v.
Goforth, Ky., 692 S.W.2d 803 (1985), and in
our recent decision, Marsch v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 743 S.W.2d 830 (1988). In all of those
cases, some attempt was made to use other
words to convey to the jury the meaning of
“beyond a reasonable doubt.” In this case,
there was no such effort.
By this we intend no retreat from our
previous decisions on this issue. Counsel
should be mindful that upon occurrence of a
bona fide violation of the Callahan rule, a
reversal will result.7
We are confronted here with what inescapably is a
violation of the Callahan rule, an attempt to convey to the jury,
in counsel’s words, what “reasonable doubt” is or is not.
Callahan, therefore, and Simpson, a reversal must result.
5
Id. at 393 (emphasis in original).
6
Simpson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 759 S.W.2d 224 (1988).
7
Id. at 226.
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Under
This is not to say that the trial court could never
remedy a Callahan violation by admonishing the jury.
As there
was no admonition in this case, that question is not before us.
It is to say, however, contrary to the Commonwealth’s urging,
that we may not excuse the violation as a harmless error.
Not
only would such an excuse run counter to the Supreme Court’s
stark warning in Simpson, but it would also tend to defeat what
we understand to be the purpose of RCr 9.56 and Callahan.
That
purpose is to stop counsel from sparring over how to express the
Commonwealth’s burden of proof, and to spare judges from having
to decide when such sparring has crossed the line from the merely
useless to the potentially misleading.
To give Callahan
violations the benefit of harmless-error analysis would serve
only to move the sparring to a different arena; it would not stop
the sparring or spare anyone the futile effort.
Having decided that Whitelow is entitled to relief
because of the prosecutor’s Callahan violation, we need address
her other contentions only to the extent that they may bear on a
new trial.
Her next contention does not do so at all.
maintains that the jury’s verdict was inconsistent.
Whitelow
How, she
wonders, could a reasonable jury have concluded that she
possessed cocaine residue, but did not possess the paraphernalia
on which the residue was found?
Was the jury’s verdict flawed,
and, if so, was the court’s response improper?
Because Whitelow
cannot be retried on the paraphernalia charge, of which she was
acquitted, there is no chance that the alleged inconsistency will
recur.
We are thus not called upon to address these questions.
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It does behoove us, however, to address briefly
Whitelow’s remaining contention, which concerns the scope of
Detective Carter’s testimony.
Over Whitelow’s objection,
Detective Carter was permitted to testify that she had visited
the Rand Avenue residence on numerous occasions, that she was
familiar with its owners, and that it functioned as a crack
house.
She testified that, in general, a crack house, among
other things, is a place where people go to smoke crack cocaine.
She also described how a cocaine smoker might typically proceed.
Whitelow contends that none of this testimony was relevant, or
that, if relevant, it was nonetheless inadmissible under KRE 403
because its relevance was outweighed by its tendency unfairly to
associate her with the criminal acts of others.
This court
reviews evidentiary rulings under an abuse-of-discretion
standard,8 and we are not persuaded that the trial court abused
its discretion in this instance.
The weakness of Whitelow’s argument appears in her
assertion that
the Commonwealth could not and did not offer
a single shred of proof that Whitelow had any
contact with or knowledge of the criminal
activity the Detective alleged occurred at
the residence.
If this were an accurate characterization of the Commonwealth’s
case, then the relevance of Detective Carter’s testimony might
justly be questioned.
Contrary to Whitelow’s assertion, however,
Officer Johnson, who testified that he came upon Whitelow with
her hands just inches away from a washrag wrapped around two
8
Barnett v. Commonwealth, Ky., 979 S.W.2d 98 (1998).
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crack pipes, provided far more than a shred of proof that
Whitelow was involved in the very sort of criminal activity that
had led to Detective Carter’s familiarity with the Rand Avenue
residence.
The detective’s testimony was plainly relevant to the
issue of Whitelow’s knowing possession of the cocaine residue,
and, in conjunction with Officer Johnson’s testimony, it was not
unfairly prejudicial.
Should there be a retrial, therefore,
Detective Carter’s testimony is not to be excluded for any reason
Whitelow has thus far put forth.
In sum, we understand our Supreme Court to have
declared a policy of no tolerance for counsel’s telling the jury
what “reasonable doubt” does or does not mean.
The benefits of
such biased explanations are minimal, at best, and are out of all
proportion to the large risk that they will confuse the jury and
the significant costs that stem from having to respond to them or
to review them.
The Commonwealth’s disregard of that policy in
this case requires that the June 27, 2000, judgment of the
Fayette Circuit Court be reversed and the matter remanded for a
new trial.
If the evidence is substantially the same on retrial
as it was originally, the trial court will again admit the
testimony of Detective Carter concerning her experience with
cocaine users in general and with cocaine use at 155 Rand Avenue
in particular.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Matthew W. Boyd
Lexington, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Matthew Nelson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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