CURTIS ELDRIDGE, AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF SANDRA L. ELDRIDGE; AND BARBARA JEAN ELDRIDGE, AS NEXT FRIEND AND LIMITED GUARDIAN OF APRIL DANIELLE SMITH, AN INFANT v. GEORGE E. MILLER, M.D.
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RENDERED: July 13, 2001; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-001331-MR
CURTIS ELDRIDGE, AS ADMINISTRATOR
OF THE ESTATE OF SANDRA L. ELDRIDGE;
AND BARBARA JEAN ELDRIDGE, AS NEXT
FRIEND AND LIMITED GUARDIAN OF
APRIL DANIELLE SMITH, AN INFANT
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DOUGLAS M. STEPHENS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-01120
GEORGE E. MILLER, M.D.
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE, EMBERTON, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of
Dr. George A. Miller in a medical malpractice case.
Having
determined that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony
of an expert witness, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
In 1990, Sandy Eldridge's left iliac artery was injured
during disc surgery performed by another physician.
Dr. Miller
was called in to repair the injury with a graft, after which
Sandy did not have any further significant problems with the
artery until 1997.
On May 12, 1997, Sandy returned to Dr.
Miller, who evaluated her symptoms and advised her that he
believed her left iliac artery had occluded, and that she would
require a diagnostic angiography with possible angioplasty and
stent.
Dr. Miller further advised her that if stent placement
was not feasible, a bypass might be necessary.
On June 4, 1997, Dr. Miller performed the diagnostic
angiography.
In performing this procedure, Dr. Miller passed a
guidewire through Sandy's left femoral artery and through the
occluded segment of the left iliac artery.
A angiographic
catheter was then passed over, and exchanged for, the guidewire.
Dr. Miller then performed the diagnostic angiogram by hand
injecting dye through the catheter three times.
After the
angiography was completed, Dr. Miller performed a right iliac to
left femoral bypass procedure, which was completed at
approximately 4:30 p.m.
At approximately 8:00 p.m., the nurses
noted that Sandy was unresponsive.
An MRI revealed a large
pontine infarction (death of tissue in the brain) with occlusion
of the basilar artery.
In light of a hopeless prognosis, the
decision was made to discontinue life support and Sandy passed
away on June 6, 1997.
On June 10, 1998, appellants filed a medical
malpractice action against Dr. Miller and others.
The opinion of
appellant's expert, Dr. Clay Skinner, a vascular surgeon, was
that the occlusion in Sandy’s basilar artery was caused by Dr.
Miller's negligence in performing the angiography.
Specifically,
Dr. Skinner opined that Dr. Miller's punching through the clot in
Sandy's left iliac artery with the guidewire caused the clot to
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break up.
Dr. Skinner further opined that when Dr. Miller passed
the catheter through the clot, the hollow catheter tip filled up
with matter from the clot, and when Dr. Miller forcefully
injected the contrast material through the catheter, a shower of
emboli was propelled retrograde in Sandy's bloodstream.
The
emboli then traveled from the distal aorta to her left subclavian
artery, a distance of about ten inches, after which emboli
traveled to her basilar artery, causing the occlusion in her
brain which resulted in her death.
Among the expert witnesses retained by Dr. Miller to
rebut the testimony of Dr. Skinner was Bruce Taylor, Ph.D.
Taylor is not a physician, but a biomedical engineer who
specializes in the field of blood flow.
Taylor developed
computer models based on principles of physics to predict
mathematically the distance emboli could have traveled retrograde
in Sandy’s bloodstream under the circumstances of the
angiography.
Taylor then constructed physical models (referred
to as the “benchtop models”) to validate the computer models, and
which he planned to use to demonstrate his theories to the jury.
The benchtop models consisted of various setups of plastic tubing
and water.
Based on his computer models, Taylor calculated that
under the circumstances of the angiogram, emboli could not have
traveled against the blood flow more than one or two centimeters,
with approximately two inches as an absolute maximum.
Thus,
Taylor concluded that Dr. Skinner's theory that emboli traveled
approximately ten to twelve inches from the aortic bifurcation to
the subclavian artery, was impossible.
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After receiving Taylor's report, on September 1, 1999,
appellants filed a motion in limine to preclude Taylor from
testifying unless a hearing pursuant to Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed.
2d 469 (1993) was first held.
The court ruled that appellants
were to proceed with taking Taylor's deposition and elicit all
testimony necessary for a Daubert hearing at that time.
was deposed on January 27, 2000.
Taylor
On February 24, 2000,
appellants moved the court to preclude Taylor from testifying, on
grounds that his proffered testimony could not properly be
applied to the facts at issue in the case.
A Daubert hearing was
held on March 8, 2000, and, in an order entered March 23, 2000,
the court ruled that Taylor could testify, but would not be
permitted to present his benchtop models to the jury.
A jury
trial commenced on March 22, 2000, with the jury finding in favor
of Dr. Miller.
The court entered its order and judgment on
April 24, 2000 in accordance with the jury's verdict.
This
appeal followed.
On appeal, appellants argue that the trial court erred
in permitting Taylor to testify as an expert witness for Dr.
Miller, as his testimony did not meet the admissibility
requirements of Daubert.
Appellants contend that Taylor's
testimony did not meet the "fit" requirement of Daubert, as his
abstract and theoretical methodology could not be applied to the
complex circumstances of Sandy Eldridge's operation.
Further,
appellants contend that Taylor's testimony was unreliable, as his
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conclusions were based on the simple benchtop experiments which
were excluded as unreliable by the trial court.
KRE 702 states:
If scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise.
In Mitchell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 908 S.W.2d 100 (1995),
overruled on other grounds, Fugate v. Commonwealth, Ky., 993
S.W.2d 931 (1999), the Kentucky Supreme Court adopted the
standard of review set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed.
2d 469 (1993) regarding the admissibility of expert scientific
testimony.
The Court held that “[w]hen ‘[f]aced with a proffer
of expert, scientific testimony,’ the trial judge must determine
at [a preliminary hearing] ‘whether the expert is proposing to
testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the
trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue.’"
Mitchell, 908 S.W.2d at 101, quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592,
113 S. Ct. at 2796.
In order to meet the above standard, such
expert testimony must be both relevant and reliable.
Goodyear
Tire and Rubber Co. v. Thompson, Ky., 11 S.W.3d 575, 578 (2000).
“The consideration of relevance has been described as
one of ‘fit’”, which depends on whether the reasoning or
methodology will assist the trier of fact.
U.S. at 591, 113 S. Ct. at 2796.
Id.; Daubert, 509
“The consideration of
reliability entails an assessment into the validity of the
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reasoning and the methodology upon which the expert testimony is
based.”
Goodyear, 11 S.W.3d at 578.
Factors to be considered by the trial court in
determining reliability include (1) whether the theory or
technique can be tested and has been tested; (2) whether the
theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and
publication; (3) whether, with respect to a particular technique,
there is a high known or potential rate of error; and (4) whether
the theory or technique has general acceptance in the relevant
community.
Id. at 578-579, citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-594,
113 S. Ct. at 2796-97;
Mitchell, 908 S.W.2d at 102.
In Goodyear
Tire and Rubber Company v. Thompson, Ky., 11 S.W.3d 575 (2000),
the Kentucky Supreme Court, adopting the reasoning of the United
States Supreme Court in Kumho Tire Company v. Carmichael, 526
U.S. 137, 119 S. Ct. 1167, 143 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1999), held that
Daubert and Mitchell apply not only to testimony based on
"scientific" knowledge, but also to testimony based on
"technical" and "other specialized knowledge" as well, and hence
the trial judge may consider the Daubert factors in performing
its “gatekeeping” role in screening expert testimony based on
“technical” or “other specialized knowledge.”
Taylor’s report indicates that his conclusions as to
specifically how far emboli could have traveled retrograde are
based on the results of his computer models and benchtop
experiments.
The trial court excluded the benchtop models, but
made no express findings in its order.
The record does not
contain the Daubert hearing nor Taylor's January 27, 1999
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deposition testimony, but does include Taylor's report and trial
testimony.
With regard to the “fit” requirement of Daubert,
Taylor’s report indicates that his methodology did not take into
account the complexities of the human circulatory system, nor
account for circumstances which occurred or may have occurred
during Sandy Eldridge’s surgery.
With regard to reliability, we
believe Taylor’s methodology fails to satisfy any of the four
Daubert factors.
Taylor’s methodology, as applied to calculating
retrograde emboli travel distance in the circulatory system, has
never been tested in a human being.
Taylor was not aware of any
studies or literature discussing the possibility or impossibility
of retrograde embolization, and had not previously performed such
a study himself, hence there has been no opportunity for peer
review of his methodology.
The third factor is difficult to
apply, as Taylor’s methods are not an accepted “technique” (the
record indicates no such technique exists) for calculating
maximum retrograde travel of an embolus in the circulatory
system.
Although we do not dispute Taylor’s concepts in the
abstract, it is clear that significant potential for error exists
in Taylor’s methodology as applied to the facts of this case.
For example, Taylor’s computations required him to make
assumptions and approximations for unknown values including size,
composition, and initial velocity of the embolus, Sandy's blood
velocity, and velocity of contrast dye leaving the catheter.
We
acknowledge that Taylor did attempt to model situations which
would allow for maximum migration of a particle.
However, it is
unclear, particularly in light of the fact that his methodology
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is untested, what cumulative effect the use of assumed and
estimated values, combined with disregard of the complexities of
the human circulatory system and conditions specific to Sandy and
the procedures performed upon her, would have on the accuracy of
Taylor’s mathematical and experimental predictions.
With regard
to the fourth factor, from his trial testimony it appears no such
technique or studies exist for calculating retrograde emboli
travel distance, and hence there is no “general acceptance” in
the community.
A trial court's ruling on the admission of expert
testimony is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.
Goodyear, 11 S.W.3d at 577-578.
Having concluded that Taylor’s
methodology in its entirety failed to satisfy either the fit or
reliability requirements of Daubert, we believe the trial court
abused its discretion in admitting Taylor’s testimony.
next determine whether such error was harmful.
We must
CR 61.01.
In his trial testimony (presented by way of videotape
deposition), Taylor repeatedly asserted that, based on the
physical principles of blood flow, Dr. Skinner's theory that
emboli traveled ten inches against the blood flow was impossible
and preposterous.
Taylor opined that under the circumstances,
the maximum distance a particle shot out of the catheter could
travel retrograde, or be propelled retrograde by the injection of
the contrast media, in the blood stream would be approximately
one or two centimeters, and about two inches at the absolute
maximum.
came from.
Taylor offered no explanation of where these figures
However, our review of the record indicates these
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figures came from Taylor’s report utilizing the methodology we
concluded inadmissible per Daubert.
As a central issue in this
case was whether emboli could travel the approximately ten-inch
distance from the aortic bifurcation to the aortic arch (from
where they could have traveled to the subclavian artery and
subsequently lodged in the basilar artery), we cannot say that
the admission of Taylor’s testimony was harmless error.
For the aforementioned reasons, the judgment of the
Kenton Circuit Court is reversed and the case remanded for a new
trial.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
William J. Gallion
Elizabeth R. Overton
Lexington, Kentucky
Gayle Arnold
David Calderhead
Cincinnati, Ohio
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANTS:
Lynn K. Rikhoff
Lexington, Kentucky
Elizabeth R. Overton
Lexington, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE:
Lynn K. Rikhoff
Lexington, Kentucky
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